(Summer 1997 NATO Workshop)
Larry K. Wentz
Command and Control Research Program
National Defense University
Fort McNair, D.C. 20319-6000
wentzl@ndu.edu
There were many NATO and national initiatives that related to collecting Bosnia insights, assessing the effectiveness of the Implementation Force (IFOR), and assembling lessons learned from the Bosnia experience. Most of these activities were not well coordinated and there was no overarching set of issues or functions driving the independent activities. Furthermore, no one person or organization was given the responsibility for setting the agendas and priorities of these efforts. Hence, there were redundancies and overlaps in the related activities. The initiatives also varied in complexity and depth, duration of the efforts, and focus of the areas of interest. The National Defense University was tasked by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence to attempt to pull together an appropriate collection of ongoing activities and put a coherent C2 and supporting C4ISR picture together, including lesson learned. This paper discusses NDU’s efforts to act as a clearinghouse for Bosnia study activities, to facilitate collaboration and cooperation among the related community initiatives, and to integrate the C4ISR community experiences and lessons learned into a coherent picture. NDU’s research initiatives related to Operation Joint Endeavor is addressed and databases, analysis tools, and activities related to longer-term assessments and strategy development are also covered. Finally, some thoughts on lessons learned about lessons learned and opportunities for longer-term assessments are discussed.
Recognizing that the deployment and operation of Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) capabilities in support of the complex coalition peace operation in Bosnia provided a unique opportunity to simultaneously collect experiences and lessons learned and to perform an analysis of the effectiveness of command arrangements and supporting C4ISR, Mr. Emmett Paige, Jr., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (ASD/C3I) tasked the Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology (ACT) [now the Command and Control Research Program} at the National Defense University (NDU) on February 15, 1996, to undertake this project in its role as his executive agent for the Command and Control Research Program.
ACT’s charge was broad, covering both the effectiveness of command arrangements and the effectiveness of supporting C4ISR. Hence, the study addressed all of the classic issues of C4ISR, including structures, functions, capacities, doctrine, and training. Furthermore, ACT was tasked to pull together the related ongoing C4ISR community activities and build a coherent C4ISR story, including lessons learned. The study charter was introduced to the Joint Staff through the J-6 (Director, Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems) and was subsequently coordinated with the J-3 (through the Vice-Director for Operations). Both endorsed the effort, and the decision was made that the J-3 would be the official Joint Staff point of contact for the effort.
This paper discusses ACT’s approach to unifying the collection of experiences, analyses of operations, and assembling of lessons learned. Some of the ACT findings are presented, including key players and reports produced by the related activities. The lessons learned processes used by various organizations and tools for longer-term assessments are also covered. Finally, some thoughts on lessons learned about lessons learned and opportunities for longer-term assessments are discussed.
The ACT Bosnia study charter listed three major tasking areas: (1) document the build-up and evolution of C4I systems and capabilities provided to all echelons; (2) document command arrangements (both formal and informal) as they evolve and the rationales for changes; and (3) assess the effectiveness of command arrangements and C4I systems and the adjustments made to them over time. Command arrangements of specific interest included those (a) associated with joint operations, (b) within and among U.S. Government (USG) organizations, (c) among military organizations (NATO, Russians, and others), (d) between the U.S. and nongovernmental and private volunteer organizations (NGOs and PVOs), and (e) associated with local governments and organizations. In addition, ACT was tasked to unify the C4ISR community activities and put together a coherent lessons learned story.
ACT was sensitized to the need to be unobtrusive and to minimize demands on military organizations in the theater of operations. In-theater travel and visits, while necessary for some aspects of the study, were limited to those required to support a quality product. Research activities were initiated in February 1996, and it was expected that they would continue for at least six months after the exit of major U.S. forces from Bosnia. With the transition of IFOR (Implementation Force) to the Stabilization Force (SFOR) on 20 December 1996, the NDU effort was adjusted to focus on putting the IFOR story together as a first priority. The collection of SFOR experiences and lessons learned was to continue but at a much lower level of effort.
The NDU study was designed to produce a variety of products and a final report will summarize all of the findings on C4ISR Lessons Learned. Early study results have already been briefed at C4ISR community symposium and workshops such as AFCEA, MILCOM, the NDU Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS)-sponsored NATO symposium, and the Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre workshop on peacekeeping and conflict resolution. In the near future, findings will also be presented at the Military Operations Research Society (MORS) C2 workshop, the Swedish Naval Warfare Centre-sponsored Partnership-for-Peace lessons learned workshop, the NATO Panel 7 workshop on IFOR data collection and analysis, and the ACT-sponsored International C2 Research symposium.
Using ACT’s approach of crafting balanced Mission Capability Packages (Figure 1) to deal with emerging issues and opportunities, key findings will be provided to doctrine developers in the Joint community and the Services. In addition, the results will be used to develop Professional Military Education (PME) materials for use at all levels of professional schooling. Finally, NDU/ACT will select the most important topics and findings for publication as articles in Joint Forces Quarterly and other visible periodicals as well as books through the NDU Press.
ACT brought together a multidisciplined, diverse group of analysts and researchers to carry out the major tasking areas of the Bosnia study charter (Figure 2). A core team was established under the leadership of the Director of the Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology and consisted of participants from NDU/ACT, Evidence Based Research, Inc. (EBR), C4I Integration Support Activity (CISA), MITRE, and Decision-Science Applications Inc. The core team was augmented, as required, with subject area experts from Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA), Joint Interoperability Test Command (JITC), Special Operations Command (SOCOM), J2/Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and J6Z. Staff from the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) and Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA) also provided advice and inputs to the effort. As other organizations and activities were identified, and their potential contributions to the effort assessed, they too were invited to augment the core team to provide additional depth of expertise. Some examples of these augmentees were experts in the area of Intelligence Operations, Information Campaign, CI/HUMINT, PSYOPS, Civil Affairs, Public Affairs, and the NGO/PVO community.
Operation Joint Endeavor was well underway before the NDU study effort was initiated and it was quickly determined that a number of other organizations had initiated efforts that would provide important information that the NDU effort did not need to duplicate. Therefore, ACT made identifying all related efforts its first priority. These included lessons learned activities, research efforts, and assessments of C4ISR performance in Bosnia. The round up of all relevant efforts was a key element of ACT’s four-part, highly leveraged plan for accomplishing the mission of assessing C4ISR effectiveness and collecting lessons learned.
ACT achieved its goal of a highly leveraged effort based upon attention to four principles: Coordination, Collaboration, Integration, and Focused Research. Coordination allowed ACT to avoid duplication, minimize demands on the commands in the field, and maximize the return on its own focused data collection efforts. Collaboration permitted the effective use of access and expertise in other organizations while also allowing ACT’s expertise to be used efficiently and effectively. Integration of all the work performed, whether by ACT personnel, those working on their behalf, or those operating under very different charters, allowed ACT to add value to the work of others and to provide a unique, and important contribution. This included collecting products from all sources, comparing and contrasting them to test for consistency of findings across time, space, levels of command, and analyst perspective, as well as looking across the range of available evidence in order to detect larger patterns. Because there were so many actors looking at the Bosnia experience from so many different perspectives, many of the reported lessons learned had parochial overtones or held true only under limited circumstances. Integrating the mass of material generated and being able to examine it from a relatively neutral perspective, the ACT team was in an excellent position to detect the trends dominating the Bosnia experiences and the structures and processes that drive them. Focused research by the ACT team was reserved for key issues that (a) were central to the charter from ASD/C3I and ACT’s priorities, (b) focused on topics where ACT had or could get expertise and relevant evidence, and (c) were not being adequately covered by other agencies or organizations.
ACT looked beyond conducting its specific technical analyses and developing specific products to helping the community at large do a better job of learning the lessons of the Bosnia experience. Therefore, ACT devoted some of its efforts to creating forums and mechanisms to encourage and facilitate the study and exchange of data, information, and ideas among the many organizations involved in studying the Bosnia experience. Formal and informal exchanges of drafts, professional discussions, workshops, publications of results, and the ACT C2 symposium and community development programs were and will continue to be used to enrich the study and leverage its impact.
The most successful ACT coordination initiative was the creation of a "Bosnia C4ISR Roundtable" (Figure 3) where a range of U.S. activities involved in lessons learned and assessment of performance in Bosnia were brought together in a constructive atmosphere to encourage sharing and cooperation. The first meeting took place on April 10, 1996, with 21 activities involved. This session was an immediate and significant success. The organizations present agreed that the meeting was very helpful. Virtually everyone present learned for the first time about one or more activities directly related to their own. Some initial findings were reported orally and consensus existed that the Roundtable should meet regularly. Participants readily agreed that the Roundtable should serve as a mechanism for reviewing draft materials and disseminating products on lessons learned and C4ISR performance.
Immediately after the first Roundtable meeting, ACT published a directory of the organizations that had attended. This directory included the addresses (including telephone, fax, and e-mail) of the points of contact and a brief description of the relevant activities and interests of each of the organizations. An e-mail network was established to facilitate collaboration, coordination, and sharing of information. This network proved to be very beneficial to all of the participants. Follow-up meetings with a variety of Roundtable participants indicated that they had subsequently made a number of direct contacts with other members of the group and had been able to coordinate and focus their activities much better because of these new linkages.
The second meeting of the Bosnia C4ISR Roundtable took place on 30 May 1996. More than 30 activities or organizations asked to be represented, an increase of more than 50 percent from the first meeting. The agenda included presentations on several efforts that had reached preliminary findings. The progress of ACT’s efforts were briefed, IDA briefed their charter and first-order conclusions (largely on the planning and deployment phases) from their lessons learned effort for European Command (EUCOM), the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) covered findings from their analysis of policies and procedures for intelligence sharing in the context of the Bosnia operation, the first results of a study by the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) were reviewed, and the progress of the CISA team building a C4ISR laydown was briefed. Substantive discussion among different agencies was encouraged and proved highly productive.
As implied by its name, the Bosnia C4ISR Roundtable was a meeting among equals. All those U.S. organizations with a charter to collect data or lessons learned related to C4ISR, either in terms of command arrangements or supporting systems, were welcomed, as were those agencies or organizations who were potential consumers of the results of those analyses. ACT served as the chair of the roundtable. The organizations listed in Figure 3 were all self-nominated by declaring that they had a role in Bosnian C4ISR and an interest in its assessment.
Taken together, the Roundtable was a major asset to the broad task of developing valid and meaningful lessons learned on the Bosnia C4ISR experience. While participation was voluntary, the value of the information exchange created a very real incentive for joining and attending. ACT continued to use the Roundtable for the duration of the IFOR phase of the Bosnia operation. It was a useful mechanism for the coordination of efforts and to ensure crosschecking of facts and findings within the community.
The rich set of lessons learned and effectiveness assessment activities already underway (Figure 4) when the ACT study started represented both major opportunities and potential problems. On the one hand, the opportunities for synergistic work were obvious. Moreover, as ACT made contacts in the theater and the U.S. community, virtually everyone indicated a willingness to cooperate and a positive attitude toward working together. Every organization involved in lessons learned or performance assessment also expressed a recognition that many different activities were underway. Almost all of them also expressed a strong desire for efficient and effective information exchange in this arena.
At the same time, the potential for problems arising from the number and variety of activities underway was obvious. Overlapping missions and redundancy of data collection efforts were the most obvious. The demands on the time of key officers and staff in the field commands and operational headquarters were already high and a multitude of visitors became a significant burden. From the IFOR Joint Analysis Team (JAT) headquarters to the field commands, ACT’s analysts heard complaints about "IFOR Tourism" almost from its first contacts in theater. Some of these comments were pointedly directed at the United States, who reportedly had the largest number of visitors in the theater. Moreover, NATO sensitivity about national access to materials within NATO commands remained high and, reportedly, had not been handled well by U.S. and other national activities.
ACT’s approach was heavily influenced by attempts to take advantage of ongoing efforts where ACT could focus its limited resources on collecting data and conducting analyses of key issues. Considerable progress was made. By stressing collaboration, working closely with the JAT and selected U.S. activities, establishing mechanisms for cooperation and information exchange, and positioning itself to address key issues in command arrangements and C4ISR structure, functions, and capacity, ACT was able to put an efficient and productive process in place that bore fruit by bringing a coherent picture into focus. Having set up the necessary data collection and sharing mechanisms, ACT became fully engaged in documenting the Bosnia C4ISR experience and identifying and researching key issues.
Three major thrusts existed (Figure 4) in the IFOR lessons learned arena: NATO’s formal effort, the NDU effort directed by ASD/C3I, and the relatively uncoordinated set of initiatives underway within the overall U.S. community. There were also national efforts undertaken by the French and British but these were not discovered until well into the ACT study. The NATO process had a formal and relatively integrated structure. The charter of the JAT was explicitly derived from Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEURs) Operations Plan (OPLAN) 10405 and linked to IFOR through the IFOR Lessons Learned Coordinating Committee chaired by the IFOR J-5. The JATs charter focused on nine issue areas, including several related to C4ISR: C2, force generation, military-civilian plans, execution, public information, and exit. The JAT also had the formal right to locate observers in NATO and IFOR headquarters and command centers in theater and had done so. While the JAT viewed its charter as limited (primarily at the operational level and above, focused on its nine issue areas, lessons learned rather than development of formal databases), they had the lead in NATO for IFOR operational lessons learned. This enabled them to collect information and conduct interviews on-site and in locations where unobtrusive presence was difficult.
Clearly, a constructive interface with the JAT and the formal NATO process represented an important opportunity for collaboration, and this was an immediate priority for the ACT team. An agreement was arranged between the Director of JAT and the Director of the NDU/ACT study team. Under this agreement, ACT provided both observers and analyst support to the JAT in return for access to data, information, and the Bosnia Theater of operation for firsthand collection of experiences and insights. The ACT and JAT collaborative effort proved to be extremely beneficial for both organizations.
In addition to the JAT, ACT collaborative efforts were pursued with U.S. organizational elements such as EUCOM, U.S. Army Europe (USAREUR), U.S. Air Force Europe (USAFE), Joint Analysis Center (JAC) at Molesworth, Electronic Systems Center (ESC), Air Mobility Command (AMC), Army Material Command/Bosnia Technology Integration Cell (AMC/BTIC), CISA, DISA/JITC, SOCOM, J2/DIA, CIA, National Security Agency (NSA), CNA, IDA, the Air Force Historian, CALL, and the Army War College Peacekeeping Institute (AWC/PKI). The ACT team had varying degrees of success in this regard but in all cases received numerous lessons learned reports and briefings from these organizations. Briefings and reports were also obtained from NATO organizational elements such as the JAT, the IFOR CJ6/Combined Joint Communications Control Center (CJCCC), the Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC), the Multi-National Divisions (MND) Hqs, the IFOR Commander for Support (C-SPT), and several other sources. ACT contacts have also been made with the British and French lessons learned activities and the sharing of experiences and findings is being actively pursued with them. Overall, the number of opportunities for collaboration was very large and potentially overwhelming for the modest size of the ACT team. However, every effort was made to find and develop efficient mechanisms for collaboration. No significant effort was ignored and all relevant products were captured to ensure that ACT’s analyses and lessons learned were based on the best available insights and evidence.
ACT assembled, reviewed, and integrated a large quantity of ACT and non-ACT briefings, reports, and other material. Products from a wide variety of sources were assembled first, so they would be available to support ACT’s analyses and reduce the effort that was required to create a comprehensive picture. Second, assembling the variety of views contained in these products put ACT in a position to see what they had in common, identify differences, and assess their relative reliability and validity, as well as the comprehensiveness, reliability, and validity of the overall body of work. Moreover, ACT was able to both use these products as sources of information in its own analyses and develop the larger picture of C4ISR experience and performance.
The products covered the entire field of C4ISR. For example, the intelligence community undertook a number of assessments and lessons learned efforts. The ACT team received inputs from the Task Force Eagle G2 on intelligence operations and ISR system performance in MND (North). Inputs were also received on the U.S. National Intelligence Cell operations in Bosnia and JAC support activities. Very early in the deployment SOCOM sent a team to inventory intelligence systems in the field and assess their contribution to Special Operations Forces (SOF) missions. The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) organized a lessons learned activity that generated several significant reports on information releasability and dissemination. DIA and NSA also conducted their own review of the Bosnia experience. Virtually every intelligence organization with presence in the theater was seeking to place its own experience in context. These efforts were very valuable inputs to ACT’s understanding of the overall C4ISR issues. In addition, the Defense Science Board Bosnia Task Force report on the Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield was also made available to the ACT team.
More focused efforts were underway from a number of other perspectives. The U.S. research and development community, particularly those elements led by DARPA and the DARPA/DISA JPO through various technology demonstration programs, were assessing the performance of leading-edge services and the process by which they were introduced into the Operation Joint Endeavor command structure. These were valuable sources for lessons learned in the technology insertion process. The Air Force established a Bosnia-oriented integration activity (referred to as the C2 Unified Battlespace Environment, CUBE) at ESC to simulate the network of C2 systems controlling air operations in the theater with a particular emphasis on the Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC). This allowed them to examine proposals for changes and assess the integration and introduction of new C2 capabilities before deployment into the Bosnian Theater of operation. The ESC and Air Combat Command (ACC) also coordinated with the CAOC to assist with decision support system integration and air operation processes enhancements. The ESC lab also provided a Help Desk for working real-time integration issues. The Army’s AMC/BTIC served as a clearinghouse for critical technologies and the "nerve center" for tracking and integrating the technology community’s efforts to support U.S. soldiers in Bosnia. The SHAPE Technical Center (now the NATO C3 Agency, the Hague), who was responsible for technical support to NATO’s C2, logistics, and transportation decision support systems as well as the new information systems used to support NATO’s C2 operations (e.g., CRONOS) in-theater, was also collecting lessons learned and provided valuable insights to the ACT team. Some of the contractors involved in bringing new technology into the theater and supporting it there were also learning important lessons and they too were documenting their experiences. N.E.T. provide ACT lessons on the IDNX deployments and EDS provided lessons on the deployment of the Interim Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps Communications and Information System (IARRCIS).
SHAPE [NATO Communications and Information Systems Operating and Support Agency (NACOSA) and Communications and Information Systems Division (CISD)], IFOR CJ6, the CJCCC, the ARRC G6, the MND G6s and the C-SPT G6 provided insights on the deployment and management of the NATO communication and information networks, including lessons learned. IFOR Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Public Information, and PSYOP organizational elements provided insights to the ACT team in the areas of civil-military operations and the IFOR information campaign. International Organizations (IOs), NGOs, and PVOs were also interviewed as a means to better understand the civil-military aspects of the operation.
The doctrine community was also watching operations in Bosnia closely, particularly for lessons learned in coalition command and control as well as civil-military relations. CALL deployed dozens of personnel with the U.S. troops supporting Task Force Eagle and issued four (a fifth in final review) volumes on findings and lessons learned. While largely at the tactical level, this work was very important to capture the U.S. experience. The U.S. Air Force had considerable interest in the Bosnia operation and began with a vigorous effort to examine the problems associated with generating an integrated air picture in the theater, but then recognized that this was only a subset of the larger and more crucial issue of generating an integrated battle space (air, ground, and maritime) picture and was deeply involved in that effort. IDA worked with the Air Force on issues related to air management, largely in the context of the CAOC. The Army War College Peacekeeping Institute held two After Action Reviews (AARs) to examine Title 10 issues that impact on the Army in the Bosnia context. These AARs have been made available to the ACT study as well.
The Air Mobility Command completed an analysis of its experiences in supporting the Bosnia deployment. The C2 elements of that report were valuable in the context of NATO lessons learned on this same topic and assisted ACT in ensuring balanced appraisal. EUCOM ECJ37 was designated by the Joint Staff J7 to be the theater manager for Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS). IDA was contracted to support EUCOM in this regard and to do an in-depth analysis of the planning, deployment, sustainment and redeployment phases of the operation. These efforts provided the ACT team with insights and a channel for monitoring a broader set of inputs relevant to C4ISR. The in-theater commands themselves held lessons learned conferences and meetings covering the deployment, sustainment, and transition of IFOR to SFOR phases of the operation. The results of some of these activities have been provided to the ACT team in the form of briefing material.
The historians in NATO and U.S. commands were generally well informed and only a few days or weeks behind real time capturing of important events. The NATO and IFOR historians’ material and chronology were accessible through the JAT. The IFOR historian had recorded thousands of hours of interviews with all levels of the command structure. Activities of the other historians were generally releasable by the commands themselves. ACT has initiated contact with the USAREUR, EUCOM, and Air Force historians to get access to their findings and databases.
The following list provides a range of available material that can be used for building a coherent picture of the Bosnia operation and to gain a better understanding of military support to peace operations in general:
[Abrams, 1996] LTG John Abrams, USA. Operation Joint Endeavor Lessons Learned. HQ V CORPS, May 1996.
[Ahlquist, 1996] Captain (N) Lief Ahlquist. Co-operation, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations. Swedish War College, 1996.
[Ainge, 1996] GP CAPT Derek Ainge, UK RAF. Operation Joint Endeavor Communications Links. NACOSA, Mons, Belgium, 1996.
[Allard, 1995] Kenneth Allard. Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned. National Defense University Press, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., January 1995.
[Allard, 1996] Kenneth Allard. Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment. National Defense University, Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Forum, Washington, D.C., November 1996.
[Asbery, 1997] Johnny Asbery and Arnie Rausch, DSA, and Michael Casey, CISA. C4ISR Laydown. CISA Architectures Directorate, Washington, D.C., 1997.
[Berry, 1996] Col Thomas Berry, USAF. Operation Joint Endeavor: Executive Lessons Learned. HQ Air Mobility Command, Scott AFB, IL, April 1996.
[Bonnart, 1996] Frederick Bonnart. NATO’S SIXTEEN NATIONS: IFOR The Mission Continues... Moench Publishing Group, Bonn, FRG, 1996.
[Brewin, 1996] Bob Brewin. BOSNIA The Role of I.T. in Operation Joint Endeavor. Federal Computer Week, Falls Church, VA, April 1996.
[Buchanan, 1996] William B. Buchanan. Operation Joint Endeavor-Description and Lessons Learned (Planning and Deployment Phases). IDA, Alexandria, VA, November 1996.
[Cook, 1996] Capt Rhonda Cook, USA. AAR Operation Joint Endeavor 1st AD Intelligence Production. HQ Task Force Eagle, Tuzla, BiH, 1996.
[CJCCC, 1996] Combined Joint Communications Control Centre. CJCCC Information Book, CJCCC Information Book (D+180), and CJCCC Information Book (TOA LANDCENT). HQ IFOR/AFSOUTH, Naples, Italy, 1996.
[C-SUPPORT, 1996] C-SUPPORT Staff. Excerpts from Lessons learned. IFOR C-SUPPORT, Zagreb, Croatia, 1996.
[Davidson, 1996] Lisa Davidson, Margaret Hayes, James Landon. Humanitarian and Peace Operations: NGOs and the Military in the Interagency Process. Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., December 1996.
[Davis, 1996] David Davis and Alexander Woodcock. Analytic Approached to the Study of Future Conflict. The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, Clementsport, NS, Canada, 1996.
[Deutch, 1996] John Deutch. Revision of Director of Central Intelligence Directive 1/7, "Security Controls on the Dissemination of Intelligence Information." Director of Central Intelligence, Washington, D.C., April 1996.
[Dziedzic, 1996] Col Michael Dziedzic, USAF. CIMIC and IPTF in Bosnia (Draft). National Defense University, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., 1996.
[Feist, 1996] CAPT Peter Feist, GEN. IFOR Joint Analysis Team three Interim Reports and one Final Report. JAT Press, Northwood, England, March/June/December 1996 and April 1997.
[Fields, 1997] Craig Fields. Report of the 1996 Defense Science Board Task Force on Improved Application of Intelligence to the Battlefield. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., March 1997.
[Forster, 1996] Col Larry Forster and Col Steve Riley, USA. Bosnia-Herzegovina After Action Review I and II. Army War College Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pa, April 1996/1997.
[Gerald, 1997] LtCol Jeffrey Gerald, USAF, and John Christakos, Booz-Allen & Hamilton, Inc. BC2A: Lessons Learned in Bosnia. DARO, Washington, D.C., 1997.
[GMU, 1997] George Mason University Center for National Security Law and The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Centre. Strengthening the United Nations and Enhancing War Prevention. GMU, Fairfax, VA, April 1997.
[Grey, 1996] LTC A J Grey, UKA. ARRC Communications and Information Systems Lessons learned. HQ ARRC, Sarajevo, BiH, June 1996.
[Griffith, 1997] LtCol Laura Griffith, USAF. BOSNIA Intelligence Lessons Learned Working Group. DIA/J2, Washington, D.C., 1997.
[Hahm, 1996] William Hahm and Frank Franks, MITRE, Larry Wentz, NDU/ACT, and Anthony Simon, CISA. Compendium of Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR Lessons Learned (Draft). CISA Architectures Directorate, Washington, D.C., September 1996.
[Hairell, 1996] LtCol Oscar Hairell, USAF. OJE Lessons Learned. HQ USAFE, Ramstein AFB, 1996.
[Hartley, 1996] D.S. Hartley III. Operations Other Than War: Requirements for Analysis Tools Research Report. CINCPAC J53, Research and Analysis Division, Camp H. M. Smith, HI, December 1996.
[Hayes, 1996/1997] Richard Hayes, James Landon, and Richard Layton. Draft Reports on IFOR C2 Structure, CIMIC, Information Operations and Other C4ISR Lessons Learned Activities. Evidence Based Research, Inc., Vienna, Va., 1996/1997.
[JAT, 1996] IFOR Joint Analysis Team. Observer Handbook. JAT Press, Northwood, England, 1996.
[Keiler, 1997] CDR Doug Keiler, USN. Bosnia Bandwidth Allocation Study (Draft). National Defense University, Advanced Concepts, Technologies, and Information Strategies, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., 1997.
[Mackinlay, 1996] John Mackinlay. A Guide to Peace Support Operations. Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies, Brown University, Providence, RI, 1996.
[Marks, 1996] Edward Marks. Complex Emergencies: Bureaucratic Arrangements in the UN Secretariat. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., October 1996.
[Mohr, 1996] Brad Mohr. SOF Mission Support Lessons Learned. HQ SOCOM, 1996.
[Nabors, 1996] BG Robert Nabors, USA. Operation Joint Endeavor Lessons Learned. HQ 5th Signal Cmd, 1996.
[NDU/ACT, 1996] NDU/ACT Bosnia Study Team. Bosnia C4ISR Project Progress Reports (1st and 2nd). National Defense University, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., July/October 1996.
[Palmer, 1996] Maj Rolf Palmer. LOCE Lessons Learned. HQ USEUCOM, 1996.
[Phillips, 1996] LtCol Timothy Phillips, USMC. JITC C4I Infrastructure Documentation Report for Operation Joint Endeavor. JITC, Ft Huachuca, AZ, June 1996.
[Pistor, 1997] Charles Pistor. USEUCOM Combined Communications Operations Manual. Joint Interoperability Engineering Organization, Defense Information Systems Agency, Ft Monmouth, NJ, 1997.
[Rapaport, 1996] Richard Rapaport. World War 3.1. FORBES ASAP, October 1996.
[Roberts, 1996] Cdr T Roberts, USN. IFOR Intelligence Sharing: Successes and Challenges Briefing. DCI, 1996.
[Rogers, 1996/1997] LtCol Gary Rogers, USAF. EUCOM JULLS. HQ USEUCOM, 1996/1997
[Seiple, 1996] Capt Chris Seiple, USMC. The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions. Peacekeeping Institute, Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, Pa, 1996.
[Siegel, 1996/1997] Pascale Combelles Siegel. Information and Command and Control in Peace Operations: The Case of IFOR in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Evidence Based Research, Inc., Vienna, VA, 1996/1997.
[Smith, 1997] Dr. Jay Smith. Bosnia Conflict. Office of history, Air Force Command, Control, Communications and Computer Agency, Scott AFB, IL, 1997.
[Stewart, 1996] George Stewart. CNA Involvement in Joint Endeavor. Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, VA, October 1996.
[Swan, 1996] Commodore P W H Swan, RN. Operation Joint Endeavor-CJ6 Lessons Learned. HQ IFOR/AFSOUTH, Naples, Italy, November 1996.
[Trewin, 1996] Wg Cdr I A Trewin, UK AF. Operation Joint Endeavour Lessons Learned. SHAPE ACOS CISD, Mons, Belgium, October 1996.
[Walley, 1996/1997] Jim Walley. Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR: Task Force EAGLE Initial Observations; Title 10 Sustainment and Force Protection; and Task Force EAGLE Continuing Operations. Operation JOINT GUARD: Task Force EAGLE Initial Impressions and Task Force EAGLE Continuing Operation. Center for Army Lessons Learned, May/August/September 1996 and March/April 1997.
[Wentz, 1991] Larry K. Wentz. DCA Grey Beard Lessons Learned: Desert Shield/Desert Storm. MITRE, McLean, VA, August 1991.
[Wentz, 1992] Larry K. Wentz. The First Information War: Communications Support for the High Technology Battlefield. AFCEA International Press, Fairfax, VA, October 1992.
[Wentz, 1993/1994] Larry K. Wentz. DISA Grey Beard Panel: Lessons Learned Operation Restore Hope (1993) and A U.S. Perspective of UN Operations (1994). MITRE, McLean, Va., September 1993/1994.
[Wentz, 1996] Larry K. Wentz. Managing The Peace Offensive: Coalition Operations Lessons Learned. AFCEA Europe Brussels Symposium and Exposition, Brussels, Belgium, October 1996.
[Wentz, 1996] Larry K. Wentz. C3I Observations: A View from the Theater. National Defense University, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., March 1996.
[Wentz, 1997] Larry K. Wentz. Bosnia C3 Observations. National Defense University, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., March 1997.
[Wentz, 1997] Larry K. Wentz. C3I for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia. National Defense University, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., May 1997.
[Wentz, 1996/1997] Larry K. Wentz. Unifying the Analysis of Bosnia C3I Lessons Learned. National Defense University, Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, Ft McNair, Washington, D.C., 1996/1997.
Assembling the documentation in itself has created a valuable resource for future research and analyses. By actively reviewing and integrating these materials, ACT has been able to make a meaningful contribution to the overall national and NATO lessons learned activities. By acting as a clearinghouse for the exchange of such materials, the Bosnia study has also been able to contribute to the coherence and quality of the overall U.S. lessons learned activities.
ACT’s priorities were based on the needs and missions of the C4ISR community. They took two different perspectives: organizational and international. Organizational priority was given to OSD and the Joint Staff, with recognition that the needs of the CINCs and Services were also important priorities. At the same time, however, NATO’s needs as a coalition and issues important to the non-NATO coalition partners were not ignored. Rather, they were picked up in the context of U.S. national needs. At the international level, U.S. issues were examined as well as issues that related to U.S. operations in the NATO context, NATO operations, and IFOR or NATO operations involving non-NATO partners. C4ISR was seen first as a military issue, but was also examined in terms of civil-military relations at all levels. ACT’s focused research addressed areas such as support to the warfighter, coalition command arrangements, C4ISR system performance and vulnerabilities, information operations, technology insertion, Civil-Military cooperation, and the lessons learned process.
The ASD(C3I) tasking for the Bosnia Command Arrangements Study was signed out on 15 February 1996 and study data collection began in the March/April 1996 time frame. The early phase of the ACT study focused on data collection. Monthly visits were made to the JAT to gain insights and to review the database they were putting together on the IFOR operation. In addition to the data collection activity, ACT also provided analyst support to the JAT during these visits and this too provided useful insights from a NATO perspective. Extensive visits were also made to supporting commands and to the theater of operation. These visits included EUCOM, DISA-EUR, the Joint Analysis Center, the 66th MI, USAREUR, USAFE, NATO, SHAPE, the SHAPE Technical Center (now the NC3A the Hague), and two extended visits were made under the umbrella of the JAT observer corps to Bosnia and Croatia. In regard to the latter, visits were made to IFOR and the ARRC in Sarajevo, MND(SW) in Banja Luka, MND(SE) in Mostar, C-Support in Zagreb, and COMMZ (FWD) in Split. Visits were also made to the IFOR CJ6 and the CJCCC in Naples. NDU/ACT also provided two observers to the JAT for duties at MND(N) in Tuzla and at IFOR (FWD) in Sarajevo. In addition, an NDU/ACT observer and analyst was also provided to the JAT to focus on the area of IFOR information operations. This support included two extended visits to Bosnia and Croatia as well as visits to NATO, SHAPE, and the UN Hqs in New York. The NATO and national insights gained through ACT participation in the JAT observer and analyst activities have been invaluable.
As soon as ACT began organizing its effort and seeking to assemble a list of ongoing activities, it became clear that a multitude of organizations and agencies were either already engaged in lessons learned activities in Bosnia or planning for them. Not only were there a large number of players, there were also a variety of approaches being employed to collect insights, assess operations, and assemble lessons learned (Figure 5). These approaches ranged from more formal and structured arrangements such as the IFOR JAT, CALL, and the JULLS process employed by USEUCOM, USAREUR, and USAFE, to ad hoc arrangements such as the Air Mobility Command and DCI quick look assessment activities. There were also other structured approaches such as the NDU/ACT study, the Army War College Peacekeeping Institute After Action Reviews, the IFOR CJ6/CJCCC, C-SPT and ARRC lessons learned activities, and the activities of the Historians (USEUCOM, USAREUR, USAF, SHAPE, IFOR and others). The French employed a more ad hoc (individual) approach to collecting their lessons and the British used a more structured (team) and unifying approach for their national effort. There were also longer term strategic thinking oriented assessment activities such as those being conducted at the George Mason University (GMU) Institute of Public Policy, the National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, and the Naval War College. These activities employed workshops, modeling and gaming techniques to examine policy, strategies, and options for the future.
The formal approaches tend to be longer-term efforts that employ highly structured processes with collection, analysis, dissemination, and action resolution phases. They use subject area experts to collect information and insights through interviews, After Action Reviews, unsolicited inputs, and formal reporting such as JULLS. They also use a collection plan to focus and guide their activities. Professional analysts are used to assess the insights and experiences and to derive the lessons learned and recommend actions to resolve outstanding issues. Extensive databases are maintained on findings and recommendations. A review process is employed to ensure consistency and quality and to provide direction and guidance to the overall effort as appropriate. Results are disseminated in the form of formal reports, pamphlets, memorandums, bulletins, newsletters, customized reports, and web homepages (both Internet and military networks). Finally, in some cases, a remedial action program is used to task organizations to fix problems found and to track the resolution of outstanding actions.
The ad hoc activities tend to be less structured and of shorter duration. Subject area expert teams are formed and a quick look assessment using detailed theater interviews and brainstorming sessions is employed to drive out the key findings and recommendations. As an example, this was the approach used by the Air Mobility Command. The actions from ad hoc efforts tend to be focused on fixing near-term problems—tactically oriented. A briefing and report on the findings and a limited number of recommended actionable items are typically the output of such efforts.
The other efforts fall somewhere in between in terms of complexity and duration. For example, the JITC put a team of subject area experts in the Bosnia Theater for three months to collect insights and develop the communications baseline and associated interfaces and interoperability issues. Two months were then spent documenting and briefing their findings and recommendations. A final report was then published for broader distribution. The Army War College Peacekeeping Institute convened subject area experts, specifically those with Bosnia operational experience, for two different one-week intensive After Action Reviews. The AAR outputs were briefings and reports with actionable items that were strategically oriented, i.e., things the Chief of Staff of the Army needed to be aware of and could take an action on. This effort was mainly focused on Title 10 issues but some other C2 issue areas were also addressed. The NDU/ACT effort employs a small team of professionals oriented toward leveraging community activities to put a coherent story together that addresses strategic, operational and tactical issues. The products are and will be briefings, reports, symposium and workshop participation and papers, and books and other material for the Professional Military Education program. The IDA study for EUCOM employed a small team of professionals to review, document, and analyze the U.S. participation in the Bosnia operation. Their reports address strategic- and operational-level issues related to the planning, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment phases of the IFOR operation.
Many of the commands involved in Bosnia had staff historians who were also seeking to document their participation in the operation. The SHAPE and IFOR historians, in particular, had rich access and developed valuable material on the command history. The EUCOM, USAREUR, USAF, SHAPE and IFOR historians were valuable sources for the NDU study. The historians used both audio and video taping extensively as the principal means for recording insights and experiences.
The commands, including the combat support organizations, also tasked their own headquarters to assemble lessons learned and perform assessments. There were a few organization elements who because of resource limitations and pressures of the operation were unable to devote the level of effort necessary to do as complete of a job as they would have liked to have been able to do on documenting lessons. These units were, however, willing to work with unifying activities such as the NDU/ACT effort to help them put their lessons learned story together. IFOR held meetings of senior officers to review phases of the operation and to look ahead at future challenges. Indeed, virtually every level of command established similar tasking to ensure that lessons were both recorded and acted upon in the near term. Some of these reviews included specific review of performance issues, but their major focus tended to be on process improvement.
Finally, the universities and the military education community also monitored Bosnia. GMU’s Institute of Public Policy (Program on Peacekeeping Policy) used their Conceptual Model of Peace Operations to examine issues related to Brcko. As noted earlier, the Army War College Peacekeeping Institute held two After Action Reviews focused on Title 10 issues. NDU’s Institute for National Security Studies has been engaged in political-military analyses based on its expertise in prior peacekeeping efforts such as Somalia and Haiti. They have held workshops and used the NDU gaming facility to examine Bosnia issues related to Civil-Military operations, Brcko and conditions for exiting Bosnia. The Naval War College has also used its Situational Influence Assessment Module (produced by SAIC) to examine exit strategies.
There were a large number and great variety of actions involved in identifying and compiling lessons learned for Joint Endeavor. ACT alone had more than 40 U.S. organizations participating in the C4ISR Lessons Learned Roundtables. In the case of NATO and other participating nations, there were also a number of initiatives identified by ACT. In addition to the formal IFOR effort of the JAT, there were NATO, SHAPE, ARRC, C-Support and IFOR CJ6/CJCCC lessons learned activities identified. The French and British also conducted national lessons learned activities. No one, however, has yet been able to pull all of these activities together into a coherent "big picture" story.
Lessons learned is a multidimensional space. On the one hand there are doctrine, policy, processes, procedures, and training aspects. On the other hand there are technical, system, operational, and command structure perspectives. One can look at them from NATO and national points-of-view or from the civilian, military, and humanitarian aspects. There are mission and function cuts that can be considered as well as looking at them from the planning, deployment, sustainment and redeployment phases of the operation. The point is that no one organization covers all aspects of an operation in a way that puts a coherent "big picture" story together. For example, the IFOR JAT did not address the intelligence aspects of the operation. The IFOR CJ6 and CJCCC focused mainly on communications. The IFOR Commander for Support focused on functions such as movement control, legal, medical, and contracting but also covered some C2 structure and communications and information support aspects. The Air Mobility Command focused on the air lift support for deployment. CALL, USAREUR, and the Army War College focused on the Army role in support of the operation. EUCOM and its IDA study are looking at the U.S support to IFOR. The French and British focused on their national roles. The NDU/ACT effort is trying to pull a bigger picture story together but again its guidance is C2 structure and the supporting C4ISR. There are lessons to be learned from the political, economic, and humanitarian activities in support of the Dayton Accord but it is not clear if anyone will be collecting insights and lessons learned for these aspects of the operation.
Clearly, broad participation has considerable benefits. The recognition of the importance of learning from the Bosnian experience, the active participation of both C4ISR producers and consumers, and the involvement of many agencies and organizations in both issue identification and problem solving are signs of learning and adaptive organizations. Hence, this bodes well for the future.
The current "catch as catch can" broad participation lessons learned system also has some very positive attributes. Lessons learned were sought throughout the operation and its supporting activities. The variety of actors involved meant that a broad range of perspectives were being considered. Moreover, because the operators were deeply involved, lessons were not generally collected and forgotten, but rather became the subject of specific actions to correct them. Obvious examples included the vigorous follow-up after the Land Information Warfare Agency (LIWA) reported vulnerabilities in unclassified LANs to USAREUR and the intelligence community’s review of dissemination policy and follow-on aggressive action to change the field practices to improve the service to the coalition operation.
However, the lessons learned process was not without its problems. First, overlap and redundancy exist, which leads to excessive demands on operator time. One senior NATO officer identified nine separate occasions when he had been interviewed by U.S. lessons learned efforts. Second, to the extent that lessons learned activities were performed within operating organizations, they tended to have parochial agendas and results. Third, no overall set of integrating issues or functions was created, so the lessons learned suffered from gaps on key issues and lacked systematic data collection efforts. Finally, while lip service to information exchange was plentiful, many products were still held closely by their originators. The "players" in Bosnia lessons learned represented almost every organization or agency involved in or supporting Operation Joint Endeavor. The most important lessons learned activities were those of the commands and headquarters themselves, both U.S. and coalition partners. These were the most important because they typically involve vigorous action programs to resolve the issues identified and because they represented the difference between the anticipated operating environment and the one actually encountered.
NDU’s efforts to assemble a coherent lessons learned picture highlighted several difficulties as well. The most important problem encountered was the uncoordinated collection of information. In an effort to reduce demands on operators and simplify the situation, some commands granted "official" status to some collectors. For example, the IFOR JAT was given official monopoly on collecting lessons learned for NATO. Unfortunately, the focus of the formal IFOR effort was limited to the nine items in the JAT charter and the quality of collection and analysis was dependent upon the specific officers the member nations were willing and able to provide the JAT for this tasking (it was necessary to augment the JAT with observers and analysts provided by NATO member nations). Only a fraction of the JAT team were trained analysts, and data collection tended to be more idiosyncratic than systematic. EUCOM granted similar "official" status to an IDA team. CALL functioned as the primary activity for U.S. Army collection. Allied efforts were seldom as systematic as those used by U.S. commands. All in all, the high level of activity did not translate into systematic coverage of key issues.
Many of the lessons learned efforts have also proven parochial. They tended to focus on the relatively minor and technical issues that made day-to-day operations inconvenient or difficult rather than on more fundamental questions. There was a natural tendency to avoid putting one’s own command on report so this resulted in a careful documentation of external factors without a balanced recognition of internal problems. Moreover, internally identified lessons learned had a tendency to focus on symptoms rather than causes. As a simple example, analyses of problems with computer systems viruses focused more on installing better virus protection devices rather than changing the behaviors that caused them to proliferate.
The most serious problem in lessons learned has been the inability to create an overarching set of issues or functions. While most lessons learned charters were very broad, no single person or organization had been given responsibility for setting the agenda. This resulted in gaps in coverage, particularly where the issues were potentially embarrassing or resided near organizational boundaries.
The lack of an overall structure for lessons learned collection was reinforced by the multiplicity of nations, organizations, and agencies involved. As noted earlier, the NATO JAT charter was limited to nine specific functional areas. C4ISR issues that cut across levels or national boundaries were particularly difficult to analyze because the charter seldom existed to examine the causal factors at work. Finally, broad community information exchange was more difficult than anticipated. The players were willing to orally discuss issues, insights, and lessons learned but few were willing to pass on formal or draft documentation until it was appropriately staffed and/or approved by their respective organizations. This reflected parochial agendas, NATO sensitivity to national access, and the lack of a central, authoritative lessons learned organization to facilitate information exchange and provide issue-focused guidance to the various efforts.
On a longer term basis, there are a number of analysis activities that should be addressed in order to better understand the planning, execution, and decision-making processes and actions related to military support of peace operations and Operation Joint Endeavor in particular. Some of these are as follows:
-Threat versus Measures versus Mission Accomplishment
-Measures of Effectiveness
-Measures of Effectiveness
-Templates and Guidelines
-Relationships and Dependencies
-Outcome Predictions and Assessments
-Effectiveness of Doctrine, CONOPS, and SOPs
-IO/NGO/PVO Relationships and Support Arrangements
-Measures of Effectiveness
-Measures of Effectiveness for Information Campaign
-Use of Information (including Intelligence) in Decision-Making
-Classification, Releasability, and Sharing of Information
-Information Warfare Implications
-Physical Attacks
-Electronic Attacks
-Environmental Impacts (Dust/Dirt, Power, Weather, Terrain)
-Restoration and Reconstitution Under Stress
-Performance Under Stress (Overloads, Degradation)
-Security (including Viruses, Intrusions, Intercepts, Penetrations, Spoofing)
-Analog to Digital Systems
-Communications to Information Systems
-Military-unique Systems to Commercial Products and Services
-Peace operations versus Warfighting
-IO/NGO/PVO Participation
There are certainly many other areas of interest to be studied in more detail. For example, in the area of "Use of Information," one could examine how information is used in decision making as a function of the level of command, the level of operational stress, and the quality and quantity of information available. Classification of information as a function of level of command (level required to effectively execute the mission versus established guidelines and procedures) needs to be examined. The impact of information overload (how much information is enough or how do you find useful details among the wealth of information available?) on decision making is another example. Bandwidth utilization is another area. One could look at military owned and operated versus leased commercial bandwidth and how the bandwidth is being used (C2 versus Mission Support versus Intelligence) and the associated cost-effectiveness. Use of bandwidth in terms of voice, data, message and video conferencing services and the relative costs of these services as a function of impact on improved decision-making would also be of interest to examine. It’s a target-rich environment with limited community resources to apply. Therefore, one has to try to make the best informed selections of issues to be studied that have the highest pay-off in improving the military support to peace operations, not a straightforward task.
The need to capture lessons learned from real-world operations and use them for subsequent remedial actions is widely acknowledged throughout the international community. The need to do a better job of pulling the independent activities together to build a more coherent story and more effectively collaborate and coordinate the collection and sharing of experiences and lessons learned may not be as widely accepted. Certainly, the international community needs to consider putting some mechanism in place to better focus, facilitate, and encourage the coordination, collaboration, and sharing of lessons learned activities and findings. The ability to enforce remedial actions also needs to be a part of this consideration. In order to accomplish this, an international organizational element would need to be granted some degree of "official status" and authority to perform the role, staffed with appropriate subject area experts and professional analysts to perform the job, adequately funded, and provided with an agreed process to guide the participation of the international community. NATO would be a logical organization to consider to establish such a capability. If NATO were to provide such a capability, it would need to go beyond the level of effort and capability of the Joint Analysis Team established to support IFOR and the current NATO Permanent Maritime Analysis Team that supports maritime exercises and operations. Furthermore, it would need to be not only a BI-Major NATO Command (MNC) initiative that addresses the military aspects but should also include the political aspects of NATO as well.
The NDU/ACT approach to facilitate coordination, collaboration, and sharing through the use of the Bosnia C4ISR Roundtable was quite successful. This coupled with the special relationships formed with the IFOR JAT and U.S. command elements significantly helped ACT’s attempts to build a coherent story out of the various independent lessons learned activities. ACT has been able to perform the role of clearinghouse with a reasonable degree of success. A lot of perseverance and community willingness to cooperate was necessary to pull off the successes to date. The effort is now beginning to bear fruit.
The use of a unifying organization is certainly one way of pulling the community and their activities together and in the end, this may be the best way to approach improved collaboration, coordination, and sharing in order to ensure a more coherent story emerges from the large number of activities triggered by a major international operation. It is certainly not a technology issue; the information networks of today provide the means to the end. It is a political will issue. There is certainly a need to do this but the issues of who, where, level of effort, staffing, ability to enforce remedial actions, and funding of such an activity are yet to be fully addressed for either national or international initiatives. The system is broken and needs to be fixed.
There is an encouraging sign on the horizon. As a result of SHAPE’s experience with IFOR, there is a BI-MNC proposal in front of the NATO Military Committee to consider the establishment of a BI-MNC JOINT ANALYSIS AND LESSONS LEARNED CENTRE. The stated purpose of this center is to be NATO’s central agency for the operational analysis of exercises and real-world operations, and for the coordination of the related lessons learned and the associated remedial action process. It is the view of the two MNCs (SACEUR and SACLANT) that these three activities—analysis, lessons learned and remedial action process--are closely connected and mutually supportive. This is certainly a step in the right direction to address fixing the system.
Based on a recent visit (2/20/1998) to the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Lessons Learned Unit, an even more encouraging possibility for a solution to the need for an international body to address capturing real-world lessons learned has surfaced. The responsibilities of the UN DPKO Lessons Learned Unit go far beyond the NATO proposed Joint Analysis and Lessons Learned Centre that only focused on military lessons learned. The UN DPKO Lessons Learned Unit has the potential to examine and assess not only the military aspects of peacekeeping operations but also the political, civil, and humanitarian aspects as well. Such a capability would serve to fill a significant gap in the way lessons learned are done today. The issue becomes one of providing adequate resources (skills and money) and establishing the appropriate collaborative arrangements with NATO and participating national level organization elements. The UN DPKO would need to be augmented to provide appropriate subject area experts and analysts and provided the necessary directives and funding to do the job. An international body could be created to provide the broader insights into experiences and lessons learned from real-world peacekeeping operations.