The U.S. forces had reasonable access to the Internet but IFOR access was quite restricted (NATO policy driven) in the early phases of the operation. As a result of the demand for Internet services by IFOR elements, NATO reviewed and revised its policy to accommodate the use of the Internet for operational purposes.
The “Night Owl,” which was produced by the U.S. at Camp Lukavac in MND (N), provided a daily summary of news and media commentary--a Bosnia version of the Pentagon's “Early Bird.” Through its publication and use, commanders and staff were able to gain a better appreciation for the political, economic, and cultural environment. The IFOR Information Campaign staff also used this as a key source of information for their activities.
The ease with which information could be shared using the IFOR data networks (CRONOS, IARRCIS, and LOCE), specifically, and the Internet to a lesser extent, fostered active, and sometimes lengthy, reporting (such as daily situation reports). Higher headquarters were constantly appraised of matters both large and small. Occasionally, headquarters and other command elements would use the data networks to bypass intervening organizations in order to get information first-hand, sometimes leaving the broader community in the dark. The problem soon became one of finding the useful details among the wealth of information available rather than a lack of information.
Managing all of the information available to the commander and his staff was a serious problem. Users did not have adequate automated tools to search for available information. Likewise, there were inadequate tools for managing information collection, storage, and distribution. This was particular true in the area of coordinating, integrating and fusing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance products and making this information available to the user who needed it when he needed it. There were other sources of information such as the Internet and local and international media that needed to be incorporated into the IFOR information database. In terms of sharing classified information, security releasability was also an issue that needed addressed to ensure that information was put in the hands of those that needed it in a timely way without revealing sources and methods, but stringently protecting highly sensitive information. There were 36 coalition partners many for which, such as the Partnership for Peace and Russian Federation, NATO had never shared classified information with before. A special category, IFOR-releasable, was established for the operation.
Although extensive use was made of email, VTC and data network services, voice communications still played a major role in conducting the IFOR operation. This was true in spite of a grade of service that, at times, exceeded a 20% probability of blocking for call attempts. In addition, the end-to-end voice quality was marginal if the call had to be routed through several different tactical switched networks.
The IFOR information revolution largely stopped at the Division Hqs level in Bosnia. In some cases, such as MND (N) and for the U.S. forces in Croatia and Hungary, higher bandwidth services were extended to the Battalion level. Every U.S. base camp had telephones service and secure and non-secure data and email capabilities. The U.S. Intelligence community extended 128 kb/s service to Brigades (via Trojan Spirit II deployments). On the other hand, the communications and information system support to the IFOR war fighter, in general, who was actually executing the peacekeeping mission, with few exceptions, changed little and they continued to operate much as they had in the past. Operations were conducted using acetate-covered 1:50,000 maps (seen in all command centers), outmoded tactical equipment (not all participating nations were equipped with the latest high technology tactical systems) and sensor or reconnaissance systems organic to the national ground units. The command centers were located in urban buildings, tents, semi-destroyed buildings or the back of armored vehicles
Although the deployed high technology systems generally supported the headquarters far more effectively than they supported the soldier on the ground, there were, of course, exceptions. Many innovative uses were made of the U.S. military's array of advanced technologies (mainly in the areas of Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR)) to more effectively support both the headquarters and the soldier on the ground. In fact, Bosnia became a model for the U.S. doctrine known as “Information Dominance.” The operation also became an advanced information system technology test bed for both NATO and advanced technology driven nations such as the U.S. The U.S. advanced technology dissemination capability the Bosnia C2 Augmentation (BC2A)/Joint Broadcast System (JBS) was such a capability tested in Bosnia. The BC2A/JBS provided improved wideband connectivity and broadcast information services to accommodate intelligent push and pull of critical C2 information and services. Live Predator (UAV) video was broadcast over the JBS to key IFOR command centers in Bosnia.
Public information is a critical element of mission accomplishment for peace operations. First, a successful public information campaign contributes to building and preserving public support for the operation. Second, the successful use of public information can help the commander achieve operational goals by influencing parties, resolving crisis, defusing misunderstandings and/or correcting misperceptions. Such use of the public information “weapon” is more critical in peace operations where the traditional military tools (weapons) have a less central role in military activities. For operation Joint Endeavor, public information became a powerful tool in shaping the operational environment.
News value of peace operations has a rather short half-life. It's not glitzy and therefore, has limited duration interest to the news media, especially for extended operations. It is important, however, to have a continuous dialogue with the public at home to ensure there continued support for the operation. Public interest also tends to have a short half-life and may become less tolerant of causalities and high costs of the operation if the duration of the operation extends beyond their expectations and if the impact on U.S. national security interests become less obvious to them. If an unfortunate incident occurs, such as the unfortunate loss of U.S. servicemen in Somalia, it can bring U.S. military support to a peace operation to termination rather quickly, especially if it has been a long duration operation. Hence, the value of a good public information campaigns.
Upon arriving in theater, IFOR troops faced serious public information challenges. IFOR succeeded a discredited UN mission and needed to distance itself from the poor image the UN gained during the four years of UNPROFOR. A large number of media were already operating throughout Bosnia and Croatia independent of the military and were able to report instantaneously most incidents, in some cases before they were reported to IFOR. In addition to IFOR, there were seven other organizations tasked with implementing the Dayton agreement. Hence, cooperation and sharing was essential to enhance the credibility of IFOR and the international community among the international and local press.
From the outset of the operation, IFOR's public information activities achieved a generally high standard of information exchange with the media. International and national media coverage was generally positive or neutral. Reporters in theater expressed satisfaction with IFOR's policies and procedures and the military spokesmen achieved a high level of credibility.
The real “peacekeepers” in a peace operation are the humanitarian relief organizations that provide both aid for the present and hope for the future. They are there before the military arrive, remain during the military presence and stay after the military leave. Although Bosnia was a mature theater of operation for them, the military planners gave little consideration to their experience, expertise, and activities in preparing for the IFOR operation. As a result, the military support to the humanitarian aspects of the operation was more re-active than pro-active, especially during the early stages of the operation.
Civilian agencies (i.e., NGOs and International Organizations such as the UN) had developed a network of influential contacts, compiled historical and specialty archives, and established relationships with local leaders and businessmen. They understood the infrastructure of the region, and the political and economic influences. The military needed to be able to take more effective advantage of these insights.
Civil humanitarian relief organizations are accustomed to autonomy and operating according to their own charters and core values. The military is an instrument of a national polity and follows its orders. Although it is not a natural relationship, these organizations need to be able to work together towards a common goal in support of the humanitarian aspects of peace operations.
For Bosnia, there were a number of factors that contributed to the lack of proper civil-military planning and cooperation. Before the IFOR deployment, there was no common understanding of the capabilities, limitations, roles, and mission of CIMIC units and personnel. In the absence of an agreed NATO doctrine, IFOR commanders and staff had to incorporate civil-military tasks into their overall operations based upon personal knowledge and experience. The individual commander's execution of the CIMIC mission reflected the various national approaches of the participating nations. For example, the Russian approach tended to be more peace enforcement or counterinsurgency oriented. France and the UK were much more active in assisting civil organizations with direct support to local “hearts and minds” projects. The U.S. approach was more “high intensity” and stressed the need to achieve decisive “victory” and quick resolution of conflicts through securing popular support. The IFOR deployment illuminated the ground combat commanders limited knowledge and experience with civil affairs activities. This lack of knowledge was demonstrated in many areas, but was particularly obvious in the campaign planning stage. During the development of the OPLAN, there was only one Civil Affairs officer assigned to assist AFSOUTH in planning for the IFOR deployment. The campaign plan not only inadequately identified military tasks for CIMIC, but due to the lack of planing knowledge, negatively impacted CIMIC deployment, manning and communications, and the development of information and logistics support requirements.
Civil cooperation in Bosnia was unique in that the members of the non-governmental and supra-governmental relief and development organizations were already actively engaged when the IFOR deployment commenced. In fact, there were an estimated 530 NGO personnel in theater at D+1. This situation created its own set of problems. First, CIMIC assets were delayed in their deployment. As UNPROFOR forces withdrew or were transferred to IFOR, valuable CIMIC turnover opportunities were lost. Lacking any advanced information on how the CIMIC mission would be executed, the NGOs/PVOs assumed that IFOR would continue, if not increase, the same type of support that UNPROFOR provided to them. The philosophy advanced by IFOR, however, was quite different from UNPROFOR's. IFOR refused to provide what it thought the NGO community could provide for themselves. There was a fear that providing such support would create a long-term dependency on IFOR, i.e., “mission creep.” Paramount in this philosophy was the promotion of self-sustaining activities in preparation for IFOR's eventual withdraw. The ARRC did send personnel in early to brief the NGOs on what to expect, educate them on what IFOR troops would being doing and related plans. This briefing was only given in Sarajevo and not in the field where a majority of the NGOs were located.
A Combined Joint Civil Military Cooperation staff element was implemented at IFOR headquarters to facilitate coordination of CIMIC activities and cooperation with the International Organizations and NGOs. The CIMIC organization was to focus on liaison with the civilian organizations from the government down to the local opstina level to regenerate national regulations and institute some limited nation rebuilding. The structure was also to provide an avenue for the numerous aid agencies to deal with the military on support arrangements related to their projects in theater. CIMIC Centers were established at all levels of the IFOR command structure to provide a location for NGOs to meet with the military. In Sarajevo, both IFOR and ARRC had CIMIC activities and this created some confusion with the NGOs who preferred to deal with the one in-charge.
CIMIC activities at MND (N) best epitomize the combined impact that doctrine, command structures, and mission interpretations have on the promotion, or prevention, of civil coordination. The CIMIC Center, which doctrinally was the central location for all NGOs to meet with the military, was located inside the gate at Tuzla, whereas most of the NGOs were downtown Tuzla. Since access to the base by non-IFOR personnel was strictly limited, the effectiveness of the CIMIC Center as a tool for coordinating NGO/PVO and military activities was greatly reduced. The force protection measures hampered CIMIC personnel in their ability to make on-site visits. It required them to muster up four vehicles just to be able to leave the base and the heavy military presence (full battle gear) did not contribute to creating an impression among the local population that the internal situation was improving.
Despite these shortcomings, CIMIC personnel were able to effectively coordinate with the NGOs and local civil authorities. Across the theater, CIMIC officers praised the efforts and working relationships with the NGOs at the tactical level. Successful coordination at the theater level, however, was less forthcoming. The lesson to be learned is that in operations where civil implementation of the overall objectives plays a key role, civil affairs assets have an important, timely role to play. This point was highlighted in the April 1996 quote from Admiral Leighton Smith, COMIFOR, in which he said, “In November we never heard of CIMIC. We had no idea what you did. Now we can't live without you.”
Under the Dayton Agreement, the Office of the High Representative (OHR) was tasked to coordinate the activities of the civilian organizations in Bosnia to ensure the efficient implementation of the civil aspects of the agreement. The OHR was also to remain in close contact with the commander IFOR to facilitate the discharge of their respective responsibilities. The civilian institutions began operation under considerable disadvantages. They had to be created, funded, and staffed in country after the military deployment occurred. This delay caused public pressure to be applied to IFOR, demanding that IFOR take on a larger role in implementing civil tasks. This public pressure resulted in a limited self-fulfilling prophecy. Once the OHR established itself in theater, the impression created was that where the OHR should have been taking the lead on projects, such as providing gas, electricity, and water, it was expecting that IFOR would take the lead. As a result, “mission extension” was a natural occurrence because of the competence and ability of the CIMIC organization.
Psychological operations (PSYOP) is an operational tool (under the G/J3) designed to shape target audiences' perceptions so that they create the least possible interference with friendly forces. For the IFOR operation, the PSYOP campaign was called the IFOR Information Campaign (IIC) because of political sensitivities to the use of the term psychological operations by some of the coalition partners—the French, in particular, due to political and historical reasons associated with the Algerian conflict in 1961. Also, by national law, the German's and Dutch cannot use the term psychological warfare. [2] The IIC was designed to influence attitudes and shape behavior of groups within the area of operation using multi-media communications and planned activities designed to facilitate the peace enforcement. Originally, the IIC was conceived as a force protection tool and used to deter the FWFs and local populations from engaging in hostile actions against IFOR troops and from interfering with IFOR operations. The campaign targeted the three sub-groups representing the three main factions: Bosniacs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs. Products were designed according to each target and impact expectations differed with each target audience. Products were also intended to send clear signals to faction leaders on NATOs resolve, mandate, and capabilities. As it became more apparent that the local population and factions were neither acting hostile or interfering with IFOR operations and that the FWF were generally in compliance with the Dayton Accord, the focus of the campaign shifted to national elections, refugee returns, and reconstruction.
A Combined Joint IFOR Information Campaign Task Force (CJIICTF) was established to take over the PSYOP aspects, orchestrate the IIC, and coordinate the IIC-related activities of the Public Affairs, Civil Affairs, and International Organizations such as the UNHCR, OSCE, OHR, UN-IPTF, and others. The CJIICTF consisted of mainly U.S. PSYOP personnel and assets with supporting elements from the UK, Germany, and France. U.S. tactical PSYOP teams were deployed and attached to the subordinate command elements they supported. The mission of the team was to disseminate pre-approved PSYOP products to the local population, broadcast loudspeaker messages, and disseminate command information. The teams also conducted assessments of the area of operation and made contact with the local media sources to gain information for the CJIICTF. Although the CJIICTF operated as a component command of IFOR with staff supervision from the IFOR CJ3, none of the national PSYOP units were placed under NATO C2. This situation created problems such as dual NATO and national chains for product approval and IIC execution direction and for the U.S., Title X issues (no JTF commander equivalent for the U.S. forces) affected administrative and logistics support to deployed U.S. PSYOP personnel. There were also coordination problems between the CJIICTF and the MNDs.
The CJIICTF headquarters developed products and COMIFOR approved all products. COMARRC was later given approval authority over all “tactical PSYOP products,” e.g., handbills, loudspeaker scripts, etc. Herald of Peace articles were jointly approved by IFOR and ARRC while television and radio “operational PSYOP products” remained under the purview of IFOR. It was felt that since all three FWFs were in each of the MND sectors that a top-down approach facilitated product coherence (unity of effort) and ensured that a single authority would review products before release. The centralized PSYOP product approval, production, and distribution process was at times cumbersome and in some cases, it was felt that it did not fully meet the needs of the tactical PSYOP mission. Products that had a high degree of receptivity at the operational level and targeted for the broader Bosnia-Herzegovina population were not always well received at the tactical level and by the local population. In some cases, PSYOP messages approved by IFOR were not agreeable to the Multinational Division Commanders. This sometimes left PSYOP forces in the unenviable position of producing PSYOP products desired and approved by the COMIFOR and the Divisions refusing to disseminate them. Because of the usual “consensus atmosphere” pervasive in a NATO command structure, both COMARRC and COMIFOR were reluctant to force Division Commanders to disseminate PSYOP products, e.g., Herald of Progress #24, which featured front page photos of Karadzic and Mladic. SFOR wanted it disseminated so as to demonstrate a firmer line against so-called Pale Serbs. MND (SW) refused to disseminate it because they feared problems would occur in their area of the RS. In MND (N), the opposite often occurred. MND (N) often requested the production of PSYOP products that stepped beyond the bounds of the then current PSYOP themes and messages. When these product concepts were disapproved by the ARRC or IFOR, MND (N) would often vent its frustration by claiming the CJIICTF was “not supportive” of the Division's needs. For example, MND (N)'s desire to produce a poster demanding all Bosnians turn in weapons when entering the Zone Of Separation (ZOS). This was a violation of the GFAP since police were allowed handguns in the ZOS. There were other problems such as a number of the PSYOP products were felt to be too “American” and did not reflect the European advertising traditions prevalent in the Bosnia region of the world—the problem was not so much in cosmopolitan Sarajevo but more in the provincial regions. There were also PSYOP product distribution problems as well that resulted in some time sensitive information getting to the local population too late to have the desired effect.
The MND commanders and the tactical PSYOP teams felt too that they needed more freedom and flexibility to tailor and produce products for use with their local population. In this regard, there was some freedom but it was limited to within the scope of the COMIFOR approved activities. The command and control relationships also needed to be more clearly articulated, disseminated to the elements involved, and consistently implemented. Additionally, changes, caveats, or exceptions also needed to be made clear to all organizations affected. In the cases where there was an absence of clear guidance, this hampered the execution of the PSYOP campaign. PSYOP teams were less effective in situations where they were subordinated to the G-5 at the tactical level and/or did not participate as part of the commander's battle staff. Working for the G5 essentially turned PSYOP into a Civil Affairs support activity.
Differences in PSYOP doctrine, particularly between the U.S. and the UK, were an issue that had to be addressed as well. The top-down product development approach of the U.S., who ran the CJIICTF, was in direct conflict with the UK approach that favored a decentralized, grass-roots product development. The British also thought the approval process was too cumbersome. They favored delegating product approval authority to the lowest level practical. The French, who were reluctant to use PSYOP forces, only allowed a limited U.S. PSYOP presence in MND (SE), a liaison officer and FM radio section. Occasionally, the French allowed the CJIICTF to pass out the COMIFOR “Herald of Peace” and voter education products. Other contingents such as the Spanish and Italians did not cooperate closely with the CJIICTF but did use “information policies” in support of their G5 activities. Although some fixes occurred over the duration of the IFOR operation to improve problems stemming from differences, a basic tension remained.
A number of other challenges were encountered in the execution of the PSYOP mission. In some cases, the CJIICTF mission statement and “commander's intent” did not get distributed to appropriate levels of the command structure. Command relationships were not always clearly articulated and/or implemented. At times, the product approval process was cumbersome and the distribution slow. Some training issues were experienced in terms of adequate preparation of the tactical PSYOP teams. The organic communications support at the tactical level was limited and in some cases inadequate to support the mission. A combination of these factors, compounded by the MND (N) mode of operation, hampered the ability of some tactical PSYOP teams to effectively accomplish their mission in the MND (N) area of operation in particular.
The U.S. tactical PSYOP teams relied almost solely on the units they supported for their communications. This left them, in many cases, with limited means of communicating with their higher headquarters. FM communications was to be the means for the teams to communicate but in the mountainous environment of Bosnia, FM communications was nearly impossible. The supported units used means such as commercial VSAT, INMARSAT, and in MND (N), the U.S. Mobile Subscriber Equipment. Tactical LANs, tactical packet networks, and Internet access were also available in MND (N) and used. PSYOP teams were not high on the priority list (and in some cases, the OPORD did not “rate” them LAN and MSE access) for access to the supported unit's scarce tactical communications assets. Relying on “borrowing” phones and computers often proved problematic due to the heavy usage of this equipment by all elements. At times, it took several hours for the tactical PSYOP teams to reach headquarters elements and them to reach the deployed teams. The urban nature of the mission required the tactical teams to split up and conduct operations often indoors as well as outdoors and in areas such as crowded markets. The lack of adequate communications for the dismounted operations became a force protection issue.
In some areas of Bosnia, such as those occupied by the Bosnian-Serbs, an information campaign targeted against NATO was already in full operation when the IFOR troops arrived. The Bosniacs and Bosnian-Croats also had a sophisticated media campaign going. For example, the Bosniac's claimed that the French were dumping their nuclear waste from tests in the South Pacific on Mount Igman—this was a running story in many Bosniac papers for most of the Spring of 1996. Hence, the IIC was at a disadvantage at the outset because it had to compete immediately with an already established and effective campaign that could get inside of the IFOR decision loop and out maneuver some of the initial IFOR Information Campaign efforts.
The CJIICTF, although aware of the sophisticated media consumption habits of the Bosnians, did not have the equipment available to cater to the media-savvy group. While IFOR relied primarily on printed material (The Herald of Peace and MIRKO, posters, and handbills) and radio to start with, the Bosnians preferred medium was television. Also, IFOR radio transmitted on AM and the Bosnians listened mostly to FM radios. By April 1996, the CJIICTF had established an FM radio transmitter in Sarajevo and started weekly television production. However, the funding and expertise to buy and operate this relatively new PSYOP equipment was difficult to obtain.
The media used by IFOR at the outset was largely driven by capabilities available from the deployed PSYOP resources (mainly from the U.S. that relied heavily on radio, printed material and loudspeaker systems). There was also limited NATO funding for acquiring airtime on the local and national radio and television stations. NATO funding to acquire FM radio and television stations for sole use by the IIC was not available. In MND (N), at the outset of the operation, some local stations would play things for free and even grant some free airtime. Not surprising, however, this changed after NATO started offering money for airtime.
Over time, adjustments were made to accommodate other media forms such as FM radio and buying airtime on local and national radio and television stations. The U.S. PSYOP platform, Commando Solo, was not deployed during the IFOR phase of the operation. This platform has a wide range of radio and television broadcast capabilities. However, due to the perceived high air threat early in the mission and the high cost of deploying this aircraft, Commando Solo was not used. It did see some limited use in support of the September 1997 election activities during the Stabilization Force (SFOR) phase of the operation (it broadcast a test pattern for a few hours a day).
There were both successes and failures in the products prepared and distributed by the IFOR Information Campaign. The Herald of Peace (a weekly newspaper published by the U.S. forces), MIRKO (a monthly youth magazine produced by the German forces), and Superman mine awareness comic books (produced by U.S. forces) were major successes. There were other products that were not as successful, mainly because they failed to adequately consider the cultural implications. For example a checklist of what was done and accomplished was produced. After it was distributed, it was discovered that Bosnians don't do checklists. Another example was a poster with a chess game to encourage voting. While CJIICTF pre-testing indicated that the Bosnians understood the “it's your move” message on the poster to mean that the Bosnians had to take charge of their own future in the upcoming election, other Bosnians, once the poster was disseminated, interpreted the chess game to mean the international community was playing with Bosnia's future.
IFOR and the Multinational Divisions used Civil Affairs, PSYOP, Special Operations, and Intelligence teams as well as other elements to survey perceptions and attitudes and to collect information that could be used to assess the effectiveness of the Information Campaign and to identify adjustments to improve its effectiveness. Feedback from other sources such as local newspapers, radio and television broadcasts, and the Internet were used as well. As the U.S. Army FM 100-6 points out, “The challenge of Information Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) is to be able to assess the effects of our efforts without the benefit of physical damage. The effects may well be trends, activities, and patterns in future adversary actions.”
The reluctance of IFOR to take on controversial issues such as war criminals had its down side effects. For example, the reluctance to deal with indicted war criminals went as far as modifying a poster printed on the behalf of the ICTY (International Criminal Tribunal for former-Yugoslavia). The original poster identified all publicly indicted war criminals with their last known addresses. After journalists challenged the U.S. military's claim that it had insufficient intelligence to arrest the war criminals by pointing to the addresses on the poster (reporters had been able to locate 12 of the indicted war criminals just using this information), IFOR reprinted the poster without the addresses. The decision outraged the ICTY who asked that its logo be removed from the poster. At the end of this controversy, IFOR decided not to distribute the posters that had omitted the addresses. [3] The conciliatory tone of the IFOR Information Campaign dismayed many in the international community working in Bosnia. For example, OHR officials commented that they had little use for a campaign that was too weak to have substantial impact. [4]
The IFOR Information Campaign proved to be a difficult task and the jury is still out on its over all success for the IFOR operation (i.e., military, civil, political, economic, and humanitarian aspects). It was certainly a success during the first 9 months of the operation in support of force protection and military compliance activities (transfer of Area of Transfer's from one faction to another and placing heavy weapons in cantonment areas). LTG Mike Walker, UKA, Commander ARRC, said, “the IIC was an unqualified success during military compliance activities (D+3 through D+120) and in support of the September 1996 National elections.” There were also some successes against the Serbs, e.g., war criminal awareness posters and the destruction of 250 tons of Bosnian Serb munitions, operation “Volcano.” Over time, speeches by Karadzic became reactive and he complained about IIC messages and actions. The raid on Fortica (terrorist training camps) was another success story. A top-down driven campaign plan with top-down driven products was viewed as an important contributor to the military successes.
Coordination of the IFOR Information Campaign was assured through several different mechanisms both internal and external. At the IFOR and ARRC headquarters level, a Joint Information Coordination Committee was set up to coordinate the activities of the PI, CIMIC, CJIICTF (PSYOP) and major international organizations (e.g., HR, OSCE, UNHCR, IPTF, and Embassy's) spokesmen. This group met weekly to inform each other of ongoing activities and future plans. It also allowed them to ensure that their messages did not conflict and to prepare common strategies. The ARRC established a Chief Information Officer who was responsible for the daily coordination of the PI and CJIICTF activities. The ARRC established other coordination activities such as the ARRC Perception Group (2 to 4 week horizons) and the ARRC Information Coordination Group (1 day to 1-week horizon) that reviewed messages, strategies, and trends associated with the information campaign. Both formal and informal coordination mechanisms were also established at the multinational divisions.
Coordination also took place with the international organizations responsible for implementing the civilian annexes of the Dayton Accord. The Office of the High Representative established Joint Civil Commissions (JCC) at the regional levels to facilitate implementation of civil actions outlined in the GFAP throughout Bosnia. Organizations that participated in the JCC included the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), the International Police Task Force (IPTF), the World Bank (WB), the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), the International Criminal Tribunal—Yugoslavia (ICTY), and IFOR. In early spring of 1996, the OHR, UNHCR, UNMIBH, OSCE, and to a lesser extent the World Bank agreed to participate with IFOR in the daily briefing to the press at the combined press information center in the Holiday Inn in Sarajevo. IFOR set up CIMIC Centers at the cantonal (local) level to implement civil reconstruction and improvement plans. These centers operated in each of the Multinational Divisions where there was a demonstrated need and available resources.
IFOR established a Joint Military Commission (JMC) as the central body for commanders of military factions to coordinate and resolve problems. Two or more FWF military representatives (usually commanders) attended meetings under IFOR supervision to coordinate joint activities, disseminate intent and instructions, and to resolve differences. COMIFOR delegated routine JMC chairmanship to COMARRC who issued instructions to ensure the Parties' compliance with the military aspects of the GFAP. Below the COMARRC level, the MNDs, their subordinate brigades and battalions established subordinate military commissions. At these lower levels, the JMC activities included disseminating policy, issuing instructions to factions on policies and procedures, and coordinating GFAP-required actions, resolving military complaints, questions or problems, coordinating civil-military actions where appropriate, and developing confidence-building measures between the parties. The first JMC meeting took place on 20 December 1995, chaired initially by COMIFOR, and then by COMARRC. Following a series of bilateral meetings with faction CORPS commanders, the first Commander, Task Force Eagle (COMEAGLE also Commander, MND (N)) JMC meeting took place on 27 December 1995 in the Posavina Corridor Zone of Separation. In Operation Joint Endeavor, COMIFOR had final authority over the military aspects of the peace agreement.
National military elements were required to provide daily situation reports to their respective national military chain of command organizations and MoDs. There was a need for these national elements to report to IFOR as well as part of the NATO chain of command. Contingents fulfilled the dual requirement by sending their situation reports to both IFOR and their respective MoDs. There were of course national interest only reports to their MoDs that did not go to IFOR. The dual reporting did not happen, however, without creating some difficulties for IFOR. In some cases, information was formally released to the international press, both by contingents in theater and by home nations, without IFOR prior knowledge.
In spite of formidable obstacles and a somewhat chaotic beginning, NATO and its member nations installed and operated the largest military-civil Communications and Information System (CIS) ever built to support a major peace operation.
A complex mixture of NATO, National, UN, and civilian or commercial networks and components provided IFOR CIS services. National tactical equipment was used to establish the core IFOR telecommunications infrastructure. The U.S. TRI-TAC system provided a large portion of the Strategic and Theater level telecommunications infrastructure supporting organizations such as SHAPE, AFSOUTH, IFOR, C-SUPPORT, COMMZ and the National Support Elements (NSE). NATO and SHAPE also provided strategic to theater level capabilities, too. These were mainly leased communications services (E1) into Croatia, the lease of UN VSAT services, establishment of the IEC commercial SATCOM/IDNX network, and UHF TACSAT. The UK tactical system, PTARMIGAN, provided the telecommunications support for the ARRC (CORPS level) and between the ARRC and the Multi-National Division (MND) headquarters. The three framework nations (U.S., UK and France) used their tactical systems to support Division level communications including service to those forces assigned to their Divisions. TRI-TAC/Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE) equipment was employed in support of MND (North) and the U.S. NSE in Hungary. PTARMIGAN was used to support MND (Southwest) and the UK NSE in Split. French tactical systems already in place (used in support of UNPROFOR) were used to initially support MND (Southeast). The tactical system RITA was deployed in the March 1996 time frame to provide additional support to MND (SE) and its NSE in Ploce. The Italian system, SOTRIN, supported the Italian Brigade in MND (SE) and the German tactical system, AUTOKO, supported the German contingent in MND (SW).
The voice network was an ad hoc integration of NATO and national strategic networks, national tactical systems, the UN VSAT network, and the Croatian and BiH PTT networks where available. The NATO CRONOS Wide Area Network and the Interim ARRC CIS network (both client-server architectures, employing Microsoft Office for office automation and M/S email service) provided valuable crisis response and Command and Control capabilities for the IFOR operation. VTC was used extensively by IFOR and the ARRC and as time went on, it became a key element in conducting business. VTC was also the C2 system of choice for the U.S. Army forces. The VTC equipment was COTS-based. The U.S. LOCE intelligence dissemination system was extended to the Multinational Division Hqs level to support IFOR intelligence needs. Nations also provided national intelligence support and services to IFOR through liaison officers and National Intelligence Cells (NICs) collocated with key command headquarters, e.g., the IFOR and ARRC headquarters in Sarajevo.
INMARSAT was used extensively and commercial cellular services were available in some areas of Croatia and towards the end of the IFOR phase of the operation in the Sarajevo area as well. Unclassified Internet was also used frequently and demands for service increased throughout the operation. Internet use was not planned, its use simply grew with user demand.
Network and system management of IFOR's Communications and Information networks proved to be a major challenge. An IFOR organization structure had to be created, agreed, and staffed quickly. The U.S Joint Pub 6-05 provided the basis for the establishment of the Combined Joint Communications Control Center (CJCCC) to manage IFOR's networks. A Theater Frequency Management capability had to be established. The NATO CIS Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA) had to expand its functionality to accommodate the management of the extension of NATO strategic network services into Croatia and Bosnia. System tools had to be acquired to monitor and manage the IFOR data networks. There were multiple NATO and national players (e.g., NACOSA, the AFSOUTH ACOS CISD, the IFOR CJ6, the CJCCC, the ARRC G6, the MND G6's and national J6's) who's roles and relationships needed to be more clearly defined and their activities in support of the operation coordinated.
There were overlaps in network and system management organizational responsibilities (e.g., NACOSA versus the CJCCC versus the ARRC G6) that needed to be worked out since the distinction between strategic, theater, and tactical became blurred. NATO communications and ADP were managed separately and this needed to be accommodated by the CJCCC. There were “stove-piped” network implementations (e.g., voice, data and VTC) that had to be accommodated as well. The NATO and national C4 and I and national ISR systems were managed separately. Coordination and collaboration became key ingredients in the evolution of the IFOR network management structure and capabilities. Over time, these issues were resolved and the CIS system provided reasonable services. However, the CIS systems for the most part were never heavily stressed during the IFOR operation. Therefore, the performance of the networks and the supporting management organization were never tested under more hostile or stressful conditions.
Historically, interoperability has been one of the most difficult areas to deal with and this operation was no exception. The analog-based NATO interface standard, STANAG 5040, was still the norm for interfacing strategic, theater and tactical voice systems. No digital interface existed for interfacing strategic and tactical digital networks. The U.S. TTC-39D tactical switch experienced interface problems with the Ericsson MD-110 switch used by the UN and IFOR. The STU-IIB is a NATO approved secure voice equipment and was used extensively by IFOR. A large number of the U.S. forces that deployed to Bosnia brought with them versions of STU-IIIs which were not interoperable with the STU-IIBs. The Interim Digital Interface PTARMIGAN (IDIP), designed by the UK for this operation, was used to provide a digital interface between the UK PTARMIGAN and the U.S. TRI-TAC/MSE tactical systems. The N.E.T. commercial IDNX (smart multiplexer) equipment required the certification of some 50 different interface arrangements as part of its use in the IFOR networks.
There were no automated interfaces between the IFOR data networks (CRONOS, IARRCIS and LOCE) and national networks. The CRONOS was not interfaced with LOCE or the ADAMS (NATO movement control system) even though information was manually transferred between the systems. The main reason for this was security considerations. There were no approved secure guard gateways that could accommodate an automated interface. The ADAMS and U.S. JOPES movement control systems required a manual interface for exchanging information. U.S. intelligence processing systems used at echelons above corps (EAC) did not “talk” to the echelons at corps and below (ECB) systems. To fix the problem, some EAC systems such as the U.S. Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) had to be deployed to ECB intelligence centers. Exercises such as INTEROP 95 and Mountain Shield served to help work out many of the integration and interoperability issues in advance of the deployment and also provided excellent training for the organizations that deployed in support of the operation. However, while interoperability is improving, there is still a long way to go to achieve seamless integration of CIS systems and services.
Problems with computer viruses were experienced not only with the CRONOS and IARRCIS data networks but also with most computers brought into the theater. Virus detection and correction measures were put in place as well as a user information awareness campaign. Other network protection tools and capabilities such as intrusion detection and protection for the data networks were slow in implementation. In addition to viruses, dust and dirt caused problems with disk drives creating the requirement for protective measures. Commercial power failures and fluctuations caused major CIS outages for those sites that did not have an UPS capability and power surge protection equipment. The extension of secure services to non-NATO coalition partners was also an issue that had to be dealt with by IFOR. Security policy modifications were required to accommodate the release of classified information, liaison teams were provide to non-NATO units assigned to IFOR such as the U.S. INTEL team with the Russian Brigade and the U.S. provided STU-IIB's for the PfP nations supporting the operation. It was suggested by the IFOR CJ6 that NATO consider the use of commercially available security products to support future peace operation security needs.
U.S commanders, in particular, reported that a virtual “flood” of new technologies followed their deployment to Bosnia. These technologies were generally inserted incompletely and imperfectly. Many of the new systems and technologies were deployed without doctrinal support or concepts of operations. As a consequence, they could not be fully employed. Moreover, because they had not been through full and systematic development and testing, trained military operators were not available. Initial operations and maintenance capabilities had to be provided by contractors or research personnel. Even so, these new technologies reportedly made excessive demands on operator personnel who eventually had to find the time to learn to maintain and operate the equipment and develop concepts of operation. In many cases, this meant that new systems were underutilized because their full functionality and potential were not understood. On the other hand, there were some very innovative uses of technology. For example, commercial of the shelf products were used to digitize the Apache attack helicopter gun-camera footage so that unclassified imagery (photos) of Dayton Accord violations could be produced and provided to the on-the-scene commander in less than 24 hours of observing the violation.
The advanced technology capabilities deployed in Bosnia were essentially “stove-pipe” systems and capabilities. Hence, one of the major challenges the U.S. and IFOR faced was the integration of these capabilities and systems into the operation and being able to exploit them to the maximum extent possible. As noted earlier, the operational integration was not accomplished as effectively as the commanders in the field would have liked to minimize the impact on the day to day operations and to allow them to fully exploit the capabilities of the systems deployed.
Bosnia is, in many regards, a living prototype of a post-Cold War complex contingency operation. It is the kind of operation we may expect to see more of in the future and if we learn the correct lessons from the operation and act upon them, the payoff could be considerable. One should not forget, however, that potential adversaries of the NATO Alliance and the U.S., in particular, will not be so foolish as to neglect glaring weakness in the doctrine and tactics and information systems and services implemented in support of the IFOR coalition information operation. Active countermeasures against coalition information and information systems may be the case in future operations. Doctrine and tactics based upon an assumed freedom to communicate and ability to achieve information dominance may not be sufficient the next time around, even for peace operations.
It is a difficult enough task to orchestrate Information Operations as a national activity; therefore, orchestrating a Coalition Information Operation is an even more difficult challenge for the multinational participants. The Information Operations doctrine for the U.S. was evolving at the outset of the IFOR operation. The U.S. Army capstone doctrine for Information Operations was not published until August 1996 as manual FM 100-6, Information Operations. This doctrine is specifically oriented at the operational and tactical levels of military operations. In October 1996, MG Meigs, USA, before his departure to command the 1ID and MND (N) in Bosnia, asked the Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA) [5] to assist in the development and execution of an Information Operation and Campaign for his area of operation. This was to be an activity directed at supporting MND (N) not IFOR/SFOR per se and would be the first Information Campaign supporting a multinational peacekeeping force since the publication of the new Army doctrine. The 1ID and LIWA applied the new doctrine and a process was put in place that enabled the commander MND (N) to execute a synchronized Information Operation and Campaign, something that had not been accomplished for IFOR. The summary of findings to follow are not, however, based on the new U.S. strategy employed by the 1ID in MND (N) but are based on IFOR experiences that did not benefit from such formal doctrine. The IFOR experience was essentially a learn-as-you-go strategy. It was a tough enough job to try to orchestrate a first-ever integrated and synchronized coalition Information Campaign.
The score card for IFOR Information Operations in Bosnia has both pluses and minuses. It was not an outstanding success but on the other hand, it certainly was not a failure and a lot has been learned and is continuing to be learned. Many of the activities that comprise Information Operations were being done but not necessarily as an integrated strategy. There were a number of factors that made it difficult to put an integrated, top-down driven process in place. This was a NATO first-ever so there was little to no doctrine and experience to guide activities. As a result, there was a lot of learning on the job, lots of creativity, and de facto doctrine was developed as the operation evolved. In the absence of doctrine, Information Operations for IFOR initially focused on the IFOR Information Campaign. There was an exception in MND (N) where Force Protection (clear U.S. guidance--take no causalities) was also a key element of the integrated operations plan. Offensive Command and Control Warfare actions such as deception, destruction, and EW and offensive warfare such as computer network attack were not employed by IFOR. PSYOP (IFOR Information Campaign) actions were aimed at force protection and deterring the local population from engaging in hostile actions against IFOR troops. The Public Information Campaign was designed to inform and build a trust relation with the local and international media. Civil Affairs aimed its efforts at informing the local population about civil affairs activities and their impact on the population's daily life. The coordination of the various information activities was a difficult task due to the fact that the Dayton Accords did not designate a single authority to synchronize the military and civil activities. There were also growing pains associated with the establishment of the IFOR C2 structure and its relationships with national military elements and the evolving International Organization elements. Physical protection measures for IFOR command and information facilities varied across the theater. And, information assurance and protection measures for the federated system of systems that comprised the IFOR information network varied across the NATO, national, and commercial systems that were used to create the IFOR network. Sharing and release of sensitive information to the coalition partners required the creative establishment of special NATO release procedures and extensive use of liaison operations.
The following is a recap of some of the important observations presented to illustrate the degree of difficulty and problems the IFOR had to over come to put in place an IFOR version of Information Operations:
The IFOR experiences have certainly contributed to shaping the emerging Information Operations doctrine and capabilities, including the SFOR phase of the Bosnia operation. Some thoughts for consideration in the development of future NATO and coalition Information Operations doctrine, actions, and capabilities follows:
In the final analysis, agility and accommodation continue to be keys to the success of complex contingency operations as well as some plain old good luck. The IFOR operation was a military success because of the professionalism, dedication and ingenuity of the men and women who were there and those who supported them.
[1] Maj Steve Collins, USA, of the USAJFKSWCS provided valuable insights to this section, in particular, as well as other sections of this report. The insights were based upon his on-the-ground experience in Bosnia.
[2] See footnote 13.
[3] “How not to catch a war criminal,” Colin Soloway, U.S. News and World Report, December 1996.
[4] See footnote 11.
[5] LIWA Support to Operation Joint Endeavor/Operation Joint Guard: Operationalizing IO in Bosnia-Herzegovina, LTC Garry Beavers, USA, and LTC Steve Shanahan, USA (Ret'd), LIWA, 1997.
[6] Multidisciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from Recent Experiences, UN Peacekeeping Operations, Lessons Learned Unit Publication.