" Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it. "
Former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammerskold
“The supreme excellence is not to win a hundred victories in a hundred
battles. The supreme excellence is to subdue the armies of your enemies
without even having to fight them.”
Sun Tzu
Today's world, with changing patterns of conflict and threats to U.S. interests, presents new political and military challenges. It also presents extraordinary opportunities. The existence of instability and potential threats require a strong military capability sufficiently versatile to execute national military strategy across the full range of operations—to include war and operations other than war (OOTW).
In the wake of the Cold War, attention has focused on a rising number of territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars that pose threats to regional and international peace and are often accompanied by manmade disasters which precipitate massive human suffering, e.g., Bosnia. Responses to these situations require multidimensional operations composed of components such as political/diplomatic, military, humanitarian assistance, civil reconstruction, and economic development. “Complex contingency operations,” as they are referred to in the context of Presidential Decision Directive-56, are operations that respond to such complex emergencies.
Complex emergencies are both war and operations other than war. Conditions of combat, and all that goes with it, indeed occur during most peace operations. But when they occur, they take place in a political and operational environment quite different from that of most operations of the past. There is no “enemy,” except starvation, waves of refugees, economic degradation, or the conflict itself that peacekeepers have come to stop. The “belligerents” are hard to identify. Victory (or in military parlance “end state”) is less clear and even less emotionally satisfying than in combat. Numerous civilian, military, and other international actors crowd the “battlefield.” The public, while supportive at the outset, may be sensitive about causalities. The media—and society's—attention may wander. Most important, peace operations take place in a fishbowl of journalistic and public scrutiny. The effects of TV and global communications on the management of such complex contingency operations in the 21st century will extend far beyond the relationships of TV news and the military. The “CNN effect” provides the clearest signs of the implications of global TV for national policy making and military operations.
Military involvement in complex contingency operations by itself cannot, however, resolve the underlying causes of complex emergencies. It can help reduce the symptoms (such as hunger and chaos) and it can buy time for other policy tools (such as diplomacy and economic support) to help resolve these issues. Bosnia is a case in point. The Implementation Force (IFOR) was a military success but politically the Dayton Agreement was a failure for this same time period. The reason for this was largely because the political effort and the military deployment were carefully separated on the ground.
Recent experience also suggests that too often the focus of the military intervention has been on short-term objectives rather than long-term political goals of conflict resolution and return to normalcy. The participants (adversaries, political, military, civil, non-governmental and international organizations) must view the crisis “as a problem to be solved and not as a contest to be won.” [8] Military planners need to be able to better understand the interactions between their activities, humanitarian assistance, civil reconstruction, economic recovery, and future requirements in order to improve their chances of “getting it right” [9] when they must intervene. In other words, if the military wants to help win the peace, they must prepare for peace. This was a situation faced by PSYOP forces in Bosnia. The IFOR Multinational Division Information Campaign interests were focused on short-term objectives and they wanted tactical PSYOP support to help address these objectives. The IFOR Information Campaign was, however, centrally controlled out of the IFOR headquarters and led by the Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force (CJIICTF). The CJIICTF had to worry about the long-term goals that often conflicted with the Division's tactically oriented objectives.
The global information age has also added a new dimension to the equation of military challenges of the future. Advanced information technologies and global information networks have fundamentally changed the way the military conducts its business. The often sought after ability to leverage the temporary advantage that comes from an information advantage is now available to the military commanders. Information dominance (the degree of information superiority and knowledge advantage over an adversary while denying those capabilities to him) has come of age and was largely achieved by the U.S. forces in Bosnia.
The emerging U.S doctrine for Information Operations applies across all phases and range of military operations. Information Operations comprise a strategy that integrates various capabilities to achieve national or military objectives. As an integrating strategy, it focuses on the vulnerabilities and opportunities presented by the increasing dependence of the U.S. and its adversaries on information and information systems. It may, in fact, have its greatest impact as a deterrent in peace and during the initial stages of crisis.
The information age has also introduced significant information and information systems vulnerabilities. Protection of our ability to conduct Information Operations will be one of the biggest challenges ahead for the military and the U.S. government in general. The national security posture of the U.S. has become increasingly dependent on its information infrastructure and these infrastructures are vulnerable to tampering and exploitation. The “information revolution” presents new operational and technological challenges to achieve “victory through information dominance” and to ensure the future security of not only the infrastructure (both at home and deployed) but the nation as well. Protecting the information environment requires a sound approach to managing risk, including the change in the value of information from one phase of a military operation to the next.
The political will of the UN, NATO, the U.S. and other nations to "win the hearts and minds" of potential adversaries has been challenged by the Bosnia crisis. Adapting the go-to-war capabilities of the military to accommodate the needs of a major coalition peace operation has also been a challenge for NATO and the nations that participated in operation Joint Endeavor. An attempt has been made herein to pull together a coherent story of Coalition Information Operations in Bosnia with particular emphasis on the IFOR experience. The story is based on the insights derived from the author's visits to Bosnia, interviews with those who have been there and those who have supported them, and lessons learned reports emerging from the IFOR phase of the operation.
Although Joint Doctrine for Information Operations is evolving for the U.S. military, it is essentially non-existent for the UN, NATO and the other member nations, especially for peace operations. Hopefully, the insights and lessons learned provided herein will serve to educate and stimulate interest on the part of the international community to become proactive and provide the leadership and resources necessary to construct an internationally-based framework for developing a Coalition Information Operations capability to support future complex emergencies.
Peace Operations is a new and comprehensive term that covers a wide range of activities. Peace operations create and sustain the conditions necessary for peace to flourish. They comprise three types of activities: support to diplomacy (peacemaking, peace building, and preventative diplomacy), peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The related activities include traditional peacekeeping as well peace enforcement, i.e., humanitarian assistance, establishment of order and stability, enforcement of sanctions, guarantee and denial of movement, establishment of protection zones, and forcible separation of belligerents.
Peace operations are not new to the US military, what is new about them is the number, pace, scope, and complexity of recent operations. Although the primary mission of the armed forces of the U.S. is to fight and win the nation's wars, any daily newspaper or evening news program shows that U.S. forces are often called upon now days to support a variety of operations spanning the conflict spectrum. Examples abound peacekeeping in Bosnia and Haiti; counter-drug operations in the Caribbean and Latin America; fighting forest fires in the Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountains; filling sandbags on the Mississippi and the list goes on. Although there are tactical similarities, many of these operations include tasks that apparently have little or nothing to do with warfighting. This is the environment that is called OOTW and one the military is likely to face for some time to come.
Peace operations often take place in environments less well defined than in war. The identity of belligerents may be uncertain and the relationship between a specific operation and the campaign plan may be more difficult to define. Forces may not encounter large, professional armies or even organized groups responding to a chain of command. Instead, they may have to deal with loosely organized groups of irregulars, terrorists, or other conflicting segments of a population as predominant forces. These elements will attempt to capitalize on perceptions of disenfranchisement or disaffection within the population. Criminal syndicates may also be involved. The close link desired by such elements and the civilian population at large means that traditional elements of combat power, such as massive firepower, may not apply to peace operations. The nonviolent application of military capabilities such as Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and psychological operations (PSYOP) may be more important. Hence, the political and cultural dimensions of the battlefield become more critical to the conflict. Settlement, not victory, is the ultimate measure of success, though settlement is rarely achievable through military efforts alone. The military actions must compliment diplomatic, economic, civil, informational, and humanitarian efforts in pursuing the overarching political objectives.
Because peace operations are usually conducted in the full glare of worldwide media attention, the strategic context of a peace operation must be communicated and understood by all involved in the operation. Soldiers must understand that they can encounter situations where the decisions they make at the tactical level have immediate strategic and political implications. On the other hand, many forget that not every tactical success or mistake will have strategic or political implications—the “President Johnson picking bombing targets syndrome.” In addition to the overall strategic and political context of the operation, soldiers should be aware of the area's history, economy, culture, and any other significant factors. Failure to fully understand the mission and operational environment can quickly lead to incidents and misunderstandings that will reduce legitimacy and consent and result in actions that are inconsistent with the overall political objective.
Today's information environment is becoming increasingly complex and developments in information technology are revolutionizing how nations and their militaries, organizations, and people interact. The global information environment links organizations and individuals around the world. The merging of civilian and military information networks, databases, and technologies put vast amounts of information at the user's fingertips. The advanced information systems and capabilities are enabling the military to achieve an operational advantage while denying those capabilities to the adversary—information dominance. Achieving a knowledge advantage requires a highly developed sense of information requirements and an ability to manage the collection, processing, use, and dissemination of that information to the right place, at the right time, for the right purpose. The military information environment consists of both friendly and adversary military and non-military elements. It also includes organizations that support, enable or significantly influence a military operation.
Taking advantage of the power of information technology and integrating all aspects of information to achieve the full potential for enhancing military operations is referred to as Information Operations (IO). IO involves actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems. Successful IO achieves information dominance and provides the commander with an information advantage over the adversaries that allow him to make more timely decisions. It also allows the commander to perform the basic combat functions (move, strike, and protect) nearly simultaneously with minimum degradation of combat effectiveness.
Conducting IO requires the close, continuous integration of offensive and defensive capabilities and activities, as well as effective design, integration, and interaction of C2 with intelligence support. Major offensive IO capabilities include, but are not limited to, C2 warfare (C2W) elements, such as, Operations Security (OPSEC), PSYOP, military deception, Electronic Warfare (EW), physical destruction, and computer network attack (CNA). Defensive IO capabilities include, physical security, counter-deception, counter-PSYOP (also called counter-propaganda), counterintelligence, electronic protection, and special information operations. IO-related activities include information assurance (IA), public affairs (PA) and civil affairs (CA). IA protects and defends information and information systems by ensuring their availability, integrity, identification and authentication, confidentiality, and non-repudiation. It also includes providing for the restoration of information systems by incorporating protection, detection, and reaction capabilities. PA communicates accurate, balanced and credible information to critical leaders and the public. Although PA will argue that “shaping the public perceptions” is a PSYOP function, their information does contribute to shaping opinion either directly (through their press conferences) or indirectly (through media reporting of their statements). CA establishes relations among military forces, the public and civil authorities to exchange information, build understanding and gain information that may be critical to decision making.
Under the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 1031, of 15 December 1995, NATO was responsible for the implementation of the military aspects of the Bosnia Peace Agreement, signed by all Parties to the conflict. There were also civilian aspects of the Peace Agreement, which were the responsibilities of other international and non-governmental organizations. One of the goals of the military mission, however, was to create secure conditions for others to carry out non-military tasks associated with the Peace Agreement.
In accordance with the Peace Agreement, IFOR had the following primary military tasks:
IFOR had a unified command and was NATO-led, under the political direction and control of the Alliance's North Atlantic Council, as stipulated by the Peace Agreement. Overall military authority was in the hands of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), General George Joulwan. General Joulwan designated Admiral Leighton Smith (NATO's Commander in Chief Southern Command) as the first Commander in theater of IFOR (COMIFOR). With the retirement of Admiral Smith in July 1996, Admiral Joseph Lopez was appointed as CINCSOUTH and also replaced Admiral Smith as COMIFOR. For the duration of the IFOR operation, the COMIFOR headquarters was split-based between Sarajevo and Naples.
The IFOR operated under Chapter VII of the UN Charter (peace enforcement). Its rules of engagement provided for the robust use of force, if necessary, to accomplish its mission and to protect itself. If force needed to be used to ensure compliance with the terms of the Peace Agreement, IFOR would observe the international legal principles of proportionality, minimum use of force and the requirement to minimize the potential for collateral damage.
The IFOR consisted of elements sent to the theater by participating nations and of elements of UN Peace Forces already in place and had been transferred to NATO command and control. Every NATO nation with armed forces committed troops to the operation. Iceland, the only NATO country without armed forces, provided medical support. But IFOR was more than just a NATO operation. In addition to troop contributions from NATO nations, a significant number of other nations were participating in the IFOR. Non-NATO participating nations included Albania, Austria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Russia, Sweden and Ukraine - all of which are Partners for Peace countries - plus, Egypt, Jordan, Malaysia and Morocco.
The first ever “Out of Area” operation for NATO was a military success but there were a number of key issues that IFOR had to address early on to establish the framework and initial conditions for success. Some of the more important ones follow.
First, the Dayton Accord did not designate a single authority to synchronize the military, political, economic, and humanitarian aspects of the mission. This lack of unified political direction for the overall peace implementation process was a risk to the success of IFOR. The General Framework Agreement established three structures for implementation; an Implementation Force for the military aspects, a High Representative to coordinate civil tasks, and Donors Conferences to stimulate reconstruction. The High Representative was not a UN Special Representative with UN authority. His political guidance came from a Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council, which was not an internationally recognized political organization. Given the UN's reluctance to take the lead, there was no internationally recognized political organization providing overall political direction. Consequently, the three structures remained virtually autonomous, operating within a loose framework of cooperation, without a formal structure for developing unified policy. The absence of a standing political organization with which the North Atlantic Council could coordinate policy exacerbated the inherent difficulties of synchronizing the civil-military implementation of the peace process at the strategic level and NATO's role in implementing the Peace Agreement. And this…said the late Joe Kruzel…was the direction NATO must head if it is to be a useful organization. [11] Ad hoc arrangements were initially employed to facilitate the civil-military collaboration and cooperation and more formal arrangements were employed later through participation in the Office of the High Representative-established Joint Civil Commission (JCC). At the outset, IFOR established a Joint Military Commission (JMC) as the central body for commanders of the military factions and IFOR to coordinate and resolve problems.
Second, NATO's ability to influence events during the early preparation for IFOR deployment helped to avoid problems encountered by UNPROFOR and ensured a clearer definition of military tasks under a unified chain of command. This was largely attributable to the close involvement of NATO military planners with Contact Group negotiators prior to and during Dayton to ensure that realistic security tasks were incorporated. Consequently, the language hammered into the General Framework Agreement made it clear that IFOR “will operate under the authority of and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command.” UNSC Resolution 1031 provided NATO with the mandate and the necessary political authority to direct NATO and non-NATO forces under IFOR. However, NATO's robust military terms of reference highlight the paucity of authority for the civil activities of the High Representative—an early weak link in the implementation of the Dayton Accords. A related factor was the military's determination (read: obsession) to stay clear of “mission creep.” Use of the military to support actions such as “nation building,” assurance of refugee return, and capturing “war criminals” was strongly resisted by them. The “police actions” were left for the UN International Police Task Force that was also a weak link—they possessed neither the mandate nor the resources to preserve public order independently. In any future operation that depends on the success of both military and civil tasks, NATO will want to ensure that its civil counterparts also enjoy a commensurate amount of authority to fulfill their responsibilities.
Third, civil-military activities in support of peace operations were new for NATO. There was no common understanding by commanders and staff at all levels of IFOR of the capabilities, roles, and mission of CA units (referred to by NATO as Civil-Military Cooperation) and personnel. Furthermore, the civil-military aspects did not receive sufficient attention during the military planning and initial execution phase of the operation due to the heavy emphasis on the peace enforcement aspects of the Dayton Accord and emphasis on Force Protection. Civil-Military activities prior to IFOR were very narrowly conceived by NATO and were generally regarded as “rear area” activities associated with host-nation logistic support and alleviating refugee interference with military operations. This combat-oriented doctrine had little relevance in the Bosnia context. The essence of the IFOR mission was to maintain a safe and secure environment so that reconciliation and reconstruction could take place. Since mission accomplishment depended upon effective civil-military cooperation (CIMIC), such cooperation and the CIMIC organizational element, in particular, became a vital “front line” asset.
Fourth, although PSYOP is an official NATO term, some North Atlantic Council members did not want to be associated with a PSYOP campaign for IFOR. PSYOP has a public relations problem. There are misperceptions of the relationship between PSYOP and intelligence. An even bigger misperception surrounds the relationship between PSYOP and Public Affairs. Even to this day, Public Affairs try to keep its distance from PSYOP. Many organizations and individuals—from the UN to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) to journalists unfamiliar with the military—hear the term and the image of “The Manchurian Candidate” comes to mind. [12] More importantly for the Europeans, the image of Joseph Goebbles comes to mind. In addition, some of the major partners in the coalition (among them the French and German forces) showed reluctance at first toward the use of U.S. PSYOP forces. [13] The IFOR planners renamed the psychological operations campaign the “IFOR Information Campaign” and this seemed to ease most fears.
Fifth, doctrine for Information Operations (which includes the Information Campaign) for peacekeeping was non-existent for NATO and SHAPE and many of the participating nations. Some of the IFOR national units understood Information Operations principles and concepts while others did not. The doctrines for Public Affairs (Public Information), CA/CIMIC, and PSYOP, and related Information Operations functional areas were either non-existent, under development or had just been revised. National doctrines differed for many of the functional areas that comprise Information Operations. The command and control of national PSYOP contingents remained with the participating nations (mainly the U.S. with participation from the UK, France and Germany) and was not placed under NATO C2 during the IFOR operation. OPLAN 40105 called for the Public Information (PI) office and coalition press and information centers (CPIC) with each of the major IFOR headquarters. In Sarajevo, IFOR and the ARRC decided to share a single press center located in the Holiday Inn but this caused confusion in the chain of command--dual command relationship and sometimes-conflicting guidance. At the Multinational Divisions, the commanders preferred to bring their own national PI assets to run the PI program and this too introduced some confusion into the IFOR PI operation--conflicting IFOR and national doctrine, procedures and guidance on the nature and amount of information to be released to the media. The PA, CA, and PSYOP aspects of the IFOR information operations and information campaign required special attention to ensure coordination and synchronization of related activities. Ad hoc committees were established at the IFOR, ARRC, and Multi-national Division levels to facilitate coordination. There was no mechanism for the coordination of Information Operations across the broader set of military, civil, humanitarian, and economic players. This was largely a military action at the outset. Ad hoc coordination groups were established over time to facilitate coordination of the IFOR Information Campaign over a broader set of military and international organization participants.
Sixth, the Intelligence community faced challenges unique to supporting a coalition peace operation. Traditionally, intelligence tends to focus on the enemy. However, it is not always clear who and what is an enemy in a peace operation. Until recently, it has been the UN's view that information (intelligence) must be public to avoid misuse by any of the parties. In combat as well as peace operations, the side with the best “situation awareness” has the greatest advantage. In a multinational setting such as Bosnia, there were, by definition, many sides. The bulk of the national intelligence systems supporting IFOR was designed for go-to-war not peace operations. “Force Protection” and the Army maneuver warfare doctrine drove the U.S. intelligence architecture for Joint Endeavor and support to the Commander MND (N) in particular. The Bosnia threat environment was, however, essentially benign and it was not maneuver warfare.
Seventh, NATO had no in-place ability to deploy forward its strategic C4I capabilities. There was little to no Bosnia telecommunications infrastructure because it had been destroyed by the war and NATO air strikes. NATO, therefore, had to rely heavily on the national tactical assets of the framework nations--particularly the U.S. (the major contributor) and UK and to a lesser extent France. The UN VSAT network, which was already in place to support UNPROFOR, was used extensively. Commercial data network products, commercial communications leases, and deployable commercial SATCOM services were employed to extend NATO's strategic information network connectivity into Croatia and Bosnia and to provide information services to the deployed headquarters and forces. Although the NATO strategic networks and the national tactical military networks operated Secret system-high, there was a lack of NATO-approved and coalition-approved communications and information system protection capabilities and management tools for the commercial-products-based networks deployed into Croatia and Bosnia at the outset of the operation.
Eighth, non-NATO and Partnership-for-Peace (PfP) nations would be involved with NATO in a real-world operation for the first time as well as the Russian Federation and there was little NATO and national guidance on how to proceed with these first time events. In the end, the integration of the PfP nations and other non-NATO nations under NATO C2 was reasonably successful and this was due to a couple of reasons. First, NATO already had experience dealing with the PfP nations through the NATO PfP Program and related exercise activities. Second, there was political will to make it happen, e.g., the special agreement between the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and the Russian Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev, for the employment of Russian forces in the IFOR operation. Third, innovative command arrangements were employed at several levels. For example, national officers were brought into the multi-national HQs and senior national officers were “dual hatted” as deputy commanders as was practiced by the Nordic-Polish Brigade in MND (N).
Some NATO and U.S.-related command arrangement shortfalls also existed early in the operation that presented challenges to mission accomplishment. Command and Control differences existed between SHAPE and AFSOUTH/IFOR and between the ARRC and the Multinational Divisions, the most significant being with the U.S. MND (N). There was the need for a better definition of the command relationships between NATO, USCINCEUR and USAREUR. Forces in the multinational environment operated with two chains of command: one for operations and the other for command, administrative, and logistical matters. The absence of a clear definition led to some inefficiencies and confusion during the operation. At the center of this issue for the U.S. was how the Army (Component) fulfilled its Title 10 responsibilities. The root cause of the problem was the absence of an U.S. Joint Task Force command equivalent in Bosnia that had the authority, expertise, and staffing to sufficiently provide U.S. C2 and coordinated logistics for out of sector U.S service members. In addition, in accordance with National Security Decision Directive 130, U.S. PSYOP forces were not placed under IFOR C2. These forces remained under USEUCOM control. This caused some problems in the product coordination and approval process and limited the flexible use of PSYOP elements at the tactical level. U.S. Civil Affairs units also remained under USAREUR C2. The command arrangements for the Public Affairs, PSYOP and Civil Affairs/CIMIC operations and some aspects of the Intelligence operations (e.g., Counter Intelligence/Human Intelligence (CI/HUMINT) required innovative adjustments to effectively integrate them into the overall IFOR command structure and operation. Finally, another important C2 shortfall was inadequate early military coordination with humanitarian organizations, particularly the NGO's already in country.
There were other factors that influenced NATO and national activities in preparation for and execution of the IFOR deployment and operation. Joint Endeavor was occurring at a time when NATO and the nations were reducing force structures. In addition to the first NATO “Out of Area” operation, it was also the first major ground operation ever (this was true for USAREUR as well). There were multiple OPLANs that added some confusion. NATO would be taking over from the UN and other peacekeeping agencies and this had some built-in uncertainties. Deployment would take place in the depth of winter and in an area of difficult terrain. The likelihood of hostilities was a major concern because of the fragility of the peace arrangements in Bosnia. There were morale effects associated with deploying troops over the Christmas period. Therefore, one should not underestimate the degree of difficulty NATO and the nations faced as they prepared for and deployed to Bosnia in support of operation Joint Endeavor.
Large areas of operation and interest marked the Bosnia operating environment. There were multiple belligerent factions and a "front line" that was 360 degrees and multidimensional. Some of the toughest terrain in the world and formidable weather conditions posed a significant challenge to mobility and everyday survival of the operation.
The threats in Bosnia were real. The three former warring factions not only possessed combat power but also had a robust intelligence collection capability. In the case of the Serbs, there was an active information campaign targeted against NATO, member NATO nations, and IFOR. The Karadzic regime was extremely well organized and had a seamless military-political-media continuum. They were the home team, spoke the home language to the home culture and had an internal security system that could apply thuggery to keep people in line if all else failed.
There were land mines everywhere, snipers and the possibilities of civil disturbances. Terrorists, organized crime, and petty criminals were also considered in the threat picture. Local civilians were hired as linguists, cooks, maids, handymen, electricians and carpenters and their activities needed to be monitored.
The local, national, and ethnic media were well established and generally trusted. The population of Bosnia was to a large extent literate and relatively well educated and used to all forms of media that characterizes an “information society.” There were of course exceptions such as Gorazde (an isolated Muslim-dominated enclave) which had little access to the news media and the outside world. The international, national, and local television, radio, and print journalist were everywhere questioning soldiers and reporting on events as they occurred.
The diverse languages in the Balkans region (e.g., Serbo-Croatian, Hungarian, Albanian, Slovenian, and Rumanian to name a few) proved to be a real challenge for IFOR and the participating nations. For example, the U.S. military did not have enough trained linguists for the theater and had to contract with local nationals to fulfill its needs. The situation and relationships among the former warring factions complicated the hire of locals in Bosnia, e.g., using Muslims in a Serb enclave. In addition, most native linguists had little or no background in the military and therefore had difficulties in translating military “lingo.”
The intelligence setting for operation Joint Endeavor was Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hungary, Croatia, Serbia, and parts of the Central European Region. IFOR and the nations had one eye on the military activity of the former warring factions (FWF) and the other on potential disruptions to civil order. Intelligence had to cast a wide net, far beyond the theater of operation, to grasp the influences in the area. For the United States, as a global power with vital interests outside of the NATO area, this was an operation of worldwide proportion and implications.
IFOR Information Operations was not an application of military doctrine such as that set forth in U.S. Army FM 100-6, Information Operations, August 1996. Black PSYOP, military deception, disinformation, EW, physical destruction, and computer network attack were not employed. For example, it became clear early on in the operation that the former warring factions (FWF) needed the ability to command and control their forces in order to be able to comply with the Dayton Accord. Therefore, actions such as jamming, electronic deception, and physical destruction were not used by IFOR against the FWF C2 and information systems. Activities associated with other IO elements such as Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP (Information Campaign), OPSEC, Force Protection, and Information Assurance were employed but it was not an integrated, top-down orchestration of the related activities.
The use of the terms black, gray, and white PSYOP refers mainly to the “source” of the message. In a “white” message, the source is acknowledged, i.e., the Herald of Peace or an IFOR leaflet. A “black” message is one that purports to be from another source such as Allied Radio stations during the Second World War that pretended to be German resistance stations. A “gray” message is one where the source is unclear or unnamed but not deliberately masked like a black source. U.S. PSYOP is 99% “white” and always tells the truth and identifies the U.S. government as its source. This is one of the major reasons for top down control—PSYOP is a statement of U.S. government policy. While U.S. military PSYOP can get involved in deception, under current law “black” and “gray” operations are the province of “civilian agencies.”
In the absence of NATO IO doctrine and since there were no declared enemies, the NATO rules of engagement (the de facto IO doctrine) for IFOR were fairly restrictive. The information campaign was to be based on truth and factual information and IFOR was to always identify itself as the source. IFOR was forbidden to use disinformation and deception and the campaign could not take actions that undermined the factions, take sides, or directly refutes FWF disinformation activities. NATO and U.S. doctrine stipulated that a separation between Public Affairs (Information) and PSYOP functions must be preserved to maintain the credibility of Public Affairs (Information) spokespersons and products. There was also a NATO reluctance to tackle difficult or controversial issues such as war criminals or the fact that the parties were failing to live up to the agreement they had signed. The NATO leadership apparently feared that addressing such controversial issues might lead to resentment against or hostility to the force.
The IFOR Information Campaign was designed to “seize and maintain the initiative by imparting timely and effective information within the commander's intent.” The term “information campaign” referred to the coordinated and synchronized use of different information activities within the IFOR command. The campaign had three components. [14]
Information activities were also used by the commanders to communicate to the factions their intentions and might and to encourage the local population to act friendly. IFOR often used information activities to deter the Bosnian factions from violating the military annex of the Dayton agreement and from attacking NATO troops. It was also used to convince the local population that a brighter future would await them if the Dayton agreement were fully complied with.
At the outset, as well as through out the operation, Bosnia was more peaceful than expected. There were few overt physical attacks on IFOR facilities and personnel. The FWF were generally in compliance (but continuously tested IFOR resolve) with the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP). One must be reminded, however, that the situation could have changed at a moment's notice for the worst.
Upon arrival in country, IFOR made it very clear to the FWF immediately that they were different than UNPROFOR and were there to enforce compliance with the Dayton Accord, including the use of force if necessary. Check points and bunkers were bulldozed, roadblocks were shut down and the FWF separated and their equipment and forces placed in cantonment areas and barracks. On 19 February 1996, COMIFOR held a meeting of the Joint Military Commission on board the USS George Washington aircraft carrier. COMIFOR stated that the reason for having the meeting on board the “Spirit of Freedom” was to give the leaders of the former warring factions a display of the firepower the U.S. was prepared to use in the enforcement of the Dayton Peace Accord.
IFOR's tremendous military firepower was certainly a major deterrent but the military also put a lot of faith in the deterrent power of “Information Dominance.” IFOR through its intelligence operation (supported by significant national contributions, especially from the U.S.) and information campaign was able to make it clear to the FWF that they could monitor them anytime of the day or night and under all weather conditions. The ability to see, understand the situation, and strike with precision no doubt had its effect in deterring aggressive actions on the part of the FWF and maintaining the peace during the IFOR phase of the operation.
Violations were experienced from time to time: weapons were discovered in unauthorized locations, soldiers and tanks in the Zone of Separation, and unauthorized police check points. Such violations were detected by the IFOR intelligence operation, were not tolerated by IFOR commanders, and swift actions were taken when the FWF tested IFOR's resolve. The intelligence operations and the military aspects of the information campaign were IFOR success stories. In spite of remarkable challenges, they were powerful tools that helped IFOR successfully monitor FWF activities and get the message to the FWF and the local population that IFOR was there to make a difference. In the words of the Commander MND (N), Major General William Nash, “We don't have arguments. We hand them pictures, and they move their tanks.”
Operation Joint Endeavor was, of course, an operation other than war (OOTW) with all of the associated ambiguities, complexities and challenges. As experienced in other OOTWs, these operations tend to be frustrating because the structure militaries take for granted such as a unified chain of command and clear, simple rules of engagement, are lacking.
For many reasons, OOTWs are usually messy and almost always involve ad hoc coalitions of the willing with politically driven command arrangements. More often than not, they will involve, at least in practice, a consultative environment in which key parties will need to develop and maintain a common understanding of the mission, issues and progress towards meeting the end state. Planning and executing such operations are also complicated by factors such as short time lines, a highly dynamic environment and uneven capabilities and experience among coalition members.
In almost all instances, OOTW operations are not able to rely on the in-country infrastructure to support their C2 needs and require augmentation of the limited indigenous capabilities with national tactical military systems. Given that a number of different players are usually involved and their desire to use systems that they are comfortable with, these operations typically begin with a “Federation of Systems” with the inevitable interoperability challenges and security disconnects. This is simply the reality of such operations; IFOR had to address similar challenges in Bosnia.
For peace operations, co-opting factions C2 may be a better strategy than destroying it. In Bosnia, commanders also found themselves spending a lot of time conducting diplomacy and mediation to resolve disputes and conflicts. They were able to deter violence by defusing potential conflicts through developing a positive relationship with key FWF leaders and local community leaders. Regular visits and meetings with all parties concerned served to develop mutual trust and respect that became invaluable in resolving conflicts through means other than force. Insights and understandings derived from these relationships were invaluable as well to the over-all success of the IFOR information operation.
Coalition peace operations are accompanied by other doctrine, culture and language differences that challenged the overall coordination of the mission and ability to achieve unity of effort. Traditions, concepts, customs, and attitudes were sometimes not compatible and needed to be coordinated. Although a common language (such as English or French) was desired to participate, many of the players were not able to speak or understand the language used, placing an added burden on the coordination activities.
In Bosnia, PSYOP and CIMIC doctrines differed. The U.S. approach to PSYOP was to centrally manage and control at the highest level of command where as other nations, such as the United Kingdom, favored delegation to lower levels of the command structure, e.g., Division headquarters. For CIMIC, there was no common understanding or approach at the outset of the IFOR operation. The ground commanders lacked a basic understanding of the role and value of CIMIC. This lack of understanding led to misperceptions that the CIMIC activities were contributing to mission creep and resulted in some unanticipated constraints being placed on their operation until their value became more apparent to the commanders. Unofficial doctrine and practices were essentially developed as the operation progressed. In the end, their respective headquarters in Sarajevo controlled both the PSYOP and CIMIC operations.
With more than 30 different nations participating, there was a significant challenge to merge the cultural differences to achieve unity of effort and avoid “cultural clashes.” Liaison activities (both officers and offices) became a very important way of doing business in IFOR and were used effectively to facilitate coordination and bridge the language gap. Special Operations Forces played a key and effective role in this regard.
Bosnia was a somewhat schizophrenic operational environment. In MND (N), force protection measures were strictly enforced and troops were required to wear full battle gear and travel in four vehicle convoys. For other parts of the area of operation, the force protection measures were less severe. For instance, in many areas of the UK-led MND (SW) and around Sarajevo, single IFOR vehicles were permitted. The headquarters facilities were located in urban and/or open areas. Many of the facilities outside of MND (N) employed limited traditional lethal and physical protection such as heavily armed guards, tanks, barriers, sandbagged bunkers, and obstacle courses in access areas (e.g., IFOR headquarters in Sarajevo). In addition to fortification, MND (N) relied on an electronic system to protect its headquarters and high technology Command Center (referred to as Battlestar). The protection system, known as Shortstop and developed by Whittaker Corp., generated an electronic umbrella that could prematurely detonate a proximity-fused artillery shell should one be launched at the facility as a result of some hostile action.
Protection for U.S. forces will always be a significant issue. In Bosnia, U.S. force protection took on a higher degree of importance than had been seen in other U.S. military peace support operations. It was a formal part of the OPLAN mission statement and permeated all aspects of mission execution—perhaps even to the detriment of accomplishing some tasks. Many non-U.S. IFOR participants believed that U.S. force protection measures were politically motivated and not based on a realistic threat assessment. MG Nash, Commander MND (N), defended the tough self-protection standard as important for both safety and discipline reasons. Furthermore, in his view, "the American soldier today is more of a target than soldiers of other countries and they deserve all the protection I can give them." The transitions of IFOR to SFOR and now SFOR to some follow-on force arrangement in 1998 no doubt will continue to be accompanied by a reduction in military force. The risks to a smaller U.S. and NATO force on indefinite station in Bosnia are likely to increase, especially if the Serbs, Croats, or Muslims see U.S. policy under the Dayton Accords working to their disadvantage. [16]
Enforcement of force protection was inconsistent between U.S. service members serving under U.S. command and those serving under NATO control. Civil agencies were concerned that this inconsistency was sending mixed signals to the warring factions. The stringent U.S. force protection measures directly hampered civil-military cooperation, PSYOP, and CI/HUMINT activities and the ability of U.S. soldiers to move away from the “peace-enforcement-only” mindset. It appeared that the second- and third-order effects of the stringent force protection measures might not have been fully anticipated. Some easing of the rules occurred over time as the operation evolved and more civil affairs work was performed off post.
Operational Security (OPSEC) was particularly challenging for the IFOR operation. The operational environment was reasonably stable for Bosnia. The lack of an obvious threat created the possibility of a relaxed security posture and increased complacency. Other types of OPSEC risks had to be managed as well. There were numerous television and print journalists questioning soldiers. On a daily basis, hundreds of local national workers entered IFOR areas of operation. It was a challenge to keep a close eye on these daily visitors. OPSEC is an operations function, not a security function per se. Therefore, there must be a proponent for OPSEC functions and the functions must be integrated into the planing and execution of the operation. The OPSEC proponent for IFOR was not clearly defined.
There were COMSEC and INFOSEC issues that had to be dealt with as well. Although the military communications and information systems operated SECRET system-high, there were other systems that were not secure. The UN VSAT network, INMARSAT, Cellular, and the commercial PTT telephone systems were not protected and they were used frequently for command and control purposes. The commercial Internet was used frequently. Configuration management and information network protect measures were slow in implementation, e.g., virus protection and intrusion detection and protection. Diskettes were shared between classified and unclassified systems and there was a lack of discipline and standard operating procedures to effectively control the situation. During IFOR, an enormous amount of classified and unclassified material was produced; extra care had to be taken when dealing with mixed classifications of information. There was a lack of security devices such as secure telephones, safes, and shredders.
Security was an ongoing responsibility for which improvements were continuously made over the duration of the IFOR phase of the operation.
The U.S. Joint Pub 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, states, “There is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own doctrine.” NATO Intelligence doctrine states, “In peacetime, NATO commanders have to rely largely on Member Nations for the intelligence they need. In wartime, the majority of NATO commanders' intelligence may still come from the member nations; however, they will also acquire intelligence from many different sources and agencies such as assigned combat units, reconnaissance units and aircraft.” The U.S. Army FM 100-23 states, “Peace operations take place in environments less well-defined than war….the traditional elements of combat power may not apply….the political and cultural dimensions become more critical….the needs of the commander involved in peace operations are in some ways more complex than those of the commander conducting combat operations.”
Intelligence requirements in Bosnia varied depending upon the phase of the operation but consistently required expertise in military, political, cultural, and economic issue areas. The information environment was complex and consisted of numerous, non-traditional sources. The major challenge was leveraging information from these sources which were as varied as Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Military Police, Political Advisors, UN organizations, the International Police Task Force, International Organizations, Non-Government and Private Volunteer Organizations, Joint Commissions, Government Agencies, Intelligence Organizations, and even the commercial Internet. Interestingly enough, these sources were also consumers of information and intelligence and their requirements were varied and unique as well. Hence, the cumulative information and intelligence requirements were tremendous and difficult to anticipate. In addition to traditional databases, non-traditional databases needed to be developed to address the varied needs such as police checkpoints, storage sites, license plates, personalities, treaty compliance, site declarations, mass gravesites, ethnicity, and others. The databases therefore had to be flexible enough to quickly respond to requirements from the commanders as well as a wide range of other consumers.
Analytical efforts were challenged. It was difficult to collect and exploit the full range of information, identify indicators, and provide predictive analysis. The analysts were trained for hard targeting based analysis supporting military courses of action, they were not as well prepared for “softer” analysis of political issues, treaty compliance, civil unrest, vigilante activities, election support, refugee movements, and faction and population intentions. Since “soft analysis” was more challenging and difficult, there was a tendency to be more reactive and analyze what happened rather than predict what might happen. In retrospect, indicators of events were often there, the challenge was developing the expertise to recognize them and then using these insights to influence outcomes. This placed high demands on intellectual and analytical flexibility.
Joint Endeavor probably more clearly than any other recent operation, showcased the strategic, theater (operational), and tactical levels of intelligence operating in joint and combined roles. Additionally for the U.S., the interagency (DIA, CIA, NSA, DOS, and others) role was highlighted as well.
There were a large number of consumers and a wide spectrum of threats and intelligence requirements to accommodate. The operation had to adapt to differences in NATO and national doctrines and procedures. Force protection measures and the constant threat of land mines forced an adaptation of normal operating procedures.
The operation had to monitor a wide spectrum of threats including the FWF, criminal activities, extremists, civil disturbances, and terrorism. FWF equipment storage sites and barracks, the Zone of Separation, mass gravesites, and potential “hot spots” caused by freedom of movement, resettlement and inter-ethnic conflicts had to be monitored as well. The nature of the operation muddled any clear division among strategic, theater, and tactical levels.
For IFOR, there were releasability issues related to sharing information and capabilities among 30 plus nations, which included the Russians, Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations, and others. Experience with other OOTWs, also clearly demonstrated that although non-intrusive means of collecting information were especially useful, human intelligence (HUMINT) was usually key. In Bosnia, the man and woman on the ground collecting first-hand information about political leaders, business men, the condition of roads and bridges, withdrawal of forces from the zones of separation, weapons and ammunition in cantonment areas, freedom of movement violations, and demonstrations and ethnic incidents proved invaluable. Over time, HUMINT became the dominant player in the IFOR intelligence operation.
In the end, “information dominance” was key to the success of the IFOR operation. The U.S. military's phenomenal array of technology on the ground, in the air and in space helped keep a risky operation relatively casualty-free. The Counterintelligence and HUMINT activities in Bosnia were also essential to accomplishing the Force Protection mission by providing the information and intelligence the commander needed to manage and avoid risk and still accomplish his mission.
Peace operations can place different and, at times, conflicting demands on information collection, use and sharing. On the one hand, the military views information (generally referred to as intelligence) as a force multiplier and requires that it be protected and selectively released to coalition partners under well defined rules and control. On the other hand, the United Nations views the collection and storage of information to be public, open and transparent in order to avoid misuse by any of the parties and to preserve the impartiality and credibility of the UN. These competing principles can impose limitations on information collection and storage in support of UN-led peacekeeping operations. Fortunately, this was not the case for the NATO-led operation Joint Endeavor.
In today's high technology environment, information activities can determine the success or failure of the military operation. The “CNN effect” (unsubstantiated media reports) coupled with the “information revolution” created formidable challenges for the IFOR military. In Bosnia, there was media presence throughout the country when IFOR arrived. The information networks serving the media, IFOR and it's coalition member nations and as a matter of fact, the rest of the free world, provided an ability to share information at a speed and efficiency never before experienced. Frequently media reports of incidents would reach the home country and/or higher headquarters before the commander on the ground was aware of the situation and able to react. Adapting to the Bosnia media environment created a challenge at the outset for the IFOR Public Information activities. It was necessary to establish credibility with local, ethnic, national, and international media while competing with an already established and trusted local media. The PSYOP (Information Campaign) also had problems adjusting to the complex, “first world” savvy audience in Bosnia. The public affairs activities proved to be quite successful over time. The Information Campaign had a much more difficult set of problems to deal with which included the media, active Bosnian-Serb, Bosnian-Croat, and Bosnian-Muslim (Muslim Slavs also referred to themselves as Bosniac's) disinformation campaigns, and the local population's media consumption habits.
The subject of “the media and the military” and “media's influence on policy and military operations” is not new and has been studied for some time. The focus of most studies has, however, been more on the relationships between these institutions rather than the challenge to explore ways in which “image considerations” and “real-time news reporting” might be used to military advantage in future operations. [17] It is interesting to note, however, that the view that the media represents a necessary evil for commanders to deal with rather than an opportunity to gain military advantage is changing. The degree of this change became quite evident in IFOR's positive approach to public information, which became a leading element of the operation. There was a proactive IFOR public information campaign that maintained credible relations with the press and it had the commander's support from the outset, including SACEUR.
On the other hand, the globalization of information and television (the so-called “CNN effect”) created some difficult challenges for the military. The military processing of information was often too slow to keep up with the fast speed of media reporting. The power of television and global information networks, such as the Internet, were not fully exploited by the IFOR and the information campaign at the outset (over time they did become key elements of the operation).
It is clear the media can exert influence on policy (although it is still within government officials power to control) regarding peace operations and related military support activities. The lesson to be learned by the policymakers and military is that they must communicate the policy goals and objectives of the operation clearly and simply. The motives for the operation need to be equally clear and simple, but also compelling, so that citizens and allies alike will want to be part of the operation while our adversaries will feel powerless to escape the inevitable outcome if they oppose our goals. If this is done, then the why and how we do what we must do will be known and observed in the actions that follow and the media will tell the story—a way to leverage the power and influence of the media.
The pervasive use of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) information products and services propelled NATO and IFOR into the “information age” and a new way of doing business. There was extensive use of email and a reduced reliance on formal messaging. The formal message traffic (the NATO TARE message network) by volume (Mega-Bytes per day) was less than 10% of the total IFOR daily data network traffic. The VTC was used daily by IFOR and ARRC command elements for collaboration and coordination. For USAREUR and its deployed commanders, VTC became the C2 system of choice. The VTCs were also used by subordinate command elements to conduct day to day business. PowerPoint briefings were used as the medium of choice for presentations and were readily distributed over the data network. A cottage industry of “PowerPoint Rangers” emerged, as the presentations became very sophisticated. The briefing packages frequently exceeded megabits in size and placed heavy loads on the data networks as they were distributed around the theater. The data networks were also used for collaborative planning and distribution of wide band information such as images.
The commercial Internet became a major player in the Bosnia operation. Internet “home pages” (e.g., DoD's BOSNIALINK and NATO, SHAPE, AFSOUTH, IFOR and Task Force Eagle home pages) were used by the Public Affairs organizations to inform and update the general public on IFOR operations. The Public Information Offices used Internet for media interactions and translations of foreign news articles. The Information Campaign staff “surfed” the Internet for information on the situation in Bosnia (e.g., news reports, adversary propaganda and disinformation, biographic data on key leaders, maps, historical reports, and cultural and demographic information). As an interesting side note, the Internet can not be used by U.S. forces as a PSYOP tool because, by law, U.S. audiences should not be able to access our PSYOP messages—dates back to World War II. Therefore, even though a Bosnian can access the 1st Armored Division or NATO web pages, the U.S. cannot officially consider this as part of its arsenal and any “tweeking” of the information has to be done by Public Affairs. [18]
The Intelligence community used the Internet for open-source assessments; legal and medical personnel used it as a reference tool; and the engineers used it for technical reference activities such as predictions for the height of the Sava River to adjust the pontoon bridges. Even the factions used the Internet to inform (and in some cases disinform) and present their case to the world audience (e.g., Serb, Muslim, Croat home pages). International and humanitarian organizations had home pages on the Internet (e.g., the UN and RELIEFWEB, respectively) that provided information related to their activities in Bosnia. Deployed U.S. military personnel used it to maintain contact with their home organizations be they located in Europe, CONUS, or elsewhere. It also had value as part of the MWR support, e.g., educational material, travel information, and e-mails to home from the troops in the field.
[1] JP 3-13, Joint Doctrine for Information Operations, 2nd draft, 2 July 1997.
[2] DSD Research Report 97-1, DOING WINDOWS: Non-Traditional Military Responses to Complex Emergencies, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Naval War College, September 1997.
[3] Information Operations, HQ Department of the Army, 1997.
[4] Joint Vision 2010, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1996.
[5] Concept for Future Joint Operations: Expanding Joint Vision 2010, Joint Warfighting Center, May 1997.
[6] Late-breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations, Warren Strobel, U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997.
[7] Winning CNN Wars, Frank Stech, Parameters, 1994.
[8] John Burton quoted in Bercovitch, 1984, p.26.
[9] See footnote 2.
[10] Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, L. K. Wentz, NDU/CCRP publication, 1998.
[11] Mark Jacobson, doctoral candidate at Ohio State University.
[12] The Role of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in Humanitarian Assistance Operations, Adam B. Siegel, CNA briefing, April 1996.
[13] TARGET BOSNIA: Integrating International Information Activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Pascale Siegel, NDU/CCRP publication,1998.
[14] See footnote 12.
[15] See footnote 9.
[16] Bosnia: Less Force, More Risk, Harvy Sicherman, Foreign Policy Research Institute, January 1998.
[17] See footnote 7.
[18] See footnote 11.