This briefing presents the findings of a research mission conducted by Pascale Combelles Siegel on behalf of Evidence Based Research (EBR) and the National Defense University in October 1996.
The mission’s purpose was to study the role of information activities in operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia-Herzegovina (December 1995/December 1996), and the impact of these activities on the command and control of peace operations.
When it comes to peace operations, many officers are convinced that victory is determined not on the ground, but in media reporting. In that regard, information is maybe more critical to mission accomplishment in a peace operation than in a traditional combat operation. I will subdivide the role of information in peace operations into three main categories.
During Operation Joint Endeavour, IFOR ran an “information campaign” designed to “seize and maintain the initiative by imparting timely and effective information within the commander’s intent”. The term ‘information campaign’ refers to the coordinated and synchronized use of public information, civil information and psychological operations in support of COMIFOR’s goals.
The campaign was articulated around three components:
Commanders expected information to play a critical role in the success of IFOR’s mission, by helping gain international support and by shaping the local’s attitudes in favor of IFOR troops and operations. Following Admiral Smith’s intent, planners established the need for a pro-active, fully coordinated campaign which was synchronized with the major staff components. The key concepts of IFOR’s information policies during Joint Endeavour were:
IFOR was to run a transparent campaign, relying on truth and dispatching complete, accurate and timely information to establish itself as a credible source of information and, thus, to gain and maintain public support for IFOR operations.
IFOR PI, PSYOP, CIMIC would coordinate their messages, would coordinate their activities with other operational elements in theater (especially CJ2 and CJ3). They would also liaise with the major civilian agencies operating in Bosnia (especially the OHR, OSCE, UNHCR, UNMIBH which includes the IPTF and to a lesser extent the World Bank and the ICRC).
IFOR would rely on information as a “non-lethal weapon system” to entice friendly behavior and deter hostile action against IFOR troops and operations.
The first requirement was to provide the media with complete, accurate and timely information.
From the outset, COMIFOR was convinced that ‘if we know, the media know’. In other words, COMIFOR was convinced that the media would be able to learn what was going on in theater. His statement was based on two assumptions: First, in peace operations, military activities are more open than in more traditional forms of combat. Second, reporters are everywhere and they have the ability to relay almost instantaneously any information. Under those circumstances, it was likely that the media would quickly relay any significant incident to the public.
Based on the above assumptions, providing complete, accurate and timely information became an absolute requirement. It was not a matter of telling the journalists something that they didn’t know. It was a matter of telling them what they would otherwise, sooner or later, learn. The command’s credibility with the international media required that it provided the information before alternate sources. Failure to do so would certainly lead the media to question IFOR’s credibility and, potentially, to accuse IFOR of cover-up. And, under such circumstances, IFOR would not be able to maintain the initiative on the information front.
Providing IFOR’s target audiences with complete, accurate and timely information required specific internal arrangements.
Commanders, especially at headquarters level, organized a close relationship with their PI and PSYOP staffs. This relationship enabled PIOs to gain insights into the commander’s thinking and to gain better understanding of HQ policy.
PI and PSYOP were closely integrated with operations staffs. Commanders ensured that PI and PSYOP had complete and timely knowledge of current and future operations (even if classified) through free access to the operations center and through staff meetings attendance.
Planners authorized the creation of an information chain paralleling the C2 chain. Reporting through the chain of command is a time-consuming process as each level processes the information before passing it up the chain. This process does not adequately support the PIO requirement for timely delivery of accurate information. The stop-gap measure lay in a functional chain of information linking all PIOs throughout theater. It allowed PIOs to communicate and exchange information without having to pass through all the layers of the command chain, thus speeding up the information flow.
The purpose of these arrangements, however, would be defeated if PIOs and their commanders in theater were not allowed to release the information in a timely manner. During Joint Endeavour, SHAPE delegated release authority for all operational matters to COMIFOR and his staff, allowing them to quickly release information to the press.
The second key concept of the information campaign was the coordination and synchronization of messages throughout theater. This was indispensible to avoid some of the pitfalls of the UNPROFOR mission. As you may recall, at the time, military and civilian spokesmen (especially the UNHCR) were often (publicly) at odds, thus fueling media and public’s unease with the whole operation.
However, coordination was a complicated process. First, DPA implementation involved a
high number of actors: three major staff components (PI, PSYOP and CIMIC), five major
organizations (IFOR, OHR, OSCE, UNMIBH, UNHCR) and to a lesser degree 36
nations were entitled to communicate to various audiences. Second, those actors shared a
common strategic goal, but remained divided on the road to take to achieve those goals: for
example, the US, the Europeans and NATO had different views on the train and equip
program. NATO and the civilian organizations had different views on indicted war criminals.
But on the other hand, coordination was bound to bring benefits to the coalition. It would
help harmonize messages, de-conflict sensitive issues, develop a sense of belonging that
would make actors choose to play together rather than to play apart. It could also help
synchronize the delivery of common messages from different actors for mutual
reinforcement.
To reap those benefits, IFOR and ARRC developed mechanisms to coordinate messages within the command structure and with the international community. The Internal coordination included:
The ARRC perception group determined how best to present and time IFOR’s arguments. The group produced a weekly information matrix. The external coordination included:
The third and last key concept was the use of information as a “non-lethal weapon system”. In peace operations, where the outside force does not conduct ‘traditional’ combat operations, the commander has to place a greater reliance on non-lethal weapons. While every military unit has some capabilities in this realm, PI and PSYOP are the two most critical non-lethal weapons. To be able to use those tools effectively, the commander had to tie PI and PSYOP into the C2 structure.
At headquarters level (as well as in some divisions), information was systematically used to reinforce the appropriateness of IFOR’s activities. For example, MND (SW) commander often relied on press statements to lay blame publicly on the factions who violated the DPA to pressure them to comply.
Information was always on the commander’s mind as one of his major tools for action. CJ3 was constantly aware of the possibility to use the media, and PI was always aware of on-going and future operations. In a small number of high profile incidents, COMIFOR relied on its information campaign to influence the behavior of local factions without having to resort to the use of force (Ex. Han Pisejak).
Finally, PI and PSYOP play another role as a non-lethal weapon as they can be source of intelligence material. To verious degrees, PI and PSYOP have the potential for providing HUMINT that will help form the INTEL picture. This use of PI and PSYOP, however, seems to have been limited under IFOR.
Political sensitivities limited the commander’s ability to resort to PSYOP activities in support of the IFOR mission. Some nations participating in the coalition saw PSYOP as the ‘Mandchurian candidate’ and were therefore reluctant to use them or to be associated with PSYOP activities.
Political sensitivities also led PSYOP personnel to remain under national C2. Based on a 1984 executive directive, the CJIICTF (mostly US personnel) remained under EUCOM C2. Refusal to place US PSYOP forces under NATO C2 led to various problems: All PSYOP units reported to the CJIICTF and not the unit they were attached to. All IIC products were approved at EUCOM before dissemination. It also set a bad precedent for future ops. Following the US example, the Ge chose to remain under national command and control.
Finally, the political sensitivities led a weak campaign, especially in support of the IOs. In this domain, the CJIICTF resorted to ‘feel-good’, non-controversial messages such as ‘peace is better than war’, ‘reconstruction not destruction’ or ‘freedom of movement is good’ and ran safety messages (‘mines are dangerous’).
The last problem stemmed from the fact that different contributors to the PSYOP campaign had different approaches to PSYOP. The US has a rigid top-down approach, with centralized product development and approval. This approach (adopted by the CJIICTF) created tensions with the UK-led division as the British HQ would have liked a more decentralized approach whereby the division could develop its own products to better suit the local circumstances.
The coordination process created a third set of problems.
First, establishing coordination mechanisms with the IOs was a difficult and time-consuming process. The IOs were slow to respond to IFOR’s offers for cooperation. They were also reluctant to cooperate with IFOR out-of-fear of loosing their ‘freedom of speech’ and being tainted by their association with a military force. As a result, coordination was not fully in place before May 96.
Second, while the coordination mechanisms at headquarters levels proved beneficial (most notably by enhancing the information flow), they were not necessarily reproduced at division levels.
The last limitations regard the effectiveness of IFOR’s information activities.
IFOR faced a number of challenges in measuring the effectiveness of its information activities. The PI and the CJIICTF only used basic measures of effectiveness. For ex., the PI looked at the day’s media coverage of IFOR operations and interacted with journalists to get a sense of its messages credibility. But, they did not conduct detailed content analysis. The CJIICTF documented the distribution of its products and compiled anecdotal evidence on the ‘people’s reactions’. In fact, neither the PI nor the CJIICTF had adequate tools and resources (personnel and expertise) to conduct extensive measurement of their effectiveness.
However, from different sources, we can sketch the following picture:
Once again, Operation Joint Endeavour showed the critical nature of information activities in a peace operation. Joint Endeavour also provided several important lessons on how best to achieve a proper information flow and real coordination.
The information campaign was based on principles that served well the commander and the public’s needs. By providing complete, accurate and timely information, IFOR established itself as a credible source of information.
The requirement for complete and timely information was adequately supported by internal arrangements which included: a functional chain of information, PI/PSYOP interactions with CJ2 and CJ3.
The common activities and extensive coordination between IFOR and the IOs contributed to mission accomplishment. They enabled IFOR and the primary organizations to appear united in a common effort on behalf of BiH.
Some issues, however, deserve attention: