



Ergonomics Challenges for Digitisation of Mission Planning Systems



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


Overview

- Why digitise?
 - What is mission planning?
 - What needs to be digitised?
 - How should it be digitised?
-
- Participant-observer
 - Observation of training in mission planning
 - Observation of field trials of mission planning (A & D)
-
- Presentation of analogue mission planning
 - Initial thoughts for digitisation.....



Command hierarchy



Helmuth von Moltke (the Elder)

No plan survives
first contact with
the enemy





KISS mission planning

- “Simpler plans might allow better implementation and easier modification”
 - Klein and Miller (1999, p. 219)
- “Plans need to be simple, modifiable, flexible, and developed so that they are quickly and easily understood”
 - Riley et al (2006, p. 1143)



Constraints acting on planning

- Time pressure
- Uncertainty of information
- Availability of expertise
- Scarcity of resources
- Changing environment
- Non-compliant enemy
- Mission requirements
- Structure of tasks
- Availability of assets



Mission planning questions


- What is the enemy doing and why?
- What have I been told to do and why?
- What effects do I want to have on the enemy?
- Where can I best accomplish each effect?
- What resources do I need to accomplish each effect?
- When and where do the actions take place in relation to each other?
- What control measures do I need to impose?

Mission planning environment






Social organisation





Planning time-line



Battle Group level plan
Two hours planning time
 $120/7 = 17$ minutes per question

What is the enemy doing?



Enemy location and strength
Mobility corridors
Go and slow-go areas
Known concepts and doctrine

What have I been told what to do?



Interpret orders

Identify explicit tasks


Deduce implicit tasks

Raise CCIRs and RFIs


MAIN ANALYSIS			
SUPER	TASKS	DEDUCTIONS	CCM TEL
SUPER	DEFEAT AA COI BLOCK FROM WEST	REASSESS CREDENCE LANDSCAPE: 2 X 1000 FT HILLS WHERE TO BLOCK IN ACOI?	1700Z DESTROY UEF - M-101L TERRAIN INTERDICT
THURSDAY	LOP 1 HQ XXX		— VARIOUS SUBORDINATE FORCES FROM WEST — BATTY AND CO — MIL. POL. GROUP: 1. UNIT IS IDENTIFIED — SOUTHERNS — DOWNS OF BATTLES? — BY NAME OR NUMBER? THE FEIS LOGGED — 1800! SFR WHERE WE CAN GET A SOURCE?
FRIDAY			RF - PREPARED HISTORY
SATURDAY	DDORTS	NARROW - LINE OF DD	15 1309 Chm 14th Dispersed

What effects do I want to have?

Understand Threat and mission
Command direction
Main effects
Rough outline




Where can I best accomplish each effect?



Turn effects schematic into a COA or a selection of COAs
Commander chooses COA that best interprets his effects schematic or cherry picks from alternative COAs or modifies COA(s)

Where can I best accomplish each effect?



Chosen COA mapped onto map
Check relation between NAI, DP and TAI



What resources do I need?

Map relations between NAI, TAI and DP

Identify location, purpose, and asset.

DSOM							
NAI	TAI	DP	LOCN	PURPOSE	ASSET	LINK	REMARKS
1			GR 849401	DEFEAT ENEMY	RECCE B6 AIRSOFT		
2			NO COMMUNICATE W/ TAI 1	CONFIRM ENEMY ADV FROM SW DEFEAT EN	RECCE ARMOUR	TAI 2 / DP 2 TAI 2 / DP 2	FWD ARMOUR, HODS REC'D
3	2		N/A	LAUNCH STRIKE W/ TAI 2	CO-TAC / HANU	NAI 2 / TM 2	
3	3			CONFIRM ENEMY ADV FROM NW DEFEAT EN	RECCE JAVELIN	TAI 3 / DP 3 NAI 3 / DP 3	EFFECT OUTSIDE BDRYS - SIDE ARMOUR REC'D
4	3		N/A	LAUNCH STRIKE W/ TAI 3	CO-TAC / HANU	NAI 3 / DP 3	
4			NO COMMUNICATE	CONFIRM ENEMY ADV FROM W	RECCE	TAI 4 / DP 4	
4				DEFEAT EN	JAVELIN	NAI 4 / DP 4	EFFECT OUTSIDE BDRYS - SIDE ARMOUR REC'D
4			N/A	LAUNCH STRIKE W/ TAI 4	CO-TAC / HANU	NAI 4 / TAI 4	

15:15:47



Where and when to actions take place?

Synchronise
actions
and co-
ordinate
assets

CO-ORD MEASURES - OPO 002

1. ASSY AREA LAYOUT / OOM - RECCE
2. CFL - NAMED REPORT LINES. - FPC
3. AD ADV - BOUND BEHIND A SQN - AD TRACK ON SIDE
4. WAN CONTROL - ND
5. BM - AIR/AVN - FPC
6. A1 + RAP IN FAIA. RAP STAY. A1 TO MNJ BEHIND FGCH - BGLO
7. OOM: RECCE - SQN - A COY - TAC - 29 & MOK - D COY - A1
 - ↳ AD (TRACK)
 - ↳ BATTLES
8. RAP - ON CALL. LIKELY LOC FIND ONCE MNJ REACHED LINE? - BGLO
9. PTP LOC/FUP GL 854410 x GR 84F7408
10. RECCE - RECCE MNJ TO SCREEN (DURING ASSLT). JAV MNJ TO JOIN
11. FLANK PROTECTION - $\frac{1}{2}$ W $\frac{1}{2}$ RECCE (BTR FOR E) - JAV
 - ↳ TANK TRK


IS 1750

Where and when to actions take place?



Check synchronisation via war-game to validate matrix

What control measures?



Identify control measures to help with co-ordination and help prevent fratricide



Overview of products and media

Products/Media	Paper	Maps/ Overlays	White board	Flip chart	Staff Note book
Warning order					
Planning time line					
Q1. BAE/TI					
Q2. Mission Analysis					
Q2. CCIRs/RFI					
Q3. Effects Schematic					
Q4. COA					
Q4. DSO					
Q5. DSOM					
Q6. War-game					
Q6. Co-ordination					
Q7. Fire control					




Task work or team work?

Planning process	Task work or team work?
Q1. What is the enemy doing and why?	Cooperative activity around the table
Q2. What have I been told to do and why?	Isolated intellectual activity followed by collaborative assessment of the CCIRs and RFIs
Q3. What effects do I want to have on the enemy?	Isolated intellectual activity followed by cooperative activity around the table
Q4. Where can I best accomplish each action/effect?	
Q5. What resources do I need to accomplish each action/effect?	
Q6. Where and when do the actions take place in relation to each other?	Collaborative activity in which the products shared
Q7. What control measures do I need to impose?	



From Lo-Fi to Hi-Fi






Initial thoughts for digitisation..

- Keep the planning process ‘public’ and ‘collaborative’
- Keep the planning process ‘elastic’ and ‘creative’
- Focus analysis on the relationship between ‘activities’ and traditional ‘artefacts’
- Support the planning process with design of ‘cognitive artefacts’ (cheat sheets, stickies, ...)
- Use accepted ‘models’ and ‘metaphors’
- Make the computer ‘invisible’
- Make sure that ‘digitisation’ isn’t an additional planning constraint




Combat Estimate



- “Answer the 7 questions, but use the tools selectively and creatively. Do not just slavishly follow process” (Combat Estimate, p. 2, 2007)
- “Too frequently information [...] disappears into staff officers notebooks. [...] large format boards are recommended to prevent information getting lost” (Combat Estimate, p. 6, 2007)

Analogue to Digital System







Where to find out more...

This research from the Human Factors Integration Defence Technology Centre was part-funded by the Human Sciences Domain of the UK Ministry of Defence Scientific Research Programme.

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Digitising Command and Control

'A thorough analysis of the various Human Factors critical to command and control planning and modelling of military missions. These include goal/function analysis, situation awareness, social interactions and cognitive work analysis, among others.' Thomas Sheridan, Professor Emeritus of Engineering and Applied Psychology MIT, and Chief Systems Engineer for Human Factors, Federal Aviation Administration, USA

'This book demystifies the digitization of military command and control and reveals that successful systems, as always, require careful attention to the details of users, use, and context. The book is a welcomed and detailed treatment of the limits and successes of current digital planning and management systems for the battlefield.'

Professor David Woods, Department of Integrated Systems Engineering, The Ohio State University, USA

'Computerizing complex undertakings is often promoted as a panacea. To be done properly, system designers and system owners must realise that they are building a socio-technical system, and that Human Factors therefore must be taken into account from the very start. Failing to do so will seriously hamper both the efficiency and the safety of the final product, as amply illustrated by this meticulous evaluation of a complex military system.' Prof Erik Hollnagel, MINES ParisTech, France

'In taking the reader through the contributions to this work, the book provides excellent overviews of a range of approaches and methods in practice. Since the context remains the same throughout, this lends a coherence of explanation, a basis for comparison and a view on methods integration that is rarely found in the Human Factors literature.' Prof John Wilson, University of Nottingham, UK