Coordinated Cybersecurity Incident Handling

Marcos Osorno, Thomas Millar, Danielle Rager



Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory ICCRTS 2011



marcos.osorno@jhuapl.edu

EPARTMEN



What are we trying to do?

Inform the design of a domestic federal network defense cybersecurity incident handling system by creating a coordinated, distributed incident handling process.

US-CERT + NIST + JHU/APL





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
Inform the design of a domestic federal network defense cybersecurity incident handling system by creating a coordinated, distributed incident handling process.

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Where did we start?






What did we do?

Inform the design of a domestic federal network defense cybersecurity incident handling <u>system</u>*by creating a coordinated, distributed incident handling process.

elements, interconnections, and purpose



Activities & Processes


Federal-civil network defense

[*] Meadows, Thinking in Systems





Complexity & Heterogeneity




Visualizing Waledac http://www.sudosecure.net/archives/429





Scale & Diversity



United States Government

1.9 million federal employees 1.25 million in federal civil sector 100+ department and agencies 208 thousand in largest dept 4 thousand in smallest dept 80.4% in IS/IT dependent work 354 million ft² in 8,600 buildings 2,758 access points (2008) 16,843 incident reports in 2008 **206%** increase from 2006



Current Incident Handling Processes

2004: US National Institute of Standards and Tech.





Background

1990: Lawrence Livermore National Labs



2004: US National Institute of Standards and Tech.





Current Trends

1990: Lawrence Livermore National Labs

Protection

Identification

Containment

Eradication

Recovery

Follow-Up

2004: US National Institute of Standards and Tech.

Preparation

Detection & Analysis

Containment, Eradication, and Recovery

Post-Incident Activity

2009: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Detection of Events

Preliminary Analysis and Identification

Incident Analysis Preliminary Response Action

Response and Recovery

Post-Incident Analysis





What about multiple incidents?

A: Serial constant time approach



B: Serial variable time approach













What about cross-cutting incidents?




different speeds?







So how could we deal with it?







Three broad answers

phase changes? focus on handling activities not an incident



different speeds? reduce locking dependencies






information and
sharing?
standard data,
common activities





1. Focus on activities

phase changes? focus on handling activities not an incident








2. Reduce locking dependencies


different speeds? reduce locking dependencies









Which: allows for complex system




Allows for multiple, concurrent flows




Accounts for role of CSIRT




Allows for integration of management




Allows for integration of policy



Uses CSIRTs to drive dissemination




And accounts for long-term impact




3a. Mapped to common activities

Information and sharing? standard data, common activities




3b. Using standards to communicate

Information and sharing? standard data, common activities



More Detail in Paper







What Difference Will It Make?

- Accounts for roles and concurrence
 - No longer just IT/CSIRT
 - Coordination function of CSIRT
 - Multiple ways to "handle" events
- Allows modeling and simulation
 - Drive toward better modeling
- Informs design and architecture
 - Helps integrate multiple data formats
 - Helps find the "verbs"

What's next: Exercise/Model Analysis







Questions?



National Institute of Standards and Technology U.S. Department of Commerce

marcos.osorno@jhuapl.edu (443) 778-9187





Issues with current approaches

Linear processes


- Limited concurrence
- Phases challenging/subjective
- Mostly "folk models" used for documentation
- Exclusion of management and policy

Knowledge and Information

- Multiple taxonomies
- A whole lot of data-formats
- A <u>few</u> exchanges




Defend Cycle





Coordinate Cycle





Complete coordination model

Identifying

Acting

Reporting Directing


Coordinating

Informing Directing

Responding

Directing


Mitigating








Simplified coordination model





Timing and Activity Diagrams







Multi-phase scenario

