International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium
June 22-24, 2010
Fairmont Miramar Hotel & Bungalows
Santa Monica, CA

Department of Defense
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
Networks and Information Integration
DoD Chief Information Officer
Command without Commanders

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Outline

• The analysis of C2 as a function opens up new possibilities
• The definition of self-synchronization
• The need for a paradigm
• A paradigm for the study of self-synchronization
• D3FIRE: A realization of the paradigm
• A first step towards a conceptualization of self-synchronization
• Empirical demonstrations: 4 experiments
• Conclusions
The analysis of C2 as a function opens up new possibilities

• *Brehmer*: C2 is the function that provides direction and coordination

• *Alberts*: Distinguish between command as a verb and a substantive
  • Focus and convergence

• When seen as a function, C2 does not imply that there is a commander

• Self-synchronization emerges as a possibility
Defining self-synchronization (1)

• One example of this highly decentralized C2 calls for lower-level decisionmakers to be guided only by their training, understanding of the commander’s intent and their awareness of the situation in relevant portions of the battlespace. (Alberts, et al., 1999, p. 219)

• This definition says both too little and too much
  • It does not tell us how to recognize self-synchronization
  • It includes preconditions for self-synchronization
Defining self-synchronization (2)

• *Self-synchronization is observed when a number of units achieve the direction and coordination necessary to handle a mission without a commander doing the directing and coordinating*

• Fighting forest fires as an example
The need for a paradigm

• A paradigm is an example serves as a model pattern (Dictionary.com Unabridged)
• It serves to identify examples of the phenomenon
• It defines (cf. Kuhn, 1962)
  • Fundamental questions that are asked about the phenomena of interest
  • What answers and results are relevant
  • How experiments are to be conducted
• A paradigm is not a theory, and it is never tested as such
A paradigm for the study of self-synchronization

• Self-synchronization is seen as a case of distributed decision making (Brehmer, 1991)
• Problems requiring distributed decision making
  • are too large to be handled by a single unit, therefore coordinated efforts from a number of units are required
  • the situation is dynamic requiring both planning and execution
  • each unit owns part of the resources that are needed to handle the problem, but no unit has complete control over all resources
  • each unit has a limited view of the problem, and no unit can achieve an overall view of the problem without input from the other units
  • no unit commander has the authority to coordinate the other units
The operationalization: D3 Fire
What the participants see: The interface
Dependent variables

- Effectiveness: the amount of forest lost to fire
- Time to extinguish the fire
- Communication among units
A first step towards a conceptualization of self-synchronization

• Guiding assumptions
  • All forces start with an understanding of its mission
  • The forces have the ability to translate this understanding into tasks to be solved to accomplish the mission

• In D3FIRE
  • The participants know that their mission is to fight fires wherever they appear
  • They understand that fire spreads in the direction of the prevailing wind
  • They understand the need to coordinate their efforts to be able to fight the fire as a whole
Hypotheses

• The guiding assumptions suggest a number of hypotheses for experimental investigation
  • An overall view of the fire and the positions of the other units will facilitate self-synchronization
    • Is it possible to achieve the necessary view from communication among the units?
    • Synchronization takes time. Information should be future-oriented, e.g., have the form of intentions
Empirical demonstration: 4 Experiments

• Experiments with D3FIRE
• Self-synchronization must be given an operational definition. This requires an adequate control condition. A no-communication condition was chosen as a control in all experiments.
• In all conditions, the participants were university students, male and female, 20-30 years old.
• They worked in teams of four participants.
• They were given 20 minutes of practice and then worked on three experimental fires
• Number of cells lost to fire was the measure of performance
• There were six or four teams in each experiment
• No significance tests were performed, Cohen’s d was used as a measure of effect throughout the series of experiments
Experiment 1: The effects of being networked

• Compared a networked condition with six teams where each participant was free to communicate with everybody else to a control condition with no communication. The control condition also had six teams.
• The teams in the experimental condition performed better than those in the control condition (68.3 vs. 82.7, Cohen’s d = 0.84, a strong effect).
• This provides a demonstration of self-synchronization.
Message traffic

![Graph showing message traffic by category. The x-axis represents different categories labeled C, QA, QE, QI, QL, IA, IE, II, and IL. The y-axis represents the number of messages sent per minute, ranging from 0.0 to 1.0. The graph plots data points for each category, showing variations in message traffic.](image-url)
Experiment 2: Making one of the participants a commander

• Compared the networked condition from Experiment 1 with a networked condition where one of the participants in each team had been given the role of commander and the other team members were instructed to obey his/her commands. There were six teams in each condition.

• Performance was worse when there was a commander (74.6 vs. 68.3, Cohen’s d = 0.52, a moderate effect)

• May be due to problems of handling the dynamics (Brehmer, 1997)
Experiments 3: Blue force tracking

• Participants in the blue force tracking condition were given information on their screens about the positions of other units, but were not allowed to communicate. Their performance was compared to that in the standard no communication control condition. There were four teams in each condition.

• Participants in the blue force tracking condition performed better than those in the control condition (74.8 vs. 82.7, Cohen’s d = 45, a weak to moderate effect).

• Participants in a networked, full communication condition performed better than the participants in the blue force tracking condition (68.3 vs. 74.8, Cohen’s d = 0.60, a moderately strong effect).

• This suggests that more useful information was communicated in full communication condition than in the blue force tracking only condition.
Experiment 4: Augmented blue force tracking

• Participants in the augmented blue force tracking condition were given information about the position of the other units and the intentions of the other units in the form of an indication of the cell to which they had been ordered to go. Their performance was compared to that of a standard no communication control condition.

• Performance was better in the augmented blue force tracking condition than in the control condition (63.6 vs. 82.7, Cohen’s d = 1.06, a strong effect) and better than the participants in a networked, full communication condition (63.6 vs. 68.3, Cohen’s d = 0.27, a weak effect).

• These results suggest that augmented blue force tracking added very little to what was achieved by ordinary communication.
Conclusions from the experiments

• The results of the experiments agree with our expectations
• They demonstrate the positive effects of networking and of communication of intentions
• There was no effect of blue force tracking also, but then there was no friendly fire either
General conclusions

• The present paradigm offers a means for the study of self-synchronization.

• It differs from ELICIT in that it examines actual coordination. ELICIT studies the effects of communication on shared situational awareness.

• D3FIRE is only one possible operationalization. DKE, a two-sided computerized war game, offers an alternative to those who need a more active opponent than a fire.
Questions and/or comments?
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