

“Mission Assurance in a Distributed Environment”

14th ICCRTS – C2 and Agility

Track 8 - C2 Assessment Tools and Metrics

Authors

Chad DeStefano and Thomas A. Clark

AFRL / RISF



- **Problem**
- **Objective**
- **Defining Mission Assurance (MA)**
- **DEEP Description**
- **Applying MA to DEEP**
- **Future Work**
 - **Metrics and Experimentation**
- **Summary**





- **Shift from individual hackers to sophisticated teams operating at will in complete stealth**
 - Website defacement, Denial of Service (DoS) attacks, identify theft are overt, and nearly immediate to detect
 - Persistent access designed to influence in subtle or perhaps violent ways is becoming the new threat
- **Continued shift to network-centric C2 with information processing distributed over computer networks at geographically dispersed locations presents technical challenges**
 - The biggest threat is to our core mission planning and processing systems, examples:
 - Target coordinate, inventory decrement manipulation




- **Define and illustrate mission assurance concepts within a distributed application operating in a notionally contested environment**
 - **Use the Distributed Episodic Exploratory Planning (DEEP) as an exemplary planning environment**
 - **Identify DEEP components that can be enhanced to maintain operations under duress**
 - **Initial “fight-through” capability**
 - **Formulate a test environment to conduct experimentation and determine metrics**



- **Use standard information assurance (IA) tenets as a baseline**
 - **Attribution** - holding a user accountable for their actions
 - **Authentication** – ensuring only privileged users access appropriate information
 - **Availability** - ensuring information and services are available when required
 - **Confidentiality** – ensuring information destined for an individual or group is exclusive
 - **Integrity** – information is kept unmodified by unintended sources
- **IA Extensions**
 - **Availability** a function of prioritized mission tasks mapped to network capabilities
 - So degraded states can be specified and measured
 - **Trust** must be built on top of attribution, authentication, confidentiality and integrity
 - So that contributors to mission success will be given increased responsibility
 - **Mission workflow** must be formally specified as business processes
- **Exploring Trust**
 - **Trust** is integral regarding either human or machine interaction
 - **DEEP** does not address trust formally yet (trust is assumed)

Current AOC Planning




BOGSAT


- Bunch of Guys/Gals Sitting Around a Table

Constrains planning


- **Quality**
 - Finite experience
- **Speed**
 - Limited automation
- **Creativity**
 - Finite diversity




- **Experienced-based**
 - Orient and decide faster than adversaries with better plans
- **Mixed-initiative**
 - Syntheses of the strengths of both human and machine
- **Net-centric**
 - Expert team formation with greater diversity and creativity




- Specifically
 - **Distributed AI Blackboard** for multi-agent, non-deterministic, opportunistic reasoning **“at the edge”**
 - **Experience-Based Reasoning** to capture experiences (successes and/or failures)
 - **Episodic Memory** for powerful analogical reasoning
 - **Multi-Agent System** for mixed-initiative planning
 - **ARPI Core Plan Representation** for human-to-machine dialog
 - **Constructive Simulation** for exploration of plausible future states





- **Protecting internal and external applications requires a model of the overall business process**
- **In DEEP, the business process is modeled at the application level and we can determine:**
 - **The sequence of prioritized events/activities**
 - **Event dependencies**
 - **Events that are not as important to the core business as others**
- **Knowing this information allows us to make decisions on redundancy, contingency plans, resource management for IA, and the impacts of resource losses**
- **In some cases, DEEP handles intrusions intrinsically**
 - **Plans have to survive a critical review process that would eliminate plans that were not fit for the objective**
 - **Critic agents do not have authority to modify plans**





- **Agent Control Center (ACC)**
 - **Agents are an integral part of DEEP, so proper synchronization and control is important**
 - **The ACC automatically and manually controls agents and monitors the system and network, it should:**
 - **Monitor traffic, move agents, shutdown agents, restart agents, ping agents, conduct behavior analysis based on connection patterns, and assess agent interaction as a foundation for determining trust**
 - **Some of these functions are provided by the Java Agent Development Framework (JADE) used to develop the DEEP agents**
 - **Detect network issues like congestion and attempt to automate system restart on an operable network**



- **Data concerns**
 - **Modification (both minute and large)**
 - **Deletion**
 - **Theft**
- **Solutions**
 - **Encryption**
 - **All traffic should be encrypted**
 - **Data repositories should be encrypted**
 - **Hold data integrity using signature techniques to ensure data has not been modified**
 - **ACC could monitor traffic and alert based on irregular data movement**
 - **Redundant stores of data and rollback capability to ensure steady recover in the event of intrusion**
 - **Authentication to data repositories (limit access to a need to know basis – blackboard has panes / layers concept)**



- **The human in the loop can pose problems for the mission as well**
 - **Classic “insider threat”**
 - **Insiders may have access to critical data and knowledge of how to use it**
 - **Very tough problem to solve**
 - **Solutions**
 - **Enable authentication procedures**
 - **User privileges – blackboard using authentication and proper registration to specific zones of information**





- **Networks that applications operate on also provide an attack vector**
 - **Examples of issues include limited bandwidth, loss of bandwidth (DoS, kinetic attack)**
 - **Solutions**
 - **Control center and network examining tools should detect loss of communication and attempt to regain functionality.**
 - **Software component movement or restart with state**
 - **Use of another mode of communication**

- **Better establishment of metrics / experimentation**
 - **Experimentation**
 - **Emulation of rogue agent behavior sending out messages it shouldn't**
 - **Conducting a DoS attack at critical pressure points**
 - **Emulation of component loss**
 - **Data modification – Can DEEP intrinsically handle data changes during the process?**
 - **Metrics (area of interest)**
 - **Must be able to achieve the above issues**
 - **Rollback must be faster than full restart**



- **Establish a generic framework to apply to other programs**
- **Integration of AFRL IA in-house technology**
- **Multi-agent control**
- **Trust (can we employ wisdom of the crowds voting mechanic or control procedures to ensure trust?)**





- **Providing mission assurance is not an option, but a requirement for surviving in a contested network environment**
- **Emphasize building applications and systems that are reliable, self-sustainable and trustworthy**
- **Applying mission assurance using DEEP allows for experimentation as well as the creation of a generic model of mission assurance**



Thank You and Questions

Chad.destefano@rl.af.mil





Backups





- **Business Process Execution Language (BPEL)**
 - Web service standard for specifying interactions
 - Model executable and abstract processes
- **Business Process Modeling Notation (BPMN)**
 - Graphical representation of business processes in a workflow
- **Unified Modeling Language (UML)**
 - Use standard UML diagrams to model the system
 - Component, sequence, activity diagrams

