

Defense Transformation and Network Centric Warfare

**Presentation to
8th ICCRTS
17 June 03**




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Objective

- **Help You Understand:**
 - *Global Trends*
 - *New Strategic Context*
 - *Warfighting Innovation*
 - *Strategy for Defense Transformation*
 - *Network Centric Warfare (NCW)*
 - *Tenets of NCW*
 - *Evidence for Warfighting Advantage*
 - *Emerging NCW Implementation Strategy*

Global Trends

Globalization II → **Globalization III**



Industrial Age → **Information Age**

Global Trends

Globalization II



Globalization III


- Static, bipolar “market”
- Bulk of population in 3rd World
- Limits on security “exports”
- **Beliefs in Conflict: Political Ideology**
- Ordering principle = Great Power War; yet none since 1945

- Also bifurcated, but very fluid
- 4 Billion in Core, 2 Billion in Gap
- “Unlimited” global demand for security exports
- **Beliefs in Conflict: Religion/culture**
- Warfare now simultaneous across system, state and individual levels


- *New Rules*
- *New Institutions*
- *New Security Environment*
- *Disconnectedness* → *Danger*



Proliferation of WMD
& military technology




Globalization III



U.S. Military Responses to Situations, 1990-2002

- Evac's
- Peace/Relief
- Contingency Positioning
- Show of Force
- Combat

Globalization III: Major Flows



Global Trends

Industrial Age



- Success = Scale + Scope
- Top Down - Centralized
- Vertical Integration
- Information Hoarding
- Local Awareness
- Arms Length Relationships
- Make and Sell
- Inwardly Focused




Information Age

- Success = Adaptability + Agility
- Empowering the “Edges”
- Virtual Integration
- Information Sharing
- Increased Transparency
- Collaboration & Synchronization
- Sense and Respond
- Externally Oriented
- Accelerated Innovation & Experimentation

- *New Rules*
- *New Behaviors*
- *New Competencies*
- *New Relationships*



Global Trends Create a New Competitive Landscape



Information Age


- **New Technological Context**

- Access to highly capable, low-cost IT
- Falling barriers to competitive entry -- sea, space, cyberspace

Globalization III

- **Broadened Threat Context**



- Era of uncertainty with rapidly evolving threats
- State/non-state, nodal/non-nodal
- Asymmetric / conventional
- Unrestricted – deterring the un-deterable



Global Trends...Threats

Disconnectedness → Danger

Islamic Technical Centers



Global Trends Create a New Competitive Landscape

Information Age


- *New Strategic Context:*

- *Information Age principles & phenomena changing character of competition*
- *Era of globalization – a changed international landscape*
- *New relationship between operations abroad and homeland security*

Globalization III

*To the degree we do not transform,
we are strategically a fixed-target and therefore at risk*

Transformation: Meeting the Challenges of the New Competitive Landscape



Transformation

...Elements

- ✓ **Continuing process**
- ✓ **Creating/anticipating the future**
- ✓ **Co-evolution of concepts, processes, organizations and technology**
- ✓ **New competitive areas / competencies; revalued attributes**
- ✓ **Fundamental shifts in underlying principles**
- ✓ **New sources of power**
- ✓ **Broadened capabilities base**

- *New technology context*
- *Broadened threat context*
- *New strategic context*

A Broad and Sustained Competitive Advantage


Creating Competitive Advantage

...Historical Insights

- Characteristics of *New Sources of Competitive Advantage*
 - Order of magnitude change in a *key* dimension of warfare
 - Emergence of “New Elite” – *Displacement* of “Existing Elite”
- Land Warfare: Sustained Rate of Fire
 - Rifle (1.8×10^1 rounds per minute)
 - Machine Gun (6×10^2 rounds per minute)
- Land Warfare: Sustained Speed Maneuver
 - Cavalry + Infantry
 - Mechanized Armor + Infantry + Air Power
- Warfare at Sea: Range of Engagement
 - Battleship: 1.8×10^1
 - Carrier Aviation: 1.8×10^2


Order of Magnitude Change is a leading indicator for a potential new source of ***Competitive Advantage***

Creating Competitive Advantage: Exploiting Order of Magnitude Change




Order of Magnitude Change \longrightarrow *New Fitness Peak*

Creating Competitive Advantage: Warfighting Innovation




Warfighting Innovation → **Competitive Advantage**

Creating Competitive Advantage: Overcoming Impediments to Innovation




Increasing Level of Difficulty for Change

Impediments to Innovation: Push Back by the “Existing Elite”



Impediments to Innovation: Push Back by the “Existing Elite”




Exploring the New Competitive Landscape

Searching Here Now

New Competitive Advantage Could Lie Here

DoD is Here

Or Here



How Do We Explore the “Evolving Competitive Landscape”

Transforming Defense

...Corporate Strategy

Part I: Continuous small steps

Sustaining

Evolutionary changes

Stay on the local maximum

Part II: Many medium jumps

Explore and expand the local region


New doctrine / organization / systems

Part III: A few big bets

Could change DOD

Change the world

Create a new game with new rules



“If you are not making any big bets you are a fixed strategic target and at risk.”

Exploring the New Competitive Landscape: Tangible Progress



Transformation Strategy

- Transform from Industrial Age to the Information Age

Implement Network Centric Operations

- Ensure sustained competitive advantage

Collaborate with Allies

Dissuade competitive entry

Underwrite deterrence

Implement countervailing strategies

- Broaden the capabilities base

Operational, Technical, Industrial


Create new competitive areas

Revalue competitive attributes for the information age

Decrease capabilities cycle time

- Leverage our advantages and opportunities

Manage the revaluation/rebalancing of capabilities and processes



Transforming Defense

... The New American Way of War

The New Rules

- Fight first for information superiority
- Speed of command
- Access to information: shared awareness
- Dispersed forces: noncontiguous operations
- Demassification
- Elimination of process lines
(e.g. - fusion of ops, intel & logistics or organize, deploy, employ & sustain)
- Elimination of structural lines
(e.g. - Joint ops at the small unit level)
- Self-synchronization
- Alter initial conditions at higher rates of change
- Compression of levels of war

Network-Centric Warfare

High Rates of Change
Closely Coupled Events
Lock In / Out
Speed of Command
Self Synchronization

What's Valued

Networking
Sensing
Envelope Management
Speed / Endurance
Numbers
Risk Tolerance
Staying Power

Transforming Defense: Exploiting New Sources of Power

*“What we are seeing, in moving from the **Industrial Age** to the **Information Age**, is what amounts to a new **theory of war**: power comes from a different place, it is used in different ways, it achieves different effects than it did before. During the **Industrial Age**, power came from mass. **Now power tends to come from information, access, and speed**. We have come to call that new theory of war **network-centric warfare**. It is not only about networks, but also about how wars are fought-how power is developed.”*

*VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret)
Director, Force Transformation
IEEE Spectrum – July 2002*

Information Age Transformation

...what we saw in Operation Iraqi Freedom

- **NCW Implementation**
- **The power of shared awareness**
 - Intelligence, Surveillance, Recon*
 - High speed networking*
 - New capabilities / Tactics, Techniques, Procedures*
- **Networking + ISR =**
 - Speed*
- **Information running ahead of the physics**
- **A new Airpower – Land power intersection**
 - All weather weapons*
 - Close Air Support*
 - Interdiction*
 - Speed*
 - Weight of Fire vs Precision*
 - The non-contiguous battlespace*
- **Movement toward tactical level jointness / interoperability**
 - Especially Special Operations Forces*

Speed creates the appearance of an incompetent opponent

ISR + Speed of Decision + Lethality => Bad options for the enemy

A New “Sweet Spot”

Information Age Transformation: Network Centric Warfare

Translates an **Information Advantage** into a decisive **Warfighting Advantage**


Information Advantage - enabled by the robust networking of **well informed** geographically dispersed forces

Characterized by:

- Information sharing
- Shared situational awareness
- Knowledge of commander's intent

Warfighting Advantage - exploits behavioral change and new doctrine to enable:

- Self-synchronization
- Speed of command
- Increased combat power



Exploits Order of Magnitude Improvement in Information Sharing

Warfighting Advantage

Networked Forces


Outfight

Non-Networked Forces

Warfighting Advantage: More Evidence

- **Full Dimensional Protection - Counter Air**
 - USAF found F-15Cs, working with data links (shared awareness), **increased kill ratio by over 100% -- 2.6:1** for both Day & Night Ops (JTIDS Operational Special Project - Mid 1990's)
- **Dominant Maneuver**
 - Digitized forces demonstrate capability to fight over a much larger area with **fewer forces** than non-digitized forces (USA Division Capstone Exercise - Phase I, Apr 2001)
- **Precision Engagement - Counter Anti Access**
 - Networked combined force requires **62% less time** to restore mine free shipping in Strait of Hormuz (FBE Foxtrot, Dec 1999)
- **Precision Engagement - Counter SOF (CSOF)**
 - Decision cycle reduced by half - shooter effectiveness increased
 - **10 fold reduction** in SOF penetrators by water (FBE Delta, Oct 1998)

Understanding the Evidence for Warfighting Advantage




Exploiting Order of Magnitude Change

Tenets of NCW: A Hypothesis Regarding Sources of Power


- A robustly networked force improves information sharing
- Information sharing and collaboration enhances the quality of information and shared situational awareness
- Shared situational awareness enables collaboration and self synchronization, and enhances sustainability and speed of command
- These in turn dramatically increase mission effectiveness

Top Level Measures for Exploring NCW Hypothesis




Information-Age Warfare

...Domains of conflict



Information Advantage / Superiority



...relative to an adversary...

OURS



NEEDS

THEIRS



NEEDS



ABILITY TO SATISFY



ABILITY TO SATISFY

Creating Information Advantage: Meeting Warfighter's Information Needs



**Individual/
Node**

**Unit/
Flight**

**Force/
Operational**

Info On:

**Blue
Force**

Where am I?
Where are my buddies?
What is CDR's Intent?

Where is the Flight?
What is its Disposition?
What is CDR's Intent?

Where is the Force?
What is its Disposition?
Does CDR's intent need to change?

**Neutrals /
Non
Combatants**

Where are the Airliners?

Where are the Airliners?

Is there commercial Air traffic in the area?


**Red
Force**

Where is the Adversary?

Where is the Adversary?

How is the Adversary Reacting?
Is this what was expected?


Creating Information Advantage: Meeting Warfighter's Information Needs



Networking the Force:

- *Provides Warfighters with Access to a New Region of the Information Domain*
- *Order of Magnitude Change enables New Type of Information Advantage*

Creating Information Advantage: Exploiting Information Sharing as a Source of Power




Information Sharing is a key enabler of increased Combat Power

Operation Iraqi Freedom: Increased Information Sharing – Personal Role Radio




Exploiting Information Advantage: Developing Network Centric Warfighting Concepts




Creating Information Advantage: Insights from the Commercial Sector

Initial Theory




Theory Meets Business Reality: Discontinuity in Integration Continuum




* Findings represent study and analysis of the results achieved by 17 large organizations. Given the size of the firms studied, the multiple for identifying benefits (X) equated to roughly \$1 million.

Source: OFT/Accenture/CRITO Case Study


Applying Theory to Make Sense of The Warfighter's Reality




Applying Theory to Make Sense of The Warfighter's Reality



Air-to-Ground Mission: Digital Close Air Support




Close Air Support Mission: Domain Overlay



Digital Close Air Support: Fighting First for Information Advantage

- **Tactical Situation:**


- Blue Force in defensive posture
- OPFOR moving to contact under cover of darkness
- Armored column detected by JSTARS and UAV at approximately 10 mile range from Blue Force and positively identified as hostile OPFOR
- Blue Force tracking information confirms that no Blue Force ground forces are in close proximity to OPFOR
- Fire mission assigned to Close Air Support (CAS)



Source: US Army
Division Capstone
Exercise - Phase I
(March-April 2001)

Digital Close Air Support: Network Enabled Engagement

- **Order of magnitude** improvement in real-time information sharing across “air-ground” seam
- Dramatically increased **situational awareness** for CAS Pilots
- **Collaborative precision engagement** of hostile OPFOR
 - Lightning II Pods used for targeting
 - Sensor Points of Interest shared over data link
 - Selective engagement of tanks with Laser Guided Munitions




Source: US Army
Division Capstone
Exercise - Phase I
(March-April 2001)

Digital Close Air Support: Decisive Defeat of OPFOR

• Warfighting Impact:


- First wave battle damage assessment: “Two OFOR Battalions rendered combat ineffective”
- Close Air Support *decisively engages* OPFOR
- Exercise stopped and “restarted” to enable Blue Ground Force to engage OPFOR



Exploiting Order of Magnitude Change

Quality of Information
- Precision Navigation
- Lightning II Pod


Output Measure:
Decisive Defeat
Of OPFOR



Networked Force
- Air
- Ground

Information Sharing
- Blue Force Information: "Trace" of Blue Forces
- Red Force Information: "Sensor Points of Interest"

Applying Theory to Make Sense of The Warfighter's Reality




Air Superiority Mission: Shared Tactical Picture + Integrated Processes

Information “Richness”


- Content
- Accuracy
- Timeliness
- Relevance

⋮
⋅



Information “Reach”

Air-to-Air Combat: Domain Overlay



Legend: — Technical — Procedural — Operational

Air-to-Air Combat: The Outcome

F15-C Air Ops: Active Missile Counter Tactics


Without JTIDS/With JTIDS

- **Information Advantage** **Voice Only vs. Shared Tactical Picture**
- **OODA Loop** **Baseline Compressed with Self-Synchronization**
- **Kill Ratio** 3.10:1 vs. 8.11:1 (*2.61 x increase*) - Day
 3.62:1 vs. 9.40:1 (*2.59 x increase*) - Night
- **Hundreds of Iterations** **10,000 plus Sorties – 15,000 plus Flying Hours**
- **Spectrum of Engagements** **2 vs. 2 to 8 vs. 16**

The Bottom Line: Demonstrated capability for networked aircrews fighting with *shared situational awareness* to increase combat power by over *100 %*

Source: JTIDS Operational Special Project - Report to Congress, Dec 97


Air-to-Air Combat: 4 vs 4 Engagement




Source: RAND/EBR Case Study

Air-to-Air Combat: Voice Only


Information Domain




Blue 11 (Lead) View



Blue 12 (Wing) View



Blue 13 (Lead) View




Blue 14 (Wing) View

*Warfighters
Do not
Share Common
Information*

*Asymmetric
Information
Positions*

Air-to-Air Combat: Coupled OODA Loops - Voice Only





Air-to-Air Combat: Voice Plus Data Links

Information Domain

Blue 11 (Lead) View



Blue 12 (Wing) View



*Warfighters
Share Common
Information*

*Symmetric
Information
Positions*


Blue 13 (Lead) View



Blue 14 (Wing) View




Air-to-Air Combat: Coupled OODA Loops - Voice Plus Data Links



Air-to-Air Combat --- Quality of Individual Information: Voice Only vs. Voice + Data Link

Voice Only

Link 16 + Voice



Q_1 Completeness: Detection

Q_3 Correctness: Location



Q_2 Correctness: ID

Q_4 Correctness: Velocity


Air-to-Air Combat: Cognitive Advantage

Superior Ability to Observe – Orient - Decide - Act

B11 (Flight lead)



B12 (Wingman)




Source: RAND/EBR Case Study

Time


Air-to-Air Combat: New Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

- Increased situational understanding enables new “high-awareness” tactics that lead to major increases in combat effectiveness*


1. Increased numbers of engagements in the same time period




2. Employment of the wingman as combatant rather than defensive patroller



3. Advance vectoring to engage red A/Cs from position of maximum advantage




4. Employment of cooperative formations to trap and destroy red A/Cs



Air-to-Air Combat: Value of Information + Cognitive Advantage

“Information Advantage”



“Cognitive Advantage”

“Warfighting Advantage”




Source: RAND/EBR Case Study


Implementing Network Centric Warfare: Key Elements of Strategy

- Get the Theory Right
- Apply the Theory Enterprise Wide
- Accelerate Networking of the Joint Force
- Accelerate Deployment of Network-Centric Concepts and Capabilities
- Experiment with Network-Centric Concepts and Capabilities
- Address Challenges of Allied & Coalition NCO
- Develop Doctrine and Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for NCO
 - Service/Combined/Joint/Allied and Coalition


Getting the Theory Right



Getting the Theory Right



Getting the Theory Right



Example Advanced Network Enabled Concept: Sea-Based Tactical Air

Distributed Sea-based TACAIR

Network-centric

- *Collaborative planning and execution*
- *Netted expeditionary sensors*


Continuous power vice pulse of power (24 hour ops)

Assured access




- *Correct tactical instability*
- *Complicate enemy ISR*
- *Improve survivability
(susceptibility/vulnerability)*
- *Reduce manpower*
- *Reduce cost*

Sea-basing implementation

- *Split operations/replenishment
AIMD ashore or ship-based*



Getting the Theory Right: The NCO Conceptual Framework




“Output Measures”

Getting the Theory Right: Command and Control of a Networked Force


What's Different?

- **Common Operational Picture**
 - Reduced “Fog” of War
- **Shared Situational Awareness (SA)**
 - Significantly increased SA for :
 - Commander
 - Subordinate Commanders
 - Individual Warfighters
 - Decreased “cognitive loading” in developing SA
- **Commanders Intent**
 - Increased shared situational understanding
 - Enhanced by capabilities for real-time collaboration
- **Enhanced speed of decision making**
- **Broader spectrum of Courses of Action**
 - Increased Audacity
 - Reduced Risk


Getting the Theory Right: Command and Control of a Networked Force



Applying the Theory Enterprise Wide: Supporting Key Force Development Decisions



Sensors



Networks

Command & Control






People

Effectors (Shooters)



Applying the Theory Enterprise Wide: Supporting Key Force Development Decisions



Implementation Challenges

- **Getting the Theory Right**
 - Advancement of “New Theory of War”
 - Development of new “mental models”
- **Applying the Theory Enterprise Wide**
 - Making the “Business Case” for key Enabling Investments
 - Networking + “Interoperability”
 - Sensing
- **Enabling Information Age Behaviors**
 - Dealing with challenges of Disruptive Innovation
 - Creating the right set of “Incentives”
- **Overcoming Cultural Impediments to Innovation**
 - Emergence of “New Elite”
 - Potential Displacement of “Existing Elite”

Take A Ways

- **Network Centric Warfare: An Emerging Military Response to the Information Age**
 - *Evidence exists and is compelling*
 - *Clear linkage between Information Advantage and Warfighting Advantage*
 - *Ideas and concepts have “traction”*
- **Early NCW adopters are reaping significant gains**
 - **Armed Services: Increased Combat Power**
 - **Industry: New Business**
- **A New Mental Model is emerging to navigate the ongoing Transformation from the Industrial Age to the Information Age**

Questions?

To Probe Further

- **DoD Report to Congress on Network Centric Warfare**
 - *Online at www.dodccrp.org*
- **Books**
 - *Blown to Bits* by Evans and Wurster
 - *The Innovators Dilemma* by Clayton Christensen
 - *Network Centric Warfare: Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority* by Alberts, Garstka, and Stein,
Online at www.dodccrp.org
 - *Understanding Information Age Warfare* by Alberts, Garstka, Hayes and Signori, *Online at www.dodccrp.org*
- **Brochures**
 - *Information Superiority*: www.c3i.osd.mil/infosup/
 - *Global Information Grid*: www.dtic.mil/jcs/J6

To Probe Further (Cont.)

- Articles

- *Proceedings of the Naval Institute*

- “*Network Centric Warfare: Its Origin and Future,*”
by VADM A.K. Cebrowski and John J. Garstka, Jan 1998
 - Multiple articles on topic of NCW in subsequent issues

- *Defense News*

- “*The Future Is Networked: U.S. Must Take Charge of New Military Revolution,*” Senator Joseph Lieberman, 21 Aug 2000

- *PHALANX*

- “*Network Centric Warfare: An Overview of Emerging Theory,*” John J. Garstka, Dec 2000

- *Business 2.0*

- “*America’s Secret Weapon,*” Tom Stewart, Dec 2001


- <http://www.business2.com/articles/mag/0,1640,35142,FF.html>

Operation Enduring Freedom

“When observing Afghanistan, we are looking for the reinforcement of trend lines. Warfare is increasingly being dominated by sensors, more so than any other piece of equipment. In Afghanistan, Special Operating Forces are lightly armed, but very well connected to networks. They know where they are in relation to other Special Operating Force and they also know where the enemy is. Our fighting forces are themselves sensors and they are connected to weapons systems and platforms that are capable of delivering enormous fire power.”

*VADM Arthur K. Cebrowski, USN (Ret)
Director, Force Transformation
IEEE Spectrum – July 2002*

Exploiting the Power of Information Sharing: Increasing Tactical Agility



Operation Enduring Freedom: Information Sharing - Voice


Unprecedented Tactical Agility

- SOF forces request Close-Air-Support
- F-14 providing Close-Air-Support out of weapons
- *Real Time Innovation*: F-14 Radar Intercept Officer employs onboard sensors to mensurate target
- F-14 crew passes target data - *via voice* - to AWACS and B-52 enabling successful target kill with precision munitions





Operation Enduring Freedom: Information Sharing: Voice + Data

Unprecedented Tactical Agility




Operation Enduring Freedom: Enabling Agile Mission “Groups”

Unprecedented Tactical Agility



Applying Theory to Make Sense of The Warfighter's Reality




Combined Forces Command Korea

Navy Component Commander's Number One Problem

Warfighting Challenges


- 1. Counter Fire**
- 2. Counter Special Operations Forces (CSOF)**
- 3. Theater Air and Missile Defense**



*Source: NWDC Briefing to DRB for RMA Oversight - 14 Jan 99
Fleet Battle Experiment Delta Quick Look Report*

Counter Special Operations Forces Mission

...Industrial Age



Counter Special Operations Forces Mission

... Dramatically Increased Mission Effectiveness

	<u>Before/After</u>	<u>Self</u>	<u>Synchronization</u>	<u>OPTEMPO</u>	<u>Lethality</u>
• Avg Decision Cycle	43 vs. 23 min	■		■	
• Mission Timeline	50% Decrease	■		■	
• Shooter Effectiveness	50% Increase	■			■
• Assets Scrambled	15% Decrease	■		■	
• SOF Leakers	10x Decrease	■			■

The **Bottom Line**: FBE Delta demonstrated the potential for a networked force provided with *shared awareness* to *self-synchronize* and to accomplish the CSOF mission in *half* the time and to reduce SOF leakers by an *order of magnitude*.

Source: Fleet Battle Experiment (FBE) Delta Quick Look Report
An Assessment of IT-21 Warfighting Value-Added, 1 Mar 99


Fleet Battle Experiment Delta: A Component Commander's Perspective

Fleet Battle Experiment Delta


- ... validated the concept of using Apache helicopters against special operations forces infiltration craft, and left behind a system for linking Navy and Army fire control systems*
- ... demonstrated how the fighting power of the Combined Forces Command Korea **could be increased without building new platforms***
- ... unlocked potential combat power that was latent in the joint task force, but had been wasted due to segmentation of the battlespace*

*ADM Dennis Blair, CINCPAC
Remarks at WEST 2001
San Diego, CA
January 23, 2001*

Exploiting the Power of Information Sharing: Closing the Air-Ground Seam




Major Transformation Challenge: Exploring the New Competitive Landscape



***DoD is Here:
Needs to Comprehensively
Search the Landscape***

What is the Rule Set for Exploration?


Globalization III




U.S. Military Responses to Situations, 1990-2002

- Evac's
- Peace/Relief
- Contingency Positioning
- Show of Force
- Combat

Globalization III: Major Flows




Advancing NCW Theory: A Closer Look



Information Advantage


What matters is Relative Information Advantage

Blue Information Needs



Blue and Red Information Needs are potentially different

One's Information position is relative to one's Needs



Red Information Needs

The Objective is to improve Blue's Relative Information Position vs Red's Relative Information Position