Task Force Fury – 4/82 ABN

Operation Enduring Freedom X
AUG 09 to SEP 10
COL Brian M. Drinkwine

The overall classification of this briefing is UNCLASSIFIED.
TF Fury Mission & C2/Evolutions

C2 (Unity of Vision/Command)
- NATO TACON/US OPCON
- Fury TAC ISO RCW, C2 TF Pro & 3F and synchronize – coordinate (SOF)
- Fury Main at KAF ISO RCS, C2 STB, BSB, 504MP, TF2F, TF1F, PRTs, and SFATs (x 6 O6/O5s)
- ADHOC BDE C2: CTZ Tac II in Zabul: then CTKC in Kandahar, ADTF West in RCW

ORG for Combat Decisions
- Command & Control (17 sub-CMDs, 5800 people)/Partner w/80,000 Afghans
- Resource TFs, SFATs and COISTs
- 3 x BCT C2 Nodes (temp 4th in Kandahar)
- Heavy LNO Network (Intel/Ops) at every level (NATO units, SOF, KIFC etc)
- Embedding in RC Staffs
- Reachback to the best of our ability
- UAV Plt in West (Center – North)
- MICO ISO of TAC in West
- Be agile enough to force generate
- Who/how to Partner (no set solution because requirements varied)

- Missioned to OIF/remissioned to OEF on 3 APR 09 (at MRE)
- Training BDE / CSTC-A (Must be better)
- IJC & NTMA- Standup / Standdown 2BCT Concept
- SFA & COIN w/wo Battlespace
- **Who Do You Work For?**
**4-82 ABN Mission**: Task Force Fury conducts security force assistance with Afghan National Security Forces (ANA, ANP, ABP, ANCOP) in cooperation with coalition partner units and other actors, to build ANSF capacity to defeat insurgents (INS)/criminals (CRIM) in order to protect the Afghan people, provide for a secure environment for sustainable stability, and enhance the development and legitimacy of Government of the Islamic Republic Afghanistan (GIRoA).

**Purpose**: Increase capability, grow capacity, improve competency & credibility, and then sustain the overall effectiveness of ANSF throughout our Operational Environment, in support of the RC-West & RC-South campaign objectives.

**Key Tasks (Through – With – By):**
- (with our ANSF) conduct Population Centric COIN (Counterinsurgency)
- Separate, disrupt/interdict INS from the Population (physically and psychologically)
- Freedom of Movement along main economic corridors
- SFA: Build, Equip, and Sustain ANSF units (Capacity Building)
- SFA: Advise, Assist, Train and Enable ANSF
- Conduct Combined Action with ANSF , improve competency and trust with the people
- Transform the environment through Unified Action to enhance GIRoA, increase development and reduce abuse of power, corruption and negative influencers
- Continue to assess our Operational Environments (OE), Afghan partners and ourselves
- Remain an agile, adaptive and learning organization (get better every day)
4-82 Main Effort ANSF Partnership Model

- Align units with ANA, ANP, ABP organizations
  - Companies and Battalions mentor and C2 subordinate advising elements
  - Mentor/Advising teams require MOS augmentation (Log, Admin, Intel, and Maintenance)
    - LNO required with B-Space owner/partnered forces
- All elements of BCT have advisor/mentor role (BSTB/BSB)

Success is defined by the enduring capability/capacity retained by the ANSF
Combined Team Zabul
- Command and Control
- C5I
- Integration/Synchronization
- Fusion and Combined Planning
  - Human Terrain
  - Intelligence
  - Governance
  - Development

GI RoA

PRT Zabul

OCC-P
(Provincial Fusion Center)

ABP
Coy/Troop Requirement

ANP
SFAT

ANA
TF 1F, 2 x ROM TFS & ROM OMLTs

NDS
SFAT (Not Filled)

Stakeholders (others)
- TF South (US SOF)
- ISAF SOF
- NGOs

BIG 4 plus 1
- Governor
- 2/205 BDE CDR
- PCoP
- NDS
- + CTZ Leader

Moving from Embedded Partnership to Integrated Partnership through Combined Action (Security) and Unified Action (Governance, Development, Sec, Information)

CTZ agility (Nov 09 – May 10)
Mobile Diplomacy consisted of Leaders throughout 4BCT traveling via aircraft to geographically separated locations to conduct Key Leader Engagements with individuals who previously had been isolated as a result of route and trafficability. These diplomatic engagements were instrumental in establishing the relations necessary to enhance the BDE’s Security and COIN Mission.
Kandahar Dynamics (Peel the Onion Apr 10)

- Narco-Drug Nexus
- Threat Finance & Resources
- Criminal Networks
- ANCOP
- AWK PowerBrokers
- Tribal Conflicts
- Local Leaders & Influencers
- KPRT
- ISAF Forces
- ISAF/IJC View
- RC View
- Ground View
- Corrupt PowerBrokers
- National Provincial District Tension
- Unemployment
- Media
- ANA
- ANP
- NGOs
- National Provincial District Tension
- Tension
- Criminal Networks
- Financing Network
- GIROA Officials (Gov & Mayor)
- ABP
- PowerBroker
- Corrupt or ineffective GIROA Officials
- Youth (<19)
- 50% of People
- NATO Country Policy
- Rc View
- Ground View
- Youth (<19)
- 50% of People
- NATO Country Policy
- Local Leaders & Influencers
- ISAF/IJC View
- Citi View
- UR View
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CTKC COIN Information Management
(Collect – Fuse – Understand - Decide)

CTKC COIN Fusion Director
“Continuous fusion Of information”

Stakeholders
CTKC
KPRT
ISAF & IJC & RCS
GIRoA
DOS/USAID
ANSF
TFK (CAN)
TF Strike (2/101)
525 BFSB
2SCR
SOF & OGA
NGOs

Inputs/Feedback
OCC
Unit Reports
Afghan Media
UNAMA
KPRT
CA & PSYOP
KFC
KIFC
SOIC
CJIATF
OGA
ISAF SOF
CAAT Tm/AWG
ANSF Dev (OCD)
NGOs
Expats/Others

Desired Outputs
COP “Dashboard”
CTKC Daily INTSUM
SIGSUM - HUMSUMs
HVT/HPTL Weekly
Effects FRAGO Weekly
FFIR/CCIR SIGACTs Postings
CTKC WiseWeb Portal
Assessment/RODEA

Comprehensive understanding for comprehensive operations
Combined Team KANDAHAR City (CTKC) as an integrated team in full partnership with ANSF, joint, interagency and multi-national organizations, conducts population centric comprehensive counterinsurgency (COIN) in key terrain to neutralize the insurgency and increase the competency, capacity and credibility of Afghan institutions to achieve stability and security in Kandahar and to connect with the Afghan people.
• Operational OCC-K and OCC-R, NDS, ANSF and ISAF intelligence representatives meet daily to share intelligence and compile daily intelligence summaries for release to both ISAF and the Government of Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA).

• The current RIG and Provincial JICB will be combined to form a weekly coordination meeting held between senior ISAF, NDS and ANSF intelligence representatives at both Provincial and Regional level to coordinate and synchronise Regional and Provincial intelligence collection and analytical efforts in line with operational requirements.

• ANSF and NDS intelligence reports will be fused with ISAF reports with the aim of increasing the quality of combined intelligence products releasable to GIRoA and for dissemination to all elements of the Combined Team (CT).

• ISAF partners to ANSF and NDS will seek to ensure that intelligence officers continue to receive appropriate levels of intelligence training.

Challenge 1: Knowledge Fusion
What is the standard and who owns the Network?
Train for Combat – MCS/CPOF for our Common Operational Picture (COP) and SATCOM for the tactical fight. BCT and Battalion Portals is how we trained and were designed for information management. Quick storyboards to capture the 5W’s and rapidly disseminate lessons learned across the formation.

Reality on the Ground – BCT is backboned off of two strategic networks, access to portals below Bns is non-existent. Email becomes the C2 net because it will eventually get through. 7 Days and 700 Emails.

What We Did – Reconfigure and streamline. Created the Fury ring to link Senior leaders, allow for collaboration of key lessons and dialogue across the formation.

Challenge 2: Tyranny of C2
How are we leveraging the Leader insights and lessons?

Fury Ring (in stride solution)
COIST/Fusion – Center of Gravity
(Must invest with people, time and resources)
Fury Challenges:
- Most spread-out decentralized BCT – operating in platoons and small SFATs
- Every unit needs access to Data on the move (mounted and dismounted) (data was at fixed sites)
- TiGRNET – CIDNE – CPOF - BIOMETRICS (Did not talk or share information) – bandwidth challenge
- Requirement tripled for Data/SIPR access – equipment available but no extra trained users

Mission Command & Situational Understanding:
- Most ambiguous and complex environment
- Unified Vision and CDR’s Intent understood and nested
- Decentralized, empowered, resourced accountable formations (US/Coalition/HN partners)
- Fuse information – top to bottom/time and bandwidth are your friction points
- But: Who can link all inputs and analyze/fuse and what is real time vs after the fact knowledge

Can We leverage what is available today in the open market?

Build the Network: Verizon, T-Mobile or ATT/IPHONE.
- Common language and protocols
- Data, Data, Data – where is it stored and who knows?

Here come the APPS:
- Prioritize APPs for warfighting functions (Maneuver, Fires..., and all types of key terrain)
- Power of all INTs fused and analyzed in present time (time sensitive – but pull previous information)
- Merging of unclassified to classified – integration of NGO, IGO and Unified Action Partners
- Must be mobile and scalable – and reduced size so the leader on the ground has it in the fight
- Seek user feedback – upgrade over time V1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and so on

Stakeholders vs Shareholders
- Shareholders – part of the enterprise want positive outcomes and measured improvement
- Stakeholders – the people on the ground whose lives depend on the information
Final Thoughts Mission Command

- Build consensus early – founded on trust and the team buying into the enterprise approach – rapidly integrate new teammates
- Subordinate approaches and visualization must be nested
- Don’t allow Doctrine to be a crutch – continue to assess/learn
- Art of Mission Command is ahead of the Science
- Cannot command/fight through Email – must strive to have a common “Dashboard” for CDRs – Staffs, Sub-units, others
- Be relevant and agile – build and generate new capabilities and capacity (help your boss/higher HQ solve problems)
- Intel, Info and Operations – can no longer be separate – all interwoven and part of a system of systems
- Knowledge Enterprise – who really owns it?
- Risk Taking – decentralize and empower till it hurts (ex clearing fires)
- Be inclusive and transparent & invest in your liaison network
- Key is to be right more than you are wrong – if you fail, fail quickly and adapt
Questions

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Challenge 4: Human Terrain

Is this the best we can do?

- P – Democratically elected officials versus tribal leadership; government reach limited

- M – Illegally armed groups versus National Army and Police - diverse security apparatus with limited C2 from national command

- E – Narco trafficking versus a developing market economy

- S – Diverse demographic; 85% Sunni /15% Shiite; Pashtun Wali stronger than adherence to official laws

- I – Limited infrastructure in urban areas versus a predominantly disconnected rural population

- I – Information disseminated through sermons and tribal leadership; lack of literate public empowers elite and religious personalities

**Tribal Breakdown**

- 41 Pashtun Tribes - 8 major
- 02 Tajik Tribes - 1 major
- 11 Hazara Tribes - 5 major