

# Transformation of European Defense Cooperation: A Complex Endeavor

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# Content

- **Introduction:** The Transatlantic Gap in NATO Military Capabilities: A perennial issue and a critical challenge for the **European Pillar** as US rebalances its strategic doctrine toward the Asia-Pacific (Pivot) and Russia becomes more assertive vis-à-vis its borderlands;
- **Meeting the Challenge:** Enhancing Europe's Collective Military Capabilities despite austerity through a **Transformation of European Defense Cooperation** in both the operational and defense planning arenas;
- **NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model (N2C2M2):** Conceptual Basis for the Transformation of Defense Cooperation in Europe (efficient C2 and convergent defense planning);
- **Recent European Defense Improvement Initiatives:**
  - Bilateral UK-France Cooperation Treaty (2010) ;
  - EU Ghent Initiative (2010);
  - NATO Smart Defense (2012).
- **Concluding Thoughts and Caveat**


# Common Principle for Building Down the Transatlantic Capability Gap for Crises Response Operations (CRO)

[Huber and Schmidt, 1999]

*“Stepwise reduction of manpower and conscript levels in a manner that the highest possible level of modernization can be reached without having to increase the defense budget in real terms and subject to the constraints that*

- the existing capability for out-of-area (OOA) deployments (in the context of CRO) is not decreased and*
- active manpower levels must not decline below a level that is required for maintaining a sufficient pool of reservists for replacement and build-up as long as the resurgence of a massive ground force threat against NATO-territory may not be dismissed altogether.”*

# The Transatlantic Gap 1998



**CRO Capabilities of European NATO Allies relative to US Capability given different levels of sustained defense spending (Huber and Schmidt, 1999; Huber; 2003)**

# Convergent Defense Planning:

## Reasons why the Common Principle (CP) was dismissed

- **Spending cuts:** By 1998, the average defense spending of the European members of NATO had fallen to 1.7 of their GDP compared to 2.5 percent in the early 1990s;
- **No commitment** to sustain or increase 1989 defense spending in real terms. (Today, only UK reaches NATO's agreed benchmark of 2.0 percent GDP).
- **Differing interests:** Promoting, among NATO member nations, the idea of the **Common Principle** (CP) was – and still is – dismissed as unrealistic: “Defense planning is a national Responsibility” (Item 7 of NATOS's 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration);
- **No validated conceptual models** for the implementation of CPs.


# Enhancing European Defense Cooperation

- Purely national capabilities insufficient to address complex emergencies (e.g. Afghanistan, Libya, Mali, Central Africa);
- Today's independent national defense planning approaches in Europe need to be replaced by cooperative ones supporting a convergent development of national capabilities that are
  1. efficient (maximizing synergies between them, no duplication);
  2. complementary (closing capability gaps);
  3. agile enough to meet new security challenges.

# Cooperative Defense Planning and N2C2M2

- N2C2N2 is a validated conceptual basis for improving collective capabilities through network-based cooperation among a collective's entities.
- Thus, it is proposed that N2C2M2 be extended to serve as conceptual underpinning for the evolution of increasingly cooperative national defense planning approaches in NATO/EU and convergent national capabilities.


# The NATO NEC C2 Maturity Model [SAS-065]






# Characteristics of Conflicted C2 [SAS-065]

- No collective objective;
- No distribution of information between or among entities;
- No interactions at all among entity clusters.





With regard to defense planning, the entity clusters comprise the national organizations responsible for planning each NATO nation's defense capabilities.





# Characteristics of De-Conflicted C2 [SAS-065]

- Partitioning of the problem space across geography, time/space, echelon and function;
- De-confliction of intents, plans, actions and the ability to recognize potential conflicts;
- Limited distribution of information and limited interaction.





# Characteristics of Coordinated C2 [SAS-065]

- Development of a degree of common intent. Entities are constrained by the common intent;
- Linking of plans and actions to reinforce and enhance effect;
- Clusters of interaction appear involving two or more entities working together.





# Characteristics of Collaborative C2 [SAS-065]

- Collective negotiates and establishes a collective intent and a single shared plan;
- Entities are symbiotic and interdependent;
- Rich sharing of non-organic resources some pooling of organic resources;
- Formation of task related clusters.



# Characteristics of Edge C2 [SAS-065]

- Patterns of interaction are dynamic and continuous and reflect confluence of mission and circumstance;
- Distribution of information is emergent as a result of dynamic patterns of interaction;
- Rich shared understanding within the collective with rich and continuous interaction;
- Task related clusters of entities dominate but are emergent and not static.



# Transformation of European Defense Planning

## A Complex Endeavor

1. **Conflicted Planning:** independent / disjointed (**no interactions** between national planners);
2. **De-conflicted Planning:** avoiding the generation of incompatible structures/capabilities (**limited interactions** and information exchange between national planning authorities);
3. **Coordinated Planning:** linking plans and capabilities (**sufficient interactions** and continuous information exchange between national defense planning authorities);
4. **Collaborative Planning:** nations establish collective intent and develop **common reference plan** for national defense planning, integration of national plans into overall collective defense plan, adjusted cooperatively to cope with changes in the operational and strategic environment;
5. **Edge-like Planning:** national planning must become part of a highly agile multilateral (supranational) defense planning approach.

# Current Situation in Europe

- Independent National Defense Planning each reflecting national political preferences of 28 sovereign countries (“The development and deployment of defence capabilities is first and foremost a national responsibility”. (Item 7 of the NATO 2012 Chicago Summit Declaration “Towards NATO Forces 2020).
- NATO/EU collective military capabilities for deployment “out-of-area” are compiled ad hoc from whatever capabilities “willing” nations have and are prepared to contribute;
- Defense Cooperation has been and still is largely limited to **Pooling and Sharing** (P&S) in the context of bi- and multilaterals projects and agreements that reflect the national preferences;
- Aware of the European capability gaps (Libya, Mali, Central, Africa) three initiatives for improving defense cooperation Europe have been recently started.

# Recent Initiatives for Improving Defense Cooperation in Europe

- **The Bilateral UK-France Cooperation Treaty (2010)**
  - Combined Joint Expeditionary Force CJEF);
  - Maritime task group around French carrier *Charles de Gaulle*;
  - Shared R&D;
  - Joint modernization of Nuclear Facilities/Capabilities.
- **The Ghent Initiative (EU)**
  - German-Swedish Initiative (2010);
  - Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing (EDA, 2012): to be implemented on a national and voluntary basis, **in line with defense policies of EU Member States**;
  - Annual EDA report on the state of P&S and EU capabilities.
- **Smart Defense concept (NATO)**
  - Encouraging allies to cooperate (P&S) in development, acquisition and operation of military capabilities in accordance with NATO's strategic concept (2012 Munich and Chicago);
  - 20 bi- and multilateral cooperation projects approved by NATO leaders at Chicago 2012 Summit.



# German-Swedish Initiative (2010)

## Cooperation Categories

- **Limited Cooperation:** Essential for the nation and therefore maintained on a strictly national level (cooperation limited to improving interoperability): **de-conflicted planning**;
- **Closer Cooperation** is possible without creating too strong dependencies (such as pooling of strategic and tactical airlift and logistics capabilities): **coordinated planning** ;
- **Mutual dependency and reliance on European partners is acceptable** in an international role-and task sharing framework (e.g. support structures for education, training, and exercises; test and evaluation facilities; aerial and maritime surveillance such as, e.g., in the Baltics: **collaborative** planning.

# Code of Conduct on Pooling and Sharing (P&S)

- Systematically consider cooperation from the outset, **in national defense planning of Member States**, the whole life-cycle of a capability, including R&D;
- Accord P&S projects a **higher degree of protection from potential cuts**;
- Take advantage of **synergies with wider European policies**, including regulatory frameworks, standards and certification;
- European Defense Agency (EDA) is mandated to
  - serve as a platform for **information exchange** to avoid gaps or duplication, to share expertise and best practices and to increase transparency (coherence);
  - annually report to Defense Ministers the status of current P&S initiatives, new opportunities and an analysis of the capability situation in Europe (assessment).

# Conclusions

- Changing nature of crises and conflicts: uncertainty and complexity;
- Large scale complex emergencies exceed national capabilities;
- Need for effective and efficient collective capabilities (intervention and deterrence) including agile C2 and management systems;
- Enhanced cooperation between national defense planners -> more convergent development of collective military capabilities;
- Convergence improves with the degree to which intent, information, and planning processes are shared.

# Return on Defense Investments:

A Quote from 20 Years ago

“Nothing short of

- replacing the many national defense and armaments planning bureaucracies with common European defense planning and RDT&E agencies;
- consolidating European defense industries into viable business enterprises; and
- integrating the European militaries into European Armed Forces

will ever yield a return on defense investments comparable to that achieved by the United States” (Huber, 2003, p. 149.)

# Building Down NATO's Transatlantic Capability Gap

- Enhancing defense cooperation in Europe is key to building down NATO's transatlantic gap (Convergent Defense Planning → European Armed Forces);
- Building down, and eventually eliminating, the transatlantic capability gap
  - supports the US in rebalancing its strategic interests between Europe and Asia (Pivot) while strengthening NATO's "European Pillar";
  - widens the freedom of action for US, NATO, and EU to cope with the uncertainties of the security environment.

# Caveat

This paper reflects the views of the authors only  
and is not  
the official position of any organization!