

Command and Control Analysis of the South West Provincial Regional Emergency Operations Centre during Vancouver 2010

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Overview

- Introduction and background
- Methodology
- Major observations
- Conclusions




Vancouver 2010 Olympic Winter Games

- February 12-28, 2010
- 82 participating countries, 6500 athletes and officials, 1.6 M tickets
- Planning started years in advance




Vancouver 2010 Integrated Connectivity Schematic



DRDC Major Events Coordinated Security Solutions (MECSS) Model

“Operationalizing S&T Investment”




SA – Scientific Advisor

Integrated Public Safety and the South West PREOC

- IPS video:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IZbnwpCFgiI&feature=youtu.be>





Slide courtesy of EMBC

C2 Analysis Methodology

- DRDC resources
- Preparatory research and experience
- Focus of C2 analysis
- Direct observation
- Semi-structured interviews
- Surveys
- Limitations



Major Observations

- Objective of analysis: To observe and report on issues to improve PREOC operations
- Despite significant preparation, including joint exercises with VANOC and the ISU, PREOC encountered some operational problems



Handling of Sensitive Information

- Issue:
 - Lack of comprehensive policy
 - Confusion over identifying sensitive information/rules for sharing
 - E.g., information provided by critical infrastructure asset owner shared outside of the PREOC to dismay of owner
 - Staff often erred on over-cautious side, unnecessarily limiting information sharing



Recommendation: Sensitive information should be clearly identified, shared with all PREOC staff, and only shared beyond the PREOC with the explicit consent of the director

Information Sharing

- Issues:
 - Lack of agreement and understanding on what PREOC would report on and to whom
 - Concern that providing additional information would create unrealistic expectations for future
- Recommendation: Agreements for information sharing should be made in advance, documented and communicated to all parties



New Software

- Issues:
 - PREOC adopted new software tool (Eteam) in lead-up to the Games to facilitate situational awareness
 - Some policies and processes not completely worked out - led to confusion
 - Staff had various levels of training and comfort with tool
- Recommendation: Protocols for tool use should be established and full use of tools exercised before major event



Situational Awareness (SA)

- Issues:
 - Staff not always aware of issues that could affect operations
 - E.g., telephone line repair
 - PREOC organized in two rooms: Command Room for PREOC staff and Agency Room for agency representatives
 - Information flow often perceived as “one way” from the Agency Room to the Command Room
- Recommendation: Regular all-staff briefings should be provided by director or another individual with a holistic understanding of issues



Chain of Command

- Issues:
 - In normal chain of command, agency representatives dealt with agency branch coordinator
 - At times, director bypassed agency branch coordinator and operations chief (usually for security-related issues)
 - Led to confusion - agency representatives unsure of when to deal with director over agency branch coordinator
- Recommendation: Chain of command should be enforced to maintain situational awareness for staff and reduce confusion as to the roles of senior staff



Shared Leadership

- Issue:
 - Several individuals in director role during different shifts
 - Personalities, experience, leadership styles led to inconsistencies and sometimes conflicting direction
- Recommendation: Management staff should operate as united team, coordinating plans and actions across shifts and delivering consistent message to staff



Consistency of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs)

- Issues:
 - Inconsistencies in SOPs occasionally noted
 - Especially when procedures unclear
 - Interpretation of procedures occasionally varied between directors
 - E.g., “change management” forms created by one director/shift
- Recommendations: Documented and clear SOPs should be established to prevent confusion and provide consistency, staff should be educated regarding relevant SOPs



Conclusions

- Research methodology
 - Pre-deployment knowledge gathering
 - Direct observation
 - Semi-structured interviews
 - Survey
- Each provided valuable and complementary information



Final Recommendations

- Info sharing a theme of challenges
- Clear definitions, policies, clearances, etc. required
 - Staff must be educated and trained appropriately
- Operators must understand roles, responsibilities, operating procedures
 - Documented guidelines, training, thorough exercises
- Operational analysis and the use of knowledge capture and exploitation is an effective means of improving operations



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