This ambitious program attempts to quantify combat effectiveness, defined as `the ability of a military organization to achieve its objectives in a hostile environment,' through analysis of quantitative and judgmental data concerning three wartime (World War II, Korea, Vietnam) and two `special operations' (operations other than war in the Dominican Republic and Lebanon) environments. The exhaustive statistical and analytical work is reflected by results of study quoted in the report itself and in the accompanying voluminous appendices. The results of the study are divided between findings based on the `historical' (that is to say, quantitative) factors and those based on the judgmental factors. The former describe the importance of military and political support to combat operations; the latter highlight the role of C3I and morale issues. Of the factors considered, the five most important contain both combat-operational (creation of local superiority by fire and movement, intense preparatory fire) and C3I elements (adaptive behavior, leadership, planning). Adaptive behavior (comprehending the battlefield situation and effectively reacting to it) emerges as `the most important single activity that a unit can execute'.