JAMES J. LANDON, an analyst with Evidence Based Research, Inc. (EBR), served in the U.S. Marine Corps in both the Infantry and Intelligence fields. Prior to joining EBR in 1996, he supported the transition to democracy in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through his activities within the non-profit sector. He is currently working to improve interagency responses to complex humanitarian emergencies and is a member of the NATO Joint Analysis Team (JAT) supporting the IFOR/SFOR deployment to the former Yugoslavia where he is analyzing multinational civil-military operations. Mr. Landon holds a Bachelor of Science Degree in Political Science (Soviet/Russian Studies) from the United States Naval Academy and a Master of Arts Degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University Elliott School of International Affairs. He is currently pursuing his Juris Doctor from the George Washington University National Law Center.
RICHARD E. HAYES, founder and president of Evidence Based Research, Inc. (EBR), is trained as a political scientist, social psychologist, and methodologist. He specializes in multidisciplinary analyses of intelligence and national security issues; the identification of opportunities to improve support to decision makers in the defense and intelligence communities; the design and development of systems to provide that support; and the criticism, test, and evaluation of systems and procedures that provide such support. His areas of expertise include political instability and social violence; political and economic development; development and validation of indicator and forecasting systems; crisis management; political-military issues; research methods; simulation and modeling; test and evaluation; military command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I); and decision aiding systems. He holds a Bachelor's degree from the Georgetown University School of Foreign Service and a Ph.D. in Political Science from Indiana University.
INTRODUCTION
The end of the Cold War has ushered in an entirely new era in international security. As tensions along Europe's East-West borders receded, both national command authorities and the international community developed a renewed willingness and proclivity to undertake operations to promote peace and stability. But the end of the Cold War did not produce an international community with a universal culture or an accepted set of “rules of collective engagement.” Past international responses to complex political emergencies, exemplified in Somalia, Haiti, Rwanda, and Bosnia, emphasized that no organization of sovereign states could function any more effectively than the consensus among its members permitted.
In its first 43 years, the United Nations Security Council authorized 13 peacekeeping operations. In 43 months from 1988 to 1992, U.N. Member States authorized 13 additional operations (see figure 1). Not only were these operations more frequent, but most were much bigger and more complicated than anything previously attempted. In addition to their fundamental political and military character, these operations contained significant humanitarian components. Large populations came under increased risk due to destabilized environments. The concern that outbreaks of instability, combined with failing national societies and humanitarian suffering, could become unpredictably explosive and seriously threaten international peace and security produced a modern interest in a form of peace operations that far transcends traditional peacekeeping deployments—the response to a complex political emergency.
Figure 1 - The Birth of Second Generation U.N. Peace Operations
During traditional peacekeeping deployments prior to the late 1980s, there was no particular need for interaction between political/military and humanitarian concerns. Today, international and non-governmental organizations have become increasingly important in the formulation of political, social, or economic solutions to complex political emergencies. In most cases, they are a crucial part of the solution. More often than not, they must take over economic and political development after the peace operation or formal military support to humanitarian assistance has ended. Consequently, national concepts' of peace support operations and civil-military relations are undergoing a paradigm shift as a result of the changing nature of international security.
Complex Political Emergencies A complex political emergency is a crisis of sufficient magnitude to engage the attention of the world community that is of a restricted local character. They arise out of some combination of humanitarian crisis, breakdown of national political authority, and/or regional political confrontation that has moved into the violent stage. Complex political emergencies tend to be intra-state in nature, but their implications often cross international borders. They pose a serious threat to the well-being of significant numbers of innocent people, and gain the attention of the international community for humanitarian and geopolitical reasons. |
Recent peace support deployments have forced the issue of post-Cold War preventive diplomacy, proactive engagement, and reactive intervention from the theoretical search for new missions and strategies, to the next generation of international security measures. Absent traditional global threats to individual national sovereignty, nations have been increasingly disinclined to respond with unilateral measures. Responding by forming “coalitions of the willing,” contributing nations have approached the common goal of resolving complex political emergencies armed with divergent national interests and national approaches.
Attempts to search for a common approach for the conduct of peace support and humanitarian assistance operations have inevitably involved major problems, not least of which is the difficulty reconciling different historical attitudes of contributing nations towards these non-traditional operations. This divergence in national approaches is due in part to different nations being involved in different types of military commitments in the past 50 years, and in part to their different perspectives of their own national interests. National interests and organizational influence often compete with doctrine and efficiency, consensus building is painstakingly difficult, and solutions are often national in character.
International cooperation in future complex emergencies, both within a coalition of nation states and in terms of their crucial interactions with international organizations and the NGO/PVO community, depends on an understanding of the backgrounds, traditions, and operational doctrines that drive the behavior of the military establishments and the guidance they receive from their national command authorities. These differences are very important determinants of the proper roles for military forces from different countries. In addition, understanding them suggests strategies for building harmonious coalitions and for designing transition strategies that will enable the military forces to disengage gracefully and efficiently.
This study was undertaken to present the main tenets of national peace support and humanitarian assistance strategies, and their operational impact on civil-military cooperation. At one end of the spectrum lies the United States and the Russian Federation, with an expansive view of the use of force and desire to strictly separate military missions from those that reduce overall warfighting capability. At the other end of the spectrum lie the doctrines of the Nordic countries and Canada, whose extensive experience with traditional peacekeeping operations has led them to develop approaches based on neutral mediation and conflict resolution. In order to provide a benchmark for analysis and comparison, existing NATO peacekeeping concepts are also discussed. These divergent national approaches to peace and humanitarian assistance operations require reconciliation if future operations are to fully succeed.
NATIONAL APPROACHES - ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES:
Russian Federation
Like most nations, Russia's peacekeeping doctrine is a relatively recent development. The general concept of Operatsi po Podderzhaniyu Mira (OPM — Operations to Maintain Peace) encompasses a much broader range of activities that include much of what the West would call peace enforcement or counter-insurgency operations. Low-Intensity Conflict Operations in Tajikistan, Moldova, Abkhazia and Nagorno-Karabakh are all encompassed in Russian OPM doctrine.
While most Russian peacekeeping training has been of the "on-the-job" variety, efforts are being made to produce written doctrine. Major General Ivan Vorob'yev of the tactics department of the Frunze Military Academy has been leading OPM doctrine development. Vorob'yev stresses that peacekeeping troops must establish close links and full cooperation with the local civil administration, law enforcement agencies, and internal troops. They should act in a firm and timely fashion to control the development of events, avoiding the use of force and relying on negotiation to prevent conflict. Provision is given for the use of stronger measures if the situation threatens to get out of control. Examples of stronger measures include active patrolling, cordons and the control of road movement, and disarming or "neutralizing" armed bandits. These measures include ground and combined air and ground sweeps, cordon and search operations, and various forms of strike against identified groupings. Thus, the Russian concept involves much more active involvement in the conflict itself. Clearly, no distinction is made between peacekeeping and counter-insurgency operations. The Russian word mirotvorets, which is generally used to translate the English word "peacekeeper," is literally translated as "peace maker."
Russia accepts that peacekeeping forces may be introduced into zones where active conflict still exists, and that the states contributing troops need not represent neutral forces. Instead, their approach assumes that those forces may be involved in the actual conflict. There is a readiness to use a high level of force if necessary. In past peace operations, Russian commanders have sought to ensure that they have preponderant forces available so that they can dominate the local military situation and forcibly separate warring parties. Their training program for peacekeeping forces includes training in establishing contacts between opposing sides in a conflict zone, transport monitoring, security and communications, checkpoint operations, and patrolling. Overall, Russian doctrine assumes a broad and robust set of military responsibility.
United States
Like the Russian Federation, the U.S. perspective on peace operations is one of the more “high intensity” approaches along the conflict spectrum. U.S. doctrine stresses the requirement to achieve decisive “victory” and the quick resolution of conflicts through the securing of popular support.
This “warfighting approach” to peace operations has been amply demonstrated in recent involvements. The United States has preferred having direct command of each country's military assets rather than subordinating their control to an international organization or another country. Criticism of U.S. peacekeeping doctrine includes the comment that it lacks the subtly required for internal conflict and has been associated with an inexact and counter-productive use of force. Translation of U.S. peace operations doctrine in recent deployments has resulted in the dominance of force protection measures, the undertaking of only major infrastructure projects, and civil affairs activities centered on coordination and liaison. U.S. Commanders see force protection as a vital element of their missions, seek to fulfill a national desire for prompt resolution of dangerous situations, and see their planning for decisive actions as appropriate.
U.S. peace support efforts encompass three types of activities: support to diplomacy, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. Support to diplomacy activities include peacemaking, peace building, and preventive diplomacy activities, including such tasks as:
The U.S. defines peacekeeping operations in the traditional sense. Peacekeeping operations are designed to monitor and facilitate the implementation of an existing truce agreement and to support diplomatic efforts to achieve a long-term political settlement. The final peace operation identified in U.S. doctrine is peace enforcement. Peace enforcement is defined as the application of military force, or the threat of its use, to compel compliance with generally accepted resolutions or sanctions.
U.S. Peace Enforcement Activities
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U.S. doctrine has increasingly recognized that military commanders must consider the presence and capabilities of NGOs and PVOs and attempt to coordinate and cooperate with their efforts. Unlike other national doctrines, which actively provide for their country's military support to NGO activities, U.S. doctrine takes a more passive approach. It cautions that these organizations have valid missions and concerns, which at times may complicate the military mission. Employing the principles of mutual respect, communication, and standardization of support, NGOs are to be supported where feasible in compliance with the mandate and military the objective.
France
Modern French doctrine on peace support operations lies in the middle of the spectrum of intensity and involvement. Above all, French doctrine stresses maintaining a flexible approach towards the use of force, and that the ability to change from a peacekeeping to a retaliation status must be maintained, yet controlled. This approach has been developed further in a study by the French military staff into the general area of Peace Support Operations in a security environment characterized by uncertainty and a wide diversity of sources of instability.
In this context, French doctrine envisages a span of options from humanitarian operations and measures for the maintenance of peace to activities designed to reestablish or enforce peace. The requirement to create a general atmosphere in which a conflict might be resolved is encompassed in all options. French doctrine distinguishes between three distinct, but related, civil-military activities: Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC), Military-Civil Affairs (MCA), and Civil-Military Relations (MCR).
French CIMIC operations have as their objective the facilitation of the actions of friendly forces, principally by minimizing the consequences of civilian actions or events on friendly military operations. Examples of CIMIC activities include controlling refugees when their movement might impact on military operations or seeking military significant information from the civilian population. MCA operations differ from CIMIC in that MCA operations aim to assist institutions and services of the host nation in their return to normalcy. MCA focuses on constitutions and laws, culture, economy, communications, and other infrastructure building activities. The final activity, MCR, is best described as information programs designed to facilitate the military mission. Within this framework, CIMIC activities with their military focus retain the priority of effort. MCA and MCR operations are undertaken when resources permit, usually under the lead of national or international agencies.
French doctrine provides for the establishment of a civil affairs cell as a vehicle for coordination in a peace or humanitarian assistance operation. The components of the cell would normally include both military and civilian staff. Sub-cells include civil-military, legal, humanitarian aide, public affairs, public security, and economic infrastructures. Each element of the French approach is identified in detail and functionally related to overall political, as well as military, objectives.
Functions of the French Civil Affairs Cell
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United Kingdom
Like other national doctrines, British military doctrine is being updated to reflect the changed environment in the post-Cold War era, while seeking to retain its basis in the historical past. The British military's approach to peacekeeping operations is that these operations are only a means to an end. British doctrine dictates that peacekeeping operations serve to create the conditions of stability from which other economic, diplomatic, and political initiatives could be brought to bear to bring about an overall solution.
British doctrine has been expanded to cover the full spectrum of military activities, including counter-insurgency, limited intervention, and peace support operations. Doctrine on peace support operations stresses the minimum use of force, the requirement of impartiality, and the overall subordination of military measures as a precondition for success through political and economic initiatives. The doctrine also encompasses a coherent approach towards the utility of military force embodied in the tenets of preemption, dislocation, and disruption. This proactive orientation reflects British experiences in Northern Ireland and former colonies, where passive postures were found wanting.
Many activities which are conducted by civil affairs specialists in other nations' militaries are currently conducted by conventional British troops. For instance, it is normal for the local British commander to conduct extensive liaison with the civic leaders within his jurisdiction. Likewise, the individual soldiers within each patrol are expected to conduct themselves in a manner that gains them credibility and respect with the local population.
Not unlike other national approaches, British peace support, humanitarian assistance, and civil affairs doctrines are evolving. Mainly as a result of the lessons learned from UNOSOM II in Somalia, the British Army outlined its new concepts of peace support operations in the doctrinal publication “Wider Peacekeeping.” Central tenets espoused in Wider Peacekeeping included the significance of strategic consent for peace support operations, the appreciation of impartiality, and the respect for the divide between peace keeping and peace enforcement operations.
The British deployment to the former Yugoslavia as part of IFOR has produced the most visible impact on peace and humanitarian doctrine. From their IFOR experience, the British have recognized the utility of establishing dedicated civil affairs organizations. A feasibility study conducted within the British military concluded that a civil affairs group should be formed, as part of Land Command, to enhance UK preparedness and effectiveness in civil affairs matters across the spectrum of conflict. The CA Group is to be comprised of a small Regular Army nucleus who would administer a pool of Territorial Army staff augmentees and specialists (approximately 50 officers) who would in turn form into groups upon deploying into a theater of operations.
Principles of “New” British Civil Affairs Doctrine
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Under the planned development of the UK Civil Affairs Group, civil affairs assets will be organized under the G-5. The scope of the G-5 function is defined to encompass all measures between a military force and national authorities, international, nongovernmental, and private voluntary organizations and the population in general required by the force commander to fulfill his mission. Notionally, the UK CA Group will be divided into a staff element with traditional responsibilities of producing estimates and advising the commander, and a specialist element. The specialist element will be responsible for civil-centric functions, including refugee monitoring, liaison with civil agencies, area assessments, infrastructure rehabilitation, and normality indicator collection.
Canada
Deploying routinely to international crises throughout the last 50 years, Canada approaches complex political emergencies along more traditional peacekeeping lines. A review of Canadian doctrine reveals that their approach to these contingencies recognizes the fundamentally civil and political nature of a peace or humanitarian assistance operation. As such, Canada has given a broad mandate to the execution of civil-military tasks.
Canadian Civil-Military Objectives in Peace and Humanitarian Operations
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Canadian doctrine defines CIMIC broadly as actions and measures undertaken by a military commander which concern the relationship between a military force and the government, civil agencies or civilian population in the areas where the military force is stationed or employed. Canadian CIMIC activities are conducted to support the relationship between military forces in a given country and the civil authorities and population of the country. These activities call for the deployed force to perform certain functions or to execute certain authority that is normally the responsibility of local agencies or the local government.
As evidenced by the above objectives, and much like French CIMIC doctrine, Canadian CIMIC activities are divided into two categories: Civil-Military Operations (CMO) and Support to Civil Administration. CMO are conducted to support the commander's mission and Canadian national policy. Three types of CMO exist: arrangement for host nation support, population and resource control, and support to civil authorities and the civilian population. The second Canadian CIMIC category, support to civil administration, is assistance to stabilize a foreign government. Support to civil administration fulfills obligations arising from treaties, agreements, or other requirements of international law, and takes the form of civil assistance and civil administration in friendly or occupied territories.
Nordic Countries
In general, the Nordic countries' historical commitment to peace operations has been based on a desire to make positive contributions to global security. As small states located on the potentially vulnerable flank of Northern Europe, their perceived interest has been to participate in international organizations as a means of upholding the fundamental principles of international law and order. Within this context, their attitudes towards intervention and peacekeeping have been strongly influenced by the practice of traditional peacekeeping.
The Nordic approach is founded on a commitment to maintaining a stance of neutrality and avoiding unnecessary external intervention. Translated into a tactical framework in the Nordic UN Tactical Manual, greater emphasis is placed upon contact and negotiation skills rather than the use of force.
Nordic Peace Support Operations Tasks
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In short, much of the Nordic doctrine rests on the experience of mediation in inter-state conflict and thus lacks the same degree of applicability to intrastate conflict as does traditional peacekeeping. It has, however, been recognized that there would be circumstances in which a Peace Support force might be deployed with a more expansive mandate for the use of force to promote compliance.
NATO
NATO's draft doctrine for Peace Support Operations has tried to be responsive to the various national approaches, particularly as they have been experienced in Bosnia, and has therefore taken a very broad view of how to accomplish this new type of mission. NATO's approach acknowledges the changing security environment following the end of the Cold War and sets the stage for a more expansive commitment beyond its former concentration on collective defense. It develops three types of deployments to meet these new contingencies, specifically: Peacekeeping Missions, Conflict Prevention, and Humanitarian Missions. The overall tone of the manual emphasizes the principles of traditional peacekeeping with a restrictive caveat applying the principles to both mediation in inter-state conflict and certain aspects of internal conflict. The principles outlined include mutual respect, impartiality, credibility, limits on the use of force, transparency of operations, unity of command, military-civil coordination, freedom of movement, and flexibility.
Peacekeeping missions include observation, interposition force, and transition assistance. In addressing Conflict Prevention missions, NATO doctrine states that the use of military forces for this purpose must be focused on the support they provide to the diplomatic and political efforts to resolve disputes. NATO doctrine also provides for the possibility that where responsible civil authority has ceased to function effectively or where authority acts against its own subjects in contravention of recognized standards of international law, more forceful measures can be used to deliver humanitarian assistance.
NATO Military Tasks in Transition Assistance
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While NATO doctrine recognizes that peace support operations involve important, but distinct contributions by the civilian and military components of the mission, it devotes just two pages of the last chapter to a discussion of military-civil relations. NATO doctrine addresses civil affairs very narrowly as an activity to facilitate combat operations by procuring host-nation logistic support and by preventing interference with military operations. NATO CIMIC activities closely resemble public affairs activities, and focus on the promotion of positive attitudes, emotions, opinions, and behavior of the civil populace towards the peace force and its mission.
NATO CIMIC Tasks
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CONCLUSIONS
Recent multinational deployments in response to complex political emergencies have amply demonstrated the difficulty reconciling divergent peace and humanitarian assistance doctrine. Despite an outwardly common objective, national concepts of operation and mission interpretation—driven by national interests—have been the rule rather than the exception (see figure 2). While a common doctrine acceptable to most is far over the horizon, understanding, accepting, and finding paths around the doctrinal differences as they exist today is a crucial first step.
Figure 2. National Approaches Affect International Response
Given the very broad range of approaches and policies present, only a few common principles emerge. However, there are several points of commonality which should perhaps be stressed in order to help the international community work together effectively. They include:
1. Recognition that different types of military roles and missions are appropriate in different kinds of crises. Limited military roles are appropriate for situations dominated by humanitarian disasters. When the rule of law has broken down and relief workers cannot do their work in safety, local security roles become appropriate. Peacekeeping, where the primary mission derives from a cease fire or settlement agreement that needs international supervision, is another qualitative dimension. Finally, peace making or peace enforcement are very aggressive postures. As noted in Command and Control in Peace Operations, transition between these types of situations can be sudden. Moreover, the measures of effectiveness for Peace Support Operations should be based on their ability to move the situation to more positive levels—e.g., from Peace Enforcement to Peacekeeping. All the doctrines examined recognize the variety of roles and missions that may arise, though some recognize the linkages between them better than others.
2. Stressing the fundamentally political nature of peace support and humanitarian assistance missions. While military support may be necessary to ensure proper resolution, these are not primarily military missions, but rather primarily situations where the conditions must be created in which the parties are able to manage their differences and take over the functioning of their own society.
3. Broad recognition of the roles and value of non-national actors. Both the international community and the NGO/PVO community have technical expertise and political postures that enable them to work toward longer term solutions in the countries where the crises occur. As this recognition grows, the desirability of finding new ways to work with these non-national actors is becoming more broadly understood.
4. Realizing that appropriate linkages to the key civilian agencies of their governments (foreign ministries, disaster relief officials, and long-term development specialists) are crucial both to successful mission accomplishment and to developing successful transition strategies.
However, while commonalties exist, there are still very large differences between the approaches of the major countries with broad peace operations experience. These differences need to be recognized and understood, particularly when plans are made for new coalitions to cooperate. Perhaps equally important, they need to be discussed in those fora where peace operators from different countries gather—regional peace operations schools and courses, workshops, and symposia.
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