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A Complementary (and Challenging) Implementation of Pre-Emption
For Inter- and National Security Outcomes

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A Complementary (and Challenging) Implementation of Pre-Emption For National and International Security Outcomes

- Russell E. Bryant -

ABSTRACT/OVERVIEW

Much of the public commentary and policy discussion following the 2002 National Security Strategy release focused on the concept of National pre-emption response in the International arena.

Yet that discussion was bounded by the traditional National tools of diplomacy, commerce, and military responses, with limited mention of 'all the tools of national power.' The author will attempt to expand that discussion by a stroll through the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies, along with the extension of the Joint Vision 2020 DOTMLP-F¹ to a possible National Joint Vision perspective beyond that of the military.

The intended outcome is a rounding out of those prior and continuing discussions of 'what to do' and 'how implementing' a complementary (and challenging) pre-emption concept for all can facilitate understanding and execution for 'C2 for agility' of solutions for during the future.

INTRODUCTION - OUTLINE

The author will frame the discussion of a complementary (and challenging) pre-emption concept through a summary of general points of action within the 2002 and 2006 National Security Strategies (NSSs). This will be followed by a short summary of the Joint Vision 2020 (JV 2020, 2000) DOTML-PF/ National Defense Strategy (NDS) framework points. This sets the general context for other areas of emphasis, or fundamental underlying efforts, which are background supporting points of 'all the tools of national power.'

This developed framework opens the door to 'what to do' on the international basis which can be considered pre-emption (or preventive) efforts and effects which can utilize those tools of national power within the international framework to help the overall greater common good.

Before continuing, a few words to keep in mind regarding definitions (from Merriam-Webster online): preemption is the action 'to take possession before others'; preempt includes 'to seize upon to the exclusion of others', and 'to prevent from happening or taking place'; prevent includes 'to keep from happening or existing' (with 'forestall' as a synonym); and, prevention is 'the action of preventing'. For context in the inter- and national community, these meanings must be kept in mind when considering that action is to forestall something from taking place whether through malevolent or benevolent action and acts to have affect and effect on courses of actions, events, decision points, decision makers, or action individuals, at any and all levels of the connected chain of events, causes of those events, and the triggers of those events.

Further, the preventive (pre-emption) employment of those tools (along with the other traditional tools) can assist, support, and facilitate the realization and results of truly agile organizations,

¹ DOTML-PF – Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, People, and Facilities: Joint Doctrine; Agile Organizations, Joint Training, Enhanced Materiel, Innovative Leadership and Education, High Quality People, and Requisite Facilities.

innovative leadership and education, rounded out doctrine and cross training, as well as a high quality population, with sufficient quality materiel and facilities which support implementation and adaptable leadership and management (C2) for the 21st century and beyond. The take away point is to prevent and pre-empt the pre-conditions and problems which generate the pressures for conflict, and thus the conditions which are exploited to create the perceptions and pressures calling for conflict. This is a different dimension of many Command and Control Research Program (CCRP) research and papers related to influence networks, organizational interactions, and planning for effects and outcomes. The potential exists to more fully flesh out National Defense with the integrated tools of national power.

This paper will touch on aspects of policy and C2 concepts, as well as parts of the international organizational issues (related to Huntington's (1996, 1997), Barnett's (2003), and Friedman's (1996) writings on conflicts, challenges, opportunities, and globalization). Both these areas are also related to the overall understanding of inter-connected issues and some social aspects of organizations and issues.

A WALK THROUGH 2002 & 2006 NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGIES – STABILITY AND CHANGE

- **Champion aspirations for human dignity;**
- **Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends;**
- **Work with others to defuse regional conflicts;**
- **Prevent our enemies from threatening us, our allies, and our friends with weapons of Mass destruction (WMD);**
- **Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade;**
- **Expand the circle of development by opening societies and building the infrastructure of democracy;**
- **Develop agendas for cooperative action with other main centers of Global Power;**
- **Transform America's National Security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century; and,**
- **Engage the opportunities and confront the challenges of Globalization.**

ASPECTS OF ORGANIZATIONAL STABILITY AND ADAPTABILITY
?? STABLE LONG TERM – ADAPTING SHORTER TERM ??

Figure 1 - 2002 (& 2006) National Security Strategies Main Points

Figure 1 above is a listing of the main points of the National Security Strategies from 2002 and 2006 (NSS 2002, NSS 2006). In 2006, the last point was added, for a total of nine (9) points of focus. The two represent a continuity of objective and vision, because so much stayed the same, much like the points raised by Collins & Porras (1994) in *Built to Last*, where successful organizations maintained stable long term objectives, with changing tactical solutions for implementation according to context. The NSS is it self a document for stability, as well as an implementation of efforts for executing protection of the country, as such it can be expected to

be rather stable in its objectives, and that other procedures and policies (like military tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs)), or business practices flow down to other parts of the organization(s).

Additionally, the NSS introduced in 2002 represented a change in format to stating objectives as capabilities and desired outcomes. This was quite a shift from details by region and region-by-region specifics. Instead it offers a broad set of principles or strategies, with a few examples or areas of concern, for it parallels other senior strategy documents shift into a capabilities format discussions associated with mission capabilities packages. This way it fits into the world organization environment more like an encompassing lasso or shielding umbrella by offering strategies or principles, which with derived and developed capabilities and capacities as the TTPs, would be useful for realizing the characterized future conditions of the world society, as a result of the interactions of the United States as an organization and society interacting with the international organizations and societies. The intent of those interactions is to promote the well-being of all (organizations and individuals) and sustain the development of international relations and interactions which respect the largest populations' community through respect for the rule of law and the realization of the greatest common good. This can be viewed as another way of saying, by being involved in the world processes offers the opportunity to interact in the cause and effect chain to influence, preclude, or pre-empt detrimental futures or events, a truly large complex adaptive system.

The body of law and well-being is related to the principle of the 'minimum world order'. That is, the care and support of the population by the established government through the delivery and provision of customary and accepted governmental services. These services can be considered as (and sometimes not limited to): health, sustenance, education, shelter, protection, water, environment, etc., as there are routine, 'customary', international standards regularly invoked when calling for action and intervention.

The concept of minimum world order (MWO) emerges from the United Nations Charter, and reflects on the ability of the government, as a recognized international entity, to carry out and discharge its duties within that international community. That the government, as the protector and guarantor of citizen's protections and care, is responsible to execute all 'usual and customary duties and services' under customary international law concepts for the care and well-being of the citizens of their 'country' (international entity) along with those that may seek refuge within their borders. (See 'The Regulation of International Coercion – Legal Authorities and Political Constraints' by Terry (2005) for an introduction and discussion of MWO background and aspects of intervention.)

Potential source problem areas with MWO impact and ramifications are: food failure, water failure, disease/health failure, economic failure, environmental failure, or education failure. (Think about all the volunteer and non-government groups which work in these areas nationally and internationally.)

These potential problem areas can be considered somewhat separately, but when the several value chains associated with them are reviewed or generated, they most likely can be found quite closely intertwined and interconnected. Thus, actions to address them are going to be particularly challenging opportunities when working to move beyond the usual military first response option of interaction for an international crises response, to those which are soft power, all-nation capability capacity action paths. Even when many of the other agencies (international and non-governmental), along with private volunteer organizations (IGOs, NGOs, PVOs) are in

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many circumstances present prior to the military, working to varying degrees of interaction within their capabilities and capacities. These other groups have the additional challenge of retaining established levels of trust and neutrality in their interactions, when or if they were to start interacting with military groups. This is where the very challenging social networking interactions must be understood and managed – in both the vertical (within organization) and horizontal (cross organization) aspects with large numbers of individuals and organization groups.

The interesting point here is that the international involvement ends up opening the door of influence and assistance whether directly stated, or merely implied and demonstrated through the interaction. This represents viewing the interaction as form and substance, not a choice between form and substance, as both are means of education and interaction. Further it represents the opportunity to offer assistance where needed, even when those that need it may not be in the condition to realize that they need assistance. It also opens the door for viewing actions, opportunities, and results within a larger national and international frame of conditions and organizations of many levels and sizes.

A LARGER VISION ON ENGAGEMENT – PARALLEL FOR ALL ORGANIZATIONS

Within the Command and Control Research Program community there has been much investment into the basic command and control systems. This investment is has been into understanding the many people, personnel, and social aspects of the overall interactions of the systems, components, and organizations composing the systems, their delivery, maintenance, and developing their replacements. This research effort has included many levels of allied and joint interactions, along with emergency and disaster response efforts.

Reflecting aspects of these efforts in the summary point: “. . . finally, the nation could respond by seeking greater efforts from allies and friends in support of maintaining regional security. This option (1), however, would depend not just on the willingness of those allies and friends to take on this responsibility but on their capability to do so as well.” (O'Rourke, 2005/2001) (Remainder of paragraph outlines the Naval parallel of a two tiered NATO membership.) This willingness factor is fundamental to the former CNO's '1000 ship navy' challenge, which became 'A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower' (Conway, et al., 2007).

The quote above merely opens the door for the development and maintenance of multiple navies cooperation, participation, and association, according to their individual strengths and specialties, vis-a-vis the cooperation and collaboration of international groups / organizations mentioned with the JV 2010/2020 documents and presentations, as well as the NSS (2002 & 2006) primary intent headings. They can become members of the community of interest supporting government responsibility and minimum world order, respecting the rule of law for all their citizens. Additionally, the quote is forward looking and almost prescient, when considering when the then CNO unveiled the '1000 ship navy' concept of an 'international navy' of allies and associates.

The 'international navy' concept is a smaller version of the cooperation and interaction of all Agencies and organizations working toward the positive support of the population segments, and mitigation of those minimum world order disturbing forces and stress factors, which are typified by appeals for humanitarian assistance responses. Those responses are not the only types of interactions, mitigation, or pre-emption which are available, in fact in many cases they

are after the fact assistance. There are also with these communities of interest, the chance to act on the causes, not only the symptoms, of those disturbing forces and stress factors. That is, the parallel of the 'international navy' extended to the other government and non-government organizations internationally represents the potential to apply the essence of effects based operations writ large employing all-nation and all-international tools and capabilities on the causes of the humanitarian responses and mitigation of minimum world order shortfalls by governments.

Returning to the release of the 2002 NSS, it prompted quite a stir. While that is appropriate in some respects, when a high level examination is completed, some will take in the eight of sections and points which set a new style of future objectives and capabilities. Some analysis and discussion focused only on the aspect of preemption via military means. (See Bunn, 2003, for one analysis.) Though a valid interpretation method, it is quite limited by the appearance of not drawing on all the tools of the nation – the tools of national power.

Joseph Nye (1999), cited two reasons for intervention (*emphasis added*):

“As a wealthy status quo power, the United States has an interest in maintaining international order. Behind the abstractions about rising interdependence are changes that make it more difficult to isolate the United States from the effects. More concretely, there are two simple reasons why Americans have a national interest in preventing disorder beyond our borders. 1st, events and actors out there can hurt us; and, 2nd, Americans want to influence distant governments and organizations on a variety of issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, drugs, shared resources, and the environment.”

This was stated primarily as the style of American interaction, and can be considered as part of our national legacy, it is not just a point linked to American interactions, it can be generalized to represent that interactions are two way interactions, not just one way. The true challenge is to change the perspective of preventing disorder, into one of getting to the fundamental reasons which cause the disorder and removing them prior to the generation of disorder or failures to deliver on accepted minimum world order responsibilities.

Let us further remember what one of the other tenets of the NSS (2002 & 2006), JVs (2010/2020), and NDS (2005), is the avenue to international alliances/cooperation and inter-agency cooperation to work together. For, when groups come together as a community of interest, and provide the means to act, there is the possibility of finding the correct fulcrum, and precisely the correct length of lever, to nudge or move the critical point of decision or action in the chain of events toward the larger better outcome, for the most individuals for the best common good. The epitome of this style of interaction is Sun Tzu's point “To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” (Griffith, 1971, p. 77.)

The truth of the matter is closer to the actions of Captain Cabrillo, who with his team of specialists, plan and anticipate the actions of the opposition, then through their own actions essentially cause the opposition to defeat themselves, or become completely stymied at the opposition plan last point of execution. Captain Cabrillo and his team, in the execution of their mitigation task demonstrate what an agile team with expert skills, and detailed knowledge at all levels – a team of experts/generalists with depth of knowledge, back-up, and an extended network of contacts, can accomplish. (Cussler & Dirgo, 2003). These fictional characters

essentially demonstrate a view of the future personnel and organizations which an international navy, or international community of interest might be capable of accomplishing to mitigate stress factors and disturbances to minimum world order responsibilities. They demonstrate adaptability and ease in changing interaction patterns with the environment around them, a capacity which is desired through many current transformation efforts.

These skills point out a style of applying the DOTML-PF framework (introduced by JV 2010/2020, and picked up by National Defense Strategy and JCIDS (see McChrystal, 2009 and Walter, 2007) to that larger model of minimum world order support, and re-integration opportunities to bring back Barnett's (2003) 'non-integrated' section of the world community. This non-integrated section of the world community is generally isolated from sections of the world globalization community as discussed by Thomas Friedman (1996), with demographic challenges discussed by Samuel Huntington (1996, 1997). All three pointed out opportunities to remove the gaps, reduce the tensions and conflicts, and improve the global well-being of the 'non-connected' segment of the world community. This is a 'non-connected' segment, which has problems of demonstrating execution of the international minimum world order standards for their population, or cause neighbors and others to potentially have the same problem, attempting to address the needs of all types of refugees (willing or non-willing), meeting minimum world order service delivery standards. Norton's (2003) standard for feral cities translated into an international basis of evaluation highlights some opportunities and challenges related to failure of MWO services delivery. Failure, which speaks to the opportunity to help and treat the symptom of population stress factors. Yet why not anticipate this type of symptom through causal analysis, and respond like Captain Cabrillo's team (Cussler & Dirgo, 2003), or better yet as an alliance community of interest on an international basis to head off the causes which lead to the symptoms. To prevent and preempt the causes of the symptoms, like preventative medicine; though not limited to medical, or military, or diplomatic actions. Those actions could come through all the agencies, organizations, and companies which are involved in the extended net of interactions which touch at the root causes and organizations at the root causes of the symptoms of minimum world order failure.

When originally introduced, the DOTML-PF factors were connected together, they were to co-evolve all the factors related to applications, interactions and solutions. They were originally a framework of reference for analysis for the military, yet, that framework can be expanded further beyond the military as a whole, to all the components, pieces, and parts of the agencies, organizations, and populations of this country and its allies. It is not a change in DOTML-PF which is needed, it is the expansion of application of its terms of reference and analysis to a higher purpose and more organizations which are involved in the mechanisms and maintenance of the minimum world order, for the betterment of the largest group of that whole impacted by the failures of the services delivery and the providers of those services.

The concepts of military capabilities for pre-emptive action must also be applied to all the action tools, options, and capacities of the other agencies, organizations, and populations (and all their sub-components) of the nation, government, commerce, and population. The factors of stealth, responsiveness, long range (distance and time), effectiveness, precision, reliability, and diversity all apply for consideration, along with lots of generalized skills, information, and points of action and influence, to address root causes, fundamental gaps in services, and remove,

prevent, pre-empt the symptoms, and therefore raise the boat by patching the holes – providing the services which represent the minimum world order – vice just bailing faster.

That was the point of Lincoln's intent for the Union to intervene, which can be extended to be a parallel of the community of interest for improvement in minimum world order performance for those in the 'non-integrated' section of the world for improvements, and improved services delivery, and thus return to the global cooperative community (like the international navy cooperative effort, and the possibilities of synergistic growth for all the parties involved. That intent is demonstrated via the description of Lincoln saying:

“At its heart was a belief in meritocracy: in the right of all individuals, through their industry, enterprise, and self-discipline to rise in an increasingly market-oriented society. Essential to his hopes for the poor were the nation's economic development and material advance. These were to be promoted and nurtured by an interventionist, forward-looking government, doing “for a community of people, whatever they need to have done, but can not do, [at all], or can not, [so well do], for themselves – in their separate, and individual capacities.” “The logic of Lincoln's economic thought was a social and moral order at odds with slavery. It was an order whose well-being, he believed, was protected and enhanced by a Union of states loyal to the Founders' vision of republican liberty.” (Carwardine, 2006)

Lincoln's principles of helping those in need, is one which has not been removed from the national or the international table of actions, opportunities, and principles of customary practices, and international treaties, communiqués, statements, and actions.

That principle is evoked within the NSS (2002 & 2006), NDS (2005), and the former CNO '1000 ship navy' position and discussions, which lead to the 'Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower' (Conway, et al, 2007). That is, to work together and individually, via the efforts to assist displaced peoples, and also not limited to the efforts to support the rule of law against the exploitation of peoples and resources of the economic engine of the world economy, to offer the 'invisible hand' of economic opportunity.

Taking this international interaction framework to another perspective, which has been articulated by Barnett (2003) via the economic factor of investment, there are very few locations where the community of industry and business organizations are NOT touching the world economy in one way or another. The most significant one, the most visible, and one which seems to regularly strike closet to home is the oil and energy market. But let us not forget about the international food market, or the international investment market. Both Barnett (ibid) and Friedman (1996) have commented on how the finances flow into some areas and not into others, as well as how confidence is communicated via the flow into or out of a country. Barnett cautiously pointed out the areas where it does not go, the relative volumes of other areas, and thus established the area of opportunity and influence application. This is a style of gap analysis, and opportunity generation for courses of action, or value chain improvements by communities of interest.

Yet the opportunity does not by itself guarantee its acceptance or the existence of the vehicles to apply action strategies to increase investment, there must be a higher purpose involved, besides just the mitigation of the comparative imbalance. It is but symptom of other problems. The gap does open the door to why the funds do not flow. A similar, though for different reason, analysis has been offered within *Partners in Prosperity* (Hamilton & Quinlan, 2004), which is a Europe-US analysis on how much foreign direct investment did NOT flow out of the US back to other markets or Europe, while the verbal rhetoric which flowed in the early

21st century over US actions within southwest Asia. This points out the strength of some international interactions which industry and commerce have established, which politics has only partial or limited effect upon. It is the underlying commercial connection which the NSSs, NDSs, and the international navy efforts and objectives address in total, not just small segments of the individual detailed interactions. The larger concept was voiced by the former CNO initially as the 'thousand ship navy', has resulted in the opportunity for the Navy to demonstrate how to build additional, new, avenues of communication, alliance development, and aspects of international community development as stated within the NSS 2002 and 2006. Through commerce and other departments of government and industry, international actions are additional tools of international engagement and influence which can be considered opportunities for action and interactions points for improving the international common good for the largest community of population – meeting minimum world order standards. The naval concept may well be a model worth monitoring along with the DOTML-PF metrics, for leverage and extension to the other agencies, as well as the services, to promote increased visibility, cooperation, and over all improvements for sustaining and improving the minimum world order opportunities and capabilities of the nations of the world (communities of interest) to move up an international scale of performance that parallels Norton's (2003) 'feral cities' evaluation matrix.

These levels are and can be the points where actions head off, cut off, 'purchase' the choices, which start to remove the fundamental causes and underlying conditions which cause pressures generating shortfalls and failures of the minimum world order concept . . . and may demand more forceful action in the future. Action which may be part be considered components of the humanitarian assistance and disaster response style of assistance; or, the phases of the three block war; or, peace keeping operations/peace enforcement operations (PKO/PEOs). All of these benefit from well coordinated larger communities of interest assistance and interaction, with described as all-nation or soft power approaches, they are application of all capabilities and capacities.

To get to the other levels of action of prevention or advanced pre-emption requires an expansion of the co-evolution and evaluation framework which was launched with JV 2010/2020 as first DOTML-P and then DOTML-PF, and has moved into the DOD JCIDS evaluation of end-to-end (E-2-E) effectiveness and efficacy reviews of programs for returns on investment analysis for delivering on missions and objects. That expansion must go beyond only the DOD military level analysis, and be fully melded into the other executive branch organizations and national business community models for investment and evaluation within the respective organizations, but also within the larger international environment of interactions and impacts of population communities, and the benefits to be realized for the largest common good. A thorough review of the spectrum of organizations strategic plans, missions, and visions can start the network analysis and opportunities and gaps analysis for improvements and contributions internally and externally for improvements in minimum world order.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE

Building from the concept of MWO, 'What is to be Done?', if a country or entity is an international arena non-performer (fails regarding MWO duties and deliveries) to some 'norm' of failure criteria. When considering aspects of Barnett (2003), Friedman (1996), or Huntington (1996, 1997) metrics and discussions, there are multiple and diverse paths of action and interaction for relief and restoration of the MWO shortfall.

An example of the extremes of action paths are: the decision to employ the hardest and heaviest military response; while an alternate path is through all the other government agencies directly on the government, and applying all the other government agencies indirectly on the government by helping and improving all the areas, organizations, governments, and services all around and outside the government demonstrating MWO shortfall.

This sets up a style of 'greener pastures' available by example outside the government of concern area such that the boat is being raised, and the efforts are being accomplished, publicized, and noticed. This sets up the internal population reaction of 'Why is our government not helping us like those around us?' It offers the generation of internal pressure for change and improvement.

What is particularly interesting in that the sources of assistance for the indirect and direct approach are much wider than usually discussed and supported. The common approach is almost described as 'looking for the fastest response and solution' which is applied to the symptom. What the widest indirect approach offers is a style of solution and opportunity for working at solving the root or fundamental causes of pressures which caused or generated the symptoms.

These sources as mentioned can be all the agencies of the government, the people of the population which established the government, the IGOs, NGOs, VPOs, industry groups, commercial groups, etc., all sometimes referred to as 'communities of interest', for interaction in this example of intervention to remove shortfalls of MWO duties, which called out for international community or organization response to 'raise the boat'. The particularly challenging aspect is actually making a change in perspective of when to act and how long to expect for the effect of action(s) to take to produce the results of effects. In an extreme, challenging circumstance and opportunity is to act in a timely manner to limit, remove, and prevent the occurrence of the problems and fundamental, root causes, so that symptoms do not result in failure of governments to deliver MWO duties. This framework of failure is similar to the 'feral cities' criteria of Norton (2003), truly extended to the international framework which generated avenues for action and intervention on the shortfalls or gaps as action plans and initiatives to prevent and pre-empt future problems. The challenge of this metric is how to generate the characteristics, abilities, and capabilities of the population or/and communities of interest to respond and prevent/pre-empt the root/fundamental causes for the whole, and subordinating the 'individual' to the benefit and betterment of the 'whole' or larger group, community of interest. That framework also opens the door for applying a transferred military DOTML-PF framework and metric to all the remaining sections and segments of the government, as was started with the requirement for those segments and sections to have strategic plans and progress reports envisioned by the Government Performance Results Act and the Government Performance Management Act, linking management and results with outcomes and budgets.

This transformed and transferred framework of evaluation and support between organizations, is an opportunity for the future. Many times it is addressed as more personnel, or more resources, more hardware, or more policy specificity. Yet, these only touch on some of the aspects of the capability to anticipate and respond to generalized of the failure type pre-conditions and obstacles to providing the services which the minimum world order concept calls for from governments. Those failures which call out for intervention, prevention, or pre-

emption. Paths which truly raise the well-being for the population, government, group of concern, or community of interest and intervention for the largest common good.

How to see those paths. One method is the distillation and contribution analysis for the components of all national tools and power. This distillation comes from the review and allocation of contributions through the hierarchy of over arching and nested policy and strategy documents. Figure 2 offers a smaller section of that flow through those documents, showing the prime form factors and outcomes which are parts of the National Military Strategy, which is subordinate to the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, with the Joint Vision documents offering levels of context and details for capabilities and capacities. The author points out that little discussed is the strategies of the remainder of governmental



Figure 2 - Partial Flow of National Defense Strategy to National Military Strategy

organizations – Commerce, Agriculture, Energy, Transportation, Health & Human Services, Education, Justice, Environment, et al. which can be linked into this flow at the region of flow between the National Security Strategy and the National Defense Strategy. Please note that all these governmental organizations have fingers and connections to the national and international community, and are thus areas for interactions, analysis and opportunities for solution delivery which could preclude, mitigate, and even prevent obstructions to, or failures to minimum world order services deliveries for populations of governments and nations. The metrics of the DOTML-PF can and need to be transformed and transferred to a wider framework of analysis and solution discovery applied to an all-nation, soft power approach, along with the military framework which was its source.

This was a point originally used with the Joint Vision metric of DOTML-PF and its co-evolution aspect of interaction and connected network of influences. All the factors and components must be analyzed, balanced, and interconnected to build upon each other, assist each

other, and delivery better solutions when working together than individually. This applies internally as a nation, internationally as the community of all nations, the community of interest for the people, and population of the world.

'WHAT TO DO' – SOME CONTRIBUTION POINTS FROM CCRP PAPERS

To accomplish aspects of the distillation and allocation process mentioned above, where can that process be started? The author draws the readers attention to the corpus of papers and research of the Command and Control Research Program – its publications, reports, symposia proceedings and papers, along with the body of actual research and experiments and exercises completed. The following small sample of paper topics and possible contributions is provided to open the door for other efforts and improved understanding for individuals and their organizations as they make their individual and collected contributions to improvements for the world community, the governments, and their populations.

-“Command and Control Simulation for Domestic Operations” – Wheaton, et al., 2007 – This paper presents the mapping or modeling of all organizational, process, and technical flows utilizing the Department of Defense Architecture Framework diagrams and methods. While many times this framework is employed on individual systems, it can also be applied nationally and internationally for the interactions and coordination needed for coalitions, operations, and even analysis of services needs of populations. These diagrams support mapping the flow associated with value streams or value chains, such as the services expected for governments to provide for the populations under the minimum world order precept. The diagrams then allow teams of personnel and communities of interest to make improvements and contributions to remove the obstacles and roadblocks to improve conditions for the people and populations suffering from failed or poorly performing governments.

-“Developing Command and Control Performance-Based Training Criteria in a Network Centric Environment” – Tossell, et al., 2006 – While this paper specifically addresses the capabilities and competencies of personnel of an Air Force Operations Center organization, the framework applies to all types of organizations and their associated skills. It describes how those skills and competencies can be gained, maintained, monitored, and improved for the personnel and the organization. It reflects a larger effort of having an organization and group which interacts well, and smoothly for regular events, along with the unexpected events which require adaptation and hopefully automatic adjustments based on the organization interaction with the environment it operates within – the internal, external, and international environment and constituents.

-“The Formal Representation of Administrative and Operational Relationships within Defense Organizational Constructs” – Chamberlain & Boller, 2006 – The authors walk through the details of organizational allocation, command, control, and equipping. The details allow for the potential to map out the explicit and implicit organization connections and flows of authority (formal and informal). While specifically for defense organizations, it can be applied to all non-defense organizations, including the opposition organizations, or population groups in need of support because of governmental failures to provide services under the precept of minimum world order. This mapping of other organizations and groups interactions supports the analysis

of courses of action for mitigation or early prevention of failures associated with failed governments.

-“Mission Command in the Networked Era” – Stewart, 2006 – This paper presents important personnel and social points and metrics regarding an organization’s movement between centralized and decentralized direction and execution. It uses clear and concise terms for the training and development of the personnel and organizations, and some of the options of when to have which type of organization carrying out a mission. This research and presentation can potentially lead to the understanding of not only the personnel and organizational leadership and action characteristics required for the future of fully networked and interconnected all-nation, soft power, but help with the development of the population so that the recruiting pool is better along with the action work force personnel of all the national, international, government, and non-government, allied and joint organizations involved.

These few examples represent only a small sampling of papers and implications which may be drawn from them for future paths and opportunities to actively address shortfalls in all value chains – national and international. The collected examples of development, testing, actions, analysis of actions, and experiments show that there are many efforts underway attempting to transform how not only the military, but any organization can be transformed and prepared for active engagement to prevent, pre-empt failures to provide services to people and populations within the precept of governmental responsibility for minimum world order. Further, the examples also show that the efforts and work have only just begun, as it is not only the organizations which must address the transformation and changes, but the whole of nations, and populations which must work together not only for their local community, but all the communities at large to support inter- and national security outcomes through the complete set of all-nation tools and capacities. It is more than a single dimension of interaction – it is truly multidimensional, and complex!

CONNECTING HORIZONTAL AND VERTICAL EFFORTS – THE BIG PICTURE

That complexity is a huge challenge, to bring all the pieces together to a cohesive whole. This is best summarized as:

“The greatest challenge of science, its art, lies in asking an important question and framing it in a way that allows it to be broken into manageable pieces, into experiments that can be conducted that ultimately lead to answers. To do this requires a certain kind of genius, one that probes vertically and sees horizontally. “Horizontal vision allows someone to assimilate and weave together seemingly unconnected bits of information. It allows an investigator to see what others do not see, and to make leaps of connectivity and creativity. Probing vertically, going deeper and deeper into something, creates new information. Sometimes what one finds will shine brilliantly enough to illuminate the whole world. “At least one question connects the vertical and the horizontal. That question is “So What?”” (Barry, 2005)

The above quote when taken with Lincoln’s perspective, the aspects of collaborative efforts embodied within the concept of an international navy, and Nye’s quote on United States interactions, collectively point to summarizing a path of opportunity toward integrating efforts,

organizations, and skills for the managing a path to the future, a course to the future with benefits for all. Former Secretary Albright (2006), may have put that path and opportunity best, saying:

“Countries must be asked to identify capable personnel who will be dedicated to the job of humanitarian response and prepared over a period of years to excel in that function. . . . Their military and paramilitary components would be accompanied by civilian administrators and prosecutors affiliated with international legal authorities. . . . It would be the international equivalent of a cavalry that leaders could call on to ride to the rescue in emergencies.”

Yet, it is also the opportunity to act with and through those same individuals, the whole of the world population, to act ahead of the time when the cavalry is called upon in extremis, that is the opportunity to act to preclude or pre-empt the loss of minimum world order governmental services for the populations of the world and the better future for all.

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