

# **Agent-Based Modeling and Distributed C2**


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Eric Bonabeau  
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**June 2003**

A decorative graphic at the bottom of the slide consisting of two overlapping, wavy lines in shades of blue and green, resembling a stylized wave or landscape.


# Outline

- The Challenge
- The Agent-Based Modeling Approach
- Illustrative Examples:
  - Flows
  - Logistics
  - Self-organized task allocation
  - Operational Risk
  - Computer Security
  - Agent-Based Evidence Marshalling
  - Emergent behavior by design
- Summary



Bottom up approach needed to capture interactions between bricks: only then can you hope to predict the collective dynamics of the system.

Plus, what if the bricks have more complex behavior, learn and adapt??



Fundamental, defining characteristics of an agent. Can be static or dynamic (time), independent or dependent (other agents/events).  
e.g. Sex, Age, Attitude


How an agent processes external and internal information when faced with an opportunity to act. e.g. When and what to prescribe


What an agent actually does in a given situation. e.g. prescribe X or Y, talk to other physician

Attributes

Decision Making

Behaviors





Attributes:  
60% Male  
40% Female

Behavior:  
60% Product A  
40% Product B

All Males

Product A


All Females

Product B


Buy from Rep  
of same sex


Attributes:  
Co A employs all Male Reps  
Co B employs all Female Reps

- Game 1: pick a protector and an aggressor, then move so that your protector is always located between you and your aggressor.



- Game 2: pick a protected and an aggressor, then move so as to be always located between your protected and his/her aggressor.








... can be predicted by  
ABM






Evacuation of a public space (stadium, city, ...)

or fire escape



45 s simulation, stampede, 200 people	# Escaped	# Injured
<i>Without column, injured people don't move</i>	<b>44</b>	<b>5</b>
<i>With column, injured people don't move</i>	<b>72</b>	<b>0</b>

From Helbing



## Problem


Find stock management rules for dealing with conflicting goals of satisfying customer demand at Marketing Units while minimizing SC costs in a highly seasonal and weather sensitive business (global rather than local optimization)

## Approach

- ABM of Supply Chain from production to consumer demand
- Analysis of impact and robustness of stock management rules on the trade-off between customer service and SC costs under 1000's of scenarios

## Results

- 5% improvement in shorts at current cost...
- ... or 10% cost reduction at current shorts





## Problem

- Optimize cargo routing (easy)
- Robustly (difficult)
- Simple rules (very difficult)


## Results


- 71% improvement
- At least \$2m/yr







- *Messor barbarus* in southern Spain retrieve seeds from a source in a bucket brigade of up to six workers.
- The first and smallest ant collects a seed from a source and starts to carry it along a trail towards the nest until it meets a larger worker.
- This larger worker takes the seed from the ant and continues to transport the seed towards the nest while the smaller ant turns and walks back towards the seed source. And so on.







Average pick rates as fraction of work standard both before, and after, switching from zone picking to bucket brigades (in week 12) at the national distribution center of *Revco Drugstores* (now *CVS*). Achieved 34% increase in throughput among order-pickers after converting to bucket brigades.



## Problem

- Measure and manage operational risk
- No data - past is not necessarily sufficient for prediction anyway!

## Approach

- Agent-based simulation:
  - risk applies to agents
  - simulation of activities rather than processes
- Analysis of outcomes:
  - Identify error accumulation and propagation (cascades and loops)
  - Identify causes of large losses

## Results

- Measure of value-at-risk
- Identification of causes
- Capital allocation by activity
- Self-assessment tool




## Objective

- Characterization of hacker behavior outcomes
- Automation of “hacker” detection

## Approach

- Develop agent-based model of intrusion behavior to explore space of possible intrusions
- Run large number of simulations to create “synthetic” data corresponding to hacker activity
- Analyze results in order to generate hacker detection



```

70 chgrp admin /home/alex/.bash_history
70 chgrp admin /home/alex/.bash_history
70 chgrp admin /home/alex/.bash_history
70 chgrp admin /home/alex/.bash_history
71 chown alex /home/alex/
72 chgrp admin /home/alex/
73 cat /.bash_history
74 echoAppend hacker:0:0:hacker:/:/bin/bash /etc/passwd
75 cat /etc/passwd
76 ftpGet login2
77 chmod login2 0 2 true
78 mv bin/login /usr/bin/temp.old
79 mv login2 /bin/login
    
```


## Statistical analysis of logs


**Types of evidence**

```

02800360040201186110201092300000
2000000003000121103091925118770
8000081900130407557090412978292120322
000000000000000000000000000000
000000000000000000000000000000
3080000003000351102081955131460
58190000012030565011524206821203221
000000000000000000000000000000
0000000000000000054240601419161310121
000000000000000000000000000000
20400030010003132000442478340
000000000000000000000000000000
1117003500503008711010871332221
8250036040108958010770113221
61500130020307509000600422221
6117001500402011860010841201221
000000000000000000000000000000
2390021100600011010001144416910100
000000000000000000000000000000
10940100824014040876801100368272524392
9192001920019014077040140360030575829311
2270560011820100104080005128640
358006800064031420408305036191060
011200132100107031200160270123604024370
0821001320010080232100025681940023251
07200043200130302220100242861040230241
0720006210012040222010039316627252402
00200010010001111000210001120
    
```


**Evidence types 17 and 27 were seen twice together**



 Understand hacker script, find new evidence, prevent crime

- Goal of overall process: To construct a self-organized crime scenario or story that suggests ways for interaction of evidence and environment, and proposes new query
  - Informs us about *what we don't yet know*
- Every observed element (computer, vehicles, people) becomes a Java object
- Objects “justify their existence” and attempt to construct their *space-time vectors* in the domain of investigation - stolen computer attempts to figure out its own trajectory


**Which triggers us to form a new query!**






## A cautionary tale about decentralized C2


Circular mill in army ants: a circle of ants continuously following each other round and round in circles until death (Schneirla). Beebe (1921) observed a mill in Guyana that measured 1200 feet in circumference with a circuit time for each ant of about 2½ hours. The mill persisted for two days, with ever increasing numbers of dead bodies littering the route, but eventually a few workers straggled from the trail thus breaking the cycle, and the raid marched off into the forest.



1. Predictive power with ABM



2. Design with interactive evolution



3. Test in the real world



# Summary

- ABM's "bottom-up philosophy" captures emergent behavior and counter-intuitive phenomena
- ABM can be used to test and design Command and Control interventions to produce desired aggregate, system-level output
- Good to test *in silico* first!