A revision of a work of the same name published in 1983 by Harvard University's Center for Information Policy Research, the 1985 edition describes theater forces, their C2, their command structure, and the influence of doctrine and mission. It goes on to examine the C2 system planning and acquisition process and the means by which assessments of success or failure for C2 system contributions to outcomes are derived. It closes with a brief chapter on `Responsibility, Accountability, Authority, and Capacity.' Appendices list program contributors and reviewers. A glossary of acronyms and an index are provided. The 1986 edition specifically addresses the C2 issues involved in the Korean theater. It consists of a background (introduction to C2, history of the US-ROK relationship, discussion of command and limits on `multiservice' and multinational commands), a Korea Assessment (an analysis of the organization of the Korea Command, its C2, its communications structure, its exercise program, and the use of and opportunities for technology in the Korea Command's C2), and a section of `Other Options and Implications,' in which the author explores the weaknesses caused by inter-Service rivalry (both in the Korean Command and, more importantly, in the JCS). The book concludes with suggested structure for resolving some of the inter-Service issues. Cushman's conclusions and suggestions are interesting reading in light of the subsequent restructuring brought about by the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986.