

# How to Win Peace Operations: Theory Vs Practice

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## Abstract

Drawing upon research trips to the Bosnia theatre, this paper compares the actual conduct of Peace Operations (PO) with the theory, based upon Confrontation Analysis, of how they ought to be conducted. A Unified Theory of War-Fighting and PO is proposed. A PO campaign is seen as essentially a sequence of *confrontations*, whereas a war-fighting campaign is essentially a sequence of *battles*. But this is a difference of emphasis: the unified theory recognizes that there is a confrontational side to war-fighting also, the difference being that in war-fighting the physical destruction of enemy fighting capacity is decisive, whereas in PO psychological factors predominate. In practice, however, a PO is conducted using doctrine, systems and methods developed primarily for war-fighting. PO commanders are therefore faced with the need to re-interpret and adapt doctrine and methods, and are doing this largely using individual initiative, particularly at company level, which is where doctrine and systems tend to assume that the decisive action will take place. In a PO theatre, however, important confrontations also occur at theatre and divisional level. A commander's overall confrontation strategy is implemented by himself. It requires to be broken down by himself and his staff into supporting confrontation strategies to be implemented by subordinate commanders in confrontations at their own level. The primary task of a PO is *to confront the hierarchies of non-compliant ethnic parties at national, regional and local level*. Systems and doctrine tend, however, to lead to it being misconceived as *to control areas of land, detect violations in them, and respond by sending resources to points where violations occur*. The paper makes recommendations as to how practice can be improved in light of an appropriate theory.

## 1. Introduction

### 1.1 Sources and Acknowledgements

This paper is drawn from a report written by ISCO Ltd for CCRP (the C4ISR Cooperative Research Program, OASD(C3I), Pentagon). The report, entitled *Theory Vs Practice in Peace Operations: Operations in Bosnia viewed from the Perspective of Confrontation Analysis*, compares the actual conduct of peace operations (PO) with a theory of how they ought to be conducted. From this it draws certain conclusions.

The theory used in the comparison may be called a *unified theory of war-fighting and peace operations*. It is based upon Confrontation Analysis – a technique first applied to PO by the UK Defence Evaluation and Research Agency (DERA, 1997) and later expanded in a CCRP publication (Howard, 1999). The unified theory itself was developed through discussions with a large number of officers experienced in peace operations. None of these officers, of course, are responsible for the theory. Development of the theory has also benefited from discussions with Peter Murray-Jones, James Bryant, Peter Bennett and Andrew Tait

A unified theory of war and peace operations is what we need for effective PO. Doctrine, training, methods and systems cannot be given to defense forces in two versions, one for war-fighting, another for PO. It is essential, therefore, to see peace operations, which are a large part of what warriors actually do, as based on the same general principles as war-fighting, which is the primary task they have to prepare for.

As said, the paper compares this theory with actual practice. Information on PO practice comes from two research visits to Bosnia in 1999, in the first of which the author was the guest of OHR (Office of the High Representative), in the second, of SFOR. I am grateful to numerous officers and officials, each using their own initiative to find a way of doing an excellent job in the Bosnia theatre, who gave some of their time to explaining what they were doing and how they did it.

## ***1.2 A Unified Theory of War and Peace Operations***

The structure of the unified theory is set out in Figure 1. This shows the implementation, at various levels, of national and international policies involving the military.

Below the highest, national-political level, policies are implemented through military operations; the diagram shows a continuum with Peace Operations at the left and War-Fighting at the right.

The continuum is one of degrees of emphasis on *confronting*, with more emphasis at the left, and less as we move to the right. Here the word “confronting” is used to denote a battle of wills in which each side tries to change the other’s intent. This is how the word is used in Confrontation Analysis. It points to a psychological phenomenon, not a physical one, though physical events may accompany it.

At the far left of the continuum, this psychological activity of confrontation dominates. Physical activities are important mainly in sending messages from one side to the other, and so adding to or detracting from the credibility of threats and promises. At the far right, however, the physical use of war-fighting assets to destroy enemy assets is dominant. It determines the outcome of the battle of wills. Thus though a confrontation exists, it is de-emphasized. The emphasis is on asset destruction and preservation, which determine the whole result.

|                  |  |   |
|------------------|--|---|
| Type             | <b>OPERATIONS INVOLVING THE MILITARY</b>   |   |
| Level            | <b>NATIONAL/INTERNAT'L</b>   |   |
|                  | <b>Diplomatic confrontation<br/>(change other's intent)</b>  |   |
|                  | ← + degree of emphasis on confronting – →  |   |
|                  | <b>PEACE OPERATION</b>   | <b>WAR-FIGHTING</b>   |
| <b>STRATEGIC</b> | <b>Strategic confrontation<br/>(change intent)</b>   | <b>War<br/>(destroy)</b>  |
| <b>THEATRE</b>   | <b>Theatre confrontation<br/>(change intent)</b>   | <b>Campaign<br/>(destroy)</b>   |
| <b>TACTICAL</b>  | <b>Local confrontation<br/>(change intent<br/>or destroy)</b>  | <b>Battle or engagement<br/>(destroy)</b>                                   |
|                  | INFORMATION<br>ORDERED IN TERMS<br>OF TIMING, THREATS,<br>PROMISES &<br>CREDIBILITY (USE<br>CARD TABLES) | INFORMATION<br>ORDERED IN TERMS<br>OF TIME,<br>SPACE & EFFORT<br>(USE MAPS) |

**Figure 1: Continuum Between Peace Operations and War-Fighting (Diagram suggested by General Sir Rupert Smith, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander, Europe)**

The figure shows the kind of operation conducted at each level, with the main objective of the operation stated in brackets. At the highest level, the objective is to change others' intent through diplomatic confrontation.

At lower levels, where military operations take place in support of national-political objectives, the objective varies with the type of operation. In PO, the main objective is to change others' intent without use of force, though at the tactical level it may sometimes be to fight them. In war-fighting, the main objective at each level is, by use of force, to destroy the enemy's fighting capability while preserving our own.

Of course, while it is true that in PO we aim to change intent without using force, we often do this by *threatening* force. Hence actual use of force may be required. At tactical level, using force serves to give credibility to a threat within a given confrontation. It does not generally imply a transition to a different confrontation. At higher levels, use of force tends to change the confrontation itself, leading to a confrontation with a greater emphasis on war-fighting, in which the outcome is decided more by force and less by threats, promises and credibility.

At the bottom of each column in Figure 1 we indicate the way information needs to be organized for that kind of operation, with the main tool that should be used shown in brackets. At the right, data is organized in the usual, quantifiable terms of time, space and resources. Maps are the main tool. Displaying data on a map, as in the technique of Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB), shows how war-fighting assets are located in space. The time dimension is shown by using arrows to show movements of assets, and by updating maps.

At the left, an equally effective method of displaying the psychological struggle is needed. The requirement is to look at the threats and promises each side is using to affect the other's intent, and to assess their credibility. Confrontation Analysis provides the needed method via diagrams called "card tables" (see Howard, 1999; Howard and Murray-Jones, 1999). We will see examples of their use below.

This, in outline, is the unified theory of war-fighting and PO. In section 2 we look at Confrontation Analysis, applying it first to peace operations, where it has a vital role to play, then to war-fighting, where it can be applied, but where its role is far from central. In Section 3 we will show how, despite excellent work by individual commanders, mistakes are made in PO by applying paradigms and methods that assume we are operating at the right-hand, war-fighting end of the continuum in Figure 1 – whereas actually we are operating at the left-hand end.

## **2. Confronting Compared with Fighting**

### ***2.1 The psychological character of confrontations***

A theoretical model of Peace Operations is developed in Howard (1999). Its argument is that a PO is an operation in which commanders at all levels exchange threats and promises with NCPs (non-compliant players) in order to bring them into compliance with the will of the International Community. Instead of winning battles, PO commanders face having to win *confrontations*.

As said, a "confrontation" is a psychological battle of wills rather than a physical battle – which may or may not accompany a battle of wills. We stress this because some writers (e.g., Leonhard, 1998, p. 255) use the word "confrontation" to refer to physical confrontation on the battlefield – i.e., a battle of attrition. Now a battle of attrition will in general be accompanied by a confrontation in our sense; it is won, as Leonhard emphasizes, by getting the enemy to accept defeat, rather than by physically destroying all enemy assets.

Physical destruction of some assets is, from this point of view, merely a means to an end. It demonstrates to the remaining enemy that it cannot win, since continuing to fight will only result in loss of more assets. Thus it may obtain enemy acceptance of defeat.

But while it is true that a battle of attrition is normally accompanied by a confrontation, we may have a confrontation without any kind of physical battle. A confrontation in our, psychological sense is a matter of exchanging messages. These messages may contain threats of continued attrition; they may also contain other kinds of threats and promises.

Our theoretical model of Peace Operations states that winning a PO campaign is mainly a matter of conducting and hopefully winning such message-sending confrontations without (if possible) doing any physical fighting. It states that a PO campaign should be seen as a matter of conducting, and if possible winning, a *linked sequence of confrontations* – just as a war-fighting campaign is a matter of fighting a linked sequence of battles.

From this we derive the concept of a *confrontation strategy* – a plan for conducting each confrontation in a linked sequence in such a way as to win the whole confrontational campaign. Note that such a plan will be carried out on the psychological plane, with physical actions functioning primarily as messages.

Of course, our messages may contain threats of fighting, and if these threats are disbelieved, they may have to be carried out. In this way, a confrontational campaign carried out by the military may always transition into war-fighting. But in PO, the threat of war-fighting – though generally present to deter others from using violence – need not be in the foreground. Other threats, such as withdrawal of aid, may be more significant. This is particularly likely in the later stages of a peace intervention, and is the case in Bosnia today. Hence a campaign that never lapses into war-fighting may be a realistic possibility in some PO theatres. And it is always the hallmark of a fully successful PO campaign.

What then is the psychological aim of an individual confrontation or a confrontation strategy for a whole campaign? It is to persuade or coerce others into accepting our preferred joint solution to a joint problem, recognizing that

- each party involved will generally have its own preferences as to the joint solution that is accepted,
- and a party that has accepted a solution often cannot be trusted to carry it out.

These are the two problems of *consent* and *trust* that must be overcome to win a confrontation.

Note that whereas the *implementation* of the joint solution may be wholly or partly physical, its *acceptance* is psychological. This psychological event of acceptance is the concern of the confrontation. Once acceptance has been achieved, the confrontation as such is over – though subsequent, separate confrontations may follow.

In our model, therefore, the (psychological) confrontation between the parties takes place prior to actual implementation. This must be so. The confrontation is an attempt to get an

agreed solution to the issues at stake between the parties, and must therefore precede the implementation of any agreed solution. This is so even when actions are being implemented designed to put pressure on the other party by sending messages or by altering the situation in our favor.

In Bosnia, for example, SFOR's aim is to get the ethnic parties to accept and implement the various provisions of the Dayton agreement. This overall solution has been accepted by all parties at the highest levels, but is not being implemented satisfactorily because positions are being taken in lower-level confrontations that contradict the agreement. Hence, lower-level confrontations are taking place between subordinate commanders and local NCPs in order to bring about local implementation. In these confrontations, SFOR commanders, in coalition with civilian agencies, communicate their demands to local mayors or police chiefs. They accompany their demands by inducements and implicit (or sometimes, explicit) threats as to what will happen if compliance is not forthcoming. Simultaneously they take measures such as troop movements or setting-up of cordons in order to put pressure on NCPs. While such a confrontation is taking place, neither the solution favored by SFOR nor that proposed by the NCPs is being finally implemented.

The task of a war-fighter is, on the face of it, quite different from this task of message-sending. It is to destroy or incapacitate the enemy's forces. This does not, in many cases, involve telling the enemy what actions we propose to take if they will take certain others (i.e., telling them our position), or warning them what we propose to do if they refuse (i.e., communicating our fallback position). We keep our actions and plans secret, since their object (incapacitation of the enemy's forces) is one the enemy will not share and will try to thwart.

Nevertheless, as we have noted in the case of attrition warfare, war-fighting does involve confrontations. The exact role played by confrontations in war is explored in section 2.3. In the next section we review Confrontation Analysis in more detail in application to PO.

## ***2.2 Confrontation analysis applied to Peace Operations***

### ***2.2.1 The underlying theory***

Confrontation analysis is a technique for applying *drama theory*, which itself is a development of game theory. Here we briefly review the concepts involved, illustrating them by applying them to Peace Operations. In doing so we will be recapitulating material from Howard (1999) or Murray-Jones and Howard (1999), which give more details.

Drama theory, which underlies confrontation analysis, differs from game theory in supposing that players may use emotion and reason to change their definition of the game itself, as well as the "positions" they are taking within it. This happens during a pre-play period of communication called a *confrontation*. Here, prior to implementing any strategies, players attempt to redefine their interdependent decision problem in such a way that it has an agreed solution. If they fail, they must fall back on taking independent action against each other. If they succeed, they have a solution to implement. Of course, each

would prefer this to be the solution they favor. Also, mere agreement is insufficient if players cannot trust others to implement their side of an agreement.

In this pre-play period of attempted conflict resolution (the confrontation) we find the phenomena associated with “drama” rather than game-playing. Actors use emotion and rational debate to try to change their own and each other’s beliefs and values. They explore, reason and exchange threats and promises; this affects the result more than calculations based upon instrumental rationality.

A mathematical analysis of what happens during a confrontation is based on analyzing the game-theoretic “dilemmas” that arise from the players’ given positions and preferences. Dilemmas trigger emotion, in rationalizing which players redefine their game-plus-positions. Redefinitions are in the direction of eliminating dilemmas. Once all dilemmas have been eliminated, it can be proved that players have agreed on a single, unproblematic solution. Sections 2.2.4 and 2.2.5 show in more detail how this happens.

### **2.2.2 Sequences and hierarchies of confrontations**

As said, applying this theory to a PO campaign shows it to consist of a sequence of confrontations. A PO commander, usually in alliance with civilian actors, confronts other parties in order to induce them to comply with his end-state (the mission objective defined by his superior) without, if possible, having to do any fighting. Thus in regard to violence, the principle of *deterrence* rules. Instead of directly using violence to bring others into compliance with his objective, a commander uses the *threat* of it. But other threats and inducements are also used. which is why a PO commander typically works with non-military actors, who generally take responsibility for implementing non-military threats and promise

Confrontations in a PO theatre take place at various levels. For example, the Dayton agreement arose out of a confrontation between the International Community (IC), the Serbs, the Croats and the Bosniacs. As a result, a NATO commander in Bosnia, allied with civilian organizations such as the Office of the High Representative, has to confront the national leadership of ethnic groups. As a result, a divisional commander under the NATO command, allied with regional representatives of civilian agencies, has to confront regional ethnic groups. As a result, battalion commanders, allied with local representatives, have to confront local ethnic groups. As a result, company commanders under each battalion commander have to conduct confrontations over specific issues.

Thus confrontations are linked vertically. When a commander is in a confrontation, his subordinates get into linked confrontations. Confrontations are also linked chronologically in that one leads to another. After resolving a confrontation with one party, a commander confronts another. How he resolves the first confrontation affects the second. Chronological linkages between confrontations give the idea of a *linked sequence of confrontations*. This in turn gives the idea of a *confrontation strategy*. This is a way of defining objectives in each of a linked sequence of confrontations so that, by resolving each confrontation in line with his objectives, a commander brings about the next con-

frontation in the sequence and, in the last confrontation, reaches his end-state (mission objective).

For planning purposes, however, the set of confrontations is more than a sequence. At various points it branches into a number of alternatives, depending on external events and the outcomes of particular confrontations. Thus the planner needs to see a tree of confrontations rather than a sequence – even though in the event only one sequence is pursued.

While a PO commander needs to see his confrontational campaign as a linked sequence of confrontations, from a higher-level viewpoint it is a single confrontation. This is the viewpoint of the commander's superior, who sees the whole campaign as one component of his own, higher-level campaign.

### ***2.2.3 A commander's personal responsibility in a confrontation; timing***

It is a long time since battles were decided by personal, hand-to-hand combat between commanders from opposing sides. A confrontation, however, is always a personal relationship between the commander (at each level) and leaders of other parties (at the same level). The commander is personally responsible for conducting the confrontation, even though he may send messages via intermediaries or by physical means such as dispatching forces. Other parties will see through these intermediaries, recognize the position of the commander, and try to assess his will, credibility and psychological authority.

This personal responsibility of the commander is of the same kind as experienced in hand-to-hand combat. This appears, in particular, in the frequent need for him to react immediately. Just as a sword-stroke must be countered at once, without taking time to deliberate, so threats made across a table must be convincingly rejected as soon as they are made. If not, significant ground may be lost.

This contrasts with the importance of timing in war-fighting, or indeed physical operations in general. Here, immediate responses are needed at the lowest, physical level. At higher levels of command, the task is to direct lower-level activities, and the time needed to respond lengthens out. At the highest command level, there is considerable time to discuss, study and plan most decisions before they are made.

As said, a commander in a confrontation who, being accustomed to making studies and consulting staff prior to making a decision, fails to react to an immediate threat or offer, may lose the psychological confrontation. Depending on what is at stake, he may then have to resort to physical force when this could have been avoided, or simply fail to achieve compliance in a matter such as refugee returns.

On the other hand, the time that matters in a confrontation is subjective time, rather than objective time as measured in charts. A tree diagram such as used in decision theory is more appropriate than a chart showing actual time differences. In physical combat, objective times and distances are what count, because physics rules. In confrontations, psychology rules, and what matters is what is perceived.

#### 2.2.4 Dilemmas and the card-table model

Confrontation analysis is a technique for identifying the dilemmas (change points) in a specific confrontation, and so showing a commander how he can pressure other parties while resisting pressure on himself.

To do this, we build a “card-table” model of the particular confrontation to be analyzed. In this model, each player has a number of “cards” it can play or not play, and the outcome depends on which cards are played. The model can be quite simple, because it models a so-called “moment of truth”, at which each player understands (and understands that each other understands, etc.) what “cards” each of them holds. Players must try to bring about such mutual understanding – i.e., move toward a moment of truth – in order to be sure that their threats and promises are understood; but it is only obtainable within a simple model.

A confrontation generally goes through a number of moments of truth, at which the game is redefined and/or players’ positions change.

A card-table model of a moment of truth consists of:

- A set of **players** (which are generally organizations, represented by individuals) each holding a number of **cards** (standing for the key issues controlled by that player).
- For each player, a **position**. This is a specification of which cards (belonging to all players) should be played and not played. It represents the future that player proposes should be implemented. A commander’s position will generally represent a way of fulfilling his objectives in the confrontation. What a player proposes to do as part of its position is, in general, its “promise”.
- For each player, a **fallback position**, specified by specifying which of its own cards that player will play if its position is not convincingly accepted. This, in general, is its “threat”. If all players implement their fallback positions, the expected result is a particular future we call the **threat** or **fallback future**.

Figure 2 illustrates these concepts. It shows a card-table model of a simple confrontation between a battalion commander and the commander of an ethnic army unit that is refusing to surrender certain prohibited weapons. This example is deliberately simplified. It is in fact the simplest possible card-table model, having two players, each with one card. Realistic tables would often have more cards and players; however, as said, very simple models often give the most realistic representation of a moment of truth in a confrontation.

A moment of truth occurs when players adopt positions they regard as “final” (though we know that as a result of the moment of truth, they may change) within what they see as a “final” *common reference frame* (i.e., a common understanding, at every depth, of what players’ cards, positions and preferences are assumed to be). This means that messages passed between the players assume the information in this card table. Players then realize

that “something has to give” – i.e., that unless they redefine the situation they are in, then they are committed to implementing the fallback future. The exception to this is when all take the same position and can trust each other to implement it. In this case the confrontation has ended in a *resolution*.

The aim of a commander is to make his confrontation end in a resolution conforming to his objectives. He must therefore understand how players are led to redefine their situation.

|   | ETHN | SFOR | threat | default |
|---|------|------|--------|---------|
| <p><b><u>ETHNIC COMMANDER</u></b><br/>surrender weapons</p>                     | 👂    |      | 👂      | 👂       |
| <p><b><u>BATTALION COMMANDER</u></b><br/>forcibly remove &amp; destroy them</p> | 👂    | 👂    |        | 👂       |

- **Players** are listed at left. They are ETHNIC COMMANDER and BATTALION COMMANDER. There can be any number of players – but a simple model with few players best represents a moment of truth.
- Beneath each player are listed the **cards** it can play (or decide not to play). These are the actions or policies it can take (or not take). Each player can have any number of cards – but again the model should be kept simple. Here each player has one card.
- Players’ **positions** are shown as columns. Column **ETHN** shows the ETHNIC COMMANDER’s position. This is that neither of the two cards should be played. (👂 stands for not playing a card.)
- Column **SFOR** shows the BATTALION COMMANDER’S position. This is that the ETHNIC COMMANDER should play the card “surrender weapons”, whereupon he will *not* play “forcibly remove & destroy them”. ( stands for playing a card).
- Column **threat** shows the result of each player carrying out its **fallback position**, or “threat”. ETHNIC COMMANDER is threatening to not surrender weapons, whereupon BATTALION COMMANDER is threatening to forcibly remove & destroy them.
- Column **default** shows present policies. No decision has yet been taken to play either card.

**Figure 2: Confrontation between SFOR commander & ethnic army unit**

### 2.2.5 Dilemmas, emotion and rational argument

As said, dilemmas are the “change points” in a confrontation. A commander must use them to bring about change in the direction of his objectives. Now there are six dilemmas that a player may face at a moment of truth. Each puts the player under specific pressure to redefine the confrontation. The player is under pressure to change its own or others’ positions or preferences, or to irreversibly change the confrontation, in such a way as to eliminate the dilemma.

In making these changes, players are motivated by *emotion* and use *rational arguments*. A commander needs to understand (either intuitively or through formal analysis) this rational-emotional pressure to eliminate dilemmas in order that he can use it. If all dilemmas have been eliminated it has been proved (see Howard, 1998) that *all players must be taking the same position and can trust each other to carry it out*. The confrontation is then resolved at this common position.

There are two kinds of dilemmas – those that arise only when players’ positions conflict and those that may arise even when all adopt the same position. Consider first the *dilemmas of conflicting positions*. They are the *threat dilemma*, *deterrence dilemma*, *inducement dilemma* and *positioning dilemma*.

**Threat:** Player A has a *threat* dilemma if it prefers not to implement its fallback position when others implement theirs. Its fallback position is then *incredible*. Example: Suppose that, in Figure 2, the battalion commander prefers column “default” to column “threat”. Then he has a threat dilemma because, if column “threat” were going to be carried out, he could move to column “default” by changing just his own selection of cards – i.e., by not playing his “remove & destroy” card. Thus he is tempted to “defect” from the threat column.

A player may react to a threat dilemma, if not by changing its fallback position, then by emotions such as anger, defiance and indignation. These lead it to find reasons to change its preferences in favor of the threat future.

**Deterrence:** Player A has a *deterrence* dilemma with respect to player B if B prefers the threat column to A’s position. B is then under no pressure to accept A’s position. Example: In Figure 2, suppose that the battalion commander prefers column “threat” to column ETHN. Then the ethnic commander has a deterrence dilemma. The fallback future (the threat column) puts the battalion commander under no pressure to accept his (the ethnic commander’s) position. This position is *unrealistic*.

Player A may react by angrily demonizing B. This helps A to find and threaten a fallback position more damaging to B. Alternatively, A may look for ways of offering B a position that B likes better than A’s present position, feeling positive emotions toward B as it does so. Thus A has two possible reactions toward B when placed in a deterrence dilemma – negative and angry, or positive and conciliatory – depending on whether A seeks to escalate out of the dilemma or seeks a compromise way out. Or A may take both these two paths at once, feeling a mixture of positive and negative emotion as it simultaneously makes B a better offer while increasing its threat toward B.

**Inducement:** Player A has an *inducement* dilemma with respect to B if A prefers B's position to the threat column. A is then under pressure to accept B's position. Example: In Figure 2, suppose the ethnic commander prefers column SFOR to column threat. Then he has an inducement dilemma.

Player A may react negatively, with anger and attempts to rationalize a preference for the threat future rather than B's position. As with the deterrence dilemma, such reactions are escalatory, since they give B a deterrence dilemma that it may overcome by further escalation. Alternatively, A may react positively (with sympathetic consideration for B's priorities and hence with suggestions for a position B might accept). If this eliminates the dilemma, it does so by creating a joint position.

**Positioning:** Player A has a *positioning* dilemma with respect to B if A prefers B's position to its own. This can happen if A is rejecting B's position, not because it dislikes it, but because it considers it unrealistic – e.g., because B has a deterrence dilemma with respect to a third player. Player A may react with irritation toward B, driving it to try to find intrinsic reasons to reject B's position. Alternatively, A may decide to accept B's position – or a position closer to B's than A's present one – and find ways to overcome the dilemmas this creates. The US may find it has a positioning dilemma when it sympathizes with the position taken by a persecuted nation, but is forced by political considerations to ask it to adopt a more realistic position.

As said, none of the above dilemmas can arise when all players all take the same position. The dilemmas that can arise in this case are those of *cooperation* and *trust*.

**Cooperation:** Player A has a *cooperation* dilemma when it would prefer not to implement (its part of) its own position if others accepted its position and were prepared to implement their parts. Its position is then *incredible*. Others suspect that it will “defect” from it. Example: In Figure 2, suppose the Ethnic Commander accepted SFOR's position. He would then have a cooperation dilemma, since he prefers column ETHN to column SFOR, and can move there from SFOR by not playing the card “surrender weapons”.

Examples of co-operation dilemmas, if not apparent in a simple, moment-of-truth model, are generally revealed by looking at a proposed position in more detail – i.e., by adding more cards and players to make a more complex model. This is because a broad, general agreement typically conceals numerous potential disagreements over matters of detail.

A player may react to a cooperation dilemma by giving up its proposed position. Otherwise, it will feel a need to project positive emotion (goodwill, etc) to convince others that it does not intend to renege on its promise (i.e., the selection of cards it promises to play as part of its position), or that it cannot or would not gain from doing so.

**Trust:** The *trust* dilemma is related to the cooperation dilemma. When all players take the same position, it is the same dilemma looked at from another's point of view. Player A has a *trust* dilemma with respect to B when B would prefer not to implement (its part of) A's position if others were prepared to implement their parts. This again makes A's position incredible. Others suspect that B would “defect” from it. Example: In Figure 2, the

battalion commander would have a trust dilemma in relation to the ethnic commander if the latter accepted the SFOR position. He would not, as things stand, be able to trust him to carry out his promise to surrender weapons.

As with the co-operation dilemma, examples of the trust dilemma are generally revealed by adding cards and players to a moment-of-truth position as a way of examining it in detail. Player A's reaction to a trust dilemma with respect to B may be to change its position to one it can trust B to adhere to. Otherwise, it needs to feel and project positive emotion toward B in order to change B's preferences toward adherence. It needs to do this even if, as perhaps in the case of the battalion commander, the dilemma can be solved by making A's promise contingent on B's – e.g., in this case, by making it clear that if weapons are not surrendered, they will be seized and destroyed. Given that the purpose of this contingent threat is to induce cooperation, it will be most effective if presented in a cooperative spirit, as a measure intended to make compliance acceptable to the ethnic commander.

Note, in regard to the cooperation and trust dilemmas, that a player's *position* is not necessarily the same as its *objective* – or, in military terms, its end-state. The end-state or objective is what the player plans to achieve. But it may plan to achieve it by deceit. That is, it may take a position different from its objective while intending, if its position is accepted, to defect from it in order to achieve its end-state. Thus in Figure 2 the ethnic commander, instead of trying to achieve his end-state (column ETHN) by openly putting it forward as his position, might change his position (while keeping the same end-state) by accepting the SFOR position. His plan would be to defect from column SFOR to column ETHN – thereby achieving his end-state by deceit.

Note that this plan still requires him to overcome a cooperation dilemma, since if the battalion commander believes he (the ethnic commander) still prefers ETHN to SFOR – and still believes he can move from one to the other – he will not trust him. Thus he must overcome a cooperation dilemma by all the usual means of positive emotion and rationalizations – even though he is doing so deceitfully. And the end result (prior to implementation) will be a common reference frame in which he no longer has a preferred outcome he can defect to, since successful deceit changes the common reference frame as much as genuine change does. The practical difference between this and the straightforward case of position=objective is that deceit requires the ethnic commander to overcome his cooperation dilemma while *actually* preserving both his ability to move from SFOR to ETHN and his preference for doing so.

In general, deceit is an alternative way of overcoming any dilemma. It is always an alternative to genuine emotion and genuine rationalization of a new definition of the situation. If successful, it too creates a new common reference frame in which the dilemma no longer exists.

This brief review of the dilemmas and reactions to them is far from complete. Readers should refer to Howard (1999) and Murray-Jones and Howard (1999), or to the CCRP report on which this paper is based, for more information.

### ***2.2.6 Formulating and devolving confrontation strategies in a PO theatre***

In section 2.2.2 we discussed the hierarchy of confrontations typically found in a PO theatre. We now briefly describe how, within this hierarchy, a commander should, in theory, formulate, implement and devolve a confrontation strategy.

A commander at each level has two kinds of confrontation to resolve in line with his mission objectives. He must, of course, confront non-compliant parties to obtain their compliance. But in doing so he generally must act in coalition with other members of the International Community (IC), such as the Bosnian OHR (Office of the High Representative), UNHCR, IPTF (International Police Task Force), aid agencies, etc. He must, therefore, obtain the cooperation of other IC members, at his level, in carrying out a confrontation strategy. And for this he generally needs to confront them, since they will have differing agendas, preferences and attitudes. Of course, at this point the term “confront” may not seem appropriate, since such “internal” confrontations (internal to the IC as a whole) are aimed at obtaining cooperation, and therefore need to end with positive feelings among the parties in order to overcome trust and cooperation dilemmas that may, on examination, be found to lurk in the details of general understandings that are reached.

But what is the objective to be obtained through such “internal confrontations”? An important consideration is that on many issues another agency, not SFOR, will be the obvious one to lead confrontations with NCPs. At the same time SFOR, with its much greater resources and central role in enforcing security, needs to be involved.

An appropriate role for the SFOR commander will then be to provide a Confrontation Analysis-based support system for use by the IC as a whole in its confrontations with NCPs. SFOR may then concentrate more on the process and management of this system than on the content, leaving much of this to be provided by IC members with a greater stake in the issues. In this kind of application, the SFOR commander’s main aim in internal confrontations will be to obtain IC cooperation with his proposed support system, not to insist on particular aims or methods to be used in confronting NCPs.

This support system needs to be hierarchical, matching the hierarchy of confrontations described in section 2.2.2 above. The procedure, at any level in the hierarchy of command, should be:

- Use card-tables (a) to analyze moments of truth in ongoing confrontations with own-level NCPs (b) to formulate strategies to move these confrontations in desired directions (b) to update analyses as strategies are implemented. Computerized card-tables can also be used to store information about ongoing confrontations (textual information about different aspects of a confrontation is recalled by clicking on different parts of the computerized table).
- Use staff to analyze positions in ongoing confrontations. Do this by adding cards and players to model the detailed implementation of positions; there is no limit to the number of cards and players that can be handled. This creates a large “master” card-table.

- Devolve confrontational missions to subordinate commanders by excerpting from each master card-table the details for which each commander must take responsibility. These excerpts will naturally be added to or amended by subordinate commanders in accordance with their knowledge of local conditions. The lower command level can then execute its mission in the way we have described for the higher level, while reporting relatively unambiguously to its superior.

For example, in the case of refugee returns in Bosnia, the theatre commander needs to support the IC in confronting national-level ethnic leaders. Positions thus supported will imply detailed policies on refugee returns at regional and local levels. Corresponding strategies can then be devolved to regional (divisional) level by analyzing (i.e., adding cards and players to) national-level card-tables, then taking excerpts from the enlarged tables. These will give guidance to divisional level in their confrontations with regional ethnic leaders. Regional-level strategies can be devolved to local (company) level in a similar manner.

In this process of hierarchical confrontations the commander at each level has two kinds of responsibility. First, he must conduct confrontations at his own level, handling relations both with NCPs and with other IC members, in accordance with the strategy of his superior. Secondly, he must devolve supporting strategies to his subordinates, receiving reports from them and updating as necessary the strategies they should pursue. At theatre and divisional level this second responsibility might be handed over to the Commander's staff, headed by a Deputy Commander.

## ***2.3 How we confront the enemy in war-fighting***

### ***2.3.1 Why look at war-fighting confrontations?***

Having in section 2.2 sketched both the theory of confrontation and the way it applies to PO, we can proceed to apply the same theory to war-fighting confrontations.

But are confrontations at all relevant in war-fighting? According to Figure 1, confronting becomes less important and fighting more so as we move to the war-fighting end of the spectrum.

This, however, is not because there is no longer a confrontation going on. It is because fighting (destruction of enemy assets with preservation of own) becomes the decisive factor in determining the confrontational outcome. It is, therefore, what we need to focus on – just as a fighter in the boxing ring must concentrate on boxing, forgetting, for the time being, such things as the political maneuvering that made him a contestant in this fight, since his success in the fight is now the decisive factor.

Nevertheless such considerations continue to exist. In this subsection, therefore, we will analyze war-fighting confrontations. We will find that the confrontational side is here more or less the same as the PSYOPS side – i.e., it plays a role, though not an over-

whelmingly important one. Our aim is not so much to cast light on this aspect as to help us compare US and UK practice in peace operations with the theory, described above, of how it should be done. This comparison requires us to take a look at war-fighting for the simple reason that *military doctrine, systems and methods, including those used in PO, are primarily designed for war.*

War-fighting is, after all, the specialty of the military. If a confrontation does not involve the threat of war-fighting and is not linked to any that do, the military does not need to be involved. Moreover, we need to be always prepared for war as the most dangerous eventuality.

Thus the focus on war-fighting is justified. However, lacking the unified theory set out in Figure 1, this focus tends to result in forces trying to deal with PO confrontations in the same way as they deal with war-fighting. That is why we need to look at the kind of confrontations that arise in war-fighting.

### **2.3.2 *Winning a battle or engagement means winning a special kind of confrontation***

Consider first the tactical level. Psychologically, a commander conducting an offensive operation is offering the enemy one of the solutions: *surrender* or *retreat*. While offering this solution to his opposing commander, he may simultaneously make a similar, complementary offer to sub-units or individual soldiers of the enemy – viz, *break away from your unit and either retreat or surrender individually*. This supports the offer he is making to the enemy commander because it increases the pressure on him (the enemy commander) to accept the solution proposed to him at his own level.

We win a battle or engagement at the point when the enemy (as a whole, in sub-units, or as individuals) decides to accept such offers rather than go on fighting. This is defeat of the enemy. Defeat is thus a *psychological* event, albeit normally brought about by the *physical* means of destroying enemy war-fighting capacity.

While an offensive operation generally aims at defeat of the enemy, a defensive operation aims at something less – viz, an end to the attack and a temporary *pause* in the fighting. Note that acceptance of a pause is also a psychological event. It consists of a common-knowledge understanding between commanders that offensive operations are suspended *for the time being* – i.e., for an indeterminate time that may however be ended without notice by either side, and in any way.

Acceptance of a pause will, however, also generally be the result of successfully *defeating* the enemy – though enemy acceptance in this case is limited to units that have not broken up. Units or individuals that have disintegrated or surrendered obviously cannot accept a pause in the intended sense. Apart from this, after we have defeated the enemy there will be a pause in the sense of *no opposed action* taking place. We may be pursuing the enemy and occupying ground to exploit our victory, but there is still a pause in hostilities, despite the fact that there is considerable movement. Note that a pause, in this sense, is not the same as standing still. Between a pause and the next engagement there generally follows, as Clausewitz (1<sup>st</sup> edition 1832) emphasizes, a period of *movement*,

during which the consequences of the accepted outcome of the last engagement are followed up.

Thus mutual acceptance of a *pause in hostilities of indeterminate duration and ending* is the normal end-state of an offensive or defensive operation. Now the peculiar nature of the pause in hostilities from the viewpoint of confrontation analysis is that it is a resolution that is expected to break down, though there is no shared expectation as to when or how it will do so. It remains a resolution, despite this, because there is mutual acceptance of the cards now being played by each player; that is, in respect of the options that are common knowledge among the players (meaning that each knows the other to have them, and knows that each other knows, ..., etc.), neither player is implicitly or explicitly demanding that the other change what it is doing or intending. For example, each accepts, for the time being, the territory the other is occupying, the movements it is openly making, its arrangements to supply itself and even its intentions to attack at some time in the future.

This changes when one side launches or threatens an attack. Then it is implicitly demanding, under threat of causing destruction, that the other withdraw from certain territory, cease certain movements or discontinue certain supply arrangements or intentions.

Another peculiarity of the pause as a resolution is that it covers *only* the cards that are common knowledge. This is in contrast to agreements reached in civil affairs and PO, where there is normally an attempt, through generating an atmosphere of goodwill and positive cooperation, to make each player abstain from secretly thinking up and preparing options that would destroy the present understanding. During a pause, such secret planning and preparation is expected. The pause is a resolution full of suspicion and mutual spying.

This is because the pause in hostilities is not to allow players to undertake some joint, mutually beneficial project, as is typically the case with resolutions of confrontations in politics, business or personal relations. The understanding is limited to *pro tem* cessation of offensive operations. This may be because an offensive has been successful, because it has failed or because it has achieved an indeterminate result. Whatever the case, resolution consists of mutual recognition of this result.

As is the case with any resolution, this mutual recognition may be deceptive! Though, by assumption, each side is implicitly or explicitly presenting a pause to the other as its position, and is presenting itself as having no improvements (for the time being) from the pause, it may be deceiving the other about this; it may be prepared, once the pause is accepted, to break it with a suddenness that contradicts even the kind of suspicious understanding that the pause represents. For example, an attack might be deliberately paused at a point where the enemy will believe it has run out of steam, simply in order to take the enemy by surprise when it is suddenly renewed. Likewise, a defense may keep secret its preparations for switching to the offensive the moment it judges the enemy has reached its "culminating point". Thus it hopes to convert what the enemy believes to be a pause into a surprise attack.

### 2.3.3 *A confrontation on the battlefield*

To illustrate, **Figure 3** attempts to model a battlefield confrontation. The example here (not based on any particular case, but drawing broadly from Keegan, 1982) concerns an enemy unit surrounded by Allied forces and under attack by them. Their objective is to break out of the encirclement. The Allied objective is to prevent this; instead, we want them to surrender.

Our position (identical with our objective or end-state) is as stated: they should surrender. By attacking them, we aim to make the threatened future (in which we attack and they do not surrender) so tough for them that they prefer to accept this position.

Our position is thus straightforward. Theirs, however, is deceitful. What they are hoping to achieve by resisting our attacks is to make the threatened future (continued attacks met by continued resistance) so tough for us that we stop attacking for a time. That is, they are hoping to achieve acceptance of a pause without movement. They send us explicit messages suggesting this. Our acceptance of this will, they believe, give them a chance to achieve their objective of breaking out. Note, however, that their messages make it clear that attempting to break out *is not part of their position*. They hope to achieve a break-out, not by getting us to accept it, but by getting us to accept a pause without a break-out. Once we have accepted this, they intend not to abide by it, but to attempt a break-out.

Thus they are hoping to deceive us – i.e., to make us think, “We’ll pause for now. They won’t try to break out, for the time being.” Recall that a party’s position is the solution they are putting forward for acceptance, and may differ from their actual intention. Our acceptance of their position is intended, by them, to give them a chance to break out – thereby violating an implicit understanding with us.

Note that this assessment is one that a commander in the field would make, whether by analysis or by instinct. That is, he would try to judge whether the enemy’s intention is to break out if he accepts a pause in the fighting – and be alert to the fact that if it is, the enemy will try to deceive him about it.

### 2.3.4 *But is defeat really a psychological matter?*

Now our assertion that defeating the enemy in war is a matter of winning a confrontation, and is therefore a psychological matter, may be questioned. Is it not simpler and more certain to regard *destruction of enemy forces or capability* as the aim of warfare?

We might answer such questions by pointing out that our assertion (i.e., that defeat occurs on the psychological or moral plane, rather than the physical plane) is part of current US and British doctrine. However, doctrine is interpreted in various ways, and some thinkers and doers will question the assertion.

For one thing, in a confrontation each side makes its position and fallback position clear to the other. Isn’t this altogether different from war, where each tries to keep its plans and intentions secret in order to catch the other by surprise?

|                          | ALLIED<br>POSTN   | ENEMY<br>POSTN  | threat  | default   | 1ST<br>ENEMY<br>IMPT  | 2ND<br>ENEMY<br>IMPT  | default   |
|--------------------------|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| <u>ENEMY UNIT</u>        |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| offer surrender          |    |    |    |    |    |    |    |
| try to break out         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| <u>SURROUNDING FORCE</u> |   |   |   |   |   |   |   |
| accept surrender         |    | ~   |    |    |    | ~   |    |
| continue attacks         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

This is a battlefield situation in which we (the Allies) have surrounded an enemy unit and are continuing to attack it while it refuses to surrender (and therefore defends itself). These assumptions have been made.

- Our strategic objective is for them to surrender. The column **ALLIED POSTN** is therefore the position we offer to them. We try to make the threatened future (column **threat**) sufficiently unpleasant for them so that they accept this position.
- Their objective is to break out. While we are attacking, they cannot do so, but as soon as we cease attacking, they will have an opportunity to try.
- Thus our position gives us a trust dilemma. Suppose they accept our position by offering to surrender. If we simply accept their offer and cease to attack, they will attempt a break-out instead (arrow from **ALLIED POSTN** to **1ST ENEMY IMPT**). Before accepting their surrender, therefore, we must eliminate this dilemma by ensuring that such a break-out will not succeed.
- Meanwhile, their objective is different from their position. Their position is that they are offering us a pause (**ENEMY POSTN**) in which we cease to attack them while they still do not surrender. This is what their defense against our attacks (in the **threat** column, as well as the **default** column) is trying to make us accept.
- But they plan to obtain their objective by defecting from their position. Once we cease our attacks, they will attempt a breakthrough (arrow from column **ENEMY POSTN** to column **2ND ENEMY IMPT**). Thus their position gives them a cooperation dilemma. To obtain their objective, they will try to eliminate this by deception, making us think that if we cease to attack, they will not be able to break out.

**Figure 3: A battlefield confrontation.**

The answer is that in war-fighting, as in every confrontation,

- I try to make the enemy prefer my position to the threatened future (which in this case is continued fighting)
- and try to put myself in a state of preferring the threatened future to the enemy's position.

War is special because of the particular means by which I do these things – viz, destruction or incapacitation of enemy war-fighting assets while protecting my own. Destruction of their war-fighting capacity with protection of my own makes continued fighting simultaneously *worse* for them and *better* for me.

It is these special means – destruction of enemy capacity, protection of own – that demand surprise and secrecy. Of course, these special means of winning a confrontation have developed and become enormously complex due to competitive interactions between opposing sides. And attention tends to focus on these *means*, rather than on the *end* (winning the confrontation), partly because of their complexity, partly because attention must be focused in this way while fighting is in prospect lest the enemy take advantage of our inattention. In just the same way men in a fist-fight must concentrate on defending against each other's blows and circumventing the other's defense. Their need to concentrate on this makes them forget, for the time being, their objective – which is, in general, to get the other to concede defeat. Nevertheless, this is the end to which fighting is a means. It is the reason why they began to fight and will be (unless their objectives change) the reason why they stop.

Thus we assert that in war-fighting the physical means (destruction or incapacitation of enemy assets) are enormously important and require, for much of the time, undivided attention. Nevertheless they are not an end in themselves, merely a means. The end is defeat of the enemy, which consists of enemy acceptance of our position in the accompanying confrontation.

Leonhard (1998, pp. 77-78) argues that this objective of defeating the enemy is lost sight of in the war-fighting simulations used in the Army's National Training Center and other facilities. These model a "worst-case" scenario in which the enemy goes on fighting while it can – i.e., till its ability to do so is totally destroyed. Assuming such a "worst case" may test the physical effectiveness of weapons systems, but it has the effect of substituting the objective of *totally destroying the enemy's capability* for the objective of *defeating them*. The latter objective is simply eliminated from the simulation. It is made impossible by assigning the enemy an impregnable will to fight.

Clearly, this is unrealistic. Leonhard believes that it has led, through the strong influence exerted by these simulations, to a neglect in practice of the *end* (defeat of the enemy) in favor of the *means* (destruction of assets). Adverse effects of this, cited by Leonhard, include equipping US forces with too much ammunition (needed in the Gulf war to destroy enemy forces) as against too little fuel (needed to pursue the enemy in flight).

There are, nevertheless, arguments in favor of omitting psychological factors.

FIRST ARGUMENT: it has been difficult (at least until the advent of confrontation analysis) to model these “soft” factors in a realistic manner. They have been inscrutable, perplexing, subjective and resistant to scientific analysis. The “worst-case” assumption is therefore the best way to deal with them, the argument being that since we cannot predict these factors, the worst case is the case to train for.

DISCUSSION: This argument holds water on the premise that the worst case covers the rest – i.e., that training for the worst case will enable us to deal with the others. Such a premise is valid when a worst-case assumption is essentially quantitative. For example, assuming the worst case in regard to the quantity of ammunition we use may cover other cases, since if we use less than the largest amount, we will have enough.

However, the worst-case assumption applied to confrontations is not quantitative in this simple way. There is no simple link between the amount or proportion of enemy assets destroyed and the likelihood of enemy surrender. For example, an enemy unit under indirect fire may be unable to take up our implicit offer of surrender because there is no way for them to communicate their surrender to us. This unit cannot surrender, no matter how many of their assets we destroy.

Thus the worst case does not cover the others, so that training for it leaves us unprepared.

In addition, we now have, in confrontation analysis, a “hard” way of modeling these “soft” factors.

SECOND ARGUMENT. An essential characteristic of war is said to be its tendency to escalate to a condition of “totality”. This is because, if one side is prepared to sacrifice more and continue fighting longer than another, that side can win by exerting extra effort. Escalation thus takes place as each side tries to commit itself more than the other. This tendency of war means that we should not make any assumptions about an enemy’s willingness to absorb casualties. We must aim to destroy enemy capability, not worry about their intentions.

DISCUSSION: The tendency of war to escalate to extremes was emphasized by Clausewitz (1<sup>st</sup> edition 1832). He points out, however, that real war is always more or less limited by the political and social factors that give rise to it. Hence its tendency toward totality never finds full expression. Moreover, escalation to extremes depends upon there being two sides with symmetric capabilities, so that neither can out-escalate the other except by increasing its will to fight. This too is unrealistic.

Accordingly, Clausewitz himself finally recognizes destruction of enemy capability as merely a means, the end being (in our terms) to win a confrontation. He says:

War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will... to impose our will on the enemy is its object. To secure that object we must render the enemy powerless; and that, in theory, is the true aim of warfare. That aim takes the place of the object, discarding it as something not actually part of war itself.

**THIRD ARGUMENT:** The handling of confrontations is best left to diplomats and politicians, who are professionally trained for it. The professional specialty of the military is the destruction or incapacitation of assets – i.e., “rendering the enemy powerless”. The military should therefore train for this. Insofar as there is a need to confront the enemy psychologically on the battlefield, this is taken care of by military specialties such as PSYOPS.

**DISCUSSION.** This attempt to separate war (the use of force to render the enemy powerless) and its strategic objective (to compel them to do our will) is again reflected in Clausewitz. In the above passage he describes the object of war as “not actually part of war itself”.

This may seem a logical division of labor: let the military do the fighting, while politicians handle the confrontations. In fact, the proposal does not work organizationally, and is not a valid application of the principle of division of labor, since it would tend to separate the purpose of a military unit – the end to which its efforts are directed – from its leadership. This cannot be done. At the moment of truth in a battle, when enemy units and individuals are deciding whether to continue fighting, the responsibility for confronting them inevitably falls on the military commander. Units and individuals decide whether to surrender to him, since he is seen as making the offer they accept and wielding the threat they wish to avoid.

Note that this is not a matter of rank. A platoon leader or individual soldier may be the commander who deals with a potential or actual surrender offer at a particular level. Nevertheless, whatever the level at which the enemy accepts defeat, it is the *commander* at this level who must handle the corresponding confrontation.

For this reason, responsibility for these confrontations cannot be delegated to PSYOPS specialists. Specialists can contribute advice and carry out designated operations. They can even “handle” a confrontation in the sense of framing and sending messages that fulfill their commander’s intent. They cannot take responsibility for a commander’s objectives, hence not for “handling” his confrontations in the sense of making strategic decisions – taking positions and accepting the other side’s positions. Here they can merely advise.

**CONCLUSION:** The objective of war-fighting is to win a psychological confrontation. And this objective needs to be maintained, even though concentration on the physical means of achieving it (destruction or incapacitation of enemy assets; protection of our own) may need at times to be total and exclusive.

### ***2.3.5 The confrontational objective at higher levels of war-fighting***

In section 2.3.3 we made up an example of a tactical-level war-fighting confrontation, to compare with our examples of PO confrontations. What do war-fighting confrontations look like at operational or strategic level?

Despite the increasing complexity of operations at higher levels, the fact that operational or strategic-level confrontations *are* confrontations, resolvable only by acceptance of a common solution, becomes clearer at higher levels than it is lower down.

At the tactical level of war-fighting the confrontational objective tends to fade into the background as the task of incapacitating enemy assets and defending our own is brought into focus. At operational or strategic level, war-fighting is more clearly seen as a method of coercing the other side into accepting our solution.

Fighting is then seen as the threatened future (the “threat” column) in a confrontation in which we are trying to achieve a strategic objective. In the case of the Gulf war (Operation Desert Storm), for example, this objective was Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait. In the case of the Normandy invasion (Operation Overlord), the objective was German unconditional surrender – by representatives of the German state who might succeed in getting rid of Hitler or, failing that, by the German armies in the West.

The confrontational objective is not only clearer at this level of war-fighting. It is closer to, or identical with, the political objective of the whole war – the objective for which national political authorities have gone to war.

The question then arises: *What exactly is the difference, at this level, between a war-fighting confrontation and a political or PO confrontation?*

Our answer is that war-fighting confrontations *at all levels* have certain special characteristics, whereas political and PO confrontations share the characteristics of confrontations in general.

### ***2.3.6 The special characteristics of war-fighting confrontations***

What then distinguishes war-fighting confrontations from confrontations in general?

This is an important question for us. We have said that because war-fighting is the primary military task, *the way we deal with PO confrontations tends to rely on doctrine, systems and terminology designed primarily for war-fighting*. One effect of this is that the particular kind of confrontations encountered in war-fighting affect the way we deal with PO confrontations, even though these are of a more general kind.

In answering the question we will therefore give a clear characterization of war-fighting confrontations, even though in reality (and as shown in Figure 1) *there are many in-between cases that share some but not all of the characteristics stated*. A clear characterization is nonetheless useful for us because it picks out the special characteristics that *military doctrine, systems and terminology tend to assume*, yet which are not normally present in PO. The example of the bombing of Serbia during the confrontation over Kosovo, which is not such a clear case of a simple war-fighting confrontation, will be used to indicate degrees of compliance with this clear characterization.

These, then are the special characteristics of a war-fighting confrontation:-

**The threatened future consists of each player trying to destroy the other's war-fighting capability while preserving its own.** For example, this is the threatened future in **Figure 3**. It was the threatened future in Operations Desert Storm and Overlord.

**This threatened future (fighting) is preferred by each side to the other's position – so that each faces a deterrence dilemma – and is a best response to the other's destroying action – so that neither faces a threat dilemma.** This was assumed in all the years of planning for Overlord. It was when (and only when) it was perceived to be the case in the confrontations with Iraq over Kuwait and with Serbia over Kosovo, that these became war-fighting confrontations. Until then they had been diplomatic or PO confrontations in which war was *threatened* in the hope that it might not have to be *implemented* – whereas in a war-fighting confrontation, the threatened future of fighting is either the default future (actually being carried out) or close to being so in the sense of being actively and realistically prepared for. This is because of the above characteristics.

**Each side proposes to overcome its deterrence dilemma by actually carrying out its threat, since destruction of enemy capacity with preservation of our own makes continued fighting progressively worse for them, to the point when acceptance of our position or abandonment of war-fighting becomes preferable for them (so that they have an inducement or threat dilemma).** In Operation Overlord and Operation Desert Storm, our position was eventually accepted through enemy defeat on the battlefield – though in the latter case there is continuing controversy as to whether we should not have demanded more. In the confrontation over Kosovo, a modified version of our position was eventually accepted at the diplomatic level – i.e., not through defeat on the battlefield as in the other two cases. In each case, this was done by destructive action making acceptance of our position preferable to continued fighting.

**At the same time, each proposes, by the same means, to stop the other from giving us an inducement or threat dilemma, since destruction of enemy capacity with preservation of our own makes continued fighting progressively more bearable for us.** We clearly succeeded in this in Operations Overlord and Desert Storm. It is not so clear that we succeeded in the confrontation over Kosovo, where public anguish over civilian casualties made continued fighting uncomfortable for us.

**In war-fighting confrontations at tactical or operational level, players may converge to a common position of a special kind – a “pause in hostilities”. While at this common position, they are still in a potential war-fighting confrontation, since they know each other to prefer fighting *at some time in the near future* to the other's conditions for permanently ending hostilities. There is thus no attempt to solve cooperation and trust dilemmas other than by trying to make the other think (a) that they cannot gain tactically from ending the pause right now (b) that we cannot gain tactically from doing so, even when we can. To this end deception is practiced, with no attempt to build up deserved trust. See the discussion of “pausing” in section 2.3.2.**

**When there are other kinds of convergence to a common position – e.g., surrender or acceptance of political conditions for ending the conflict – the confrontation ceases to be a war-fighting confrontation. The result is that generally used methods**

**for solving cooperation and trust dilemmas that involve building up deserved trust do not generally belong to the war-fighting paradigm.** In Kosovo, Milosevic's acceptance of NATO's revised conditions meant that the war-fighting phase was over. The operation had become a PO. Similarly when Germany surrendered unconditionally at the end of World War 2.

Despite these special characteristics of war-fighting confrontations, they, like confrontations in general, are *meant to end in an agreed solution*, preferably *without* resort to the threatened future – which, in this case, is fighting. Clausewitz says, “The aggressor always has peaceful intentions. He would prefer you to surrender your territory without a fight.”

In the case of a campaign or large-scale operation, this agreed solution – our position in the confrontation – is normally the end-state that is part of our commander's intent. Of course, as said above, our end-state will not be the same as our position *except when the end-state involves enemy acceptance of our position* – as in the case of enemy defeat or surrender. An end-state that is intended to be *deceptive* will not be the same as our position. But this will not normally be the case with the final end-state of a large-scale operation. Example: In the case of the D-day invasions, we succeeded in deceiving the enemy on an unprecedentedly large scale. However, even in this case a state of enemy deception was not our final end-state – merely the end-state of a particular phase of the operation. Our final end-state was to achieve a secure bridgehead – which was a state that we would want the enemy to recognize as existing.

Even though they may aim at an agreed solution, war-fighting confrontations do entail more acting out of, or thinking through, the threatened future than general confrontations. The military spend their time analyzing the threatened future of fighting. In more cooperative confrontations, players are sometimes too squeamish to mention or think coherently about the threatened future; often players in a marriage or corporate alliance, for example, would be horrified if the threat of divorce or break-up that underlies their interactions were openly referred to.

These special characteristics of war-fighting confrontations are reflected in the way they are handled. In warfare, a commander may rely on PSYOPS to make our offered solution seem more attractive to the enemy than the alternative of continuing to fight, or to make the enemy believe that they or we cannot gain from various ways of ending a pause in hostilities (so that they will avoid the former and be unprepared for the latter). Deception is considered a valid means to these ends. In PO, by contrast, a commander will tend to rely on Public Affairs and civilian political advisers to make our position more attractive than the threatened future and to build up deserved trust.

This is because, owing to the special characteristics of war-fighting confrontations, PSYOPS tends not only to make free use of *deception* but also tries to break down enemy *cohesion*. Deception, however, can be counterproductive in PO, as it undermines long-term trust. Moreover, in PO the war-fighter's assumption that enemy cohesion is aimed against *us* may be false. While structures designed to undermine compliant parties (in-

cluding us) may need to be selectively attacked, there is also a need to make other structures *cohesive* in order to enable them to implement the solution we advocate.

In the next subsection we will look in more detail at how dilemmas are resolved in PO as compared to war-fighting confrontations.

## **2.4 Resolution of dilemmas in war and in peace operations**

### **2.4.1 Eliminating threat, deterrence and inducement dilemmas**

There are four general ways of eliminating the six dilemmas – by *preference-changing*, *irreversible action*, *denial* and *position-changing*. Each may be practiced *deceptively*. The CCRP report *Theory Vs Practice in Peace Operations* looks at these possibilities in relation to each dilemma and discusses the contrasts that emerge between war and peace operations. In this and the next subsection we review the results.

In war, where the threatened future consists of fighting, a *threat dilemma* occurs when individuals or groups prefer to seek safety by surrendering, hiding, retreating or dispersing. The angry, negative emotions needed to change such preferences are well expressed by Shakespeare's Henry V:

Stiffen the sinews, conjure up the blood,  
Disguise fair nature with hard-favored rage.  
Then lend the eye a terrible aspect,  
Let it pry through the portage of the head  
Like the brass cannon, let the brow o'erwhelm it  
As fearfully as does a galléd rock  
O'erhang and jutty his confounded base,  
Swilled with the wild and wasteful ocean.  
Now set the teeth and stretch the nostril wide,  
Hold hard the breath, and bend up every spirit  
To his full height.

These emotions have the function of making individual soldiers and units prefer to fight. They are rationalized by stereotyping the enemy as inhumanly barbaric and dangerous, hence fit only to be killed, and one's own side as a noble band of brothers.

Such emotions and rationalizations occur also in PO, but there it is dangerous to encourage them as whole-heartedly as Henry V does. Indeed, one problem in Bosnia is that the one-sided demonization of the Serbs that was necessary to mobilize international public opinion in favor of intervention has become an obstacle to achieving PO objectives, as it continually gives Serbs reasons for resentment and continued non-compliance.

On the other hand, the need to maintain a balanced view of players whom it may become necessary to fight also creates difficulties for PO. Typically, as in the case of the strategic-level confrontation with Serbia over Kosovo, the IC hopes to achieve its objectives

without use of force. But this creates a conflict between the IC's desire for peace and its possible need to go to war. In such cases a player needs to develop a *contingent objective* to be pursued in case its *main objective* fails; otherwise it tends to face a threat dilemma, and find its threats to be ineffective because incredible.

What is the main objective in such cases? Peaceful acceptance of our position. But if this is rejected we may have to implement the threat future, as distinct from merely threatening to. For this we need to have a well-thought out "contingent" objective to be pursued via the threat future if our position continues to be rejected – while being willing to revert to our main objective should our increased credibility cause others to accept it. All this is in contrast to war-fighting confrontations, where the contingent objective is generally well-defined and planned for – it is the destruction of enemy capability with preservation of our own. There may instead be a need to define the main objective that we would like to revert to rather than pursue this contingent objective; this is often less in focus than the contingent objective.

Thus comparatively strong concentration on the threatened future in war-fighting confrontations and on the advantages of our own position in PO mark a difference between the two. Now focus on the threat future tends, in itself, to cause emotions and rationalizations similar to those caused by a threat dilemma – simply because of the need to guard against threat dilemmas that may appear if the threatened future is subjected to detailed analysis, or acted out. Such angry or negative emotions and rationalizations can be harmful in PO, where there is often a need, particularly in later stages, to build up a positive, co-operative attitude in order to guard against possible cooperation and trust dilemmas attending an agreed solution.

In war-fighting, as we have said, the most important *irreversible action* to eliminate an actual or putative threat dilemma (or, indeed, an inducement dilemma) consists of destroying enemy war-fighting assets while preserving our own. This is relatively unimportant in PO, where we generally have overwhelming war-fighting capacity – but our aim is not to use it. Instead, the key to success is confronting. Because of this central difference between the two kinds of operation, the detailed technical requirements of asset destruction and preservation tend to impose systems of reporting and review that become, in PO campaigns, unnecessary and distracting. In PO, irreversible actions – e.g., destruction of illicit materials – are taken primarily to send a message to NCPs.

*Deception* is a possible response to all dilemmas. All non-deceptive responses may, in fact, be practiced deceptively; that is, either emotion or its absence may be feigned, and arguments as to why one future should be preferred to another may be based on false evidence or false statements about values and contingent objectives. Irreversible actions may also be deceptive, as a player may pretend to have taken an action it has not taken, or may pretend that an action has effects it does not have. Now deception of all kinds is easier and more appropriate in war-fighting than in PO for two reasons.

- There is almost no need in war-fighting to build up long-term relationships of trust with the other side. (Obviously, this may become necessary once the enemy has admitted defeat; but at that point war-fighting as such has ceased.)

- There is a comparative lack in war-fighting of close communication with the other side. Communication tends to be indirect (via actions taken) or broadcast. This makes deception easier.

An effect of this is that forces operating systems developed for war-fighting tend to evoke distrust when engaged in PO, due to close and mistrustful operating procedures. Deceit on the part of NCPs is, of course, prevalent in PO. But while PO forces should not be too trustful, they need to make themselves trusted.

How does the *deterrence dilemma* appear in war-fighting? We have said that it has a special, defining role. War-fighting confrontations are characterized by the fact that *both sides have a deterrence dilemma* – in that the threatened future of fighting is recognized as being preferred by each to the other's position. In resolving this dilemma, the irreversible action of asset destruction is the key method. At the same time, we try to prevent the enemy from eliminating *their* deterrence dilemma – and so giving us an inducement dilemma – by preserving our own fighting assets.

In this, our intentions and the enemy's are directly opposed – which marks an important general difference between war-fighting and PO. In PO, elimination of a deterrence dilemma is often best effected by pointing out or enhancing the benefits of our position to a NCP – e.g., by stressing that compliance will bring economic benefits and acceptance by the international community. Of course, this does occur in war-fighting. We may enhance our position in the enemy's eyes by promising better surrender terms or giving them a chance to flee rather forcing them to stand and fight. But in war-fighting the central method used is the zero-sum one of asset destruction/preservation.

An important difference emerges between war-fighting and PO in relation to *preemption*. Irreversible actions to eliminate a dilemma are *preemptive* if implemented without due warning. *Negative* preemption (e.g., asset destruction) makes the other's prospects worse; *positive* preemption (e.g., irreversibly improving our offer) makes their prospects better. Now preemption tends to produce a psychological shock. This, in the case of negative preemption, causes one of two different reactions: fear (inclining the other to give in and accept our position) or desire for revenge (inclining them to carry out reprisals). The psychological shock of positive preemption also causes two possible reactions: gratitude (inclining the other to accept our improved offer) or angry rejection (inclining them to despise it as inadequate).

In war, the main irreversible action (asset destruction) is negative and is normally taken without due warning, both because giving warning is likely to lead to counter-measures and because it is hoped to produce the reaction of fear. There is little concern with producing the opposite reaction of anger and revenge, since it is accepted that these will be present on the battle-field in any case.

Thus negative preemption is generally given a high, positive value in war-fighting. In PO, by contrast, negative preemption certainly has a place (e.g., decisive, preemptive action to enforce security may induce a healthy reaction of fear), but must be avoided where there is need to build up positive, cooperative relations. Actions that inspire a desire for

revenge against PO forces are counter-productive. Even positive preemption can be dangerous in situations where it is likely to create anger. However, positive preemption in the form of good works for which no reward appears to be expected is generally helpful in PO.

Dealing with an *inducement* dilemma requires a player that does not want to give in to the other's position to choose between *preference-changing* (so as to favor the threatened future more and the other's position less) and *persuasion to a new joint position* (one better for us than the other's current position). Preference-changing is here accompanied by negative emotions toward the other, persuasion by positive emotion that takes their preferences into account. Now preference-changing is the normal choice in war-fighting. Own morale is raised by generating emotions of anger and defiance and by pointing to the shameful consequences of giving in. This recourse is both negative toward the other side and *escalatory*: it tends toward escalation because, if successful, it gives the other a deterrence dilemma that faces it with a choice of giving in or making the threatened future still worse for us. However, escalation of this kind is expected in war, and is brought to an end by maintaining our own morale while concentrating on the technical business of asset destruction.

In PO, by contrast, escalation, with its generation of negative attitudes, is to be avoided if possible, since the objective is generally cooperation in joint enterprises. Hence there is a need to escape an inducement dilemma either by *escalation accompanied by total self-protection* (so that the other has no means of overcoming its deterrence dilemma by making the threatened future significantly worse for us) and/or by *persuasion to a new joint position* (requiring, as said, a sympathetic attitude toward the other's needs). In either case, *denial* of our inducement dilemma (by purporting to prefer the threatened future to the other's position) is appropriate.

*Preemption* to eliminate an inducement dilemma is dangerous in PO. It may be justified by the need for surprise; however, it is negative (since suggesting joint positions is necessarily consultative, therefore not preemptive) and escalatory if the other side can find any way of responding by raising the stakes against us. Measures should therefore be advertised in advance when this is technically possible. In war-fighting, however, preemption is the rule both for technical reasons (i.e., to avoid counter-measures) and with the aim of inspiring fear and capitulation.

#### **2.4.2 Negative and positive attitudes in war-fighting and in PO**

The dilemmas of threat, deterrence and inducement are those of most importance in war-fighting because *these are the dilemmas eliminated by destruction of enemy fighting power*. The other three – the *trust*, *cooperation* and *positioning* dilemmas –, while of central importance in PO, tend for this reason to be of marginal or no importance in a war-fighting confrontation.

The *positioning* dilemma occurs in relationships with a player whose objectives we agree with while considering its way of pursuing them unwise. We are not likely to *fight against* such a player, so this dilemma hardly occurs in war-fighting confrontations –

though it may be significant in related confrontations, such as internal confrontations between alliance partners.

As to the dilemmas of trust and cooperation, these pertain, in war-fighting confrontations, either to a *pause in fighting* or *acceptance of a peaceful solution*. Now acceptance of a peaceful solution at strategic level, in the sense of a high-level agreement on political objectives, would be taken to mean that the confrontation has ceased to be a war-fighting confrontation. Its management would then be handed over to politicians and administrators or, if the military continue to be involved, they would treat it as a PO confrontation. This follows a general two-stage pattern in PO, whereby in Stage 1 war-fighting is used to achieve apparent compliance (i.e., convergence to a high-level common position acceptable to the IC), after which, at Stage 2, a PO is launched to achieve actual compliance (implementation of the high-level common position through acceptance at all levels). See Murray-Jones and Howard (1999).

At the tactical level, we may want to ensure that the enemy cannot gain from unexpectedly ending a pause or betraying a peaceful solution – and does not believe that we can (even when we can). Also, we may want, using PSYOPS, to present the enemy's surrender as a stable, cooperative position that does not suffer from trust or cooperation dilemmas. This may be a way of making it more attractive to them.

This, however, comes about because PSYOPS must help to solve our deterrence dilemma – i.e., make the enemy prefer our position to the alternative of continued fighting. Thus it is really the interconnectedness of dilemmas – the fact that a player will not accept a solution it cannot trust – that hands to PSYOPS the related problem of proposing solutions to cooperation and trust dilemmas.

Thus it remains true that the central confrontational problem of war-fighting as such is to solve threat, deterrence and inducement dilemmas by destroying enemy fighting power (which includes enemy morale) while preserving our own.

This has an important general consequence. *Positive, co-operative emotions and rationalizations toward the other player play little part in war-fighting confrontations* – though of course such feelings are important in our “internal” confrontations with friendly players. This is because positive attitudes are useful in solving dilemmas of cooperation and trust – not so much in solving threat, deterrence and inducement dilemmas.

Positive attitudes are, it is true, effective in *non-escalatory* ways of solving inducement dilemmas, as discussed in the last subsection; however, we also pointed out that such non-escalatory methods are of little interest in war-fighting, which is essentially a contest in escalation.

Hence a general consequence of using war-fighting doctrine and methods for stability operations is *an undue emphasis on negative methods*.

Consider, for example, our approach to C2 warfare – i.e., acting upon another player's command and control system. In war-fighting, the enemy's C2 system is by definition oriented toward destroying or incapacitating our forces. That is its function. Conse-

quently to destroy or disrupt their C2 system is advantageous. In PO, however, there may be no “enemy” – i.e., no party whose C2 systems are oriented toward our destruction. Instead, there are NCPs whose policies need to be changed toward compliance with the will of the IC. In Bosnia, for example, the NCPs are the ethnic political parties and their allies in government, business, the media, the police, the military, local communities and so on. It may be advantageous to us to build up the C2 system of such a party in order to enable it to comply.

**Example:** An SFOR commander’s Main Effort is to get a local mayor to accept certain refugee returns. He coordinates with civilian agencies, such as the OHR (Office of the High Representative), UNHCR and various aid agencies, to pressure the mayor into compliance. He at the same time prepares offensive and defensive operations in case the situation deteriorates to one in which force must be used. However, the present function of these war-fighting preparations is to facilitate and enable the operation of getting the mayor to comply – by deterring him from violent escalation of the conflict and threatening him with forceful action if he refuses.

But the mayor does not comply partly because he has (in military terms) inadequate C2 systems – i.e., he cannot keep in sufficient contact with his followers. The commander thus finds he can reach his objective by *improving*, rather than degrading, the mayor’s C2 system, provided he does this in a positive, cooperative spirit, so that the mayor trusts him.

Although positive, cooperative emotions and rationalizations play a larger part in PO than in war-fighting, this does not mean that hostile, negative attitudes play no part. PO confrontations are more general than war-fighting ones in that both kinds of approach are needed. A commander must be prepared both to enforce his minimal will with actual or threatened violence *and*, once he succeeds, to hold out the offer of cooperation.

The ongoing problem of refugee returns in Bosnia is one in which there is still only apparent, not actual compliance with a common position. The ethnic party leaders have publicly accepted refugee returns, but are not yet doing anything within their party hierarchies to encourage them. This is because each of them faces cooperation dilemmas both individually (each would prefer not to implement returns while the others do so) and jointly (each would prefer none of them to implement returns). They also have trust dilemmas with respect to each other, consisting in the fact that one did not renege, the others would.

As the party leaders are all successfully renegeing on their position, they are not suffering any difficulties from these dilemmas other than from attempts to hold them to their publicly declared position. They should also have to face the threat that the IC will withhold aid – but at present this threat seems not to be materializing at theatre level.

What can the IC do? To eliminate its trust dilemma, it can try to generate enthusiasm for refugee returns on the basis of a common interest in these ethnic groups adopting Western values and eventually enjoying Western prosperity and security. If ethnic leaders were under more pressure to eliminate their cooperation dilemmas than is apparent, this

would encourage them to respond positively to such common interests. Applying such pressure may, however, require greater coordination among IC members of the IC than at present.

### **3. Use of war-fighting doctrine and methods in Bosnia**

#### ***3.1.1 A simple, mistaken view and some of its consequences***

Fighting (destruction of enemy fighting power) depends ultimately on the success of individual warriors or platforms; higher command directs them. By contrast, a PO confrontation at any particular level is not directed by the commander; he does it. He personally communicates positions and eliminates dilemmas in such a way as to get compliance. Indeed, the psychological event of dilemma-elimination has not occurred at all until it has become common knowledge between the commander and other players at his level; it cannot be *reported up to him*.

What can be reported up to him are facts that may help him decide that dilemmas have been eliminated, or help him decide how to eliminate them. Among these facts are (a) actions taken on the ground; (b) understandings reached by his subordinate commanders, who have undertaken confrontations following his directives.

Of course, even in war-fighting, a unit that remains intact is not defeated until its commander accepts the fact. But in war-fighting, winning the confrontation, though it is the *objective*, is not crucial. The crucial factor is destruction of enemy capability. Ultimately, it will not matter whether the commander of a destroyed asset knows he is defeated – he will know it. The matter has been decided by the crucial action of destruction. This takes place on the ground, and is reported upward to the commander.

In PO, by contrast, winning confrontations *is* crucial. We have won a PO campaign when leaders at all levels adopt policies of compliance - and the commander at each level knows best whether this has been achieved. He is his own best intelligence officer.

A PO is primarily a structure of confrontations conducted by commanders at all levels, with higher commanders conducting the more important confrontations.

Unfortunately, the influence of war-fighting doctrine and methods means that our systems tend to assume the opposite – that the really important events occur “on the ground”; that is, at company level. They assume the following definition of the task of obtaining compliance: to *control areas of land, detect violations in them, and respond by sending resources to the point where the violation occurs*.

This simple, mistaken definition misrepresents the task in PO, where the primary task is to *confront the command hierarchies of non-compliant parties and get them to change their policies*. Instead, the task of confronting tends to be assigned *too much to the company commander*, who conducts local confrontations, and too little to higher command levels.

Moreover, it tends to be seen too much as a task for the military alone – though in practice company commanders recognize the need to work with other IC members. Nevertheless, an important consequence of this mistaken definition has been setting *boundaries between company AORs that do not correspond with local government boundaries* – despite the fact that company commanders have to confront local government officials over each problem, and must be able to make threats and promises to those officials concerning what will happen within their boundaries.

We need to have a firm grasp of the problem as being one of *whom we confront*, rather than *which areas we control*. In Bosnia, we are mainly confronting the hierarchies of the ethnic political parties, the main organizational structures of which go through local government. AORs need to be defined to meet this confrontational need, and confrontation strategies need to be formulated and implemented jointly with civilian agencies.

In some areas – e.g., in getting compliance from ethnic armed forces – this is less necessary than in other. In refugee returns, where compliance is linked to the provision of reconstruction aid, SFOR holds only some of the cards: OHR, UNHCR, IPTF and aid agencies must be involved. They will not be involved sufficiently, and coordination of strategies will be inadequate, if SFOR commanders work out beforehand what joint strategies should be pursued and try to persuade other members of the IC to follow them. All members of the IC must feel they “own” joint plans. To achieve this, it will be necessary to get other IC members to work co-operatively with SFOR in developing joint strategies and overseeing their implementation.

What is needed is a “double-jointed” process of strategy formulation and implementation along the lines discussed in section 2.2.6. First, SFOR commanders and their staffs need to develop strategies to pursue and implement toward other IC members, regarded as separate players. These will be strategies for “co-operative” confrontations, in which the aim is to get and maintain agreement to work closely together in a joint project. And this joint project – the result of successful resolution of the “co-operative” confrontations – will be to formulate, implement, revise and oversee a *joint IC strategy* toward the NCPs, in which the IC appears as a single, unified player.

It is particularly important to work out “co-operative” strategies for conducting relations with other IC members because there are cultural difficulties. There is, in the first place, much mutual suspicion between the military and civilian agencies, many of which are staffed by “peace-loving” individuals with an anti-military bias.

A more fundamental reason for this cultural barrier is, however, that military doctrine and methods, formed primarily for war-fighting, assume an *internal* estimate process. The OODA loop – Observe, Orientate, Decide and Act – is normally assumed to take place within the military, rather than be done jointly with civilians who do not share our doctrine.

Lack of a common doctrine means, in particular, that joint strategy formulation with other IC members will not generally be possible using military terminology and methods.

Civilian agencies will need to contribute toward the organization of strategy formulation and implementation, as well the content, if they are to feel that they “own” it.

An example of the need for a strategy to get co-operation from relevant civilian agencies is the above-mentioned boundary problem. Not only do AOR boundaries need to coincide with local-government boundaries – they also should coincide with the boundaries used by civilian agencies to split up the country into *their* administrative divisions. This requires negotiations between equals to reach cooperative conclusions.

### **3.1.2 The work of the company commander**

As said, application of war-fighting concepts has meant that higher command levels – the battalion, brigade, divisional and theatre commander – are seen as essentially coordinating and assisting the work of the company commander.

What is this work? In Bosnia, the British or American company commander

- is in day-to-day contact with local players such as local government officers, police chiefs, ethnic army units and community leaders,
- sends out *patrols* that gather information about what is going on in each locality and are in day-to-day contact with individuals belonging to or support non-compliant factions
- constantly comes in contact with local representatives of civilian agencies who rely on him for transportation, communication, information and protection and are needed by him to co-ordinate the offering of carrots and sticks.

Thus the company commander is continuously involved in handling ongoing confrontations with individuals and local leaders that need to be made compliant, and in bringing together the different members of the IC at local level.

As a result, company commanders tend quickly to develop strong confrontational skills – making their positions clear, enforcing threats with anger or with assumed indifference to their effects, using positive emotions of goodwill to build up co-operation, and so on. They also find ways of reinforcing their position by using the hierarchical structure of confrontations from their own level downwards – i.e., using the whole structure of confrontation at levels where they are in command. For example, a company commander utilizes the patrols under his command, who are in day-to-day contact with supporters or constituents of a recalcitrant mayor, to get those constituents to send a message to the mayor: *please comply! We’re going to suffer if you don’t!*

Unfortunately, with this focus on the work of the company commander goes a comparative lack of focus on the need for higher-level commanders to engage in confrontations at their own proper level. Company commanders are seen as being in the “front line”. It is not seen as equally or even more necessary for higher-level commanders to open separate “front lines” at their own level.

This attitude has several consequences:

**USE OF HIGHER COMMANDERS AS A ‘RESERVE’.** Instead of being employed in confrontations at their own level, higher-level command staffs tend to be regarded as a kind of “reserve unit” to strengthen the promises and threats made by company commanders. In this way the battalion commander will come to the aid of the company commander; if this fails, the brigade commander may be called in; if this fails, the divisional commander or a members of his staff is brought in, till even the theatre commander or his staff may be called in to resolve a confrontation at company level.

**INFORMATION BIASED TOWARD LOCAL REPORTING:** Instead of the information needed to conduct confrontations at their own level, higher-level commanders tend to receive general surveys of the situation at local level. Much of this is in the form of socio-economic indices and information about deployment of forces, but there are also surveys of ongoing confrontations at company level. These, however, are considered to require action only when a crisis occurs – i.e., when destructive threats are being invoked or actually carried out. When this happens, action often tends the form of using higher commanders and their staff as “reserve” units to support the local commander’s efforts.

**LACK OF PRESSURE ON HIGHER-LEVEL NCP LEADERS.** There is a comparative lack of support for the company commander in the form of *pressure applied at higher levels in the command structure of NCPs*. Often, the company commander is given the job of forcing a reluctant mayor, community or ethnic faction commander to comply with an SFOR position that directly contradicts the policy of his own ethnic leadership. The company commanders realizes that while the NCP he is confronting may comply on this occasion (particularly if higher-level SFOR commanders intervene) he will not do so next time. What is needed, he realizes, is a policy change within the NCP structure. This, however, can only take place at higher levels, to which the company commander does not have access.

We stress that these tendencies are brought about by the system – i.e., by the fact that our doctrine, systems and methods are primarily developed for war-fighting – rather than by faults on the part of individual officers, many of whom resist the tendencies cited. Thus we find divisional and theatre commanders applying pressure at their own level, demanding confrontation-relevant intelligence, and so on. Their efforts are hampered, however, by the set of expectations engendered by common training and doctrine.

### ***3.1.3 The need to confront at company and divisional level***

As said, the company commander in Bosnia has to learn quickly how to conduct confrontations, and usually does so to great effect.

His battalion commander is in close contact with what he does and tends to sympathize with his problems. He

- oversees his efforts

- interprets higher-level policy (operational direction) to apply to what he does
- provides physical and administrative support
- provides lateral intelligence and co-ordination with other units – particularly in order to overcome the *boundary problems* noted above
- provides “top-cover” – i.e., protection against misunderstanding and misdirection from higher levels of command
- comes in in a ‘reserve’ capacity to apply extra pressure when required
- spreads “best practice” as commanders invent new ways of doing things.

This supportive role for the battalion commander is usually correct. There is in Bosnia generally no command level in the hierarchies of NCPs and civilian agencies that corresponds with the position of battalion commander, since the company commander deals continuously with local government officials, representatives of civilian agencies, and so on. Hence overseeing and supporting company commanders in this way is a valid function for the battalion commander. Note that he does conduct certain confrontations, particularly those involved in lateral coordination. However, he sees these, not incorrectly, as ways of providing support to his company commanders, who carry the day-to-day burden of communication with other parties.

The brigade commander (a level omitted in the UK sector) has a similar supportive function at a higher level.

It is not till we reach the level of the division, where commanders confront ethnic leaders at regional level, that there is a real, separate need for higher-level confrontations, as distinct from support given to company-level confrontations. In general, this need is not being fulfilled. There tends to be confusion at this level between the “reserve” function of bringing in senior officers to make local-level threats and promises sound more impressive, and the conduct of regional-level confrontations.

The aim of the latter should be

- to induce regional politicians to adopt policies of compliance and give corresponding *downward* directives and guidance to their local followers
- to induce regional politicians to exert *upward* pressure on their national and international leaderships in favor of compliance.

Lack of general success in this is inevitable – as it is at all levels – unless divisional commanders and staff formulate and carry out confrontation strategies *jointly with civilian agencies*. Without this in many areas adequate pressure cannot be brought on regional politicians, since aid agencies in particular have far more “carrots” to offer than the military. This is one factor inhibiting adequate regional-level confrontations. Another factor is the bias toward seeing what happens “on the ground” (at company level) as the crucial

factor, with the role of higher commanders being to integrate and coordinate these activities into an operational campaign. They ought, they feel to be able to do this effectively by reviewing and directing the work of their subordinate commanders

But battalion commanders who try to direct their company commanders' confrontational work by finding a "unifying theme" for them to work within – let alone a concrete, battalion-level operational objective such as would be found in war-fighting – usually find that they are wasting their time. The confrontations that company commanders are handling are diverse and particular. They are linked in various ways – e.g., by the need to coordinate across boundaries when a village sending refugees is in a different battalion or divisional AO from that of the receiving village. But such linkages do not link units together in a cohesive strategy in the way they are linked by operational objectives in war-fighting.

Despite the pointlessness of finding even unifying themes for their company commanders' work, military procedures tend to dictate that battalion commanders should report upward to brigade and divisional level in the same way as they would in war-fighting.

Now a war-fighting divisional commander obviously needs to know whether and how far a battalion has met a war-fighting objective – e.g., stopped an enemy advance or held a hill. But *why, exactly, does he need to know, in a PO, how company commanders, assisted by battalion commanders, are succeeding in their local-level confrontations?*

Various reasons exist. One is that co-ordination may be needed at this level – as, for example, when refugee exchanges occur between villages in different divisional AOs. However, *a local-level confrontation does not cease to be local-level because co-ordination through higher levels is required.* Mechanisms should be set up to allow such coordination to be as autonomous as possible – i.e., to operate as far as possible without the need for higher-level intervention. This prescription is organizationally sound and in line with the principle of mission command.

Despite this, higher-level intervention may be needed. In general, the function of assisting lower-level commanders in the same way as battalion commanders assist their company commanders is a valid one. Another example of this is when a divisional commander assists a company commander's local confrontation by putting his prestige and authority behind the company commander's threats and promises. In fact, all the means, listed above, by which battalion commanders support company commanders may be provided at a higher level by divisional commanders and their staff.

Few of them, however, require much in the way of *top-down direction* or *regular, comprehensive upward reporting*. The company commander handling a confrontation knows best what support he needs. Ideally, it should be up to him to request support when needed and to *direct* those supporting him, rather than let them direct him.

The exception, of course, is the downward transmission of and interpretation of operational direction. However, because of the mistaken stress on the importance of "grass-roots", company-level confrontations, this tends to be static and general in nature – not at

all like the fast-moving, responsive operational direction of a war-fighting campaign. Higher-level commanders must and do give direction as to the *objectives* of company-level confrontations (ethnic-armed-forces compliance, de-mining, assistance with economic recovery, refugee returns, elections, common institutions, etc) and *how, in general, to achieve them* (replacement of officials, arrest of individuals, deployment to maintain civil order, tying refugee returns to reconstruction aid, etc.). However, this direction does not change much. The company commander has to be informed what his job is and the general means he has to employ to do it. Once he knows this, reiterating the information is not important. What is constantly changing is not this operational direction, but the details of the confrontations he is conducting with non-compliant parties.

### ***3.1.4 Confrontations at different levels of command***

Despite the tendency to focus on company-level confrontations, confrontations are certainly conducted at regional and theatre level. Many of these are initiated, following a local, company-level crisis, in an attempt to get regional-level NCPs to exert downward pressure on their local subordinates.

Other confrontations at regional and theatre level are undertaken for reasons emanating from their own, proper level. Thus, SFOR has a clear interest in higher-level political developments that affect its mission. For example, we may want to encourage the replacement of a hard-line politician, opposed to compliance with the Dayton accords, by a moderate who is less opposed or is selectively in favor of compliance. We may therefore confront those able to make the replacement, offering them threats and promises to induce acceptance of our position – though we are constrained by the need to respect democratic processes.

Again, certain activities affecting SFOR's mission, such as TV and radio broadcasting or ethnic army command structures, are clearly located at regional or national level. Accordingly we conduct confrontations at these levels to bring about compliance. For example, in Sarajevo the SCMM (Standing Committee for Military Matters) meets regularly, attended by the three ethnic presidencies, their defense chiefs, SFOR, OSCE and OHR. Through these meetings and associated channels a long-term confrontation is conducted with the object of empowering the SCMM and its secretariat to integrate Bosnia's three separate armies.

The system of military expectations, formed primarily for war-fighting, allows for such confrontations. They are seen as taking place at the margins of military operations – i.e., at the interface between military and political activities. They are nevertheless hard to justify, in terms of military expectations, when

- they *lack a formal mandate and structure*, such as is provided by the SCMM in the case quoted above,
- and they demand, for success, *joint formulation and implementation of strategies with civilian agencies*.

Note that, despite conflict with military expectations, company commanders in Bosnia are continuously engaged in confrontations that both lack a formal mandate and structure and also demand coordination with civilian agencies. At this level, where the military expectation is that the “real work” will be done, company commanders may neglect normal military terminology, procedures and expectations to get results – not, of course, doing anything wrong, but merely using initiative to find ways of accomplishing their mission when no way is provided by training and doctrine.

The fact that they are working outside formal doctrine does, however, have disadvantages. First, there is *difficulty in briefing replacements*. Replacements inexperienced in PO of this kind may have to be told, before being briefed on a company commander’s and other players’ positions and tactics in an ongoing confrontation, what kind of operation the commander is involved in, and why he has interpreted his mission in this way.

Secondly, many feel *lack of recognition* of what they are doing, despite the fact that the expectations of their superiors largely rest on their doing it. Superiors, however, tend to assume that they are doing something different from what they are doing – i.e., that they are deploying and carrying out military operations rather than confronting NCPs.

Finally, they are aware that they could from the start do a better job if training and doctrine recognized the job of “confronting” for what it is, instead of seeing it as a psychological adjunct to something more important (something that it is felt ought to be there to occupy the place of war-fighting).

Meanwhile, at theatre and divisional levels, confrontations that lack a formal mandate and involve joint strategy formulations with civilians are of the utmost importance. They are probably the decisive ones for the whole PO campaign. Yet at these levels, while individual commanders may do their best to launch and maintain such confrontations, the system of military expectations makes it hard. The reason for this is that (on the war-fighting model) it is not expected that crucial engagements should take place at this high level. Even less is it expected that civilians should take an equal or dominant role in not only formulating, but also *implementing* the campaign plan by which victory is won.

The reason why crucial confrontations at this level tend to lack a formal structure and mandate is that we are in Stage 2 of the Bosnian PO. Here, as noted in section 2.4.2, and described more fully in Murray-Jones and Howard (1999), the NCPs at national level, and to some extent also at regional level, have *formally* declared their compliance with the IC. They are in *apparent* but not *actual* compliance. The need, therefore, is to confront them over policies they are not prepared to admit to following.

At theatre level in Sarajevo, for example, the SFOR commander has to coordinate with the leaderships of civilian agencies in confronting the ethnic party national leaders. Here, an important factor is that the leaders of the three ethnic presidencies do not all occupy the highest levels in their parties. The Croat leader undoubtedly reports back to Zagreb, the Serb leader to Belgrade. This, however, is not freely admitted; the ethnic presidents are formally supposed to be ultimate decision-makers for their parties. As such, they have

each formally consented to the Dayton accords – including, for example, refugee returns. But they are not pursuing policies that match this.

If, for example, the leader of an ethnic faction in Sarajevo were to go on national television to urge his supporters to comply with refugee returns, while simultaneously working with powerful factions in his party to enforce that policy throughout his organization, that development would be far more important than the success of a company commander in getting the compliance of a local mayor who knows that compliance is contrary to his party's policy. As things stand, ethnic leaders are paying lip service to the Dayton agreement while supporting anti-Dayton policies within their party organizations. This follows centuries of practice in the Balkans, where foreign occupying powers have been resisted by agreeing with them to their faces while conducting clandestine policies of opposition.

Theatre-level confrontations have generally succeeded in some areas, such as controlling the ethnic armies. In areas where there is less formal structure and greater need to coordinate strategies with civilian agencies, they have been difficult for individual commanders to mount and sustain against the inertia of a military system designed primarily for war-fighting.

### ***3.1.5 How doctrine, training and systems can be improved***

To conclude, we make some tentative suggestions as to how doctrine, training and systems might be improved to make PO more effective.

Some senior officers argue that such improvements should not be undertaken, as armed forces should concentrate on their primary mission of war-fighting. Even on this view, it would be advantageous if forces committed to PO could be extracted more quickly through completing their missions more effectively. Hence, given the political fact that forces will be dispatched on PO missions, these should be conducted as effectively as possible.

A constraint on any improvements is the requirement that armed forces operate with a single, unified doctrine and set of procedures, not with two different versions, one for war-fighting, one for PO.

Conceptually, therefore, we suggest building upon the *unified theory of war-fighting and peace operations* sketched in section Figure 1 and applying it to the four-fold classification of military operations into Offensive, Defensive, Support and Stability operations set out in FM 100-5. We should also make use of the distinction between three domains of conflict – Physical, Informational and Moral (again, see FM 100-5). The Moral (or psychological) Domain of conflict should be given more emphasis in operations more to the PO end of the continuum set out in Figure 1.

In all types of operation (offensive, defensive, support and stability) the Moral Domain should be recognized as a personal relationship between the commander (at each level) and the leaders of other parties (at the same level). The commander is responsible for it, but can be helped and advised in how he conducts it and how he devolves a confrontation

strategy to subordinate command levels. But to improve the conduct of PO, *the primacy of different domains in different types of operation* needs to be recognized. A PO is a stability operation, and in this type of operation, the Moral Domain is primary, just as in war-fighting the physical domain is primary.

Organizationally, we suggest using the technique of Confrontation Analysis to build systems for training, rehearsal and command-and-control of confrontations. The psychological nature of confrontation means that such systems will be relatively inexpensive. Though based on principles applicable across the spectrum of military activity, they will be of central importance in PO. Here they should make our operations more effective, leading to quicker withdrawal of forces from PO theatres where they tend to become committed for longer periods than national policies intend.

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