

Command Authority and Information Flows in Net-Centric Operations

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Preview



- Information sharing is an important part of net-centricity
 - Break down the stovepipes
 - Eliminate / reduce the "seams"
 - Enable many new possible information flows
- Some of those many new possible flows must be plugged
- Hard to do that and be net-centric
- We talk about why that is, and what to do about it

Net-Centric Information Management








Seamless network connectivity





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- Very many network participants







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- Bandwidth limits at the sharp end






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


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- **6** Flexibility essential for quick coevolution



Implications




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- Five Rights
 - Get the Right information
 - To the Right person
 - At the Right time
 - At the Right place
 - To make the Right decision
- End of end-to-end pairwise arrangements
 - For semantics
 - For information flows
 - For access control

DoD Net-Centric Data Strategy: Goals





Access Control Is Part of NCDS



- Making data accessible isn't the end of access control
- Access will be limited by law, policy, security classification
- Access restrictions
 - Should be based on deliberate policy choices (Which can be changed quickly)
 - Not accidents of incompatible implementation (Which take a long, long time to change)
- Much of what we say about access control applies elsewhere
 - Priority
 - Quality of service

Changes Are Required



- Can't succeed with the old approaches
- Access control via stovepipe systems
- Rigid implementation control only via air gap physical separation


Information-Based Policy Enforcement



- What are the component parts?
 - Attributes of information that make it sensitive
 - Attributes of consumers that give them access
 - Rules that define policy in terms of those attributes
 - Infrastructure that is trusted to enforce those rules
- This is Attribute-Based Access Control

Task, Post, Process, Use (TPPU) Paradigm







Problems of Administration



- Managing attribute definitions
- Tagging data assets
- Assigning privilege attributes to consumers
- Scale explodes when many organizations networked together
- Creates problems with administration
 - Huge "laundry list" of attribute definitions
 - Impenetrable "spaghetti" of policy rules
 - Far too much administration work

What Can Help



- Automated tools
 - To turn commander's intent into formal policy rules
 - To analyze effect of combining sets of rules
- Tagging information with the inputs needed to decide, not the outcome of the decision
- Administrative conventions, based on
 - Command authority
 - Organization structure
 - Data asset type

Conclusion



- Net-centric access control requires
 - Attribute tagging for data assets
 - Attribute-based policy rules
 - Trusted infrastructure to enforce those rules
- Large enterprises will require
 - Administrative conventions
 - Automated support