

Massachusetts Headquarters: 781-935-3966

Washington DC Office: 202-842-1548

# Organizational Structure and Dynamic Information Awareness In Command Teams

Keith Baker<sup>1</sup>, Elliot E. Entin<sup>1</sup>, Katrina See<sup>1</sup>, Kevin Gildea<sup>1</sup>, Bonnie S. Baker<sup>1</sup>, Stephen Downes-Martin<sup>2</sup>, & CDR Jon Cecchetti<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup>Aptima, Inc. and <sup>2</sup>Naval War college


The Command & Control Research & Technology Symposium SPAWAR, San Diego, CA June 15 - 17, 2004

\*Sponsored by the Office Of Naval Research, Contract No. N00014-99-C-0255, COTR Gerald Malecki



## **FORCEnet Principles Hold Promise**

- Modeling & simulation effort conducted for SSG-XXI, predict:
  - An increase in shared knowledge in a FORCEnet structure
  - Allow organizations to respond more effectively to new & unexpected situations
  - More adaptable structures
  - \*Will handle complex tasks that require coordination more effectively than current organization structures
  - In FORCEnet collaboration as a way of life







# FORCEnet Drives Investigation of New C<sup>2</sup> Structures

- Modeling examined several structural changes
  - One example creations of an intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) coordinator
  - Could increase mission performance by as much as 25%
- A primary goal of this research was to empirically test this model prediction
  - ISR vs. no ISR organizational structures





# Network Centric Warfare Spawns High Information Loads

- Increased volume of information that commanders must deal with
  - High information load can denigrate situation assessment & decrease mission performance
- Second study goal: investigate effects of high information load on decision making & mission performance
  - Manipulate information load across the two organizational structures (ISR & no ISR)
  - Embedded tactical judgment task to focus on critical aspects of decision making under different information loads





## Tactical Judgment Task

- Addresses the process of sequential revision of belief
  - Task: estimate probability that the enemy would launch a counter-attack
  - Information necessary for the judgment task embedded in information flow
    - Two orders of information: 3 confirming followed by 3 disconfirming
       & 3 disconfirming followed by 3 confirming messages
    - Likelihood of attack assessed at middle & end of scenario
- A contrast-inertia model (Hogath & Einhorn, 1992) postulated to describe sequential revision process
  - The "order effect" a heuristic error
  - Sequential order of confirming or disconfirming evidence can have a profound effect on participants' judgments
- Not sure how information load will interact with order effect – two speculations






## **Experimental Design**

#### Independent variables:


- Organizational Structures (both functional)
  - ISR Coordinator vs. No ISR coordinator (Surface Warfare Commander)
- Information Load
  - High (9 messages per minute)
  - Low (3.5 messages per minute)
  - Counter-balanced across trials
- Confirmation order
  - Confirm-disconfirm
  - Disconfirm-confirm
  - Between Ss Nested
- Primary performance measure
  - Percentage of task attacked with 100% accuracy





#### Simulation Environment

#### DDD simulation: modified A2C2 Exp 8 Scenarios




- Scenarios used involved land, sea, & air operations to prepare battle space for insertion of follow on forces
- Primary mission was to engage in information gathering, achieve & maintain good SA, discern if enemy planned launch a counter-attack monitor Email/Intel traffic
- Secondary task: complete mission tasks



# Presence of an ISR Coordinator: Performance Results

Contrary to expectations the traditional org. structure with no ISR coordinator out performed the org. structure with an ISR coordinator – most evident in trial 1 (p < .055)




- In trial 2, pattern quite different: teams in both organizational structures performed at about the same level in the high & low information load conditions
  - Steep improvement (38%, p < .05) in performance for org. with ISR coord. in high information load condition</p>
  - Speculate that with sufficient training & practice org. with ISR coord. might prove superior



#### **Tactical Judgment**

As predicted the confirming-disconfirming & disconfirming confirmation orders elicited different strengths of belief for an enemy attack (p < .06)









## **Tactical Judgment and Information Load**

- No evidence of an order effect when information load is low
- Significant contrast (order effect) when information load is high

Low Information Load



**High Information Load** 



- The results demonstrated an order effect despite the fact:
  - Participants had to glean the information from the Email/Intel traffic of over 75 messages
  - Participants received the same information only in a different order





#### **Conclusions**

- Performance results did not support the prediction that an org. with an ISR coord. would out perform an org. without an ISR coord.
  - However, org. with an ISR coord. Caught up to the org. without an ISR coord. in trial 2 in both low & high information load conditions
  - Steep improvement may indicate presence of an ISR coord.
     does facilitate performance once sufficient training & practice have occurred
- Participants exhibited an order effect (a heuristic error) even though the confirmatory and disconfirmatory evidence was embedded in Email/Intel traffic
  - Order effect heuristic error strengthen by high information load
  - Suggest a problem related to network centric warfare that will have to be address