

## Game Theory, Adaptation, and Genetic Programming: Some Perspectives on Operations Research for Counter-IED Paper 055



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## The IED Problem

photo from www.army.mil

### **Overview of this talk**



### A simple simulation model



### Simple optimisation



#### **Game theory**



### Adaptation



**Genetic programming** 

### A simple simulation model



## Blue & Red options in real life

### Blue

- IED detection
- IED countermeasures
- IED-resistant vehicles
- IED disposal techniques
- Route planning
- SOPs

### Counterinsurgency (COIN)



### Red

- IED type (buried, EFP, etc.),
- **Triggering device** (radio, wire, phone, pressure plate, IR, etc.)
- Placement options
- Camouflage options
- Decoy devices.



### In both the simulation & real life ...



## Simple optimisation



# Assume a fixed Red strategy (random)

Construct a "fitness landscape" of Blue options

# The peak is the best option (direct route)

### Limitations of simple optimisation

# Assumes a fixed Red strategy, but IEDs are **improvised**.

# Ignores Red's **mind** – Red **chooses** a strategy.

### Game theory – taking Red's mind into account

# Has been used for anti-submarine warfare, cold-war strategy, etc.



### Game theory uses a matrix of options & outcomes



**Red Options** 

#### **Blue Options**

	Sand	Path	Road	Direct
Sand	37%	87%	93%	63%
Path	70%	0%	94%	41%
Road	66%	65%	1%	49%
Rock	81%	54%	66%	59%
Central	26%	10%	94%	19%
Random	44%	27%	41%	60%

## Textbook methods exist for "solving" the matrix



The result is two "pessimistic" probability distributions over options

45% getting through is the best eac

#### **Blue Options** & probabilities

ach side can hope for		<b>Sand</b> 0.58	<b>Road</b> 0.29	<b>Direct</b> 0.12
<b>Red Options</b> & probabilities	<b>Road</b> 0.28	66%	1%	49%
	Central 0.29	26%	94%	19%
	Random 0.44	44%	41%	60%

### Limitations of "textbook" game theory

For the IED problem, **the table is not fully known**, and is constantly changing as well.

"Standard" game theory is "single-shot." **The IED problem is an iterated game, where both sides adapt**, but neither side can do so instantly – buying equipment & changing SOPs takes time.

**Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a nonzero-sum game** – the desired solution is a "win-win" where insurgents stop placing IEDs, and counter-IED tactics should take COIN into account

# Adaptation ...



### ... using the table options



### Performance oscillates, as one or other side gets ahead



Trips

## Crippling one side (delayed learning) benefits the other



### Limitations of this approach

### Ad-hoc learning mechanism – doesn't easily generalise to more complex problems.

Doesn't allow for innovation.

### Genetic programming CAN produce innovation



## Genetic programming (GP) has been used for ...



Simulation of cooperative hunting strategies in lions



#### Evolved X-band antenna (NASA)



Evolved strategies for Tic-Tac-Toe

### "Genes" are tree-structured programs, not 0's & 1's



### Oscillation again – sides take turns being "ahead"



Trips

### The adaptivity effect is stronger this time



### GP has potential for simulating adaptation & innovation



## Summary



A simple model, for looking at basic principles



Simple optimisation ignores Red's mind



Simple game theory doesn't adapt



Adaptation yes, but innovation?



Yes! With GP!