

Human Aspects of Command



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UK Directorate of Land Warfare


Philosophy (1)

- Digitization, NCW, RMA?
- What equation?
- Land combat is not determined: causes do not lead predictably to effects.
- Hence the importance of seeking **evidence.**

Psychology (1): Success on the Battlefield

- Battles and engagements are won when one side believes itself beaten.
- Empirically, the two factors that most contribute to battlefield success are **surprise** and **shock**.

Shock, Surprise, Control of the Air and Aggressive Recce



Force Ratio

Probability of Campaign Success (%)

100%

0%

No Factors

-2:1

6:1


Force Ratio

Force Ratio

Probability of Campaign Success (%)

100%

0%



Three Factors

No Factors

-2:1

6:1

Force Ratio

Psychology: Decision Making

- Combat as complex, dynamic, lethal, adversarial and evolutionary – but fundamentally **human**.
- Battlefield decision making must be ‘about right but very quick’.
- Do we train and select commanders who can make those decisions?

Psychology: Senior Commanders

- Authoritarians and autocrats.
- Sackers, bullies: the British Army of the Rhine in the 1980s.
- Authoritarian personalities cannot cope with uncertainty:
 - fail or be sacked
 - take decisions too early
 - seek ever more information

Psychology: Summary

- The resolution of combat is fundamentally a human condition.
- The nature of land combat requires tactical decisions that are 'about right, but very quick'.
- Some people (authoritarians) are temperamentally poorly suited to command in battle.

Sociology: A Comparison of Armies

- The British Army in the Boer War (1900-2).
- The British Army in 1940.
- Relative Mortalities.

Sociology: The Cohorts of the 1990s

Sociology: The Cohorts of the 1990s

- Captains and Majors:

SJ Guardians

SP Artisans

~ 40%


~ 40%

~ 10%

~ 10%

NT Rationals


NF Idealists



SJ Guardians

SP Artisans

**80% of all
UK Army
JSCSC
students**




NT Rationals

NF Idealists

SJ Guardians

SP Artisans

85% of all
USMC
CGC
students



NT Rationals

NF Idealists


Sociology: The Cohorts of the 1990s

- Captains and Majors:
- Brigadiers and Colonels:

SJ Guardians

SP Artisans

**British
Colonels
and above**




NT Rationals

NF Idealists

Sociology: The Cohorts of the 1990s

- Captains and Majors:
- Brigadiers and Colonels:
- Authoritarians and Autocrats.



Sociology: Structure and Behaviour

- The rank and age structure of units and brigades.
- Bright officers who aren't particularly rational or mathematical; who don't seek evidence to confirm their deductions; and who demonstrably behave in ways prejudicial to operational efficiency.
- The need for consensus, and attitude towards orders.

Sociology: Summary

- Differences between armies in the way their generals behaved in war.
- Polarization of officer cohorts over time into autocrats and authoritarians.
- Rank, age, structure and appropriate behaviour.
- Overall: much about armies that we do not know, and probably more that we do not even suspect.

Anthropology: Myths and Beliefs

- The OODA Loop: a fallacy of induction
- The Principle of Four: a failure of inadequate research


Anthropology: Engineering Approaches

- The Tank
- The US Corps of Engineers
- Engineering Graduates
- But combat is not usefully determined!


Anthropology: More Information Please!

- With more information we can be faster, more precise, and more effective.
- However:


Typical OA Result: HQs




Typical OA Result: HQs



Typical OA Result: Commanders



Typical OA Result: Commanders



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- With more information we can be faster, more precise, and more effective.
- However – what evidence is there that this is true?
- And what about information overload? Larger HQs that take ever longer to make decisions that are not as good?





Anthropology: Summary

- Military myths are prevalent. A military myth must:
 - Contain something superficially easy to grasp.
 - Reflect some underlying logic, albeit often very little.
 - Bring some obvious advantage.
- Self-belief.

Observations


- The behavioural human sciences:
 - Have little useful theory in this area
 - Use poorly-developed technical language
 - & are rarely at a state at which technical interventions can be made.
- Military knowledge of the behavioural human sciences is even worse.

Conclusions


- Considerable empirical evidence as to the incidence, and importance, of behavioural issues in the conduct of war (ie, command).
- Recommendations:
 - Engage the scientists
 - Deploy the military
- The future is not digital; it's human.

Questions



'About right but very quick' (1)



'About right but very quick' (1)




Decide and act: quality of decision




Authoritarians

- **Cannot deal with uncertainty**
 - hence poor at dealing with complexity of combat
- **Strong wish to control**
 - hence will not permit decentralised C2.
- **Often bullies**
 - hence damage social cohesion of command teams, and
 - inhibit truthful reporting.


C2: the Technical Layer



C2: the Social Layer



C2: the Socio-Technical Complex



Do individuals make a difference?

- 5% of all fighter pilots scored more than 40% of all aircraft kills.
- 8% of submarine commanders sank 40% of all shipping.
- Snipers, tank commanders?

Human Typology

ESFP	ISFP	ESFJ	ISFJ
ESTP	ISTP	ESTJ	ISTJ
ENFP	INFP	ENFJ	INFJ
ENTP	INTP	ENTJ	INTJ

SP: Artisan

SJ: Guardian

NF: Idealist

NT: Rational

4 kinds of people:

- Pedants.
- Those who reject the paradigm.
- Those who struggle to understand the new paradigm.
- Those for whom this is nothing new.