CAPT E.A. Smith, Jr. USN

From: Subject: CAPT E.A. Smith, Jr. USN Date: Mon, 21 Aug 2006 13:10:47 -0400 MIME-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/related; type="text/html"; boundary="----=_NextPart_000_0000_01C6C523.37E57670" X-MimeOLE: Produced By Microsoft MimeOLE V6.00.2900.2962 This is a multi-part message in MIME format. ------=_NextPart_000_0000_01C6C523.37E57670 Content-Type: text/html; charset="Windows-1252" Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable Content-Location: http://www.dodccrp.org/research/other/IS/eSmith/NCW_eSmith.htm CAPT E.A. Smith, Jr. USN

Submission to the Naval War College = Review

Dr. Edward A. Smith, Jr.
(703) = 465-3319

Network Centric = Warfare:
Where's=20 the beef?

What is Network Centric Warfare? = Where's=20 the beef? Most attempts to answer these questions seem to = emphasize the=20 "network" and the new technologies used to create more effective = sensor=20 and communications architectures. These architectures, it is = argued, will=20 enable us to create and exploit a common situational awareness, to = increase our speed of command, and to "get inside the enemy's OODA = loop."=20 ¹ Yet, descriptions of the technologies and = capabilities=20 alone can leave us asking the same questions. What is it? Just = what does=20 it bring to warfare? Why is it so critical to America's future = military=20 power that we must give up other capabilities to buy it?=20

These persistent questions point to the need for a different = emphasis,=20 one that focuses first on the "warfare" side of the equation. That = is, we=20 need a working warfare concept of what we are trying to do = with=20 network centric operations before we can create the necessary = information=20 architectures. Such conceptual work can help us not only to = recognize the=20 potential in networking but can help us discern the limits and = limitations=20 of the changes we propose. It also can provide a fundamental = understanding=20 of the role of network centric operations both in battlefield and = across=20 the spectrum from peace through war, as well as in our national = security=20 and national military strategies. An evolving working concept is, = in=20 short, the first step in drawing a road map for building a network = centric=20 "Navy after next."

As we gradually build this working concept, we need to bear = some=20 common-sense caveats in mind. We are not likely to find in any = network a=20 single universal technological solution to all our warfare = problems. Older=20 forms of warfare are likely to persist alongside the new. Greatly=20 accelerated speed of command will be a critical measure of our = success,=20 but numbers and endurance will still count. Enhanced common = situational=20 awareness will multiply our power, but knowing our enemy = will be=20 more critical than ever. Adversaries will respond and, the more = successful=20 our concept of warfare, the more asymmetrical their responses are = likely=20 to become. Our objective in network centric warfare is not to = provide a=20 single answer or to provide all the answers. It is to identify = those=20 combinations of new thinking and new things that offer better = answers to=20 our warfare needs on as many levels of war as possible and over as = great a=20 portion of the spectrum of conflict as possible. The measure of = our=20 success will not be the quality of the network or the quantity of=20 firepower we build but rather, what effect the networking = of combat=20 resources enables us to have on the enemy. That suggests two = things.=20
-First, our concept of network centric operations will be = intimately=20 tied to an understanding of effects-based warfare, that is, = a=20 results-oriented process centered on the relationship between our = actions=20 and specific desired enemy reactions.² = Network=20 centric operations are the "enabler" for effects-based warfare. = The shared=20 situational awareness, speed of command, precision, "lock out," = and other=20 capabilities we seek to effect in network centric operations are = the tools=20 needed to implement effects-based warfare. Indeed, we can almost = begin to=20 think in terms of a single working concept of network centric=20 effects-based warfare.
-Second, as this connection between = network=20 centric and effects-based warfare implies, our working concept = must step=20 beyond the problems of the tactical battlefield engagement. It = must=20 address how network centric operations can be used to produce = decisive=20 effects in theater/ campaign level operations and in the = politico-military=20 and strategic dimensions of war. Even more, it should address how = such=20 capabilities might help us translate our warfare prowess into a = broad=20 stabilizing deterrence running from peace through crisis and war. =
The=20 better our concepts and technologies, the more often and more = widely=20 network centric warfare will be applicable. And, the more often it = works,=20 the better will be our success in deterring future conflict.=20

For the United States, the success of both network centric = warfare and=20 effects-based warfare is likely to hinge on how they enhance our = ability=20 to project decisive military power over vast distances. Power = projection=20 is one of the pillars of our National Military Strategy and is the = focus=20 of the Navy's =85From the Sea. The reason is simple. It is = the=20 capacity to project decisive military power across the world that = makes=20 the United States a global power and undergirds a national = security=20 strategy founded on engagement and shaping. This requirement is = rooted in=20 America's geography. Because the United States lies far from most = of the=20 regions in which it has vital interests, it must deploy its = military power=20 to the regions where it is needed if it is to be = effective.³=20

Projecting decisive power is costly. Not only is it expensive = to=20 transport and sustain forces over vast distances or to maintain = the=20 capability to do so, but the distance tends to attenuate the = quantity of=20 conventional forces that can be deployed and sustained. To apply = decisive=20 military power at considerable distances from the American = heartland, the=20 United States has relied heavily on high technology to multiply = the power=20 of the forces it projects. These force-multiplying technologies = are at the=20 root of network centric warfare and effects-based warfare. Both = concepts=20 may be enabled by new technologies, but there is clearly much more = to=20 them. Their real power derives from the combination of new = thinking and=20 new technology applied to a new, more decisive style of = expeditionary=20 warfare.

Technologies, Synergies and Force = Multipliers

Using technology to multiply the impact of military forces = seems almost=20 axiomatic. But, how do we identify which technologies in=20 which combinations hold the most potential? Then, how do we = make=20 them decisive both in battle and across the spectrum of conflict? = That is,=20 "how do we fight smarter?" ⁴ The information = technology=20 at the core of network centric operations is one obvious force = multiplier,=20 but there is clearly more to the technological revolution than = computers=20 and communications. What we really are seeing are three on-going = global=20 technological revolutions, each with great military import but = under only=20 limited military control.⁵

Sensor Technologies. The revolution in sensor = technologies is=20 twofold. On one hand, there is a movement toward more and more = capable=20 sensors, especially satellite-borne sensors able to achieve=20 near-real-time surveillance over vast areas. On the other, there = is a=20 movement toward dispersed fields of smaller, cheaper, and more = numerous=20 sensors, ultimately including those based on nano-technologies. = Fields=20 of sensors, both space-based and local, might then be netted to = detect,=20 locate, identify, track, and target potential threats or=20 vulnerabilities, and to disseminate vast quantities of = surveillance data=20 to all levels of command. Thus, we stand to create a new "shared = situational awareness" that is "global in scope and precise in = detail."=20 ⁶
Information Processing Technologies. The revolution in=20 information technologies will bring a geometric increase in = computing=20 power and, hence, increases capabilities of all forms of = computer=20 applications including communications. Over the next 10 to 15 = years,=20 increased processing capabilities will provide the means of = processing,=20 collating, and analyzing the vast quantities of sensor data. It = will=20 provide military forces with the ability to handle those vast = amounts of=20 data quickly and begin to apply automatic correlation. It also = will=20 provide the means of distributing information⁷ to any = designee or "shooter" anywhere in the world at near real time = speeds.=20 Over the longer term, therefore, the information revolution = offers=20 military planners what amounts to a blank check to create = whatever=20 "network" they may need to support operations.⁸ = The=20 limit is that of imagination rather than of = technology.
Precision Weapons Technology. The weapons revolution is = not=20 toward increasing weapon accuracy so much as it is toward more = efficient=20 production. Current accuracy is sufficient to exploit the vast = majority=20 of potential targets in the world, but cost and limited numbers = make=20 precise weapons "silver bullets" to be used only sparingly. = However,=20 this seems poised to change. Redesign, incorporation of new = electronics,=20 lean manufacturing, and mass production can result in a sharply = decrease=20 in cost for a given level of accuracy and capability -- and, = thus,=20 increasing numbers and more widespread deployment of more lethal = missiles.⁹ Similarly, better networking and = targeting=20 data streams from external sources can enable us to use cheaper = guidance=20 packages on precise weapons, also decreasing cost.

Separately, each of the three individual revolutions promises=20 significant change, but only when they are taken together does the = potential for the revolutionary new synergies embodied in network = centric=20 warfare begin to emerge. Without the new sensors, = targeting¹⁰=20 would never be sufficiently broad, accurate, or timely to exploit = the=20 potential of highly accurate weapons. Without the information = structure,=20 any set of sensors would quickly submerge the system with so much = data as=20 to make it unworkable. Without adequate numbers of low-cost, = precise,=20 long-range weapons, successes in sensing and information = processing could=20 not be translated into a decisive battlefield effect. What is = more, each=20 revolution is an on-going trend that will continue for decades to = come.=20 There is no single technology or system to be mastered and = incorporated=20 into warfare, rather a continuing, uneven succession of = developments will=20 create staccato opportunities for change in our own and our = adversaries'=20 forces and capabilities.¹¹

As we pursue network centric warfare, therefore, we must accept = that=20 there will be no immediate conclusive answer, but rather a rapidly = evolving situation in which we must be able to identify and grasp=20 technological opportunities as they occur. There also are two = further=20 complications.
-First, since the evolving sensor, information = and=20 weapons capabilities will interact and multiply each other=92s = effectiveness=20 in a kaleidoscope of potential synergies, we should expect a = geometrically=20 increasing set of possible outcomes.
-Second, while we must = assess the=20 utility of each new technology in the context of warfare as we = know it,=20 the technologies will also change the character of warfare = dramatically.=20
The situation is analogous to the triple revolution in guns, = armor,=20 and propulsion that marked warship design in the fifty years = between 1862=20 and 1912.¹² That three-fold revolution introduced = a=20 period of trial and error experimentation and forced such rapid = change in=20 warship design that new units were obsolete within a few years of = fleet=20 entry. It also brought forth Mahan and a fundamental rethinking of = what=20 navies could do.

Our problem, thus, is not simply to integrate information = technology=20 into our current way of war. It is rather to manage a complex = iterative=20 process in which the synergies generated by a succession of = sensor,=20 information and weapons technological developments will redefine = the=20 character of warfare and lay the basis for a precise effects-based = approach. New technologies will continually present new = possibilities that=20 will make our working concept, of necessity, a "work in progress." = The=20 changing concept will in turn suggest still more ways in which = those or=20 other technologies may be applied, and so on in an unending cycle. = Our=20 challenge is to identify the evolving synergies, to adapt them to = the=20 power projection needs of the United States on a continuing basis, = and do=20 so within the defense budgets we are likely to have.

As this suggests, a static "if you build it, they will come" = approach=20 focused solely on communications architecture would leave us just = reacting=20 to individual technology developments as they occur, and making = only=20 incremental changes. Harnessing the rolling synergies of this = complex=20 technological revolution will require a broad, long-term = perspective wide=20 that encompasses both the potential impact of the new = technologies' on our=20 military power and the derivative impact of new capabilities on = our=20 operational and strategic objectives. We must ask not simply how = new=20 technologies might handle existing tasks better, but also what we = might=20 now do that we have never been able to do before.

This would indicate that our conceptualization should start by=20 identifying the defining military capabilities that derive from = the=20 combined impact of the sensor, information and weapons = revolutions. We can=20 then assess how those capabilities affect the character of = military=20 operations in peace and war, then how new technologies might be = made to=20 interact to produce a desired effect, and finally, how that effect = might=20 be enhanced by new organization, training, doctrine and tactics. =

Precision, Speed and =85 Flexibility

From the military standpoint, perhaps the most striking common = element=20 in the new technologies is the increased precision and = speed=20 that may now be possible in military operations. Evolving sensors = will=20 provide more and better data, thereby enabling military operations = to be=20 more and more responsive and exact. Evolving information = technology will=20 enable us to handle the vast quantities of data from the sensors = quickly,=20 and to meld the resulting situational awareness with the = information=20 needed to control and support our forces. Increasing numbers of = highly=20 accurate weapons and forces, in turn, will enable us to exploit = the=20 information we acquire on the battlefield.¹³ In each = case, the=20 result of applying the technology is an increasing ability to be = highly=20 exact in our operations, and to generate a pace of operations that = would=20 not heretofore have been possible. The more successfully we = develop and=20 combine the technologies, the more exact, and the more nearly = real-time=20 our responses to battlefield threats and opportunities are likely = to=20 become. This relationship suggests that to optimize technologies = or=20 explore potential synergies, we must first understand the = potential impact=20 of precision and speed on warfare.

What do precision and speed do for us? The starting point is = the=20 realization that "precision" lies in the effects achieved and = not in=20 the arms and systems employed. We must talk in terms of = effects-based=20 warfare. To achieve precise effects, we must do more than simply = identify=20 a target or category of targets. We must know the = specific=20 political or military effect we seek at each level of war. Thus, = we must=20 identify which enemy vulnerability or target subjected to=20 what form of duress where, when and for = how=20 long will create the precise effect we seek. This is far more = than=20 seeing where the enemy is or tracking his forces. It also means = that we=20 must be able to assess not only the potential military impact of = our=20 actions, but also the potential political, economic, or other = impact upon=20 the enemy and even upon our own public, e.g. collateral damage. = Nor is=20 that all. We also must be able to generate the right force at the = right=20 time, and then monitor measures of effectiveness that will test = our=20 success =96 a requirement that far transcends conventional notions = of bomb=20 damage assessment and focuses instead on enemy will. Finally, if = we are=20 really to make the most of the precision our technology permits, = we must=20 be able to do all of this reliably in the heat of battle, and = quickly and=20 accurately enough to take advantage of each fleeting opportunity. =

In short, to be decisive in anything more than a one-time, = pre-planned=20 strike, we need more than speed and precision. We must be have a = third=20 element, operational flexibility, i.e. the ability to change from = one=20 rapid, precise operation or tactical engagement to another at will = to=20 exploit the opportunities and deal with the threats of a changing=20 battlefield. We need to be able to compress a relatively complex = targeting=20 and command and control process until it fits the nearly real-time = dimensions of a battlefield engagement. These requirements are at = the=20 center of ideas like "speed of command," "the ring of fires," and = "time=20 critical targeting." Each of these ideas makes intuitive sense, = and each=20 can be understood in the context of a limited engagement, such as = a call=20 for fire support or a long-range strike. The key to understanding = how both=20 the concepts and the new technologies fit together is "network = centric=20 warfare."

Network Centric Warfare and Combat=20 Efficiency

VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, the leading proponent of "network = centric=20 warfare," has described it in terms of the more efficient = application of=20 combat power. This idea of combat efficiency as the true measure = of the=20 success of network centric warfare clearly steps beyond the = tactical C4ISR=20 focus. It implies a fundamental change in how we think and operate = as well=20 as what we use, and it demands an understanding of how the = precision,=20 speed, and flexibility of military operations that the network can = produce=20 change what we can do with the forces we will have available.

As Cebrowski puts it, traditional military operations usually = occur in=20 stair step fashion. A mission is assigned and planned; forces are=20 generated and coordinated; and finally, an operation is launched = that=20 concentrates this power on an assigned objective. As a result of = this=20 inaction-action cycle, military power tends to be applied in = spurts. The=20 horizontal part represents

the periods of inaction during which the coordination and force = generation functions are undertaken, while the vertical part of = the step=20 or "execution" equates to the power applied.

Cebrowski contends that a network centric approach to warfare = would=20 enable us to move from this highly coordinated cycle of operations = ("planned synchronization") to what is effectively a smooth curve = defined=20 by a multitude of smaller, semi-independent operations ("empowered = self-synchronization.") Given the power of the shared situational=20 awareness created by the network, it would no longer would it be = necessary=20 to initiate an action, wait to see its impact or an enemy's = reaction,=20 decide on a further action, and so on, in the manner of Col. John = Boyd's=20 famed Observe, Orient, Decide, Act (OODA) loop.¹⁴ = The=20 availability and immediacy of information on the network would = permit us=20 to accomplish this cycle on a nearly continuous basis at all = levels of=20 command in order to achieve a new form of "empowered = self-synchronized"=20 operations. That is, the network would permit us to decentralize = or=20 flatten the command structure, taking the control function down to = the=20 lowest practicable level of command and shortening the response = cycle by=20 removing unneeded levels of command and control. Finally, as = training and=20 organization improve at all levels, the pace of the = semi-independent=20 operations should accelerate further to create a new "speed of = command."=20

As Admiral Cebrowski's diagram underlines, the contribution of = network=20 centric operations is much more than speed. Rather, by permitting=20 individual units to "self-synchronize" and substantially = increasing the=20 speed of operations, the network enables us to optimize the combat = power=20 of our forces and to regain "lost combat power." Put simply, it = suggests=20 that network centric warfare is not about communications. It is = about=20 combat efficiency.

Creating Disproportionate Effects

What is "combat efficiency" and how do network centric = operations=20 generate it? In essence, combat efficiency is the degree to which = we can=20 optimize the impact of military power. In effects-based warfare, = this=20 efficiency is denominated in terms of how successful a given unit = of=20 combat power was in inducing the enemy to react in the desired = way. This=20 measure is more complicated than the traditional Lanchestrian = tallies of=20 bombs dropped versus forces destroyed, but it drives to the heart = of the=20 role of precision in warfare. It says that effective military = power is not=20 a function of how fast we attrite an opposing military force, but = of how=20 well we force the enemy to yield -- and by extension how = successful we are=20 in avoiding an attrition exchange altogether. Such a definition = conforms=20 well to the challenge confronting us in the expeditionary warfare = of the=20 21st century: to enable relatively small forward forces to create = effects=20 that are disproportionate to their numbers.

Admiral Cebrowski's discussions of network centric warfare = suggest that=20 there are in fact two distinct levels of combat efficiency. The = diagram=20 points to the first level. It outlines the potential role of = network=20 centric operations in enabling us to apply combat power better, = faster,=20 and in greater quantity. The admiral, however, clearly points = beyond this=20 limited goal and sees in the "better, faster, more" a means to = something=20 more. Speed, precision and flexibility combined with a superior = knowledge=20 of the enemy can enable us to seize and sustain the initiative on = the=20 battlefield, to "lock out" any meaningful enemy response, and to = break the=20 enemy will to resist rather than slowly grinding down his means of = resisting. It is this latter second level of combat efficiency = that=20 promises the greater return, but is also the most challenging. =

Better, Faster, More: The First Level of = Combat=20 Efficiency

While the admiral's depiction of the increased combat = efficiency=20 deriving from accelerated self-synchronized operations makes = intuitive=20 sense, it leaves some questions to be answered. For example, how = much of=20 the efficiency accrues from better communications and information = and how=20 much from better organization, training and doctrine? How does the = power=20 of shared situational awareness translate into increased = efficiency?=20 Further explanation is in order.

One approach to providing such an explanation is to combine = VADM=20 Cebrowski's depiction of the traditional stepped application of = military=20 power with Col. John Boyd's Observe, Orient, Decide, Act or OODA = loop.=20 Although the OODA loop was originally conceived as a tactical = engagement=20 circle, it is now commonly applied to exchanges at the operational = and=20 strategic levels as well. In this case, we will take an additional = step=20 and employ it to describe both decision making and power = generation and=20 use the orient/decide phases to equate to the period required for=20 gathering and directing the military force to be applied. If we = further=20 look at Boyd's OODA loop not as a circular, repeating loop, but as = a=20 series of linear cycles occurring in succession over time, we can = overlay=20 these linear OODA cycles onto the step functions in the Cebrowski = diagram.=20 Boyd's Observe, Orient and Decide phases then would = equate=20 to the horizontal part of the step function or delay while the = Act=20 phase would constitute the vertical or application of force = phase.=20 Plotted on axes of time (x) versus cumulative application of = military=20 force (y), the "steps," then become OODA cycles that are repeated = as often=20 as necessary with Act adding to the total of the military = force=20 applied.

This overlay permits us to dissect the individual steps by = defining=20 what the "observe," "orient," "decide," and "act" phases might = actually=20 entail in terms of specific operational functions. By doing this, = several=20 additional insights emerge. For example, the "observe" process = includes=20 the steps necessary to acquire the intelligence, surveillance,=20 reconnaissance, and targeting data needed to act. It entails = getting the=20 right sensors looking at the right targets or threats so as to = collect the=20 right data, and it includes transmitting that data, information or = intelligence to the right person or system at the right time. This = phase=20 is clearly the domain of network centric warfare, of = sensor-to-shooter=20 architectures, and of concepts like nodal targeting. Thus, the = observe=20 phase lends itself very well to new information and sensor = technologies=20 and holds great promise both of significant time compression and = greater=20 precision. But, there is a limit to this compression. Precise=20 effects-based warfare will demand more than sensor-based = awareness. It=20 will require us to identify both the specific vulnerability we = need to act=20 against and the desired result. To do this, we need to = know=20 the enemy. The process of creating such knowledge of the enemy = will draw=20 on sensor information, to be sure, and will be subject to some = time=20 compression as a result, but it is much more a matter of creating = regional=20 expertise and extensive regional and technical intelligence = databases. In=20 short, we will find ourselves reintroducing the human dimension = into the=20 loop and expanding our reliance on functions that must be carried = out over=20 months and years, and essentially, must be completed before the = battle=20 even begins. This means that the increasing speed and precision = brought be=20 new sensors and information technology can only shorten the OODA = cycle to=20 the degree that such long term collection and analysis has already = been=20 done and is available on the net.

A similar limit emerges as we move to the "orient/decide"=20 phase¹⁵ of our redefined OODA cycle. Better information = and=20 situational awareness can help us to avoid mistakes and permit a = more=20 efficient use of assets. However, the time required to generate = combat=20 power and, hence, the length of the "orient/decide" phase is only=20 indirectly affected by better information. This is because the = timing is=20 dictated by the succession of physical steps necessary to generate = the=20 right force in the right numbers to achieve the effect we seek. = For=20 example, we might have to move the carrier within range of the = objective,=20 plan and brief the mission, fuel and arm the aircraft, and launch = the=20 right planes to do the job, and then sustain our strikes as long = as=20 necessary to achieve our objective. Although better, more reliable = information can help, the process remains a collection of physical = functions that must be completed before we can produce the = military power=20 needed and apply it to an "act" phase. Each of these functions has = its=20 pace determined by the physical capabilities of the systems and = people=20 involved. The carrier can move only so fast, the planning process=20 compressed just so far, or the flight deck operations hurried = along only=20 so much. The major "delays" associated with these physical steps = in the=20 orient/decide process are functions of how we organize, train and = equip=20 our forces, and have little to do with information flows. Hence, = they=20 stand to be improved only marginally by network centric warfare = taken in=20 its narrow connectivity sense.

Moreover, much the same is true of the "act" phase. To carry = the=20 example further, the aircraft we will have to launch must proceed = to the=20 target area, a function of distance and air speed. Then, they will = have to=20 drop or launch their weapons, a function of weapons = characteristics such=20 as stand-off range and speed. Thus, the time required to complete = the=20 "act" phase depends on the kind of forces being used and the = physical=20 parameters of the combat situation, much more than on the speed or = scope=20 of the information flow.

The lesson is clear. Optimizing the OODA cycle and increasing = our=20 "speed of command" is as much a question of finding out how to = organize=20 the information we need and how to accelerate the process of = generating=20 combat power and moving it to target as it is of speeding the = forces'=20 communications. Increasing combat efficiency, therefore, must = necessarily=20 be a multi- pronged effort.

The strike generation experiment run by the USS Nimitz in 1997 = is=20 illustrative of how changes in organization, training, and = equipment can=20 be combined with network centric approaches to warfare in order to = create=20 a more efficient use of combat forces. The purpose of the = experiment was=20 to maximize the number of sorties a carrier could generate and = sustain,=20 that is, to increase the combat efficiency of a carrier battle = group. To=20 do this, the carrier beefed up its air wing with more pilots, = abandoned=20 traditional cyclical operations¹⁶ in favor of new = high-speed=20 cyclical operations, and relied on accompanying missile ships for = its air=20 defense. The result was a demonstrated capacity to generate = approximately=20 1,000 carrier air sorties over four days or around five times the = usual=20 number of sorties. To further enhance its impact, Nimitz also = armed the=20 aircraft it launched with precision weapons and began to define = its power=20 projection in terms of target aim points attacked rather than = planes=20 launched. Thus, if each aircraft carried four precise weapons, = each of=20 which could reliably destroy an aimpoint, then the total the = effect would=20 be one of 4,000 aim points attacked over a four day period by a = single=20 carrier.¹⁷ However, generating more sorties and = attacking=20 more aim points would be of little consequence if not accompanied = by an=20 ability to identify the right targets, prioritize them, coordinate = the=20 strikes and assess the effects of our actions at a rate at least=20 equivalent to our ability to generate the sorties. The "effects" = created=20 by the Nimitz demonstration, thus, stemmed from two capacities: to = conduct=20 strike operations at a heretofore inconceivable rate, and to use = each of=20 those strikes to its fullest advantage.

To apply our OODA perspective, Nimitz and its air wing = established a=20 new faster physical operational cycle. By training = differently,=20 changing the way in which operations were planned and organized, = and by=20 augmenting selected personnel, they increased the speed at which = their=20 military power could be generated. However, as the changes imply, = the=20 accelerated OODA cycle that resulted was peculiar to that = particular class=20 of carrier with that particular air wing organized and trained in = this=20 specific manner embarked.¹⁸

The implications of the Nimitz demonstration are significant = for=20 several reasons. First, the Nimitz operation shows that the power=20 generation portion of the OODA cycle and hence the cycle as a = whole can be=20 shortened by the use of better equipment, organization, training = and=20 information. And, indeed, subsequent operations by other Nimitz = class=20 carriers bear out that similar changes in equipment, organization, = training and information can have a similar impact. Second, if the = changes=20 could produce different length OODA cycles, then the OODA cycles = of each=20 individual military force also may be expected to vary with = equipment,=20 training, and organization. Stated in reverse, a different class = carrier=20 with a different air wing containing different aircraft would not = be=20 expected to perform in the same way. Third, if this line of = reasoning is=20 carried a step further, we also should expect that dissimilar = military=20 forces will have different, even radically different OODA cycle = lengths.=20 For example, the Nimitz' cycle would differ from that of a cruiser = firing=20 a cruise missile, and the cruiser's OODA cycle, in turn, would = differ=20 markedly from that of a squad of Marines engaged in a fire fight. = If the=20 analogy is extended further to joint and allied forces, the same = disparity=20 should be apparent. Air Force B-2 bombers operating from bases in = the=20 United States have a demonstrably different OODA cycle from a = Nimitz class=20 carrier operating 300 miles from the battlefield.¹⁹=20 Similarly, any allied operation, especially one where = individual=20 national Rules of Engagement are enforced, is likely to have to = deal with=20 widely different OODA cycles. The bottom line is clear. Different = kinds of=20 combat forces with different equipment, organization and training = generate=20 distinctly different OODA cycles of very different lengths.

The battlefield represents a complex interaction among very = different=20 kinds of military forces with OODA cycles of widely varying = length. To use=20 a more specific example, at one extreme, a SEAL insertion would=20 necessitate the acquisition of some very exact intelligence on = enemy=20 operations in the target area. Then it would require detailed = planning,=20 and rehearsal perhaps followed by a submarine transit to the = operating=20 area, a swim ashore, and a trek to the target, likely with an = attendant=20 requirement for cover of darkness. At the other extreme, the squad = of=20 Marines engaged in a fire fight, if it is to survive, must create = a very=20 short decision making/OODA cycle. Each Marine becomes the sensor,=20 coordinator, and shooter all wrapped up into one. The members of = the=20 platoon rely on training, doctrine and the immediate presence of a = platoon=20 commander to coordinate the individual action and to sustain the = pace of=20 the exchange. However, if the squad were to require assistance, it = would=20 have to deal with forces whose reaction or OODA cycles might be = very=20 different. A call for fire to a destroyer off shore might require = the ship=20 to move into position and/or man the guns, load and fire, as well = as a=20 delay for the round fired to reach the target designated. If the = call for=20 support went instead to a carrier

off-shore, then the Marines' call for support and targeting = data might=20 have to be married with other observations as to the state of = enemy=20 anti-aircraft capabilities in and en route the target area. Then = the=20 appropriate strike or reaction package would have to be generated, = crews=20 briefed, and aircraft armed and launched. Finally, the aircraft = might have=20 to proceed to the target area and the launch of its weapons with = the=20 forward observer. Obviously in each of these cases, response time = would be=20 greatly shortened if the ship were on the gun line ready to fire = or the=20 aircraft were overhead or on strip alert nearby. However, two = things are=20 apparent:

-That, in shortening the power generation OODA = cycle,=20 improved C4ISR is only one part of a much larger operational = challenge;=20 and
-That, any effort to increase the "speed of command" must = focus on=20 the diversity of OODA cycles generated by the very different = forces that=20 are likely to play on the modern battlefield. The more diverse the = forces,=20 the greater the problem is likely to be.
The above also = underlines the=20 nature of the coordination undertaken by the combat commander. = Putting the=20 ship into a position to fire, or stationing the aircraft overhead = or on=20 strip alert nearby entails coordinating their different OODA = cycles so=20 that they can act simultaneously or when needed. This means that = their=20 "act" phases must be alligned so that all earlier aspects of force = generation have already been satisfied. In battle, the commander=20 "coordinates" the different OODA cycles of the forces under his = command so=20 that the "act" phase of each of his differing forces strikes the = enemy at=20 the same time or in some prescribed sequence. This kind of = coordination is=20 a necessary facet of battlefield operations, however, something = else needs=20 to be borne in mind. What is happening is that the commander = deliberately=20 keeps most of his units from achieving their optimum OODA cycle = length or=20 pace of operations in order to mass effects or to be mutually = supportive.=20 To carry our example further, if it were necessary for an air = strike to=20 incapacitate an artillery position in order to enable several = platoons of=20 Marines to reach an objective, and if that in turn were contingent = on the=20 SEALs taking down a surveillance radar en route that target, then = the=20 entire operation would be tied to the pace of the SEALs. That is, = by the=20 planned synchronization of the OODA cycles, we have held our = entire effort=20 hostage to the speed of the slowest OODA cycle.=20

Obviously, there are many situations in which it will be = operationally=20 necessary to mass effects in order to create the greatest shock = value, or=20 to prevent the enemy from defeating our forces in = detail.²⁰=20 But there is a price to be paid. The result of massing = forces or=20 effects is that less force is applied than if each force, system = or unit=20 had been permitted to operate at its own optimum rate. This means=20 foregoing those cycles of applied combat power that might have = been=20 generated by quicker paced forces during the time in question. = Moreover,=20 as Admiral Cebrowski's step diagram underlines, this massing of = effects in=20 a "planned synchronized" attack may occur time after time with the = timing=20 of each wave of massed attacks contingent on the pace of the = slowest=20 unit.²¹ In effect, by optimizing mass, we = minimize=20 efficiency.

Here is where the question of flexibility becomes important. = Precision=20 and speed may permit us to reduce the length of our OODA cycles = and,=20 thereby, increase the pace of our operations, but alone they are=20 insufficient to realize the revolution -- or prevent it from = backfiring.=20 Efficiency is not enough. Rather, we must be able both to = conduct=20 rapid, semi-independent operations and to mass forces and = effects=20 as required to deal with changes in the enemy threat or to take = advantage=20 of emerging battlefield opportunities. We need to be able to = change the=20 mode, direction and objectives of our actions just as much as we = need to=20 bring speed and precision to targeting. That is, we must be = flexible to a=20 degree that we have never before managed.

Network centric operations are at the heart of this = flexibility. The=20 flexibility and the speed and precision it exploits all derive = from the=20 amalgam of information, sensors, and communications that = constitutes the=20 information back plane of network centric warfare. The "network" = permits=20 us to undertake more actions in a given time, to focus those = actions=20 better, and to act and react both faster and with more certainty. = Yet, all=20 of these "better, faster, more" attributes by themselves still add = up to=20 little more than a more efficient form of attrition. How then do = we make=20 the leap to a level of efficiency that would permit us to "break" = the=20 enemy will rather than grind down his means of waging war?

Breaking Enemy Will: The Second Level of = Combat=20 Efficiency

The first level of combat efficiency can be reduced to aim = points=20 serviced, volume of fires generated, or damage inflicted on enemy = forces=20 and capabilities. While such combat efficiency remains the = critical,=20 irreducible core of what we must be able to do, it also = understates the=20 real pay-off that may be possible with network centric approaches = to=20 warfare. In fact, the ultimate objective of the network centric = warfare=20 described by VADM Cebrowski is not to wear down the enemy's = physical=20 ability to make war at all, but to instill a sense of "shock and = awe" that=20 will create a "self-fulfilling prophecy" of defeat. These ideas = and,=20 indeed, the example of the 1940 blitzkrieg itself, suggest = that the=20 route to the next level of "combat efficiency" is not applying = even=20 greater amounts of combat power over shorter periods of time. It = is=20 instead a foreshortening of the combat itself by breaking the = enemy will=20 to resist long before his means to resist have been exhausted -- = and long=20 before the full panoply of US forces might be expected to arrive = in the=20 crisis area.

The precision, speed and flexibility that lie at the core of = the=20 concept of the "empowered self-synchronization" are, in fact, the = entry=20 point to this second dimension of combat efficiency. This "break = not=20 grind" level of combat efficiency can perhaps best be described in = terms=20 of two ideas. The first is the concept of "getting inside the = enemy's OODA=20 loop," and the second is that of inducing and/or exploiting chaos. = The=20 starting point for both ideas is the realization that "breaking" = is a=20 psychological rather than a physical process and that our efforts, = therefore, need to focus on the enemy's decision making process = and his=20 ability to take action in some coherent manner.

"Getting inside the Enemy's OODA = Loop"

If we return to our OODA cycle diagram, we can hypothesize that = any=20 "act" or application of combat power can be seen in two ways. From = the=20 standpoint of first level attrition, it is an effort that attacks, = destroys, or in some way degrades the enemy capability to wage or = sustain=20 a war. Yet, that same "act" can also be seen as a stimulus that = the enemy=20 will "observe" and factor into his decision making process. The = more=20 significant the action on our part, the more of an effect it is = likely to=20 have on the decisions the enemy makes. This "significance" is not = solely a=20 function of how much we destroy. It is at least as much a question = of what=20 we attack, when, and how fast. If the stimulus is significant = enough, the=20 effect may be to force the enemy to reconsider his course of = action and,=20 perhaps, to begin his OODA cycle all over again, that is, we will = have=20 disrupted his OODA loop. If a succession of stimuli have a similar = impact,=20 then the effect might be not only to disrupt his OODA loop but to = create=20 an almost catatonic state of "lock out" in which the enemy can no = longer=20 react coherently.

The requirements for second level combat efficiency are = stringent. If=20 we were only concerned with a first level wearing down the enemy = ability=20 to wage war, then to increase efficiency, we would only need to = increase=20 the size and frequency of the attacks we generate, i.e. the total = quantity=20 of power applied. However, if we are trying to break the enemy's = will to=20 resist, then our actions must be tightly coordinated so as to put = the=20 right forces on the right targets or vulnerabilities at the right = times so=20 as to produce the right effect on his decision making cycle. To = make=20 matters still more difficult, what we face is not a single enemy = OODA=20 cycle in the manner of a one-v-one fighter engagement. Instead, we = will=20 have to deal with a multiplicity of different OODA cycles that, = much like=20 our own, represent different units and forces operating = simultaneously at=20 the tactical, operational, and strategic levels of conflict.

A pointed, if serendipitous, example of such a disruption = occurred in=20 the Battle of Midway. In that battle, intelligence derived from = breaking=20 Japanese codes enabled the Americans to anticipate the Japanese = attack.=20 The Americans, thus, detected the Japanese carrier force first and = launched the first attack. When the Japanese commander, VADM = Nagumo, first=20 received word of an American carrier in the area, and then was = attacked be=20 carrier based torpedo planes, he was obliged to reconsider his = plan for an=20 attack on Midway. He re-oriented his effort and ordered his = aircraft=20 rearmed for a fleet action. The indication of a US fleet in the = area, in=20 effect, "reset" the Japanese OODA cycle. Then, as the Japanese = planes were=20 being rearmed and their fleet's Combat Air Patrol (CAP) was = engaged in low=20 level intercept of the American torpedo planes, the dive-bombers = in the=20 disjointed American attack (the second dotted blue arrow) struck = catching=20 the Japanese carriers with decks full of planes and bombs. The = chaos that=20 they created in the ensuing minutes not only ended the whole = attack on=20 Midway, but also proved to be the turning point in the Pacific = war. In=20 effect, the sighting of one ship and the torpedo plane attack -- a = relatively small application of force in the scale of the entire = battle=20 much less of the whole war -- had a decisive impact on the = Japanese OODA=20 cycle at just the right time, forcing them to begin anew.

The success at Midway was a matter of uniquely significant = intelligence=20 and breathtakingly good luck. The challenge for network centric = operations=20 is to repeat this accidental effect reliably, predictably, and at = will.=20 How do we do that? If we compare the Japanese and American OODA = cycles at=20 the time of the torpedo attack, it becomes evident that the OODA = cycles=20 were out of phase. If the American and Japanese attacks had been = in phase,=20 the strikes would have crossed in the air and struck empty decks = on both=20 sides without the disastrous consequences for the Japanese and = possibly=20 with dire consequences for the smaller number of American = carriers. But,=20 American intelligence knew the Japanese effort was coming, = American=20 reconnaissance located the Japanese fleet first, and the American = carriers=20 launched first. That is, the Americans completed their = observation,=20 orientation, and decision phases in time for the air strike "act" = to hit=20 the Japanese when they were most vulnerable, and before they could = initiate a fleet action. The American success, then, rested = partially on=20 careful preparation -- the intelligence, reconnaissance, and early = launch=20 of aircraft -- as well as on the serendipity of a disjointed = arrival of=20 the strike elements over target.

If we are to emulate Midway, we must strike the enemy at the = right time=20 and then to continue to strike at the right time as often as = necessary.=20 This challenge is twofold. We must both judge the enemy's OODA = cycle=20 correctly and coordinate our own actions with great exactitude so = as to=20 make our attacks or other actions occur at the right time. To do = this, our=20 intelligence and reconnaissance inputs must be sufficiently = precise and=20 reliable to let us time the enemy OODA cycle correctly. They must = include=20 the kind of "battlespace awareness" that enabled the American = fleet to get=20 its strikes off first, to be sure, but they must also enable us to = know=20 the enemy's OODA cycle sufficiently well to identify and exploit = the=20 critical junctures.²² And, we must be able to = coordinate=20 our own actions so as to be able to sustain controlled high- tempo = operations on the edge of chaos, and not just a serendipitous=20 reinforcement of actions, like the torpedo and dive bomber = aircraft at=20 Midway. It is exactly these two challenges that we are attempting = to=20 grapple with in the ideas of network centric warfare, speed of = command and=20 battlespace awareness. However, there is an additional problem. = Barring=20 some unforeseeable breakthrough, our intelligence and = reconnaissance is=20 not likely to enable us to achieve such knowledge of the = enemy=20 reliably, consistently, or at all levels.²³

How then might network centric operations enable us to bring = about=20 another Midway? One solution is to multiply the number of = opportunities to=20 repeat the Midway serendipity. The more often we provide a = stimulus, the=20 greater the chances we will have the effect we seek on the = decision=20 enemy's making process. Taken to an extreme, we can try to so = overwhelm=20 the enemy with new developments to consider that he must = continually=20 revisit his decisions, re-orient his efforts and, perhaps, pause = for=20 further observations to the point that no action is actually = taken.

We could try to do this by using new sensor and information=20 technologies to improve our C4ISR capabilities and thereby = increase our=20 pace of operations. In effect, we could apply combat power in the = same=20 increments and much the same manner as before, but would use new=20 information technology and better communications plumbing to = shorten the=20 length of our OODA cycles and compress the time over which that = power is=20 applied. This would multiply the number of impacts on adversary = decision=20 making over a given period and increase the likelihood of striking = at the=20 "right time" to disrupt the adversary's cycle. It certainly helps, = but as=20 the time required to generate the combat power can be compressed = only so=20 much, something more is needed to achieve a greater pace and = frequency of=20 stimuli.

Another approach would be to orchestrate not one large = operation at a=20 time, but to apply the same total amount of power in more numerous = if=20 smaller increments. The length of the individual OODA cycles -- as = dictated by the physical requirements for generating combat power = -- might=20 remain the same, but the overall application would be in = overlapping=20 cycles staggered so as to maintain a rapid succession of stimuli. = In=20 effect, we could build on training and a universally available=20 "battlespace awareness" to separate our actions into smaller,=20 semi-independent, self-synchroinized operations, each of which = could=20 generate a stimulus sufficient to affect the adversary's OODA=20 cycles.²⁴

This approach has obvious limitations. The more we diminish the = size of=20 our actions, the more vulnerable they will be to being defeated in = detail.=20 However, the better our command and control and battlespace = awareness --=20 the potential fruits of network centric warfare -- and the better = our=20 knowledge of the enemy, the less risk this will entail. If we can = further=20 use the flexibility the network brings to anticipate enemy actions = and to=20 aggregate or disaggregate our actions at will, then the danger = would be=20 diminished still more.

Or finally, we can combine the last two approaches. We can both = multiply the number of cycles and compress the time needed to = execute each=20 cycle. We might apply the same total amount of force in the same=20 overlapping increments as above, but would do so over a much = shorter=20 period of time, for example, half that of the previous approach. = In=20 essence, we would use our expanded C4ISR capability to liberate = individual=20 forces to operate at something more closely approximating their = OODA cycle=20 maximums and by so doing multiply the number of OODA cycles we = execute.=20

This suggests a very different analogy from that of Midway. The = torpedo=20 squadron attacks on the Japanese fleet acted like a rapier thrust = that=20 attacked the Japanese OODA cycle at just the critical time, a feat = which=20 we acknowledge will be difficult if not impossible to duplicate = reliably.=20 The accelerated, multiplied stimuli suggest an attack more akin to = that of=20 a swarm of bees. Even though no single unit may have a decisive = impact,=20 the overall effect is to leave the victim swinging helplessly at = attackers=20 coming from all directions and unable to mount any coherent = defense save=20 retreat.

This "swarm" approach poses a series of significant new = challenges. How=20 do we coordinate the swarm of operations so as to achieve military = objectives apart from interfering -- perhaps without success -- in = the=20 enemy decision making loop?²⁵ How do we know when = to mass=20 forces or effects so as to avoid being defeated in detail? And, = how do we=20 assess the effectiveness of our efforts and then feed the results = of these=20 assessments into the next round of orient, decide and act phases? = Will the=20 enemy know he has been defeated and cease his resistance? Or, will = he=20 simply continue to swat at the attacks until he can no longer do = so, that=20 is continue a blind attrition war?

To be effective, the "swarm" will need to work toward a unified = set of=20 military objectives under the same commander's intent. But to = achieve the=20 brief cycle times, the elements of the swarm would need to operate = as=20 largely self-contained, self-coordinated individual operations. In = short,=20 our forces would need to become self-synchronized and = self-adaptive. We=20 could then move our own operations toward the edge of chaos as = needed by=20 deliberately undertaking a proliferation of independent = operations.=20 Finally, we could use this ability to create and operate in a = state of=20 controlled chaos, that is, to conduct operations that are so fast = and so=20 unconnected as to risk spinning out of control in any but a = network=20 centric force, thereby securing an asymmetric advantage to = ourselves.

This approach comes closest to the smooth empowered=20 self-synchronization action-reaction curve proposed by VADM = Cebrowski. It=20 also begins to lay the foundation for a new understanding of how = we might=20 induce chaos. In essence, we provide so many stimuli that the = adversary=20 can no longer act coherently, but constantly must revisit the = earlier=20 stages of his OODA cycle to ask. "Does the act which just struck = me=20 invalidate the assumptions upon which my currently intended course = of=20 action rest? Does it demand a redirection of my effort? Will an = additional=20 attack come and will it force me into revisiting my plans yet = again?" The=20 result would be a catatonic inability to act, that is, a "lock = out."

Exploiting Chaos

The principle of chaos in warfare is not new.²⁶ = It is=20 as rooted in Sun Tzu as it is in Napoleon. Clausewitz talks in = terms of=20 exploiting the fog and friction of war to drive the enemy into a = rout,=20 that is, into a state of chaos.²⁷ The essence of = the=20 German blitzkrieg in 1940 was that it induced so much chaos = into=20 French and British efforts that a coherent defense was no longer = possible=20 and resistance collapsed more or less simultaneously at the = strategic,=20 operational, and tactical levels. The German success rested on a=20 combination of new technologies used in a bold new "lightening" = thrust by=20 armored columns that left Allied forces no time to form an ordered = defense. In brief, the Germans operated at such a speed and with = such=20 flexibility that they instilled "shock and awe" and created a = "powerful=20 self-fulfilling prophecy" of defeat and French resistance at all = levels=20 collapsed.

Recent writings on "chaos" ²⁸ theory have drawn a = comparison=20 between the concept of chaos in physical systems and its = application to=20 warfare. They point out that the boundary between chaos and order = is=20 particularly important because that boundary is a region in which = very=20 small inputs or changes in system parameters can have very large = impacts=20 on the whole system, and even cause it to collapse. The = implication for=20 military operations is that we might be able to create situations = in which=20 relatively small applications of military power can have a highly=20 disproportionate and potentially decisive impact. This ability = would have=20 a particular significance for expeditionary warfare and forward = presence=20 because it is a way in which the relatively small numbers of = forces that=20 can be maintained forward or deployed quickly might be able to use = speed,=20 precision, and flexibility to be decisive in peace or war.

The idea sounds good but leaves many questions. How do we = define this=20 boundary in operational terms? How do network centric operations = permit us=20 to exploit it? One approach is to define this edge of chaos in = terms of=20 the intensity of the military operations. We can describe this = intensity=20 in terms of the pace and the scale/ scope of operations, as = plotted along=20 the x and y axes of the graph below. We can understand intuitively = that=20 the more we increase the pace of our operations (x), the more = difficult=20 they will be to control or focus. Similarly, the more we increase = the=20 scope and scale of our operations (y), the more difficult they = will be to=20 control. By extension, we also can surmise that, at some point = along the x=20 axis, there would lie an operation so rapid that we will no longer = be able=20 to coordinate or focus it. Similarly, at some point along the y = axis,=20 there will be an operation of such a size or scope, e.g. global=20 thermonuclear war, as to cause us to lose control of our forces = and to=20 lapse into chaos. In short, we can identify a set of two = transition points=20 from order into chaos. Figuratively, then, the "edge of chaos" = would be a=20 line drawn between these two points that touches all the various=20 combinations of scale/scope and pace of operations that define the = limit=20 of what we can control or coordinate, i.e., a set comprising all = of our=20 order-to-chaos transition points. Beyond this line, lies a region = of=20 operations

that are so large and/or so rapid that we cannot hope to = execute them=20 and remain a coherent viable force, that is, the zone of chaos. = Within the=20 line, lie all of the operations we can control, that is, the zone = of=20 order.

In this context, "chaos" can be understood as a zone within = which=20 military operations become so rapid and/or assume such a scale and = scope=20 as to become uncontrollable, thus, un-focused, incoherent or=20 chaotic, such as in an "every man for himself" battlefield=20 rout.²⁹ The opposite of this battlefield chaos is = "order"=20 -- military operations whose scale, scope and pace permit them to = be=20 precisely controlled, coordinated, and focused on a given=20 objective.³⁰ Historically, when armies and navies = have=20 met in battle, at least one tactical objective has been to drive = the enemy=20 force from order into chaos. But how do we identify or create = situations=20 in which we can do this reliably, with a minimum of force, and = without=20 risking to lose control of our own forces? That is, how can we = identify=20 and exploit an operational edge of chaos?

By defining these transition points in terms of the size and = pace of=20 operations that can be successfully generated and controlled, = something=20 else becomes obvious. The edge of chaos is not fixed. It is = constantly=20 changing. As the Nimitz demonstration underlined, the better = trained and=20 organized our force is and the better its command and control = system and=20 its integration of sensors and weapons, the greater the scale and = pace of=20 operations it will be able to sustain without losing = control.³¹=20 Stated differently, a highly trained and organized force = using=20 sophisticated equipment will be able to operate safely at a pace = and scale=20 of operations that would cause a less well-trained and equipped = force to=20 lapse into chaos. Better equipment, training, and organization, = therefore,=20 can enable us to drive our transition points further out along the = x and y=20 axes and define a new edge of chaos.

However, this implies something else as well. Just as the OODA = cycle=20 varied from one force to another, the edge of chaos will vary from = one=20 force to the next. Not only will the forces be composed of = different=20 units, differently equipped, manned, trained and organized, but = each unit=20 may be expected to evolve over time as these factors change as, = for=20 example, in battle. This suggests that the opposing forces in any = battle=20 are likely to have very different edges of chaos specifically = because=20 their personnel, equipment, training and organization are = different. Thus,=20 if we were to plot an adversary's edge of on the same graph with = our own,=20 we probably would find two different sets of transition points and = two=20 distinctly different edges of chaos.

In fact, these two different edges of chaos define three zones: =

Zone 1 encompasses all the combinations of scale/ scope and = pace of=20 operations in which neither side will be able to control or = focus, that=20 is, the zone of chaos;
Zone 2 defines a complex asymmetric region in which our = better=20 equipped and trained forces will be able to control and focus = our=20 operations while the enemy will be unable to do so; and
Zone 3 encompasses all the combinations of scale/scope and = pace of=20 operations in which both sides will be able to maintain control = and=20 focus, that is, the zone of order.

By definition, neither side will be able to operate = successfully in the=20 zone of chaos (Zone 1), and we would derive no special tactical = advantage=20 from operating at a scale and pace of operations that permits the = enemy an=20 orderly focused response, that is the zone of order (Zone = 3).³²=20 However, the boundary region represented by Zone 2 offers = the=20 prospect of the kind of disproportionate impact outlined in chaos = theory.=20 It is a zone of inherent complexity and asymmetry in which = superior=20 information, training, organization and equipment can enable us to = operate=20 at a rate, scope and scale that the enemy simply cannot match. We = can use=20 this asymmetry to confront the enemy with a dilemma. If he = attempts to=20 react to our rapid paced attacks, he is likely to lose control of = his own=20 forces and cross the line into chaos, but if he fails to react, he = stands=20 to be either pummeled into submission or confined to time-late,=20 pre-planned actions.³³ In short, we can use our = ability=20 to operate beyond the enemy's edge of chaos to induce a state of = despair=20 in which further resistance either is, or appears to be, futile. = By=20 extension, we can accelerate this process by using the information = network=20 to focus our efforts precisely on those vulnerabilities that will = drive=20 the enemy into a state of chaos.

How does this relate to the empowered self-synchronized = operations to=20 which VADM Cebrowski refers? Strangely enough one good example is = the 1805=20 Battle of Trafalgar in which Admiral Nelson destroyed the combined = French=20 and Spanish fleets. The essence of that battle was Nelson's bold = move to=20 break through the French-Spanish battle line in two places and = then=20 concentrate his forces on bite-sized portions of the enemy fleet. = The=20 basis for Nelson's confidence that such a risky operation could be = successful was what could be described as a cerebral networking = that had=20 been created among Nelson and his ship captains to whom he = referred as a=20 "band of brothers." That networking had been formed by more than = eight=20 years of combat operations together. Nelson, therefore, was = confident that=20 all of his subordinates would perceive the developing situation in = the=20 same way, that is, they would have a shared situational=20 awareness.³⁴ He was equally sure that his = commanders not=20 only understood his commander's intent, but that they would = exploit=20 aggressively any opening in the enemy line and carry through = mutually=20 supportive actions without further direction. Thus, Nelson's = directive to=20 the fleet on the day of battle could be limited to a single, = inspiring, if=20 not otherwise very helpful, "England expects every man to do his = duty."=20 Nothing more was needed. The commanders knew what to do.

This contrasts sharply with the situation of the opposing = commander=20 Admiral Villeneuve-Joyeuse. His force was larger than that of = Nelson and=20 in many ways technologically superior, however, it lacked any = semblance of=20 the cerebral networking that Nelson had forged with his = subordinate=20 commanders. The French commanders were either new or had spent the = war=20 years blockaded in port. They distrusted each other even as = Villeneuve=20 distrusted his own judgment. Added to this was the problem of = coordinating=20 operations with a separate Spanish fleet with which the French had = never=20 before operated. The best Villeneuve could do was to form the = fleet into a=20 conventional eighteenth century line of battle in which two = opposing=20 fleets in ordered, parallel battle lines would pound each other = until one=20 or the other struck or sank. This was the limit of his ability to = control=20 an operation of this scope and complexity.

When Nelson refused battle on these terms and instead broke = through the=20 French-Spanish line, the increased pace of operation that he = forced on=20 Villeneuve immediately exceeded what the French-Spanish ability to = cope=20 and invalidated their numerical superiority. Villeneuve lost the = ability=20 to fight a coherent battle and largely lost control of all his = forces save=20 his own flagship. His ships, although bravely fought, became part = of=20 general chaos in which substantial French and Spanish forces never = entered=20 the battle.

What the ideas of network centric warfare do is to permit us = to, after=20 a fashion, replicate the cerebral networking of Nelson's band of = brothers=20 without the preceding eight years of combat operations together = and=20 without the common situational awareness possible in a slowly = developing=20 eighteenth century naval battle.³⁵ They also have = the=20 potential to permit us to do something more than: to use = information,=20 speed, and precision to create a multi-level strategic, = operational,=20 and tactical collapse analogous to the blitzkrieg of = 1940.=20 That suggests that our basic RMA challenge is to improve sensing,=20 targeting, power projection and generation, and so on, both to = create a=20 Zone 2 asymmetry and to exploit it.

=85and Asymmetric Warfare?

There is a hitch. However mesmerizing Nelson's band of brothers = may be,=20 we need to stretch our reasoning further and ask, what would = happen if the=20 Zone 2 situation were reversed? What if the enemy could manage a = pace of=20 operations greater than our own in a given area of competition? = What if=20 the conflict were a Viet Nam or Somalia and not a Desert Storm? = Under=20 these conditions the enemy's edge of chaos may not lie = entirely=20 within our own as diagrammed. Instead, the two edges of chaos = would cross,=20 and we would be confronted with a fourth zone in which the = situation was=20 reversed. The enemy would be capable of undertaking operations of = a pace=20 and scope to which we could not respond quickly or effectively. =

In fact, the potential for such a reversal points to a = dangerous=20 underlying assumption in much RMA thinking: that the US will = always be=20 superior because it will always be faster and better. The reality = is that=20 the pace of operations is not solely a function of technology, but = can=20 also be created by decentralizing operations so as to conduct = larger=20 numbers of smaller operations. This is much the same as we = undertook to do=20 in multiplying the number of OODA cycles in hope of disrupting the = enemy=20 decision making cycle. Here too, the foe can choose to trade = centralized=20 control for speed and scope of operations. In so doing, he may = lose at=20 least some of his ability to mass effects or to concentrate the = weight of=20 his forces on a specific objective. However, if the effect he = seeks=20 derives from the pace and scope of the attacks rather than from = the amount=20 of destruction, or derives from a cumulative effect, then the = trade-off=20 may be very acceptable. In other words, the enemy could create a = fourth=20 zone in which he could operate successfully using small units and=20 decentralized control, but in which we could not respond = coherently using=20 large formations and centralized control. That is, he could = attempt to=20 confront us in a zone where our traditional approaches to = controlling=20 forces in combat can become counterproductive.

The importance of this fourth zone is even more evident if we = look at=20 the respective edges of chaos plotted on a graph with three axes: = one for=20 pace, one for scale, and a separate orthogonal axis for scope. = Here, the=20 enemy has two measures he can take. He can decentralize his forces = breaking them into smaller self-synchronized units, and he can = disperse=20 them over a wide area to make a coordinated and timely response on = our=20 part more difficult.

In fact, this corresponds rather closely to the second stage in = the=20 Maoist theory of guerrilla warfare. The guerrillas use dispersed=20 formations so small that they can no longer be targeted = effectively by the=20 heavier forces of the enemy. These forces then conduct large = numbers of=20 small raids across the breadth of the countryside that are so = dispersed=20 and rapid as to be completed before larger scale opposing forces = can be=20 brought to bear.³⁶ Their objective is first to = challenge=20 the government's control of the countryside, then to seize control = of the=20 countryside and isolate the cities, and finally, to use the = control of the=20 countryside to attack the remaining government bastions in the = cities.=20 Since the effect of this approach depends on the pace and scope of = the=20 operations rather than damage to any specific set of targets or = forces,=20 the control of the operations can remain highly=20 decentralized.³⁷ This was the essential problem = we=20 confronted in Viet Nam.

Mohammed Aideed used a variation of this approach adapted to = urban=20 warfare in Mogadishu. Aideed's forces, often little more than = disorganized=20 bands of street fighters, operated on a decentralized basis in an = urban=20 jungle staying below the size threshold for effective US and = allied=20 reaction but maintaining an almost continuous harassment of allied = forces=20 with these small units. In Aideed's case, the objective was not to = defeat=20 US military forces or take and hold urban territory, but rather to = block=20 effective action by US forces and inflict casualties that would = lead to US=20 withdrawal and a political vice military victory.

This discussion and these examples imply a slightly different=20 understanding of chaos. They infer that chaos need not be solely a = loss of=20 control over one's forces. It could also be a situation in which = the size=20 of the forces involved and delays associated with generating and = using=20 such combat power prevent us from accomplishing our objectives, a = zone in=20 which the use of large units and centralized control becomes=20 self-defeating.

How might network centric warfare address this dilemma? = Obviously, one=20 aspect of the applicability of network centric operations is the = power of=20 superior knowledge and shared situational awareness. Together, = they would=20 clearly reduce the freedom of action that an enemy might gain by=20 dispersing and decentralizing his forces. However, the key to = denying the=20 enemy an exploitable asymmetry is to operate faster than our = decentralized=20 foe. We must move our own edge of chaos further out along the x = axis of=20 the diagram until decentralized operations no longer confer any = advantage=20 on the enemy and until our own flexibility enables us to mass our = superior=20 scale of power at will. We can do this by increasing either the = number of=20 operations we undertake or the speed at which we accomplish them. = By=20 decentralizing, the guerrilla or street fighter has opted for = increasing=20 the number and decreasing the size of operations. We might respond = by=20 doing the same, as for example, by resorting to a small unit = ground war.=20 Or, we could increase the pace of our operations along the lines = outlines=20 in the discussion of first level combat efficiency. Or again, we = could use=20 some combination of the two. In each case, precise, = information-based,=20 network centric abilities enable us to safely increase the pace of = our=20 actions because the network enables us to retain control in = high-speed=20 complex operations. More significantly, the network enables us to = operate=20 our forces as -- in the terminology of chaos theory -- a = "self-adjusting=20 complex adaptive system." That is, we can decentralize our = operations to=20 whatever degree is most effective and efficient giving local = commanders=20 the control envisioned in "empowered self-synchronization." At the = same=20 time we retain the dominance of scale and can mass effects while = matching=20 or nearly matching the pace and scope of enemy operations at = will.

Achieving this second level of combat efficiency can sound like = an=20 almost impossible task, but in fact, the effort forces us to begin = to=20 define the basic requirements for implementing a network centric=20 effects-based warfare. In effect, the evolving rough concept of = what we=20 are trying to do gives us an increasing understanding of what we = will=20 need. That understanding lets us approach the on-going = technological=20 revolutions with specific requirements, while the revolutions, in = turn,=20 provide us with a new grasp of what might be possible.

Conclusion: A Reality Check

If we are to be clear minded about network centric warfare, we = must=20 acknowledge both that there is indeed "beef" in the concept, but = also that=20 there are risks involved. Certainly, empowered self-synchronized=20 operations can leave forces open to defeat in detail. Certainly, = operating=20 at the pace, scale, scope and complexity that is being proposed = can leave=20 us skirting chaos ourselves if we are not careful. In both cases, = the=20 networking of combat resources and the shared awareness promises = to avoid=20 the peril while realizing the advantages of speed, precision and=20 flexibility. However, therein lies an additional risk. If we adopt = a=20 network centric approach to warfare, how well will we be able to = function=20 if the network is somehow degraded? Could we unwittingly be = building a=20 single point failure into our nation's military capability? There = are as=20 yet no definitive answers to these questions and concerns. Answers = to them=20 and to hundreds more questions yet to surface will have to be = worked out=20 in years of effort still ahead.

What we do know is that we must proceed. Balancing these risks = is the=20 enduring American need for effective power projection. Like it or = not, we=20 will have to depend on relatively small numbers of forward forces = to=20 create decisive effects for conventional deterrence, peacekeeping = and=20 peacemaking, crisis response, and conflict -- all in the face of = an=20 adversary's best efforts to prevent their success. This will = clearly=20 necessitate reliance on force multipliers and some form of network = centric=20 operations. The real issue is not whether we need to do so, but = how we get=20 there. (11,759 words)

¹ The Observe, Orient, Decide, Act cycle that = Col.=20 John R. Boyd USAF used to characterize a fighter engagement and = that has=20 come to be applied to the decision making process in general. John = R.=20 Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and Losing," Air University, August = 1987.=20

² The process to identify the actions, the = reactions=20 and the linkages between occurs separately but interdependently at = the=20 strategic, operational, and tactical levels of warfare. Properly = carried=20 out it should produce a cascading designation of increasingly = specific=20 effects and military objectives. The strategic impact desired is = defined=20 by the National Command Authority is defined and tasked to the = CINC or JTF=20 operational commander who translates that impact into sets of = military=20 objectives to achieve them. These are then tasked to the = appropriate=20 tactical level commanders who identify and task the specific = military=20 actions to achieve them.=20

³ This was the central idea in Forward=85From = the Sea=20 that spoke of a series of overseas "hubs" from which sea-based = American=20 power radiated.=20

⁴ ADM J.M. Boorda, Address to the Naval = Strategy=20 Forum, 14 June 1995.=20

⁵ Walter Morrow, "Technology for a Naval = Revolution in=20 Military Affairs," Second Navy RMA Round Table, 4 June 1997.=20

⁶ Ibid=20

⁷ Although the word "information" will be used = here in=20 the current broad understanding encompassing both intelligence and = surveillance data, it is worth noting the distinctions draw in the = intelligence lexicon. In this usage, "data" is the raw untouched = input=20 direct from a source or sensor with no attempt made to judge its = validity=20 or accuracy. "Information" is data that have been collated to = establish a=20 relationship with other known facts. "Intelligence," then, is = information=20 that has been analyzed to derive the meaning and implications of = the=20 information, that is, in the sense of "knowledge of the enemy." = These same=20 distinctions apply to the terms "data," "information," and = "knowledge."=20

⁸ The almost geometric rate of change in = information=20 and other technologies turns our Cold war link between technology = and=20 strategy on its head. Rather than carefully developing military=20 technologies in government programs and then applying the = capabilities=20 developed in the context of new strategies and tactics, post-Cold = War=20 technologies are largely developed for a civilian market and at a = rate far=20 faster than government efforts during the Cold War. In effect, the = pace of=20 change is uncontrolled and threatens to outstrip our strategic and = tactical imagination.=20

⁹ This trend is already evident in the falling = unit=20 price of the Navy Tomahawk cruise missile from $1.2 million ten = years ago,=20 to less than $700 thousand in 1998, to the prospect of $300 or = less before=20 the next decade is out - a roughly 50%drop every ten years. RADM = Daniel=20 Murphy, "Surface warfare," Navy RMA Round Table, 4 June 1997.=20

¹⁰ To think in terms of "effects," the word = "target"=20 must be used in its broadest sense, not in the traditional context = of=20 facilities and forces to be destroyed by attacking it with = weapons, but as=20 a focus of our actions, a vulnerability to be exploited.=20

¹¹ Notice that this coincides very directly = with the=20 idea that a true RMA needs to be successful on the strategic and=20 operational level even more than on the tactical if it is to = achieve=20 victory.=20

¹² That is, the period between the Monitor and = the=20 Merrimac and the birth of naval aviation.=20

¹³ The weapons will give us the ability to = destroy,=20 degrade, isolate, etc. the targets developed and selected by a = command=20 structure that is able to observe the unfolding of its plans in = near-real=20 time and that is thus in a position to adapt to changes as they = occur.=20

¹⁴ John R. Boyd, "A Discourse on Winning and = Losing,"=20 Air University, August 1987.=20

¹⁵ In Boyd's tactical engagement loop, = "orient" and=20 "decide" are separated into two phases, however, this separation = becomes=20 difficult to distinguish in more complex operations, especially at = the=20 operational and strategic levels of war. As used in this paper, = the orient=20 and decide phases are combined and used to define the period of = time=20 necessary to generate the right force to achieve the right = effects.=20

¹⁶ The carrier air wing started with intense=20 "flex-deck" operations but soon discovered that the flight deck = became=20 unworkable. They, therefore, switched to an aggressive concept of = cyclical=20 operations that enabled them to launch more aircraft while = maintaining=20 better order on the flight deck. Interview with RADM John Nathman, = 11=20 February 1999.=20

¹⁷ Although the demonstration ran for four = days, the=20 "surge" need not have stopped there. If the carrier had then been = rearmed=20 and replenished from accompanying resupply ships, the rate could = have been=20 maintained, with brief periods off-line, through successive = "surges." If=20 multiple carriers had been operated as a battle force, not only = could the=20 numbers been further multiplied, but the carriers could have been = rotated=20 through the replenishment cycle so as to sustain an uninterrupted = high=20 level of strikes for some protracted period of time. Ibid.=20

¹⁸ In the Nimitz case, this meant an air wing = composed=20 of low maintenance, quick turnaround F/A-18's that could readily = undertake=20 five or more sorties per day.=20

¹⁹ The more joint the forces applied to the = problem,=20 the more different the OODA cycles are likely to be. The Libya = bombing in=20 April 1986 is a good example. Although initially planned as a = carrier air=20 strike, the inclusion of Air Force F-111's operating from bases in = the=20 United Kingdom, while militarily sound from the standpoint of=20 capabilities, introduced a completely different set of operational = time=20 lines including a need to secure overflight permission -- in any = event=20 denied.=20

²⁰ The D-Day invasion of Normandy is one = example. The=20 success of the Allied attack hinged on so overwhelming the local = German=20 resistance with massed forces or effects that the allies could get = ashore=20 and establish a defensible beach head. That meant coordinating an = almost=20 inconceivable range and variety of operations to cut interior = German lines=20 of communications simultaneously.=20

²¹ This is similar to the speed of convoys = during=20 World War I and II. The speed of the convoy was that of the = slowest ship.=20 Consequently, convoys were separated into slow and fast depending = on the=20 ships' fastest speed. The slower the speed the greater was the=20 vulnerability to U-boat operations, but the consequences of a = failure to=20 convoy were still higher losses. This dilemma was one reason the = British=20 resisted convoying at the beginning of each war.=20

²² In the Midway example, because the forces = were very=20 similar in character, the length of the US and Japanese OODA = cycles would=20 have been roughly similar. In a conflict between two dissimilar = forces,=20 that would not be the case making the OODA cycle that much more = difficult=20 to predict.=20

²³ Despite the best surveillance picture or=20 "battlespace awareness" we can generate, the ultimate determinate = of the=20 speed and direction of the enemy decision making cycle will be the = enemy=20 himself. Such "knowledge of the enemy" is not the result of sensor = data=20 but of analysis based in large part on sporadic human intelligence = reporting. We cannot, therefore, depend on having the intelligence = when we=20 need it or, indeed, on collecting the needed data at all.=20

²⁴ Note that in each case the total amount of = force=20 applied remains constant and that what varies is the way in which = that=20 force is applied.=20

²⁵ The caveat on military revolutions warns us = to be=20 prepared to deal with the question "what is if it does not work." = Thus,=20 actions undertaken by the swarm cannot focus solely on the = potential=20 impact on the decision making cycle, particularly if, as noted = earlier, it=20 is unlikely that we will have enough information to predict that = process=20 with great exactitude.=20

²⁶ It should be noted that the idea of = inducing chaos=20 will hardly be a new concept to ground forces for whom the = primordial=20 challenge is to control very large numbers of actors in battle. In = the=20 ground context, "breaking the enemy will to resist" equates to = causing the=20 enemy to lose control and disintegrate into a chaotic "every man = for=20 himself" rout. While this understanding remains operative to be = sure, the=20 focus of the chaos sought here lies at the operational and even = the=20 strategic level even more than of the battlefield.=20

²⁷ Barry Watts, Clausewitzian Friction and = Future War,=20 NDU, Washington, D.C. pp. 105ff.=20

²⁸ Maj. James uses the example of a water = faucet that=20 will drip with an annoying regularity. As the flow of water is = increased=20 the frequency of the drip increases but the regularity remains. = However,=20 when the flow is increased even minutely beyond some definable = rate, the=20 drops no longer have time to form and the drip changes abruptly to = a=20 sporadic -- that is chaotic -- flow. The very minor increase in = flow has=20 caused the physical system to become chaotic.
Maj. Glenn James = USAF,=20 Chaos Theory, The Essentials for Military Applications, Newport = Paper 10,=20 Naval War College, Newport, R.I.: 1997, p. 15-16.=20

²⁹ It is worth making a distinction here = between a=20 tactical level chaos that induces the enemy to take flight and a = strategic=20 level chaos that may induce irrational behavior. The latter would = be a=20 very dangerous development in the case of a power armed with = nuclear=20 weapons or prepared to resort to terrorism. Between these two = extremes=20 lies in which inducing "shock and awe" is a tool that can be used = to=20 achieve specific effects calculated to support our political and = military=20 objectives. However, implicit in the idea of effects is a risks = versus=20 gains analysis that applies to chaos as to all other effects.=20

³⁰ The model that springs to mind is that of = the Army=20 of the Potomac under McClellan during the Civil War. The Army was = so=20 perfectly ordered that it was only reluctantly and hesitantly = committed to=20 battle and failed to press the South's vulnerabilities or produce = a=20 decisive victory. By contrast, Lee's Army of Northern Virginia = operated=20 close to the edge of chaos. It foraged for supplies, moved and = struck with=20 an efficiency that put it well inside the OODA loop of a = succession of=20 Union generals. By 1865, however, Grant's unyielding pressure had = pinned=20 down the Army of Northern Virginia in front of Richmond and = Petersburg and=20 deprived it of this ability. Indeed, from the standpoint of = logistics,=20 Grant turned the table on Lee and drove Lee's supply system into = chaos.=20

³¹ In the Nimitz demonstration, the air wing = set out=20 to conduct "flex-deck" operations which were thought to offer the = fastest=20 turnaround and sortie generation. What they soon discovered was = that this=20 "clobbered" the deck making it difficult to move even as many = aircraft as=20 they routinely did. In effect, they had reached the edge of chaos = for=20 flex-deck operations. Then, they adapted to the new requirement, = and=20 instituted a new form of accelerated cyclic operations that not = only=20 avoided the previous bottlenecks but enabled them to operate = comfortably=20 at the new higher pace. Nathman, Op. Cit.=20

³² It should be noted here that under some=20 circumstances such as in a confrontation with a nuclear armed = opponent, it=20 may be necessary to operate in this zone of order so as to avoid = the risk=20 of an irrational act or and uncontrolled escalation.=20

³³ One example of this is the October 1973=20 Arab-Israeli War. The Egyptian Army's "edge of chaos" could not = hope to=20 match that of the Israelis. Therefore, the Egyptians were forced = to resort=20 to a highly planned pre-emptive operation in which virtually all = actions=20 were pre-scripted. That gave them an initial success in crossing = the Suez=20 Canal, but left them largely incapable of responding to Israeli=20 counter-action.=20

³⁴ As the two fleets took more than three = hours to=20 close, there would have been a fairly comprehensive common = situational=20 awareness by the time the battle began.=20

³⁵ Nelson's approach to the opposing fleet at = the slow=20 pace of a sailing ship would have allowed ample time for the = commanders to=20 observe the enemy line and any potential gaps in that line that = they might=20 exploit. The cerebral networking provided a common understanding = of how=20 such gaps might be exploited and how each might provide mutual = support and=20 exploit any further opportunities that might be observed during = the=20 battle.=20

³⁶ While the length of the OODA cycle of any=20 individual enemy action may be longer than our own network aided = cycle,=20 the aggregate impact on our own operations can be almost = continuous in the=20 manner of a hailstorm. This would be especially true if the = "effect"=20 sought by the enemy derived not from levels of destruction or = military=20 objectives achieved but from the sheer quantity of stimuli = presented over=20 time.=20

³⁷ The most difficult task in a guerrilla war = is=20 identifying the moment to shift from this decentralized warfare = used to=20 wear down enemy resistance and confine him to the cities, to the = more=20 centralized effort that will be required to take control of the = cities and=20 the entire country.

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