



INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

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CCRP



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INTRODUCTION

Increasingly in recent years the notions of “information operations” or “information campaigns” have garnered much attention in military and defense circles. The bulk of attention has focused on information as connected to warfighting capabilities, and the idea of “information warfare” has gained easy currency.¹ In this context, as Martin Libicki puts it, the basic assumption is that as information and information technologies come to dominate society in general and national security in particular, “advanced conflict will increasingly be characterized by the struggle over information systems.”² In its broadest sense, this report asks whether the notion of struggles for control over information identifiable in situations of conflict also has relevance for situations of third-party conflict management—for peace operations. More specifically, the study is designed to address the following questions:

- *Principles*—What are the principles of an information campaign for peace operations? How does an information campaign for peace operations differ from more established principles of “information warfare?”
- *Coordination*—How can elements of an information campaign be coordinated to enhance cooperation among the various actors—military and civilian—in peace operations? What are the differences and similarities in approaches to information among the various (including *indigenous*) actors?

- *Metrics*—How can we measure the effectiveness or success of the information campaign?

Study Design and Methodology

In answering these questions, the research team first reviewed the existing literature on information activities in military, peace support, and complex humanitarian emergency operations, summarized in our annotated bibliography (appendix I).³ We followed this with a workshop on July 13, 1998, at which our preliminary findings—actually a review of information activities as understood mainly in the military and a set of questions about its relevance to peace operations—were shared with a group from the military, defense, intelligence, U.S. governmental, and NGO communities, whose members have all worked on aspects of peace operations.⁴ With their feedback, we designed and coordinated the field research component. In late July two teams went to Haiti (Stadtler, Narel, and Diby), and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Avruch and Siegel), to examine information activities as carried on by international participants in the respective peace operations: the military, civilian, governmental, United Nations, other international organizations (such as the OAS in Haiti and the OSCE in Bosnia-Herzegovina), and NGOs. In both places, as well, the teams strove to ask “local folk” (especially including journalists, print and electronic) about their perceptions of the effectiveness and impact of the information campaign. The results of this field research are reported here as two separate chapters and form the core of the report.⁵ In both Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina the teams focused on elucidating the following:

- The nature of the “campaign” itself: Who are the relevant actors? What information activities do they

engage in? What are their goals? What resources do they bring to bear?

- **Coordination:** To what extent are they able to coordinate their information activities? What are obstacles to coordination? Aids to coordination? How important are individual or personal as opposed to institutional or doctrinal factors in enhancing coordination? These questions aim to get at the very notion of an information *campaign* as distinct from sets of more-or-less related information *activities*.
- **The campaign's effectiveness:** How do the actors assess the effectiveness of their—and each others'—efforts? Is there agreement on conceptualizing and implementing measures of effectiveness among the various actors in the campaign? We should note, however, that we ourselves did not independently seek to assess the campaign's effectiveness as part of this research. To do so would require tools, resources, and time, all of which were unavailable to us here. Indeed, the fashioning of these tools, along with the resources to test and deploy them, we see as one of the major tasks for future work in understanding and using information activities in peace operations.

A second workshop held October 8, 1998, disseminated the findings of the draft report to a wider audience and solicited feedback. The final draft of the report benefited greatly from this.⁶

The report is organized in four main parts. In the first part we describe and analyze the sorts of activities that comprise information operations, beginning with how the term is used in military and defense contexts. Two chapters follow, detailing information activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

Haiti, and paying particular attention to how these activities changed throughout the course of the respective peace operations in both settings. In the last chapter the two cases are compared and contrasted with an eye toward the questions we posed above, namely, seeking general principles of information campaigns (as distinct from characteristics owing directly to specific missions and local conditions), ways to integrate and coordinate information activities, and ways to assess effectiveness of information operations in the larger context of peace operations. We conclude with a set of cautions and recommendations for future study and analysis.

¹To take just three examples: *Defensive Information Warfare*, David Alberts, 1996; *Information Warfare and International Law*, Lawrence T. Greenberg, et al., 1997; *What is Information Warfare?* Martin Libicki, 1995.

²In *What is Information Warfare?* p. ix.

³The bibliography was compiled by Annemarie van Berkel.

⁴The list of participants in the July 13 workshop can be found in Appendix II.

⁵James L. Narel was the primary author of the chapter on Haiti and Pascale Combelles Siegel of the chapter on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

⁶The list of participants in the October 8 workshop can be found in Appendix III.

WHAT IS AN INFORMATION CAMPAIGN?

Information Operations

Even though the military is but one among several actors in a peace operation, we begin with its conception of information activities—what the American military calls “information operations”—for two reasons. First, compared to the other actors—such as the UN or other international organizations (IO), non-governmental organizations (NGO), or non-military governmental agencies, such as the departments of State or Justice—the military has put more thought into conceiving a doctrine for setting out and integrating the various elements of an information campaign, as well as planning for the campaign’s deployment in the field. Second, in peace operations the military’s appearance on the scene signals the arrival, as many have put it, of the proverbial “900-pound gorilla,” so that military doctrine on *anything* always carries the potential for dominating the process and discourse of these operations. In other words, it is important for the other, non-military, actors to at least be aware of, and at best understand, the military’s approach to information (among many other things).

The military’s conception of information operations is broad, dividing the domain into three functional areas.¹ The first has to do with how information relates to the overall

success of the mission. Information in this sense includes intelligence, logistics, personnel, legal issues, and weather, among other factors. The second functional area has to do with how information is transported to relevant decision makers. This area, encompassing hardware and software, includes communication links, satellites, cables, and procedures, formats, and filters for information transport and retrieval. The third area can be called information operations “proper,” and includes measures for ensuring the operational security of information, electronic warfare, deception and disinformation, as well as techniques for the physical destruction of the enemy’s information systems. Also included in this third area are public affairs, psychological operations (PSYOP), and civil affairs. It is these last three areas that appear most evidently relevant to peace operations.

Information Warfare

The ultimate point of doctrine or operations in the military is its ability to contribute to the military’s traditional main mission: to fight and win the nation’s wars. Thus information operations connect ultimately to “information warfare.” Moreover, insofar as peace operations are predominantly understood in the military as a kind of “operation other than war” (OOTW), it makes sense to begin our analysis of information campaigns in peace operations with a discussion of how the term is used in warfare. Libicki has described seven distinct forms of information warfare. By “information warfare” in general Libicki means kinds of “conflict that involves the protection, manipulation, degradation, and denial of information.” He specifically identifies seven varieties of information warfare:

-
- Command and control warfare (striking the “enemy’s head and neck”)
 - Intelligence-based warfare (seeking to control the knowledge necessary to dominate the battlespace)
 - Electronic warfare (including cryptographic techniques)
 - Psychological warfare (PSYOP—winning hearts and minds to alter behavior)
 - Hacker warfare (attacking the enemy’s computer systems)
 - Economic information warfare (seeking economic destruction and dominance of the enemy)
 - Cyber warfare (“a grab bag of futuristic scenarios” from information terrorism to science fiction plots)²

One of the main points of Libicki’s study is that these seven forms, while loosely connected, do not in fact cohere into a specialized form of fighting that can be called “information warfare.” Some forms, notably psychological warfare, are arguably as old as warfare itself. Likewise, intelligence activities (and their costs!) can be documented at least as far back as Moses sending spies into Canaan. Other forms, such as the idea of a “cyber soldier,” simula-warfare, or so-called Gibson-warfare, are only to be found—at present—in science fiction novels or on Hollywood soundstages. Nevertheless, his basic assumption is worth attention: that as information and information technologies come to dominate society in general and national security in particular, “advanced conflict will increasingly be characterized by the struggle for control over information systems.”

The question for our purposes is how relevant are conceptions of information warfare for peace operations? First, consider the notion, in Libicki's words of "advanced conflict." In places like Haiti, Rwanda, or Somalia, U.S. forces did not encounter contestants who possessed either sophisticated information systems of their own, nor the technologies to infiltrate, manipulate, or degrade American information systems. The very high-tech orientation of the military's approach to information warfare assumes a high-tech adversary, and thus may be of limited utility in the low-tech environments in which so many peace operations occur. More profoundly, the military's approach to *warfare* assumes an *adversary*. While it makes sense to adopt one basic assumption of information warfare—that a peace operation is as likely as warfighting to involve, on the part of the third-party intervenor (including the military), a "struggle for control over information"—it is not so clear how this assumption can be adapted to peace operations. We may speak of "struggle," but the questions remain:

- Struggling against whom? (Who's the enemy in a peace operation—isn't it famine, or drought or disease?)
- Struggling with whom? (Who are the other actors in the operation; who constitutes the coalition, and what comprises *their* information campaign?)
- Struggling with what? (Are all the options in information warfare available or appropriate for peace operations—what about deception or disinformation, for example?)

INFORMATION AND PEACE OPERATIONS

If, as Libicki's study asserts, doctrine governing information in warfare is somewhat controversial and yet to be adequately conceived, doctrine regarding information in "peaceware" is almost entirely nonexistent. Part of the notional problem here is that information operations in peace support suffers in the same conceptual fog (exacerbated greatly by the political minefields) that often surrounds thinking about "operations other than war" in general. Certainly at the tactical level, both the theory and practice of warfighting are more developed and better thought-out than either the theory or practice of peacekeeping. A cynic could be forgiven for saying that humankind has had far more experience with the former than the latter.

The broader question remains how much of the military's approach to information operations has any direct relevance to peace operations. As noted above, the three areas of information operations "proper" that seem self-evidently connected to peace operations are public affairs, psychological operations, and information activities related to civil affairs. In her study of information activities undertaken by NATO in Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995–1997), Pascale Siegel characterized these components—*public information (PI)*, *psychological operations (PSYOP)*, and *civil affairs (civil military cooperation: CIMIC in NATO parlance)*—as the "three pillars" of NATO's information campaign ("campaign" being NATO's preferred term).³

- *Public Information* is designed to inform (and influence) international journalists and media, but also local or indigenous media.

- *PSYOP* is designed to influence (if necessary, by informing) the local population (with or without a “media filter”) toward attitudinal and behavioral changes that support the mission’s mandate and goals.
- *Civil Affairs*, while broad-ranging, has an information component (“civil information”) aimed directly at the local population, informing them for example of military assistance programs that benefit the indigenous civilian sector (e.g., infrastructure repair and reconstruction, electoral support, mine education, health care assistance).

While these three pillars accurately reflect the military’s (specifically, NATO’s) parsing of information activities relevant to peace operations, it is highly unlikely that most civilian actors would divide up the domain in the same way. First of all, it is likely they view information in essentially an undifferentiated way, related perhaps to press relations or public relations, or advertising. Some might go so far as to see information activities specifically in the context of peace operations as connected to public diplomacy or, more broadly, even to perception management directed at the contesting parties. On the other hand, if they thought about the military’s approach to information (even leaving out information *warfare*), there might well be on the part of many civilians a reluctance to accept some of these activities as appropriate for peace operations. In particular, the following problem areas suggest themselves: intelligence, “transparency,” coalitions, the cultural complexities of multiple parties in peace operations, and the problem of dealing with the media. Another problem involves sensitivities to *PSYOP*. In the discussion that follows, we often highlight the discrepancy between U.S. military and UN approaches to these matters—

the UN being the dominant international organization in most peace operations.

Intelligence. Historically the UN has eschewed formal development of intelligence-related capabilities (see below). Notice too that *intelligence operations* are formally excluded from inclusion among the three pillars of NATO's (IFOR/SFOR) campaign. Whether intelligence operations are *operationally* excluded is another question entirely. We suspect that they are not, if only because the military views information and intelligence fundamentally in the same way. *For the military, information activities are essentially conceived as tactical or operational tools—even as “nonlethal weapons”—which, when successfully deployed, can act as a “force multiplier” and in the service of “force protection.”* And as is well known since Somalia, issues surrounding force protection—what some have called the “zero-casualties requirement” levied on U.S. commanders in peace operations—have become among the most crucial ones in determining American policy and practice in these operations. This is reflected quite clearly in the first executive-level directive relating specifically to peace operations, Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), issued February 22, 1996. Referring to a U.S. involvement in future UN-mandated multilateral peace operations, the directive, in section IV, “Strengthening the UN,” recommends setting up a “Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going peace operations and disseminating information within host countries in order to reduce the risks to UN personnel and increase the potential for mission success.”⁴

Transparency. Many analysts have pointed to the principle of “transparency” as a key precept in peace operations.⁵ It is a fundamental (almost doctrinal) attribute of United

Nations's peace operations. Transparency extends especially to the "management" of information flowing outward—particularly (as we shall see) given the large role that media has come to play in these operations.⁶ In pointed contrast, in the military information is usually highly protected and transparency of any sort (unless a false transparency aimed to promote, say, deception or *disinformation*) is to be avoided.⁷ In matters of defense or security generally, the default response to information flows is to classify and obstruct them. In peace and humanitarian assistance operations, there is good reason to believe that as a response the default setting is highly dysfunctional.

Coalitions. One of the reasons that default settings generally are problematic relates to the mention, above, of United Nations's "doctrine" on information. This reminds us that the military is not the only player on the scene. (Factoring in relief and development NGOs, it is rarely the first on the scene.) Peace operations today usually entail not just a singular military presence, but rather, especially in UN-mandated operations, a joint or coalition military presence. Each national contingent comes with its own doctrine, its own rules of engagement (or at least, their *interpretation*), and—in the classic problem of all UN peace missions—its own reporting (if not fully articulated command and control) lines back to its own capital, joint chiefs, or ministry of defense. All this diversity entails the possibility that different default settings for crucial tasks exist among the different militaries in the operation. For example, the French entered IFOR with an aversion to PSYOP (see below). To take another example, many of the activities conducted by special (usually reservist) civil affairs units in the American army are routinely conducted by conventional units (and troops) of the British army.⁸ At the very least, this results in different "stovepipe" command and control architectures at tactical

and operational levels for the two contingents in the field. In joint or coalition operations, where by definition they must work together—at least toward the same strategic goals—on civil affairs matters, then successful coordination simply cannot be assumed.

Multiple parties, multiple cultures. Although the similar structures and shared culture of most professional militaries will go a long way to mitigate these differences, the situation today is always complicated by the fact that militaries are never the only third-party intervenors on the scene. We have mentioned briefly relief and development NGOs. In fact, civilians of various sorts, from international civil servants or police, to journalists and NGOs, bring with them their own national and institutional cultures, not to mention their own goals. To this is added the culture(s) of the locals. In this way, peace operations (especially when combined with humanitarian aspects), have become complicated multicultural fields of national, political, and institutional interactions. The conduct of information campaigns (among all other tasks) must in the end both reflect and adapt to this cultural complexity. Although it may be said that all tasks carried on in the operation must take account of this cultural complexity, it is the case that *information* activities are especially vulnerable, because information transmission depends basically on communication, and communication depends fundamentally on shared codes—the ability of senders and receivers to successfully interpret one another. Matters of interpretation are cultural matters. *This means that attention to issues of cultural sensitivity is crucial to the success of these operations.* Nowhere is this more evident than when we consider the crucial, and in many ways oversized, role the media plays in peace operations.

THE ROLE OF THE MEDIA IN INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS

While in the military's approach to information the media is explicitly referenced only in one of the three pillars—*public information*—the role that it plays in the dynamics of peace operations is recognizably a much broader one. In PDD-25 (1996), mentioned above, information was understood mostly in terms of a “small public affairs cell,” established in aid of enhancing force protection—consonant with the dominant military view of things. By the time the next executive-level pronouncement on these matters was made—Presidential Directive 56 (PDD-56) in May 1997—information activities were divided in two parts. Under functional tasks and agency plans, “public information” was included as part of the larger Political-Military (POLMIL) plan for complex contingency operations. Another aspect of information campaigning was also singled out. Under the rubric of “preparatory tasks,” to be undertaken before the operation begins, along with “congressional consultation” and seeing to “funding requirements and sources,” was listed “media coordination.”⁹ Although not explicitly stated, the “media” in question was not presumed to be limited only to those “within the host countries,” the main orientation of PDD-25. By the time PDD-56 was promulgated, information campaigning had come to include forthrightly a public relations dimension. After Somalia, the “hearts and minds” to be won over in mounting these operations were not only those of the host country—the traditional PSYOP targets. They now included, perhaps predominantly, the hearts and minds of the American people and Congress.

No one has expressed this more articulately, and perhaps more often, than Ambassador Robert B. Oakley. Before his full on-the-ground experience in Somalia, Oakley said he conceived of peace support operations as a “three-legged stool”: humanitarian/economic, military/security, and political/diplomatic. After Somalia, especially after dealing with the extremely media-savvy General Mohamed Farah Aideed, Oakley concluded

that you had to add a fourth leg, make it a table rather than a stool. The fourth leg would be public information which includes public relations going out, the messages that the media are conveying. If you lose the public relations, that is the message going out, then you can lose your support at home.... The same thing happens internally. If your enemies or potential enemies get the upper hand in terms of information, they begin to look good and you begin to look bad. And this incites more and more people to turn against you and it disrupts your mission.¹⁰

This sense of information campaign as a public relations endeavor aimed at the international media, *Newsweek*, and *The New York Times*—conceived, that is, essentially as a PSYOP operation directed at American public opinion—refers to what is now routinely called the “CNN effect,” which may be summed up succinctly in the oft-repeated phrase, “CNN got us into Somalia, and CNN got us out.”¹¹ It is no coincidence that the complex peace and humanitarian support operation in Somalia is nowadays used to illustrate the power of the growing worldwide electronic media (synecdochically represented by CNN). According to conventional wisdom, images of starving children on prime-time nightly news broadcasts were said to have influenced President Bush to send in U.S. troops to protect food

convoys, and images of the dead American soldier dragged through the streets of Mogadishu, as well as of Chief Warrant Officer Michael Durant held prisoner by the Somalis after the deadly fire fight of October 4, 1993, were said to have determined President Clinton's decision to pull out.

But Warren Strobel's study of the media's influence on peace or humanitarian support operations—specifically in Bosnia, Rwanda, Haiti, and northern Iraq—paints a more complicated picture. Media influence can easily be overstated, both by its critics and supporters. Although Strobel argues that the *potential* for media influence is certainly strong after an operation has begun—and therefore the potential for *pulling* the United States out of one is, as in Somalia, a great one, he finds less evidence that media attention or editorializing can by itself *push* the United States into such an operation. Moreover, by its very mandate of reporting the news, media finds itself having to report official, Administration, policy positions first. In this sense, media always initially follows the official line. If, however, the official line is fragmented, contradictory, incoherent, or at serious variance with facts on the ground—that is, if there is no consensus, a sudden shift in policy or, worse, a policy or communications vacuum, *then* media can—and will—move in to the vacuum and have a determining effect on policy and decision-making.¹²

Without doubt, gaining and maintaining public and congressional support through the media is important for the military in both warfighting and peace operations. But the question of media presence is important because once again it raises the problem of differences between combat and peace operations. First of all, perhaps as a residue of the infamous “five o'clock follies” of the Vietnam era, the military tends to slip easily into viewing media through an

adversarial lens—a “default setting?” In combat operations subsequent to Vietnam, from Panama and Grenada through *Operation Desert Storm*, it has tried in different ways (notably the controversial “press pool”) to limit and control media access to and autonomy in the battlespace. The main reason given is the sacrosanct one of operational security and force protection. Predictably, the media responds with vocal and heated criticism. But whatever the dynamics of military-media interaction are in full combat, where the military enjoys the upper-hand, in peace or humanitarian support operations the dynamics are much more complex for, among other reasons, the following:

- Appreciating the powerful public relations potential of the media for building popular support for such operations, actors at the national decision- and policy-making levels might attempt to use media politically in ways that go against principles of security. No better example exists than the glare of TV lights that greeted Navy Seals and Marines as they landed (luckily, unopposed) on Mogadishu’s beaches on the night of December 9, 1992. Although the media was heavily criticized for this breach of security at the time, it had been told by Pentagon and State Department officials where and when the landing would occur, and invited to cover fully the exciting “photo op.”¹³
- The dictum that, force security issues aside, peace operations will be “transparent” means that media can demand greater access to operational functions and units. In addition, the often non-obvious ways in which these operations relate directly to U.S. national security or interests, means that positive media coverage can go a long way to building popular and

congressional support (see above), but also, as Kenneth Allard has put it, “In our system...the media spotlight serves the additional purpose of public accountability and highlights our special responsibilities whenever we put the lives of American troops at risk—something that is an inevitable part of any peace operation.”¹⁴

- The presence in the field of diverse civilian (nonmilitary) actors means that media are not dependent solely on military sources for information, or even logistical support. Moreover, some of these civilian actors, notably relief and development NGOs that depend on public contributions for their own survival and thus welcome and seek out broad media attention to their work, will often invite media coverage into areas where the military might seek to obstruct it.¹⁵ Even more pointedly than the lack of congruence between military and NGO agendas (with respect to media), may be that between military and indigenous leaders or actors.
- Because there is usually no clear “enemy” in these operations (hunger, disease, drought, anarchy, etc., are the “enemies”—at least at first), and often a reluctance on the part of the international community to stamp even emerging indigenous adversaries with an “enemy” label, media has relatively open access to indigenous actors and leaders in ways that, as CNN’s Peter Arnett found while broadcasting from Baghdad in early 1991, are much more difficult in war situations. (Recall that Arnett was accused of treason by Wyoming Senator Alan Simpson.) This openness means that the media can be used reciprocally by indigenous actors *as part of their own information*

campaign vis-à-vis the peace operation. Mention was made earlier of the media-savvy General Aideed. Walter Clarke has called him the most effective of all the Somali warlords in using media coverage to demonstrate their credibility and legitimacy as leaders—to *the international community*. Aideed “always had a cameraman ready to record the visits to his office of senior U.S. and UN officials....[Whose nearly daily calls and] slavish kowtowing... was baffling to most Somalis.”¹⁶ Of course, what Gen. Aideed was doing was pursuing his own information campaign against UNOSOM—a campaign, incidentally, closer in many ways to pure information warfare—it included the skillful use of deception and disinformation, for example.

In analyzing the role media plays in peace and humanitarian support operations, two conclusions from Strobel’s study are worth emphasizing. First, with respect to the military’s role, “Public affairs cannot be a second- or third-tier priority (or worse, an afterthought) in peace operations, as it has been in too many recent military deployments. A media and public affairs plan needs to be in place well before the mission begins and should be integrated into the overall operational plan.”¹⁷ His second point goes directly to the heart of the multi-institutional nature of these operations, especially the UN’s role in them: “[T]he United Nations urgently needs to improve its public affairs apparatus, both in New York and in the field. Every reporter interviewed for this study, as well as many civilian and military officials, harshly criticized the closed and inefficient manner in which the United Nations distributes information.”¹⁸

In the next section, before turning to our major two case studies, Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina, we briefly review

the development of information activities in peace and humanitarian support operations, continuing to highlight conceptual and operational problem areas.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS IN PEACE OPERATIONS

Any “history” of information campaigns in peace operations would necessarily come in the plural. As noted above, each national military contingent brings with it its own doctrine on information—for example on what constitutes *public* information, on the nature and amount of information to release, to whom, and when. When one national contingent dominates an operation, then its own doctrine may dominate (see the chapter on Haiti). In joint or coalition operations, however, such differences can lead to major disagreements among coalition members—as they did among French, British, and Americans in IFOR/SFOR (see the Bosnia-Herzegovina chapter). Mention was already made of the different placement of civil affairs functions in British and U.S. Army doctrine. Within IFOR/SFOR, there were other problems as well.

Sensitivities to PSYOP. The French in IFOR, for example, initially resisted using PSYOP capabilities because of a “doctrinal” reluctance toward PSYOP rooted in their own recent history: the involvement of PSYOP officers in the “Generals’ coup” of 1961 toward the end of the Algerian conflict. Moreover, PSYOP as a whole labors under its identification with “brainwashing” or “Manchurian Candidate” scenarios, which render it frightening or at least suspect to many civilians.¹⁹ Yet PSYOP is arguably an integral part of *any* information campaign. At the July 13, 1998, workshop, for example, one of the NGO participants,

active in relating media outreach to conflict resolution concerns, noted that what they do—fostering through media attitudinal and behavioral changes toward the nonviolent resolution of conflict—could also be considered “psychological operations.” He went on to note that in fact one could argue that the beloved children’s TV show *Sesame Street* is also a “psychological operation” because it attempts to change children’s attitudes and behavior toward learning. However, it is worth noting that in warfighting, “full” PSYOP legitimately includes *deception* and *disinformation* as part of its armamentarium, among several other techniques that *Sesame Street* would presumably eschew. *The whole question of deception and disinformation is hugely problematic in peace operations, where “transparency” is valued, and the credibility of the intervening third party (to the disputants) is deemed crucial to the mission’s success.* Even forswearing deception and disinformation, still, the basic PSYOP mission—to influence attitudes and change behavior—may remain problematic for a Public Information/Affairs officer, who needs to maintain credibility while facing a perennially skeptical press. For these reasons, the lingering aroma surrounding PSYOP remains sulfuric, and what one finds is that in recent peace operations the *functions* of PSYOP get carried on in units bearing other, euphemistic, names: in Haiti, Military Information Support Teams (MIST), in Bosnia-Herzegovina the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF).

UN sensitivities to intelligence. When the UN enters the picture in these operations the situation becomes even more complicated, because at that point the multifarious national and cultural sensibilities of the Security Council—much less the General Assembly!—come into play. This affects information activities in particular, because members’

national/cultural attitudes toward and experience with information in general—say, the role of an independent and critical press—can vary tremendously. Nowhere is this more apparent than in considering the unsettled linkage (perhaps especially in civil affairs units or by public information officers) between “information” and “intelligence.”²⁰ In military thinking, information and intelligence remain connected cognitively (if not always operationally).²¹ This linkage carries over in the UN, where although “intelligence is only a part of information,” the “UN word for ‘intelligence’ is ‘information.’”²² This creates a problem for the UN because both structurally—there has been no separate unit in the UN devoted to intelligence—and culturally—there is strong feeling among members (for various reasons) that the UN *ought not* to have intelligence capabilities—the UN resists openly committing itself to developing independent intelligence capabilities. Yet the closer “peacekeeping” gets to “peace enforcement,” the closer UN troops come to engaging in combat, the more important situational awareness and intelligence capabilities become. Thus, from the Congo operation onward (ONUC, 1960–1964),²³ although no formal United Nations “intelligence service” existed, force commanders sought (invariably) and had (variably) access to intelligence—supplied either by its own military intelligence officers, its own or other national intelligence services, embassies or, wittingly or not, journalists or NGOs.²⁴

In fact, so far as UN peace operations are concerned, it is fair to say that a sense of “information activities” much beyond the narrow military understanding of it as intelligence-gathering, or even in the public relations sense of a mission-specific public affairs or press spokesperson (even if relatively ineffective, as Strobel contends), did not seriously begin until Namibia (1991), Cambodia (UNTAC,

March 1992–September 1993) and, more problematically, Somalia.²⁵ We will focus briefly on the latter two.

Somalia. In Somalia, the situation vis-à-vis information was complicated by the different structures, personnel, and mandates that all changed from UNOSOM-I through UNITAF and UNOSOM-II. The special representative of the UN secretary general (SRSG) from March through October 1992, was Mohamed Sahnoun, who was noted for his abilities to reach out to broad sectors of Somali society, including elders and Somali journalists. After he resigned in late October over disagreements with HQ-New York, many elders and indigenous journalists complained that they were never taken as seriously by subsequent representatives (who seemed, as Walter Clarke noted, to favor the so-called warlords.)²⁶

When the American-led UNITAF forces arrived it was recognized from the outset that the mission had to be “explained to the Somalis”—an apt way to express the core of an information campaign in peace operations.²⁷ Within a week of landing, the U.S. Army set up a Somali-language newspaper, *Rajo* (“Hope”), and a radio station.²⁸ Circulation of *Rajo* in Mogadishu soon reached about 18,000, with an additional 5,000–8,000 distributed by air to the interior. Also air-dropped were leaflets in Somali addressing specific issues such as mine safety. The radio station suffered technical transmission problems, however, and many Somalis derided the apparently poor quality of Somali writing and oration in these media.²⁹ Whatever their problems, these information activities were crucial to the mission and successful enough that Aideed’s own radio station regularly attacked *Rajo*. Significantly, when UNITAF handed over the mission to the UN, in UNOSOM-II, the PSYOP unit that ran the newspaper and *Rajo*, as well as key civil affairs units, were not replaced. In the opinion

of Hirsch and Oakley, this lack (among others) seriously compromised the effectiveness of UNOSOM-II.³⁰

So far as the “third pillar” of the information campaign, civil-military affairs, was concerned, the great innovation of Somalia (at least the UNITAF portion of it) was the refinement of the Humanitarian Operations Center/Civil Military Operations Center (HOC/CMOC), which coordinated NGO and military actors.³¹ Even here, however, problems arose initially because the majority of civil affairs troops are reservists, and when C Company of the 96th Civil Affairs unit (the only active duty C.A. unit in the Army) was sent to Somalia, its reserves component was never activated. Seiple remarks: “[T]he Marines thought they did not need them....the call-up of such units generally implies the longer-term commitment of nation-building, something that was clearly not part of the mission statement. The Marines, as a short-term expeditionary unit, fit the political climate of Washington, DC.”³² In any event, as noted above, both PSYOP and civil affairs capabilities declined significantly after the hand-over to UNOSOM-II, with deleterious effects on the mission. With regard to the “first pillar” of information campaigning, Public Information (PI), even U.S. forces in UNOSOM-II had no public affairs organization, the lack of which Maj. Gen. Thomas Montgomery complained about.³³

One of the possible lessons from Somalia is the potential degradation in coherence and effectiveness of an information campaign in the passage from a formally multilateral but still single force dominated operation (UNITAF), to a more thoroughgoing multilateral UN dominated one (UNOSOM-II). Note that in a sense this trajectory was reversed in Bosnia-Herzegovina; in fact, the opposite occurred

there: UNPROFOR was replaced by a formally joint but in fact far more consistent command and control apparatus in NATO/IFOR—with a far more coherent information campaign as one result (see the chapter in this report on Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Cambodia.³⁴ The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) began operations in the country in March 1992, following the signing of the Agreement on a Comprehensive Political Settlement in Paris by all the parties to the conflict in October 1991. Central to the agreement was the holding of national elections, and UNTAC's mandate specifically charged it with organizing "free and fair elections." From the mission's inception an information component was built in. The formal information campaign was handled by the Information and Education Division ("Info/Ed"), directed by Timothy Carney. It was under Info/Ed that Radio UNTAC, in November 1992, was established, headquartered in Phnom Penh. It marked the first time in its almost 45-year history of peace operations that the UN used radio directly as a way to advance peacemaking. The AM station cost the UN about \$3 million, which included studio construction and equipment, especially the several transmitters needed to broadcast the signal to the entire country. During peak listening periods, according to the Radio UNTAC's director, Jeffrey Heyman, about 97 percent of Cambodia was included in the station's "footprint." UNTAC estimates of daily listenership when the station was fully up and running was 6 to 9 million. Because many Cambodians could not afford a radio, a Japanese NGO, with corporate and government of Japan support, collected close to 500,000 used and new radios in Japan and gave them away or sold them for a nominal amount. (This tactic would be repeated by Americans in

Haiti—see Haiti chapter.) This is a fine example of corporate/governmental/UN/NGO cooperation in mounting an information campaign. By all reports Radio UNTAC was a success, and Heyman noted that William Shawcross, a longtime commentator on Cambodian affairs, has said that Radio UNTAC's record proves that radio can be crucial to peace operations.

No doubt in addition to the devotion, skills, and commitment of Radio UNTAC's staff, several other factors for its success must be mentioned. First, there was very little competition to Radio UNTAC in the country—certainly none of it funded with several millions of dollars, allowing it to possess as large an electronic footprint as the UN radio station. (This is in pointed contrast to Haiti but especially with Bosnia-Herzegovina.) Second, the cooperation between the UN and Japanese sources of a half million inexpensive transistor radios, mentioned above, was extremely fortuitous. Third, the station employed as staff announcers and reporters individuals who were fluent in Khmer and knew the country well; they were culturally attuned. Fourth, there was effective cooperation between Info/Ed, which supported the station, and the rest of the UN mission. And finally, although the station did branch out into general news coverage and entertainment, it was always able to maintain a clear broadcast focus, one that paralleled UNTAC's mandate in general: the organization of free and fair elections. With respect to the elections, Heyman said, "The station's message to the Cambodian people remained clear and simple: 'Your vote is secret.'"³⁵

To summarize the development of information activities in United Nations peace operations: until Cambodia and Somalia they were underdeveloped. Somalia is a problematic case, because information activities were supported (if

imperfectly) during UNITAF, but devolved and suffered degradation in the transition to UNOSOM-II. The Cambodian experience, on the other hand, shows that a coherent information campaign relying upon electronic media such as radio can be very effective in furthering the goals of the mission. It remains to be seen if the lessons learned and positive accomplishments of Radio UNTAC can be carried forward into very different operational environment.

¹This reflects doctrine in the U.S. Army's Field Manual (FM) 100-6, as related in an interview carried out by Pascale Siegel with Col. Halbert Stevens, director of Land Information Warfare Activity (LIWA), Ft. Belvoir VA, on April 9, 1998. FM 100-6 is an Army, not a Joint, document; but the Joint document on Information Operations, when it emerges, will probably reflect closely FM 100-6.

²In *What Is Information Warfare?* p. x.

³In *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations*, 1998, pp. 2-3.

⁴PDD-25, *Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations*, issued by the Bureau of International Organizational Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 22, 1996, section IV, p. 7.

⁵For example, *A Guide to Peace Support Operations*, John Mackinlay, 1996, p. 27; or "C3I for Peace Operations: Lessons from Bosnia," Larry Wentz, In *Analysis for and of the Resolution of Conflict*, 1998, p. 219.

⁶See *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, Kenneth Allard, pp. 86-87.

⁷See for example, *Requirements for Humanitarian Assistance and Peace Operations: Insight from Seven Case Studies*, Adam B. Siegel, 1995, p. 22.

⁸"Different Countries Different Worlds: National Approaches to Civil-Military Coordination in Peace and Humanitarian Assistance Operations," J. Landon and R.E. Hayes, In *Analysis for and of the Resolution of Conflict*, 1998, p. 53.

⁹White Paper: *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Managing Complex Contingency Operations: Presidential Decision Directive 56*, May 1997.

¹⁰Ambassador Oakley made this point at many conferences and workshops; these words can be found in remarks reported in *Cooperation, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Leif Ahlquist, 1996, p. 80.

¹¹*Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media's Influence on Peace Operations*, Warren P. Strobel, 1997, p. 131.

¹²See *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*.

¹³See *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, pp. 92–93.

¹⁴In *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, 1995, p. 87.

¹⁵Ambassador Ismat Kittani, who replaced Mohamed Sahnoun as SRSG in Somalia in October 1992 (UNOSOM-I), reflected bitterly on the “tremendous influence” of NGOs over the media, “half our time is spent answering and defending allegations by the media, the source of which is NGOs....They are the darlings of the media, because they are free, they have no accountability, they only account to themselves, so they constantly criticise the UN....” Quoted in *Cooperation, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, p. 88.

¹⁶In *Learning From Somalia*, 1997, p. 12.

¹⁷*Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, p. 229.

¹⁸*Late-Breaking Foreign Policy*, p. 231.

¹⁹See *The Role of Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations in Humanitarian Assistance Operations*, p. 12.

²⁰In joint or coalition operations even the “internal” linkages of functional areas can be problematic. In NATO doctrine, for example, intelligence is a national prerogative, and in IFOR/SFOR intelligence “cells” remained under national command and control; see *Target Bosnia*, pp. 27–28.

²¹For example, “C3I For Peace Operations: Lessons Learned From Bosnia,” p. 219.

²²*Cooperation, Command and Control in UN Peace Support Operations: A Case Study on Haiti*, p. 143.

²³On the Congo see *Military Advisor to the Secretary General: UN Peacekeeping and the Congo Crisis*, Indarjit Rikhye, 1993.

²⁴Perhaps even more than journalists, most NGOs are particularly sensitive to being “used” for intelligence purposes, because they (rightfully) believe that any connection of that sort made between them and the military would seriously compromise their ability to work in the host country. Also, part of the overt ideology or deeper cultural ethos of some NGOs is an antimilitary (sometimes specifically anti-American, occasionally even anti-Western) strain.

²⁵The Somalia operation was comprised of UNOSOM-I (Provide Relief, August 1992–December 1992); UNITAF (Restore Hope, December 1992–May 1993); and UNOSOM-II (May 1993–March 1994).

²⁶See *Somalia: The Missed Opportunities*, Mohamed Sahnoun, U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1994.

²⁷See *Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, John L. Hirsch and Robert B. Oakley, U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1995, esp. pp. 61–63.

²⁸According to Hirsch and Oakley, the radio was particularly important because the much listened to BBC's Somali-language service, perhaps unbeknownst to its English-speaking head, "had a decided political slant, often hostile to the United States and UNITAF." In effect there were already information campaigns being carried on that had to be acknowledged, assessed, and dealt with.

²⁹Finding qualified linguists (especially given limitations imposed by security concerns) is a problem in all peace operations, where communication with indigenous civilians is both frequent and crucial to the mission's success. See (on Somalia) *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, and more generally, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*, Chris Seiple, 1996.

³⁰*Somalia and Operation Restore Hope*, p. 153, fn. 5.

³¹HOC/CMOC had their origins in such earlier U.S.-dominated humanitarian relief operations as *Provide Comfort* (northern Iraq, April 1991) and *Sea Angel* (Bangladesh, May 1991); see *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions* for a full discussion. On Somalia, see also "Military Relationships with Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations from Restore Hope," Jonathan Dworken, 1993.

³²In, *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship*, p. 112.

³³Maj. Gen. Montgomery served as commander of U.S. forces and as deputy UN commander for UNOSOM-II. See *Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned*, pp. 85–87.

³⁴This section relies heavily on an interview Avruch carried out in Sarajevo on July 21, 1998, with Jeffrey Heyman, who was the Common Ground Productions Television Project Director there. In 1992–1993, Heyman directed Radio UNTAC in Cambodia, and some of the interview dealt with his Cambodian experiences. See also his article in *Monitoring Times* 13(10), "The Story of Radio UNTAC: The United Nations' First Peacekeeping Radio Station," 1994. See as well the brief discussion of information activities in Cambodia in *Cooperation, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations*, pp. 73–75.

³⁵Avruch-Heyman interview, July 21, 1998. See also his article, cited above.

BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA INFORMATION CAMPAIGN¹

GOALS AND METHODOLOGY

The overall study is designed to answer two questions:

1. What are the possibilities of coordinating and collaborating on information campaigns across all players in a peace operation?
2. What are the principles of an information campaign in peace operations and how is its effectiveness measured?

This research trip was designed as a case study to document and analyze the “information campaign” led by the international community in the Bosnian peace operation. More precisely, the campaign was designed to convince the local populations that the Dayton agreement (which stopped the war in December 1995 and lay the groundwork for the political and economic reconstruction of a unified, democratic, multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina) could lead to a brighter and better future.

The team viewed its task as gathering as much information as possible on the following aspects of the campaign:

- The campaign itself—The team sought to identify the players, what their information activities are, and how they coordinate their operations.
- The campaign principles—The team sought to analyze why the campaign is run the way it is.
- The campaign effectiveness—The team sought to explain how the international community views its effectiveness.

We did not try, however, to assess the campaign's impact. We determined we did not have the tools, resources, and time necessary to conduct such a research.²

To achieve our goals we interviewed numerous actors of the “campaign” within the international organizations tasked by the Dayton agreement (SFOR, OHR, UNHCR, OSCE, UN), governmental organizations in charge of democratization and reconstruction (such as the European Commission and USAID), non-governmental organizations involved in media actions (such as the Soros foundation, Common Ground Productions, Media Plan). We also spoke to local journalists who confront every day the international community's information campaign, and discussed with them how it affects their work. We managed to talk to journalists from all sides: Bosniaks, Bosnian Serbs (in Banja Luka, Lukavica, and Pale) and Bosnian Croats (in West Mostar). We interviewed journalists from State-owned media (RTV B-H, SRT Pale), pseudo-independent media and internationally owned media (OBN).³

BACKGROUND

A Few Words About the War in Bosnia-Herzegovina

War broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in April 1992 after the government of Alija Izetbegovitch declared independence from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). At that point, the Bosnian Serbs, fully backed by the Yugoslav army (JNA) and the Serbian government of Slobodan Milosevic, launched a ruthless offensive across Bosnia to establish an ethnically pure (composed only of Bosnian Serbs) independent republic (Republika Srpska). Thus began a 3-year siege of Sarajevo. Their operations were mostly targeted against the Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims under the leadership of Izetbegovitch) and incidentally against the Croats. In March 1993, fighting erupted between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks. Like their Serb counterparts, the Bosnian Croats thought to create an ethnically pure territory in Bosnia with the full backing of the Croatian government. The Bosniak government of Alija Izetbegovitch claimed to support a unified, multi-ethnic Bosnia. Finally, in the Northern part of the country, two Bosniak factions fought one another. The fighting continued until October 1995, when a viable cease-fire was signed and respected by all three parties. Fighting on all sides was marked by ethnic cleansing, savagery, and countless atrocities.

The international community's response was at first slow to come and then inadequate. In 1992, the UN Security Council authorized a blue beret mission, the United Nations Force Protection (UNPROFOR). It was tasked with helping the delivery of humanitarian aid across the country. The mission quickly came under attack from the Bosnian factions, the international press, and international and non-

governmental organizations because its mandate was viewed as totally inadequate, because it took little to no action to stop the fighting and the atrocities. Worse, in the view of many analysts, the UN's inaction made it an accomplice to the atrocities committed in the name of nationalism.

Meanwhile, European diplomacy failed in its attempt to solve the crisis. By the end of the Cold War, the European Union moved toward a closer political integration (which until then had been prevented by the strategic environment), particularly in the fields of defense and foreign policy; however, when war broke out in Bosnia, the European process was still in its infancy. The European partners were unable to come up with a coherent approach to the conflict. In addition, the parties to the war (especially the Bosnian Serb leadership and Milosevic) did not take European threats seriously. They viewed the EU as a political dwarf and did not believe it had the ability to impose or coerce any solution. The situation was no better on the other side of the Atlantic. The Bush administration first considered Bosnia a European matter, and decided to adopt a hands-off approach. After Clinton's election, when American diplomacy turned toward Bosnia, its approach was quite different from the Europeans. It is an understatement to say that European and American diplomacies often found themselves at odds to the point that they eventually undermined any possibility of resolution.⁴ Bosnia marked one of the gravest recent crises in American-European relations. For more than 3 years, the international community's mishandling of the situation allowed the war and the massacres to go on unpunished.

Three major events turned things around in 1995. First, the American government decided to take a leading position in the negotiations. First with Robert Fraiser and later with Richard Holbrooke as a presidential special envoy in Bosnia, the U.S. government became fully involved in the diplomatic

effort and committed itself to participating (with a sizable force) in the enforcement process of any subsequent agreement. In Europe, too, the climate finally favored a more forceful approach. Jacques Chirac, newly elected President of France, in May 1995 advocated either a complete withdrawal or a radical modification of the UNPROFOR mission, a view increasingly shared by his British counterparts. Second, in late summer 1995, the Croats launched an offensive to regain control of the Krajina.⁵ Similarly, in Bosnia Izetbegovitch's government launched an offensive against Bosnian-Serb held territories. For the first time since 1992, the Bosnian Serbs were on the defensive and losing previously conquered territory. Finally, NATO was called in to bomb Bosnian-Serb targets (notably after a presumably Serb mortar fell on a Sarajevo market, killing 34 people), sending a strong message that the international community was no longer willing to stand by idly while civilians were killed. In the wake of these events, the Bosniaks, Bosnian-Croats and Serbs (representing the Bosnian-Serbs) agreed to meet for negotiations in Dayton, Ohio, under U.S. government auspices. After several months of negotiations, the General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), better known as the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), was signed in Paris on December 14, 1995. It provided the structure and mandates for an international mission designed to end the fighting and help the Former Warring Factions achieve reconciliation under a single, unified, democratic and multi-ethnic Bosnia.

The DPA lays down the responsibilities of the parties and the international community in the implementation process. It establishes that the parties are mostly responsible for implementing the agreement. Five major international organizations are tasked with helping in the process. NATO is tasked with "ensuring a durable cease-fire" by separating

the factions, cantoning their heavy weapons, and monitoring the factions' compliance with the military provisions of the agreement. Among the five international organizations, only NATO has any enforcement powers in case of non-compliance. The Office of the High Representative (OHR) is tasked with coordinating and facilitating the implementation of the civilian aspects of the agreement. OHR is also tasked with helping the factions set up common political institutions. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) is tasked with helping the factions organize the returns and resettlement of hundreds of thousands of refugees and displaced persons. The Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) is tasked with organizing national and municipal elections. The United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH) is tasked with setting up an international police task force to help the factions' reform their police institutions.⁶ As the operation progressed, the international community's mandate changed slightly. For example, NATO has become more involved in the civilian implementation expanding the scope of its activities to support more effectively refugee returns or media reform. Similarly, the OHR has become more directive than originally planned, making decisions when the parties fail to come to an agreement on their own.⁷

The Role of Propaganda in the Bosnian Conflict

“My country was first shattered by the media, then by guns.”⁸ Indeed, propaganda and control of the airwaves played a major role in forging the war and justifying the factions' strategies.

Step One

The first step in this process occurred in the mid-1980s in Serbia. As soon as Slobodan Milosevic arose to power in 1987, he replaced the leadership of TV Belgrade with supporters of the “new Serb nationalism” and fired several hundred journalists who did not subscribe to his agenda. As a result, Serb television began promoting the official national myth of the Serbian people’s eternal martyrdom. According to Renaud de la Brosse, a French scholar who studied propaganda during the Bosnian conflict, the Serbian media reflected on the great past of the Serbian nation, devoting articles and programs to the injustices and attacks the Serbians had fallen victims to during their long history. Among the events recounted at great length were the 1389 battle of Kosovo (where the Ottomans defeated the Serbs and put an end to the autonomy of Serbia) and the “genocide” of Serbs orchestrated by the Ustachas of Ante Palevitch in Croatia during World War II.⁹ Throughout the 1990s, Serbian media reinforced the memory of the crimes committed (or supposedly committed) by other communities against the Serb people, thus demonizing Kosovo Albanians, Croats, and Bosniaks, and paving the way for justifying the war aims and the atrocities committed along the way.¹⁰

Step Two

The second step was taken when war broke out, first in Croatia (June 1991) and then in Bosnia (April 1992). In each case, nationalistic forces took control of the existing media as well as created new ones to broadcast their messages. They instituted censorship and limited or eradicated the few existing independent voices. For example, when the war broke out in Croatia, Franjo Tujman’s party (HDZ) fired several hundred journalists from the state television in Zagreb and established censorship. The few

independent media outlets remaining were subject to harassment and intimidation to align them with the nationalist party's line. Similarly, when the war broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the three communities (Bosniaks, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs) each established new media and seized control of existing ones to serve as vehicles for their respective propaganda campaigns. In Bosnia's case, the battle for the airwaves even preceded the guns. Six months before the Bosniak government declared independence (April 1992), the Serb-controlled Yugoslav National Army seized or destroyed 8 out of 11 Bosnian main television transmitters and repeaters and established a rival network to Radio-Television Bosnia-Herzegovina (RTV B-H). This allowed the Bosnian Serbs to broadcast their inflammatory propaganda over half the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.¹¹ Similarly, a few weeks before the war broke out between the Bosnian Croats and the Bosniaks (March 1993), the Croats seized several repeaters in Bosnia-Herzegovina to allow the reception of HRT Croatia (Croat state television) throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina. They also created new media outlets favorable to their war goals (such as Radio Herceg-Bosna). Meanwhile, the Bosniak authorities imposed their own strict censorship and took editorial control of the major media outlets in the remaining territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Step Three

Throughout the war, the media on all three sides became the loyal instruments of the nationalistic parties' policies of war and ethnic purification. "From the war's outbreak, the media in former Yugoslavia mostly published and broadcast nationalist discourses, attacks, and other general insults directed against other ethnic groups. It is not surprising that this led directly to horrible atrocities on the battlefields and throughout the territory."¹² The people's

horizons shrank as the media portrayed reality in simplistic, black and white terms, demonized other ethnic groups (by exaggerating or inventing their crimes and responsibilities), and offered simplistic explanations for what was a complex and ambivalent reality. Such propaganda enabled the nationalistic parties to mobilize their public opinions in favor of their war goals and to justify whatever means they used to accomplish these goals. Marjan Malesic, a scholar from the University of Ljubana (Slovenia), analyzed Serbian and Croatian media content during the early stage of the Serbian-Croatian conflict. He concluded that both media considerably distorted a complex reality to fit the nationalistic parties' war goals. For example, he found that the mainstream Serbian media consistently portrayed Croatia as an aggressive, violent state that forced the war on the Serbian people—who simply acted in self-defense. On the other side, he found that mainstream Croatian media portrayed Serbia as an aggressive, chauvinistic, and nationalistic state, while Croatia was a peaceful state made victim to Serbian ambitions. Concerning the role of television, Malesic concludes that “there has been little debate about the conflict, and of the diagnosis-prognosis-therapy even less. Television did not contribute to a peaceful solution of the conflict. On the contrary, television *spread the hatred and fear of the opposing side.*”¹³

The UNPROFOR Experience

At the end of 1992, the UN Security Council authorized a UN mission in Bosnia to help deliver humanitarian relief to civilian populations. The mission, UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Force), quickly faced increasing hostility from the local authorities and population, as well as widespread skepticism on the part of the international press.

UNPROFOR quickly lost credibility with the international press as it appeared that its mandate was too limited to stop the fighting. The international press did not fault the UN for not delivering enough humanitarian aid, but faulted it for letting aggression and ethnic cleansing go unpunished and most of all unstopped. As Alex Ivanko, spokesman for the UNPROFOR mission, put it: “We were not believed and not credible because our mission was indefensible.”¹⁴ As ethnic cleansing, concentration camps, mass murders were uncovered (summer 1992),¹⁵ the press became increasingly hostile toward the UN leadership and demanded greater action from the peacekeepers. Most of the international press viewed the UN mission as completely inadequate to respond to the situation on the ground. As Ivanko explained, the press conferences became increasingly hostile and contentious. The UN mission felt besieged and was unable to communicate its agenda.

In addition, the UN mission quickly became the target of propaganda campaigns launched against it from all sides through the international media. For example, UN peacekeepers accused both Bosnian Serbs and Bosniaks of firing at times on their own positions—even their own civilians—for the benefit of TV cameras. At his final press conference on July 21, 1992, Maj.Gen. Lewis MacKenzie (CA) explained: There is no cease-fire “because I can’t keep the two sides from firing on their own positions for the benefit of CNN.”¹⁶ All sides used their own media to discredit the UN mission and vilify the international community for not standing by their side. For example, during the first Bosnian Serb siege of Srebrenica (March 1993), the Serbian media accused the UNPROFOR of trying to infiltrate the town and prevent the Bosnian Serbs from “liberating the town.”¹⁷ Likewise, the Croatian media accused Russian UNPROFOR troops of “openly consorting

with the Chetniks, passing on information to them, congregating in the same places.”¹⁸ In addition, UN peacekeepers also believed the UNPROFOR was victim of a propaganda campaign orchestrated by the Bosniak government to discredit the UN mission to sway enough American public opinion to bring about a full-scale military intervention on its behalf. According to Stephen Badsey, a British scholar with the UK war college, this campaign consisted of discrediting the commanders of UNPROFOR by accusing them of bias in favor of the Bosnian Serbs. The personal attacks reached such a level that Gen. MacKenzie asked to be relieved because he could no longer function without risk to his troops, identified as “MacKenzie men.”¹⁹ Later, Gen. Michael Rose fell victim of similar propaganda. According to Badsey, the Bosniak campaign successfully strained the relations between the British commander on the ground and his superiors in New York (UN headquarters) and with Washington. UNPROFOR neither took these propaganda campaigns seriously nor mounted any effective counter-measures, and this contributed to the erosion of its credibility.²⁰

The Post-Dayton State of Affairs

The situation changed somewhat as the three nationalist parties agreed to a cease-fire and signed the Dayton Agreement, and as NATO deployed in the country as “IFOR” ([Dayton] Implementation Force).

As NATO prepared for its first-ever operational deployment, IFOR commanders felt that information would play a critical role in the success or failure of their mission. At all levels of the NATO structure, it was deemed paramount to avoid the mistakes that had plagued the UNPROFOR mission. NATO commanders viewed establishing a high level of

credibility with the press vital for mission success because it was the only way to gain and maintain public support. Both the IFOR and ARRC commanders considered media relations to be a central element of their operations. According to Capt. Van Dyke, IFOR Chief Public Information Officer, public information “was one of the elements of power used by the international community’s political and military leaders to shape the operational environment, deter potential conflicts, and resolve the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”²¹

The NATO deployment also marked a general change of tone in the international media’s coverage of the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The international press saluted the Dayton agreement (and American diplomacy) to finally bring a durable cease-fire and create the conditions for a possible peaceful solution to the conflict. The international press also viewed NATO in a mostly positive light. Indeed, the media considered that the NATO bombing campaign had been instrumental in bringing the Serb side (in the person of Slobodan Milosevic) to the negotiation table, and keeping it there. As far as many journalists who had reported the war for 4 years were concerned, the NATO bombing campaign confirmed their intuition that force was needed to bring the parties to negotiate.

On the other hand, Dayton did not radically change the indigenous media environment in Bosnia. First, at that point (fall-winter 1995–1996), the nationalistic parties that had fought the war retained much of their control over the local media. Although the fighting stopped, the umbilical cords connecting the indigenous media to the dominant political parties were not severed. Second, even though the international community was well aware of the dramatic role that information had played before and during the war, Dayton itself remarkably contained no provision for dealing

with the Bosnian media. It was therefore left to each of the international organizations (IO) to assess the problem and deal with it.

Looking Back at the International Community's Information Campaigns

IFOR/SFORNATO

IFOR/SFORNATO was the international organization perhaps most concerned with the media environment. Upon deployment, NATO commanders were concerned with three issues:

- Establishing a high degree of credibility with the international media to gain and maintain public support
- Making sure that NATO would be viewed differently than UNPROFOR
- Sending a strong message to the locals and the nationalistic parties that NATO would not tolerate any interference with its operations (mostly for force protection reasons).

Based on these principles, IFOR planned a proactive information campaign, especially toward the international media.

Most of the other international organizations arrived in Bosnia less preoccupied by the media situation. Most of them established public information bureaus upon arrival in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but none had a readily established strategy to deal with the local media situation. First, few of these organizations had been given any mandate to deal with the media situation. Recall that the Dayton Peace Agreement itself gave neither mandate nor special powers to the OHR for dealing with the local media environment. Only the OSCE's mandate to conduct "free and fair

elections” implied that some action might be needed to expand the free flow of information. Indeed, the issue of media independence first came up only in the few months preceding the first national elections of September 1996. At that point, the international community took the following steps:

1. The OSCE began monitoring the local press (especially for inflammatory speech), and sanctioning offending publications. According to interviews with the media development staff at the OSCE, the monitoring and sanctions did not work as expected. According to an interview with the then-director of the program, few media outlets were in fact ever sanctioned.
2. The OSCE established Radio FERN to promote an alternative information source to the established media, which continued to be overwhelmingly dominated by the nationalist parties. Radio FERN broadcasts out of Sarajevo and covers about two-thirds of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The effect it had on the 1996 elections is difficult to assess.
3. The UN set up a radio with the University of Sarajevo to encourage free and professional media environment.
4. With financial support from US-AID and the EU, the OHR launched the Open Broadcast Network (OBN), a television network of local stations whose editorial policies are deemed compatible with the Dayton Peace Agreement. In exchange for financial support, the local stations had to provide programs to the network. OBN could be seen across all entities. Today it still is the only cross-entity television network; however, OBN was not up and running appropriately

in time for the 1996 national elections. Moreover, for the next year and a half, it encountered numerous financial and technical problems, and its impact was widely viewed as negligible. By the first half of 1998, according to some observers, OBN's effectiveness has increased (see paragraph on OBN below).

All of these efforts, appeared to be too little, too late. In the fall of 1996, the International Crisis Group (ICG) issued a critical report on the international community's actions toward the local media. The London-based group concluded that the international community had put too little emphasis on democratization of the media in Bosnia. Meanwhile, the Peace Implementation Conference (PIC, consisting of representatives of the Contact Group and overseeing the High Representative's work in Bosnia), and the OSCE decided to devote more attention to the media situation. The successive mandate revisions have put some teeth in the international community's plan to foster media democratization in the country.

The OSCE set up an intensive media monitoring program, established regulations for media content (banning hate and inflammatory speech), as well as an enforcement process to punish violations.

The PIC mandated the High Representative to curb inflammatory speech and foster independent media. Since December 1996, the PIC regularly has emphasized the need for media restructuring and augmented the High Representative's prerogatives in that domain. The most important document is the declaration of Sintra (May 1997). This change in the mandate made it possible for the OHR to act forcefully to coerce to some degree the local media into restructuring.

THE INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AS OF SUMMER 1998

As of summer 1998, it can be claimed that the international community has been running an “information campaign” in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The campaign is designed to foster local acceptance of the Dayton agreement and to help facilitate its implementation. The main focus of the campaign is to convince the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina that they will be better off if the Dayton agreement is fully implemented. The campaign appears all the more crucial to the international community’s effort in Bosnia in that the local political leadership (especially the nationalistic parties that still dominate the political landscape) has proven reluctant to implement fully the agreement. For the international community, it was hoped that swaying the local population in favor of Dayton would put additional pressure on the local political parties to accept the agreement and start seriously implementing it.

The SFOR Information Campaign

The SFOR effort is a two-legged campaign relying mostly on Public Information (PI) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP). The PI effort consists of releasing factual information on the SFOR mission and activities to inform the local and international media. The PSYOP effort is designed to alter the attitudes of the locals in the hope they will change their behavior.

SFOR-PI conducts regular media activities. It organizes press conferences (twice a week at the Coalition Press and Information Center in Tito Barracks in Sarajevo). The press conferences are held jointly with representatives of the international community, in English (with simultaneous

translation in Serbo-Croat for local reporters). According to an SFOR spokesman, some difficulty still resides in attracting non-Bosniak reporters to the daily briefing. SFOR-PI also organizes media opportunities for the local and international press. It provides information and logistical assistance for reporters who want to cover stories about SFOR operations. SFOR-PI releases regular press communiqués. Finally, it monitors the local and international press for stories relating to SFOR. The monitoring involves two elements: SFOR checks local reports for inflammatory language (such as incitements to riot or disturbances) that may have an impact on SFOR's mission. SFOR also monitors local and international press to check how its message has played out in the media. SFOR Public Information Officers (PIOs) encode articles in a "red-amber-green" code, according to whether the articles are negative, neutral, or positive towards SFOR. Such monitoring helps the PIO to determine the issues that the media care about, to inform the SFOR Commander (COMSFOR) about the media's apparent agenda, and to develop appropriate responses. Finally, SFOR-PI puts out command information (news magazines and other regular publications to inform the NATO troops about the deployment).²²

SFOR-PSYOP

The PSYOP effort is called the Combined Joint SFOR Information Campaign Task Force (CJICTF).²³ By July 1998, it was a multinational effort with a U.S.–German–British–French headquarters and several nations contributing personnel at the division level.²⁴ According to the CJICTF's Operations Officer (S3), the PSYOP effort supports COMSFOR's priority programs.

OSCE-Sponsored (September 1998) National Elections (*Operation Camelot*)

As with the 1996 national and 1997 local elections, the CJICTF helps the OSCE voter education program produce and disseminate information about the voting process. In July 1998, the CJICTF's level of support was slightly scaled back from 1997 levels (mostly because of the CJICTF reduced capabilities). SFOR also disseminates its own products, stressing the "secure environment" theme to let the people know it is safe to go vote. The OSCE campaign focuses on informing and motivating people about the electoral process. At the time of our trip, the CJICTF is likely to cooperate with the OSCE campaign (most likely with logistical or technical support), but the extent and details of this support is not yet known because of internal problems at the OSCE.

OHR/UNHCR Displaced Persons and Refugees Returns Programs (*Operation Roundtable*)

As of summer 1998, the campaign was designed to promote the new Federation property laws, give people the precise information they need to claim their property back, including accurate information about where to get the claim forms, how to fill it in, and what the deadlines are. According the CJICTF S3, "by publicizing this type of information, we try to overcome Bosnian bureaucratic obfuscation and blockages." The campaign is not designed to say that it is safe to return to a specific town.

De-mining Program (*Operation Excalibur*)

This is the continuation of past programs that focused mostly on mine awareness (for locals and NATO troops). The programs are designed to raise people's awareness of the danger of mines and to give them instructions on how to

handle mines if or when they find some. *Excalibur* followed up *Harvest*, an SFOR Mines and Explosives Ordnance Amnesty (March–April 1998) designed to get people to turn in weapons. According to this program, Bosnians were asked to turn in weapons (including mines, artillery and mortar shells, rounds of small ammunition, grenades, explosives, weapons) to their local police stations. According to the CJICTF S3, “We did not target ‘personal weapons’ in this program, only grenades, mortar.... We stressed the safety aspects of keeping old grenades and large shells in a house, children finding them and all that.” According to the SFOR Chief Information Operations Officer (CIO), the turned-over weapons were then destroyed by SFOR on the grounds that they did not meet the standard of what weapons police stations are supposed to have.²⁵ In July 1998, SFOR personnel anticipated a continuation of this program, *Operation Harvest II*.

“Good Things SFOR Is Doing” (*Operation Lancelot*)

With the second anniversary of the NATO deployment, the CJICTF launched a true public relations campaign to promote the “good things that IFOR/SFOR” have done during the past 2 years. The focus was on SFOR CIMIC work, such as school reconstruction, engineering projects, and housing.

Good Things the International Organization and Entities Are Doing (*Operation Galahad*)

This is a program similar to *Lancelot* but focused on the international organizations and entities’ role in democratization and reconstruction. This program is not yet in full gear because some funding problems have delayed the production and dissemination phase.

Strategic Reserves Exercise Support (*Operation Dynamic Reserve 98*)

This was a major campaign. The CJICTF contracted with two television stations in the Federation and RS to cover the exercise. Both stations ran daily news stories and ran a wrap-up documentary. According to the CJICTF, this was a successful program because SFOR retained editorial control over the products, but the locals provided the manpower (thus easing the CJICTF's workload) and ran SFOR's story on the local networks that people watch and trust.

The main problem faced by the CJICTF stems from NATO's decision to freeze PSYOP funds as of mid-July 1998. The decision seems to be the consequence of political wrangling between the nations and NATO. As of July 1998, the CJICTF was operating on residual funds and already had delayed some programs (*Operation Galahad*) and initiatives (such as hiring a local marketing firm to conduct impact assessment).

Civil information does not play a major role in information dissemination. Its primary focus is on operational work through the Civil-Military Task Force (CMTF) and the German CIMIC unit (for example, surveys of counties/opstinas; preparing Municipalities Information Reports (MIRs) for the Repatriation Information Center (RIC). Civil Affairs contribute material to the PIO or the CJICTF on their activities to support the overall information campaign. For example, Civil Affairs provided information on its programs and activities to help the CJICTF in its campaign on the second anniversary of Dayton. The major information endeavor of the Civil Affairs is to work on the Municipalities Information Reports (MIR; *mir* in Serbo-Croat means "peace"). The MIRs are designed to provide potential returnees practical information on the municipalities and opstinas (counties) they intend to return to. The MIRs are

researched and written by Civil Affairs units and are a collaborative effort with the UNHCR. After they are produced, they are translated into Bosnian and disseminated by the Joint Information Center for DPRES.

The Chief of Information Operations (CIO) works under CJ3 supervision (Operations), who is involved in the monitoring and restructuring of the local media (in support of OHR and OSCE) and is tasked with coordinating SFOR's internal message.

Monitoring and Restructuring of Local Media

In the monitoring aspect, CIO supports the OSCE. SFOR-PIO monitors the local media for inflammatory language so that SFOR or other international organizations (mostly the OSCE) can take proper action. In the restructuring aspect, SFOR supports the OHR effort by backing them up when "things go wrong." For example, SFOR took over several SRT-Pale transmitting towers in October 1997 after a station's journalist made a disparaging comment about Louise Arbour (chief prosecutor at the International Criminal Tribunal on ex-Yugoslavia). Nevertheless, on the whole the CIO characterized the local media as being "remarkably compliant."

Coordinating Various Elements of the SFOR Campaign

Internal coordination is necessary to make sure that the various elements of SFOR campaign do not work at cross-purposes, and reinforce one another to the maximum possible extent. The current CIO sees his mission as gathering the various information disseminators (PIO/CJICTF) and working out, in a collaborative atmosphere, what SFOR's message should be. The CIO made it clear that he does not have a command relationship over the CPIO or COMCJICTF and that he neither "orders" or "instructs"

them to adopt a certain line. Instead, he explained, the three of them work together as “equal partners” to determine a common line and to synchronize their operations for maximum reinforcement. Following are several examples of successful coordination:

Operation Harvest was coordinated to ensure that the PSYOP and PIO would send out synchronized messages that reinforced each other. As the CJICTF was putting out posters, pamphlets, articles, and radio and TV spots, the PIO was covering the operation in its press communiqués and conferences.

Dynamic Response 98 (a large-scale NATO exercise) was also coordinated to make sure that SFOR spoke with one voice. The PIO reinforced the CJICTF campaign by stressing two points: To the local Bosnian population, SFOR said the environment was still safe. To the local political factions, SFOR stressed the capabilities of its strategic reserves in case of problems from the factions.

Program Orion was designed to de-link SFOR from NATO’s operations in Kosovo, as events there heated up during the summer of 1998. This was intended as a preemptive campaign to make sure that SFOR and Kosovo were not linked together in the Bosnians’ mind. For example, SFOR made sure to let people know that SFOR was not involved in the Flying Falcon exercise, and that NATO assets in Bosnia were, and that SFOR would not be used in Kosovo. When we spoke with him, the SFOR-PIO considered the program successful because (as of July 1998), the local press had not linked SFOR to the Kosovo crisis.

EXTERNAL COORDINATION

The CIO links with the OSCE and the OHR for the monitoring and restructuring of the local media. SFOR-PIO works in close cooperation with the OHR, UN, UNHCR, OSCE, and to a lesser extent the EU, to coordinate the statements at the biweekly press conference. Before each press conference, the spokesmen meet at the prebriefing meeting where they present their information, make sure to warn each other if they have a statement that will conflict with another organization, and try to resolve sensitive issues. This formal system is backed by regular informal communications between the spokesmen. Even though there are some differences among the international organizations, SFOR maintains that there is a constant effort to present a united front. The sensitive issues are worked out (either by the spokespersons or at the Principal level).²⁶ Indeed, the Principals have been adamant that the international community with one voice “sticks to the peacekeeping line”—to help the parties implement Dayton.

The OHR Information Campaign

OHR has recognized that media reform was a major missing aspect in the Dayton agreement. As the PIC has increased the High Representative’s mandate to foster media democratization, the OHR has become a leading agency in media restructuring.

As of July 1998, the OHR’s campaign focused on the coming elections. According to an OHR official, “if there is no positive change in the next elections (that is if the non-nationalistic parties do not progress significantly in the next national elections), then we might as well pack up and go home.”²⁷ In that environment, the OHR strategy has been

to educate the electorate about voting. The media is crucial to this strategy, because to have free and open debate, you need a free and open media. The OHR's goal is to fill the knowledge vacuum by providing alternative information to that of the nationalistic parties. According to the OHR spokesman, "we try to challenge the authority of the biased information people have been receiving from the nationalistic parties. We are in the business of trying to discredit the nationalistic parties." There are three pillars to this strategy: restructuring of existing media, building and reinforcing the independent sector, and news management.

Restructuring of Existing Media

OHR directs the restructuring of local radio-television outlets into public service media governed by the common practices of Western European public services. OHR began restructuring SRT-Pale in 1997 and is currently restructuring Radio-Television Bosnia-Herzegovina.

OHR is working on a regulatory regime for frequency management, media, and telecommunication laws. Right now, the media theoretically is governed by the old Yugoslavian media law, which, for all practical purposes, is no longer in effect. Thus the current state of affairs is anarchic. There is no media law, and the system by which frequencies are allocated is corrupted by politics (especially in the Federation, with the "government of Herceg-Bosna" granting frequencies). On July 30, 1998, the Independent Media Commission (IMC) was to be established. Eventually, it is supposed to become an independent state institution, but it first will be run under the OHR auspices as an interim institution.²⁸ The commission will issue licenses (based on technical and professional standards), introduce and promote a code of journalistic ethics, and monitor compliance with an enforcement panel.

Building and Reinforcing the Independent Sector

The OHR sponsors the only cross-entity existing TV network, Open Broadcast Network (OBN). At this stage of the campaign, the OBN broadcasts daily from 6 p.m. to 1 a.m. Its prime time program includes a lead-in program (a popular U.S. TV series), followed by news. According to the OHR spokesman, it is “a jewel in the crown” of the media campaign because it is the only cross-entity news network. According to the OHR spokesman, OBN is encountering two sets of difficulties. First, the financial commitment of the international community is low. Second, OBN’s footprint is limited because the Bosniak authorities would not allow the use of terrestrial transmitters to send the signal. The OHR also supports (with help from the Swiss government) Radio FERN, established and run by the OSCE in August 1996. Like the OBN, Radio FERN is also designed to provide Bosnians with unbiased and independent information. Finally, OHR supports a variety of municipality radios. This support is partisan. OHR offers its assistance to “independent” stations that are not attached to the nationalistic parties and whose editorial line is not hostile to the Dayton Peace Process. OHR also tries to guide various embassies who want to get involved in media democratization toward worthwhile projects.

News Management

The third pillar in OHR’s information campaign is news management. As an information provider, OHR has a two-prong strategy.

OHR wants to give people information to make them think and challenge their minds. For that purpose, OHR has created a series of 1-minute ads challenging people’s basic attitudes on subjects such as common license plates,

common passport, common flag, common currency, and refugee returns. In addition, OHR produces 10-minute public information announcements on specific subjects (police restructuring, freedom of movement [FOM], refugees, and missing persons). According to the OHR spokesman, the Sintra declaration makes it easy for OHR to get its message out because according to section 69, all TV stations in Bosnia-Herzegovina are required to take the international community's announcements for free and to broadcast them at least twice a week (including once in prime time).

As part of the news management operation, the OHR is taking the lead in coordinating information activities of the various players. To that effect, (1) the OHR leads the discussion at the pre-press conference meeting at the CPIC. (2) The OHR also runs a weekly meeting called the Media Issues Group (MIG), which includes the OSCE, UN, SFOR, UNHCR, USAID, and EU. The OHR spokesman chairs the meeting. "We discuss everything. I brief them on what OHR is doing and hopefully they brief me on what their agencies are doing. However, I get the feeling that I give out more information than I receive." NGOs do not participate in that meeting because they are too numerous, according to the spokesman. (3) Monthly the OHR spokesman meets with various embassies to let them know what OHR is doing. This is the media roundtable.

The UNMIBH Information Campaign

The UNMIBH spokesman and public information officer runs the mission's information campaign. "I am not a big supporter of information campaigns in general," he said. "The whole concept sounds too militaristic. Perhaps it is because I am from the former USSR and I was raised on them, so to speak. In addition, I don't think they are very

effective.” The UNMIBH spokesman is mostly reacting to the “management aspect” involved in the international community’s information campaign in Bosnia. He thinks good information management is difficult to achieve for two reasons. First, it needs to be culturally sensitive. Propaganda by the factions worked during the war because it played on the people’s existing fears and prejudices. To be effective, good information management should play on the locals’ prejudices. As well, it can be very difficult to use information management to pressure the nationalist parties into a preferred course of action. For example, the Republika Srpska main media is not now (July 1998) critical of the international community and is sympathetic to the government led by Biljana Plavsic. “You can’t really use them to pressure Plavsic into doing something she does not want to do. At this point, I strongly doubt that our information campaign will help discredit the nationalist parties. Taking down the SRT towers in 1997 may have helped Plavsic secure power (last November), but I am not sure it will serve her this time around (for the September 1998 elections). It might even hurt her, considering that she might be portrayed as a puppet of the west. In the Federation, the SDA will probably clinch on victory and in ‘Herceg-Bosna,’ the HDZ will not lose. We have no carrot to offer them. They don’t like Bosniaks or Serbs and they don’t need the reconstruction money.”²⁹

The UNMIBH spokesman believes that the international community can play a role “in terms of information, but not in terms of ‘campaign.’” The role he envisions for the international community, and the role his organization plays, is “to make alternative information available to the public.” It consists of putting out objective information so that people have an alternative source of information and can make informed judgments. For example, for the new common

license plates, UNMIBH did not aggressively “market” the change. It simply put out the information that the plates were available and how they could be purchased. According to UNMIBH officials, the campaign has been a huge success. In the early stages, the Bosnian Croats and Serbs did not even want to talk about the license plates. Now the common license plates are picking up in Republika Srpska and in “Herceg-Bosna.”

The UN also established a radio with Sarajevo University in 1997. The radio is viewed as a local outlet. It helps provide training for journalism students (who receive a stipend of 100–200 DM a month). UNMIBH arranged with a London music distribution company for the station to get complimentary CDs of new releases (such novelties are available here a few weeks after their release in England). This has made the station popular with local youth because “the youth feels treated like its Western European counterparts.” The UN also produced 30-second public service announcements on subjects such as refugees, voter registration, property laws, and elections. These ads are aired on the station at UNMIBH request.

The UNHCR Information Campaign

The UNHCR information campaign focuses on providing the Bosnians with information on refugees returns. The UNHCR’s goal is to make sure that DPRES know everything there is to know about resettlement.³⁰

The major obstacle to the UNHCR campaign lies in the local political environment where the dominant political parties (nationalistic) seek to prevent the HCR’s message from getting through to the people. For example, according to the UNHCR spokesman in Sarajevo, the local DPRES associations, created after the war by the nationalistic parties,

put out disinformation to discourage returns.³¹ The HCR's message must therefore bypass the authorities and speak directly to the people. According to the UNHCR spokesman, "In today's negative climate, we must provide material that the local press does not provide, such as detailed information on resettlement procedures or property claims."

At the beginning of the summer 1998, the UNHCR launched an expensive campaign with 13 10-minute programs featuring "happy returns." The stories are locally produced by *InterNews* (a local NGO), to make sure that they are relevant to the locals' preoccupations. The stories on return to Martin Brod (in the Federation) and Mrkonjic grad (Republika Srpska) include "soft messages" and "key icons"—symbols recognizable to all Bosnians. For example, one program features an Orthodox monk talking about Bosnian Serb returns and his own community's successful return to a monastery in Bosniak territory. Another features a young man, still dressed in his Serb army fatigues, helping his newly returned Bosniak neighbor fix his house. The UNHCR stories feature locals who have resettled where they lived before the war, local community leaders (such as mayors, religious authorities, police, and relevant ministers). In order not to appear as a foreign product, the stories do not feature any international community voice-overs or subtitles.

These products are intended to reach the 800,000 displaced persons in Bosnia, the 200,000 refugees still in Germany, and the 250,000 refugees in FRY. To date, the UNHCR has an agreement with 15 TV stations in Bosnia and 25 stations in ex-FRY to broadcast the programs once a week for 13 weeks (the series was to run during the summer through to the national elections). The UNHCR uses the OHR provisions (notably section 69 of the Sintra declaration) to get the stories aired on Bosnian stations. It also negotiated broadcast agreements with other stations, including some

in Serbia and Croatia where the OHR has no jurisdiction. In addition, the UNHCR also has worked a cooperative agreement with the UN-sponsored radio. The radio is doing short stories with the UNHCR material. According to the UNHCR spokesman, there are some dissemination problems. Some stations in Croatia and Serbia are reluctant to accept the material. The biggest dissemination problem lies with Germany and Switzerland because the UNHCR's products there must circulate through informal networking.

Within UNHCR there has been strong internal reluctance toward this type of Mass Information Campaign (as the spokesman calls it). Some people within the organization feel that mounting a local mass media campaign is not an appropriate task. They think that PI should deal only with the international press, as a public relations function aimed at putting UNHCR "on the map." They do not feel that local media and local populations are important targets for the HCR information. The spokesman we interviewed considered this approach misguided. "I think that mass information campaigns are different from, but complementary to, the public information effort. There is a real lack of understanding of many in this office about the impact that the media can have."

The OSCE Information Campaign

The OSCE runs a multifaceted information campaign designed to foster the goals of Dayton by encouraging free and fair elections and regional stability and promoting democratization. As of spring 1998, the OSCE assessed the need for an information campaign as follows: "Unfortunately, the major problem concerning the media in B-H is the continued control of most of the media by governments and political parties who use this control to their own ends to

deny accurate, balanced, impartial information to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina and to foment dissension and division among the people along nationalist and ethnic lines This control of the media has a particularly negative effect on elections because it is used to starve the citizens of B-H of the information they need to make informed decisions during the election process.” Based on that assessment, the OSCE launched an information campaign designed to “ensure that equivalent access to the media for all political parties, coalitions, and independent candidates, to ensure that voters are fully informed of the election process, and to ensure that voters are provided enough information to make fully informed choices during the elections process.”³² This overall campaign involves at least five OSCE offices: the office of public affairs (in charge of communication with local and international media), the voter information office (in charge of publicizing voting rules and procedures), the office of democratization (in charge of publicizing efforts in favor of democratic institutions), the media expert commission, and the media development (in charge of monitoring and sanctioning local media).

The Office of Public Affairs

The Office of Public Affairs provides information to the local and international press on OSCE operations. The office participates in the CPIC briefings twice a week, answers media queries, and regularly issues press communiqués. The OSCE spokeswoman sees her mission as cardinal in the reconstruction of Bosnia, because only through objective and pluralistic media can a democratic, multiethnic Bosnia become a reality. “All you have to do is look at what happened before and during the war. The media helped bring the war about and wage it. Now, I think that if people are fed a steady diet of information, they will come around

eventually,” and accept that Dayton is their path toward a better future. Because of the state of the local Bosnian press, the OSCE spokeswoman (herself a former journalist) finds herself doing “media development” by having to teach the young local reporters the basics of western-style journalism. “Journalists in this country are quite young, and most of them became journalists during the war. They lack professional standards. What they want you to do is comment on the record on stuff. For example, the new electoral rules require all candidates to make financial disclosures to the OSCE. Reporters expect us to go on the record and say whether the disclosures are true or false. So I have to tell them that I am not doing that. It is not in my job description. So I am involved in some kind of continued education with locals.”

The Voter Education Campaign

In preparation for the national elections (September 13–14, 1998), the OSCE launched an information campaign designed to provide information about the electoral process. The campaign ran into some administrative trouble in the summer when its director unexpectedly quit. In mid-July, a temporary replacement was brought in.³³ The OSCE hoped to have a new permanent director in place by early August. The OSCE conceives its campaign as providing information to the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the voting procedures. It is a public service campaign. A voter education official said: “We are not in the business of telling the people not to vote for the nationalistic parties. Other organizations, such as democratization or the OHR, are in charge of that. The only thing that we can do is tell the people how the electoral process is organized and what they need to do to be part of the electoral process.” It is mostly an information and motivation campaign designed to make

sure that the Bosnians go vote. Several elements in this campaign differ from previous ones. First, the OSCE changed the ballot, so the campaign focused on explaining the new ballot and how to use it. Second, the OSCE will run several products focusing on the candidates' electoral platforms to make sure that the people have a chance to look at the different programs before they go vote. Voter education officials conceded that their campaign already showed signs of mixed results. For example, they are trying to appeal to the youth to register and vote, but this particular category of population has shown considerable apathy toward the process. When the OSCE launched a campaign for registering new young citizens last April, the turn-out was not as high as expected.

The Office of Democratization

This office facilitates dialogue and confidence-building among social, political, and religious groups in Bosnia to overcome the ethnic divisions that led to the war. The mission is to “strengthen civil society (and) foster democratic institution-building.” As the OSCE mission subscribes to the charter laid out in the Dayton Peace Agreement, the office of democratization selectively supports those political parties and institutions “that advocate multiethnic platforms.”³⁴ As part of that mission, the Office of Democratization has promoted a campaign on democratic values and human rights to advocate tolerance and multiethnicity. The campaign was a multifaceted effort, including essay and drawing contests on tolerance (with prizes for both the winner and the winner's school),³⁵ a logo design contest, TV spots, books to be distributed in school, sponsorship of cultural events that stressed tolerance, reconciliation, and multiethnicity, and a series of pamphlets telling stories of people during the war (the stories are

selected to emphasize tolerance and multi-ethnicity). The themes stressed included support to government institutions, refugee returns, and respecting difference. According to the Democratization Information officer, this particular campaign was scaled back because the OSCE felt it was time for other organizations, such as NGOs or private public relations firms, to pick up the work. “Our approach from the start was to get started with a campaign and then pass it on to some other organization.” In addition, there are many other campaigns (SFOR, OHR, UNHCR) that stress the same themes, so “we had the feeling of an overlap between our and their activities.” The streamlining of the operation is in accordance with the reorganization of the department’s strategy to refocus its effort toward higher authorities and activities at local and grass-roots levels. “In 1998, the Democratization Department will augment its strategy with initiatives to imbue higher authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina with democratic principles and practices, while streamlining initiatives at the local and grass-roots level.”³⁶ Indeed, in May and June 1998, the information campaign on democratic values and human rights constituted only 5 of 92 initiatives undertaken by the office.

The Media Expert Commission (MEC)

The MEC is comprised of 17 members drawn from the local environment and from the international community tasked with monitoring and enforcing the media rules and regulations laid out by the Provisional Election Commission (PEC). The media expert commission was established in summer 1997. Among the most important rules for the 1998 elections are:

- Journalists and the media they represent must maintain the highest professional and ethical standards in the pursuit of their duties
- Reporting must be factually accurate, complete, fair, equitable, and unbiased
- Equitable access must be given to all registered political parties, coalitions, and independent candidates
- Reporters should not use inflammatory language, hate language, or language that could incite hate or violence. The Media Expert Commission may impose fines or other appropriate sanctions on media violating this provision
- Political paid advertising is prohibited on all broadcast media and limited in print media.

The MEC has authority to enforce the PEC rules. Its jurisdiction applies to all media publications and broadcasts originating in Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as media broadcast using frequencies or transmission facilities within Bosnia-Herzegovina. The MEC monitors compliance with the PEC's media rules. In particular, the MEC investigates complaints of mistreatment of journalists, monitors and enforces the dispositions on inflammatory and hate speech on the major networks, and makes sure that the provisions of the PEC for the elections (no paid advertising and equal access for all legitimate parties) are enforced. The MEC has enforcement powers that include summoning a medium to investigate its behavior and imposing fines and other sanctions the Commission deems appropriate. What our research team has not been able to ascertain is how the commission uses its enforcement powers. According to an

OSCE fact sheet, “incidents investigated by the MEC so far included attacks on journalists, unlawful detention of journalists and confiscation of their equipment, use of inflammatory language or improper terminology, inequitable coverage of political parties by the media, and refusal to broadcast election materials mandated by the PEC.”³⁷ It seems that the regular monitoring of daily broadcasts across the country has resulted in forceful action from the international community mostly in the area of inflammatory and hate speech. For example, in summer 1997, the OSCE monitoring led to the realization that SRT was broadcasting hate reports inciting violence against the international community. The monitoring was used by the OHR to pressure SRT and the RS authorities into curbing hostile rhetoric and into making SRT compliant with the PEC provisions. As of the beginning of September 1997, SRT had complied with the OSCE/OHR and curbed its incitement to violence. Similarly, in July 1998, the OSCE office in Mostar monitored a report from Radio Herceg-Bosna comparing the international community to Hitler. The local offices of the OSCE and OHR took immediate action and demanded that the radio issue an apology. All international players that we interviewed praised the monitoring and sanctions as having a beneficial effect on the media landscape in Bosnia.

The Media Development Office

The media development office has a four-fold mission:

- To strengthen and expand media pluralism, which ensures citizens’ access to information and opinions from a variety of perspectives and a multiplicity of sources
- To foster media professionalism both in journalism and management practices

- To monitor and facilitate enforcement of compliance with laws and standards concerning the media, including both government obligations toward the media and media observance of standards of professional conduct
- To promote interentity communication by making publications available across entity lines and by facilitating personal contacts among journalists and editors.

To that effect, media development has launched a number of initiatives, including the following:

- Supporting the development and sustainment of viable independent alternative media and facilitating equitable media access to political parties and candidates
- Supporting media organizations that are not controlled or heavily influenced by governments or dominant political parties
- Supporting and cooperating with Radio FERN and the OBN, “both of which bring strong independent voices to Bosnia and Herzegovina”
- Facilitating interentity communication through a press distribution program, interentity journalist and editors conferences, and joint publishing efforts.

The European Commission Information Campaign

The EU has been heavily involved in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the beginning of the war, but until recently it had not done much in terms of information.³⁸ This changed about a year ago when the organization decided to reorganize its public information office. There were two reasons for the changes. First, the EU felt it was not getting proper credit

for its work in Bosnia. Second, it felt it was necessary to do more work on media democratization.

If the EU tries to increase its visibility in Bosnia, it does not do “information campaign” per se. The EU is simply a provider of information. It informs Bosnians on its role in Bosnia and on larger EU issues (such as the common currency). To achieve this, the EU spokesman participates regularly in the CPIC briefing and releases press communiqués. These activities have helped him increase both the EU visibility and credibility. “As a mark of my success, I can point out to the fact that the amount of coverage the EU has received has greatly increased. This increased interest, in turn, makes my job easier.” Although the EU does not do information campaign, it participates in those of other international organizations such as the OHR. For example, the EU office funds some of the OHR ads and stories. The office spokesman participates in the Media Issues Group (MIG). The EU, however, is not involved in the more forceful approach of the OSCE (with the sanctions for non-compliant media) and the OHR (with restructuring of the RTV stations). The spokesman acknowledged that he personally supports this forceful approach because it means taking down the assets of the nationalistic powers. “We have to be proactive in this area, otherwise it is just the status quo and the status quo serves the nationalistic parties.”

The EU office is also heavily involved in media democratization. EU officials feel it is an important task because the media helped disseminate the hate propaganda that led to the war. As the media made the war possible, it can make reconciliation possible. According to the EU spokesman: “This nation will not be viable as long as it doesn’t have independent media, because the nationalistic media prevent this country from returning to normalcy. I

fundamentally believe that nationalism only festers on isolation and is thoroughly unsustainable with the free flow of information. The free flow of information will ultimately defeat nationalism.” For that very reason, the EU supports independent media. In 1997 and 1998, the EU gave out 10 million *ecus* for independent media in ex-FRY. These funds help support 18 independent media by offering them money to buy modern equipment or run specific projects. The EU also supports the establishment of cross-entity distribution of newspapers and of cross-entity network and finances the Media Plan school of journalism.

The USAID Information Campaign

The Sarajevo office of USAID is a major donor (along with the EU) supporting “independent” media across Bosnia. So far, the organization has invested \$10 million in media democratization since 1995. USAID support involves the following features:

- On-site training for journalists and technical assistance provided through a local NGO called InterNews (\$3.5 million grant in FY 98). InterNews provides on-site training by going into news media offices, giving advice on technical and professional standards. (For example, InterNews teaches journalists to check their information, get confirmation on stories from at least two independent sources, and advises against using inflammatory speech). According to USAID figures, eight radio stations in Republika Srpska and six stations in the Federation benefited from 80 days of technical assistance over the last year, while six TV stations in the Federation and one in Republika Srpska benefited from 200 person-days of technical assistance.³⁹

- U.S.-based training for journalists and media managers. In 1998, this effort included a 3-week program for 12 journalists specializing in investigative reporting and a 3-week program for 10 media managers to learn media management. According to the official in charge of the program, “The aim of these training programs is to help make stations more independent. We emphasize marketing and management and investigative reporting skills.”
- Financing the acquisition of technical equipment. Grants are awarded to radio and TV stations so they can buy more modern, sophisticated equipment to enhance the quality of their broadcasting and their footprint. In 1996, USAID funded the purchase of major studio equipment for the television stations part of the OBN.
- Financing efforts to improve programming. InterNews produces a magazine (FRESH) and translates foreign documentaries aired on the OBN. InterNews has also awarded production grants to local independent producers and students at the Sarajevo Film Academy for the production of films to be broadcast on local television stations.

USAID’s Office of Transition Initiative (OTI) has provided \$1.8 million to date in direct support of alternative media outlets.

- Support to the OBN Network. This support is deemed crucial because OBN is the only interentity network and its programs are balanced, professional, and support the goals of Dayton.

The USAID program is currently supporting 12 radio and television stations across B-H. Six of them are in the Federation, six in RS. The stations are: TV Gorazde (Federation–Bosniak), TV Vitez (Federation–Croat), NTV Banja Luka (RS), TV Travnik (Federation–Bosniak), TV Hayat (Federation–Bosniak), TV Maglaj (Federation–Bosniak), TV GLS (Srbac–RS), Radio Dzungla (RS), Radio Best (Sipovo–RS), Radio Pan (Bijeljina–RS), Radio Sik (Mrkonjic Grad–RS), Radio Fenix (Novi Travnik–Federation, Croat). Some stations were dropped in the past few years because they no longer met the criteria set for support. For example, USAID stopped supporting TV Hayat when it accepted a grant from Saudi Arabia to broadcast a program about the Ramadan and agreed to broadcast Iranian movies. Hayat came back to AID in early 1998 with a request for funding to organize an electoral debate for the next national elections. As of July 1998, the USAID office had not responded to the request.

USAID’s criteria for support include both content and technical data. In terms of technical data, USAID supports news media according to their footprint and geographical location. In terms of content, the news media must be supportive of Dayton, profess to be “independent” from political influences, and agree to accept certain different sources for their programming such as VOA or RFE programs. According to the official in charge of the program, “supporting Dayton is key for us. It is the first priority. We need to make people understand that they can live better if Dayton is fully implemented.” Finally, the media outlets must agree to be privatized eventually, and show signs that they can rapidly become self-sustainable. As the official in charge of the program summarized the general philosophy: “Our best hope is to identify and assist media outlets who

are viable, professional, and who can assist in the implementation of the Dayton Peace Agreement.”

Future plans include developing training programs and increase the production capabilities of the local stations, and creating an interentity Association of Broadcasters concerned with ethics and journalistic standards.

Common Ground Productions

Common Ground Productions is the media arm of Search for Common Ground, an NGO concerned with promoting reconciliation in a country torn by civil strife. It has operated in Bosnia since August 1996. The NGO produces an innovative series called “Resolutions Radio.” The program is aired weekly on Radio FERN and is aimed at fighting the nationalistic vitriol that is endemic to local media. The show has run into some difficulties. First, Radio FERN has experienced serious technical problems. Second, CGP quickly realized that the show on Radio FERN was not as popular as the shows it aired on local media, leading it to conclude that the network was still very much perceived as a “foreign outlet,” a perception that hampered the reconciliation effort.

In summer 1998, CGP launched a television series, *Mimo Var* (“Life Goes On”) a half-hour program aired weekly on OBN. The goal of the TV program, like the radio talk-show, is to promote reconciliation between the various communities.⁴⁰

The Open Broadcast Network

The OHR created OBN in summer 1996 to establish the first cross-entity television network and to provide alternative information to the people of Bosnia in time for the first national elections (September 1996). At the time

the consensus of the international community was that the effort largely failed.⁴¹ Since then, the network has been revamped in the past year to increase the quantity and quality of its production. It has recruited new stations (including on the RS side) and has expanded efforts to determine what people wanted to watch on their televisions to better respond to their wishes.

The OBN director views the project as both useful and successful. “OBN is the international community’s most important project in Bosnia because it is the only cross-entity one,” thus presenting to the locals across Bosnia the same news. He also sees the OBN as being the only one capable of undermining the local propaganda by providing the only balanced information. “OBN tells people what is really going on. It undermines propaganda by telling the truth. In this country, we give the only balanced views. All state televisions give a biased view. They are all politically funded and politically driven.”

OBN’s director is convinced that his operation could be a lot more successful if the international community made a more significant financial commitment. According to him, the \$16 million spent so far on OBN are “peanuts, a drop in the ocean,” because it takes a lot more than that to create a real television network from scratch. To illustrate his point, he explained that SkyNews (the British 24-hour news network) was started with more than £90 millions in funding.

The BBC School, Soros Media Center

Funded by the Soros Foundation, the Media Center was established in Sarajevo in 1995 to address the problem of the extreme youth and inexperience of Bosnia’s journalists. “At the time,” according to the School’s Director, “statistics showed that 60 percent of all journalists were between 15

and 25 years old. They were predominantly girls and boys who started working in the profession with the beginning of the war. In some towns, almost 90 percent of the journalists were new to the profession.” The Center now boasts a library of about a thousand books and many periodicals—147 titles from the former-Yugoslavia and almost 90 foreign periodical—as well as complete sets of Oslobodenje (1993-1997) and other Bosnian journals. Since June 1996, the Media Center also has run a school for radio and television journalists in conjunction with the BBC. By the summer of 1998, the Center had run six 10-week courses, serving more than a hundred young journalists from both entities and all three groups. The training stresses technical skills as well as professional standards of journalistic practice—objective, balanced, and accurate reporting.

Media Plan

Media Plan is a local NGO specializing in media issues. According to its deputy director, Media Plan’s agenda is to foster professionalization (which he describes as lacking so far) among journalists and to promote alternative sources of information in a country dominated by partisan media. He went on, the media bears a large responsibility in the war; therefore, the media has a social responsibility to play a leading role in the reconciliation process. The media should “document how some people are trying to live together as they did before the war. For some reason, these stories are ignored. If this sort of coverage can make a small contribution towards reconciliation, let’s do it. The media has a social mission.”

Media Plan is a small organization with seven permanent staff members and several temporary workers. It recently moved to the old architecture school in Sarajevo.

Financially, Media Plan depends on foreign donors, which makes the organization depend on bureaucratic procedures for its survival. Media Plan activities include:

- Running a news agency, Sarajevo Fax (SAFAX). SAFAX specializes in information about reconstruction and development in Bosnia, human rights and freedoms, and media news. This includes “Media News,” a periodic service information about the media, “RENS,” a radio exchange network service, “Nase Sanse,” a weekly service for refugees; and occasional news services for local media.
- Running a documentation center that receives many of the local publications available for consultation. The documentation center also provides content analysis of the local media on sensitive issues such as Human Rights or Kosovo.
- Editing a yearly guide to existing media in Bosnia (“Guide to Journalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina”). The guide provides a useful background on the local media situation and lists media outlets across the country.
- Creating a school of journalism, to open next fall. This is a project run in conjunction with the EU, the French government, and the Journalism School of Lille. Unlike the BBC school of journalism (run in Sarajevo in conjunction with the Soros Foundation), the Media Plan school of journalism will focus on all types of media (both print and electronic).
- Organizing seminars on media issues such as Human Rights in the media, information in the local press, the interview in print media. In 1997, most of these seminars were organized with the Ecole Superieure de

Journalisme de Lille (France) and with the Westminster Foundation (United Kingdom).

- Monitoring local and international programs. In 1997, Media Plan ran audience surveys of both OBN and SRT Banja Luka.
- Consulting: Media Plan consulted with many international organizations on the media situation in Bosnia.

FINDINGS

There *is* an international information campaign in Bosnia.

The international community in Bosnia has used a coordinated information campaign designed to support and promote the goals of the Dayton Peace Agreement: a single, democratic, multiethnic state within the internationally recognized borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The information campaign is rooted in a double conviction, both practical and ideological. First, the international community considers that the current political control of the control of local media by the dominant nationalist parties constitutes a major obstacle to the fulfillment of the Dayton agreement. Most of the personnel we interviewed within the five major international organizations (OHR, UNHRC, OSCE, UNMIBH, and SFOR) all agreed that the local media is still, by and large, controlled by the nationalistic parties and that this control is hindering the fulfillment of Dayton's goals. According to the OHR spokesman, "there is a lot of evidence that the media played a crucial role in the war and subsequently in the early part of the of the peace operation to impede the reconciliation process." This belief is echoed by the OSCE spokeswoman, who considers that "the media in this country brought evil," and by the UNHCR

spokeswoman who argues that the factions' political control of the media is definitely hindering the UNHCR's efforts in favor of refugee returns because the nationalist parties use the media to spread disinformation and fear. The OSCE democratization information officer concurs. "The ordinary people agree with what we do in this country, but sometimes there is resistance orchestrated by the nationalistic parties, because they are trying to stall some of our processes." Many in the NGO community echo this view. The OBN director considers that "all state media are going to give a biased view of the situation. They are all politically funded, and they are politically driven." For Media Plan's deputy director, "the media have shattered this country before the guns and now they remain tightly controlled by the nationalistic parties. There are very few truly independent media outlets."

Second, the international community believes that an efficient media campaign will ultimately help in the reconstruction of a single multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina, by undoing what the nationalistic propaganda did immediately before and during the war. It is rooted in the ideological belief that the free flow of information will:

1. Bring pluralism by enabling multiple voices to be heard (thus developing a new marketplace of ideas)
2. Which in turn will serve democratization by enlarging the scope of political alternatives available to the people
3. And serve moderation in the political process by allowing people to choose courses of action through a non-violent process.

The OHR spokesman said: "I believe that if Bosnians are able to make informed judgments based on the totality of

information available to them, they are less likely to vote for the extreme nationalistic parties. Our goal then, is to see a much more pluralistic political mandate, and to fulfill Dayton's mandate—a multiethnic state and society.” The EU public information officer concurred: “I fundamentally believe that nationalism only festers on isolation and is thoroughly unsustainable with the free flow of information.” So did the OSCE spokeswoman: “I firmly believe in the power of the media to do some good here—after all it brought evil. The free flow of information will ultimately defeat nationalism.”

A Two-Pillar Campaign

This two-prong philosophy has been the ideological basis on which the international community built a two-pillar campaign.

The first pillar, fairly standard, consists of advancing Dayton's agenda by preaching relentlessly in favor of a single, democratic, and multiethnic state. This is viewed as a necessary step to provide the Bosnians with alternative sources of news to help them make truly informed decisions. The agenda has only slightly changed since December 1995. In the early days of operations, the international community presented its agenda as supporting “a single, democratic, multiethnic state.” Now, the international community's ambitions seems to have been prioritized. In order of decreasing importance, the IC fully and adamantly supports a single state with common institutions. It also encourages DPREs returns and supports their right to return to their prewar settlements. Finally, it encourages tolerance and multiethnicity.

The second pillar consists of encouraging media democratization to reduce the nationalistic parties' control.

These steps are viewed as necessary because the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina had never operated under democratic standards. It was first a partisan press serving the communist party (until the first free elections of 1990), and then became a partisan press serving the particular leading nationalist party with which it was affiliated (during and after the war). In both cases, it did not operate under “western standards” of professionalism. This second aspect of the campaign involves the following measures. Pluralism development is achieved through a series of mandatory and voluntary measures, such as:

- Imposing rules and regulations designed to expand the scope and diversity of coverage on existing media. This is achieved, for example, through the OSCE rules on media access for political candidates and through the OHR rule on international community’s free access to television and radio stations
- Establishing new networks like Radio FERN and the OBN to provide alternative sources of information
- Encouraging cross-entity initiatives such as journalists and editors meetings and distribution of newspapers in entities where they are not available
- Supporting “independent” media consists of providing financial resources and equipment to media that shows some degree of independence toward the dominating nationalistic parties. The extent of “independence” often remains questionable
- Restructuring State media consists of imposing new rules to the state-controlled radio and television so they become more public service oriented rather than parties’ mouthpieces.

Some Degree of Coordination

The campaign involves five major partners, the OHR, the OSCE, SFOR, the UNHCR and the UNMIBH. These organizations were tasked in the Dayton Peace Agreement with enforcing or facilitating the implementation of the agreement. As the operation unfolded, the campaign was further coordinated with the major donors (EU and USAID), and with some embassies seeking involvement in media democratization. To a certain extent, the campaign is actually coordinated between all these players.

The five major organizations, the two major donors, and some embassies meet once a week under the OHR's chairmanship to discuss the overall media strategy (Media Issues Group). The participants share information on their respective operations and discuss plans for further action. This meeting is simply an information-sharing session. The OHR has no power or mandate to compel other organizations into specific actions. According to the EU spokesman, the MIG "is a useful meeting because it provides a platform for information sharing and helps all the parties involved work within a consistent approach. It helps make sure we don't work at cross-purpose." The coordination does not extend to all the actors involved in media activities in Bosnia because they are too numerous. The OHR said: "You can consult with some of the NGOs sometimes, but you cannot talk to all of them all the time." Likewise, coordination with embassies is sometimes difficult because while they send representatives to the coordinating meetings, they provided very little feedback on their own activities.

The five major organizations also coordinate their messages on a regular basis. They hold two common press conferences a week. Before presenting their statements to the press, the

five spokesmen meet for 10 to 15 minutes and share information, run through their respective statements, warn each other if they have a statement that may contradict another organization's policy, and work out differences of opinion. Overall, this coordination for a common message seems to work reasonably well: Differences of opinions (among the international players) do not regularly make the headlines.

In addition, the major players in the campaign have developed a certain familiarity and some of their coordination occurs through informal means (telephone calls, ad-hoc meetings, casual conversations).

Finally, to some degree, the five major organizations have come to depend and rely on each other. For example, the OSCE benefits from SFOR's monitoring the local media. When SFOR-CIO detects inflammatory language, he passes it up to the OSCE for proper action.⁴² Conversely, the OSCE can work with the OHR or SFOR on non-compliance issues.⁴³

A core factor for successful coordination appears to be personal ability, knowledge, and trust. The fact that the spokesmen for the major organizations have known each other for a substantial amount of time and have become familiar with one another seems to facilitate coordination among them. Indeed, the OHR spokesman has worked in Bosnia for the past 2 years, the UNHCR spokeswoman has worked in Bosnia since 1992, first as a journalist for *Le Figaro*, then for the UNHCR. The UNMIBH spokesman arrived to work with the UNPROFOR in 1993. SFOR, with its frequent and short rotations of personnel, is an exception.

Ill-defined Campaign

As much as the main players in the international community are driven by a similar agenda and a will to cooperate in a

unified effort, the campaign is not very well defined and there are substantial disagreements as to the campaign's goals and methods.

The basic reason for this stems from the fact that there was no "media annex" in Dayton. At the onset of operations, the international community received no clear mandate to deal with local media issues. In consequence, the campaign has developed haphazardly. Steps have been taken as needs arose (such as the establishment of the OBN in early September 1996 or Radio FERN in summer 1996 to try to promote alternative thinking before the first national elections) or as opportunities developed (such as the seizure of SRT-Pale broadcast towers).

Nevertheless, if most players share some basic beliefs about the need for providing alternative information and promoting media democratization, they also disagree on the specifics. Basically, our research team encountered as many ideas as players. For example, one IO spokesman argued against any heavy-handed tactics because one cannot change people's minds through force. "Taking down SRT towers, international-sponsored editorial supervision, internal restructuring are the wrong approaches as far as I am concerned. You can restructure SRT, but you still have the same people working there, I mean the same hard core racist hard-liners. Once we are gone in 5 years, they will go back to their own little routine. Now, they can't because they know they can't get away with it. But their innermost feelings have not changed." The right approach, in his view, is to foster independent media (such as TV Alternativa in Banja Luka, Studio 99, Dani Magazine, Slobodo Bosna, Radio Jungle in Doboje, Radio M or Radio Zad in Sarajevo, Nizavesnija) and give them financial assistance (with limited oversight because you do not want them to be seen as the

international community's tool). That's what the UN has tried to do with the University radio.

Another IO official responsible for media development shared a similar view, considering that the OHR heavy-handed tactics is counterproductive because it alienates the locals. She thought a more subtle approach involving "more cajoling and less fist on the table" might be appropriate. The director of an NGO working in media production also voiced disagreement with the OHR's effort to restructure the existing media. "I am in favor of offering quality and choice—of encouraging other voices rather than stifling some voices." Saying this, he also acknowledged that he thought he was in the minority among the international community.

On the other hand, we found a few people arguing that the international community is not forceful enough. The deputy director of a local NGO, a Sarjevan Serb, asserted that the international community's effort is not strong enough. According to him, the media in Bosnia-Herzegovina cannot follow the pattern of the media in Western Europe because the situation and the history are so peculiar. "Here, something else has to be done. The media have to participate in the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina." As a practical measure, he proposed that the international community imposes an embargo on bad news for a while, to teach the media to take an active part in the reconciliation process. In short, he believed the international community should be doing more and be more assertive. "I think the international community should impose more sanctions and close down more media outlets. Although they have the powers, they don't do it often enough."⁴⁴ Likewise, the director of a major media NGO thinks the reconfiguration of the local radio and television stations is necessary, but "not under the format" currently used. According to him, "it's not because

you put an international board of supervisors that you have a successful reconfiguration. You also need to impose financial and staffing restructuring and to redirect programming based on what viewers want to see.”

More importantly, as the campaign developed haphazardly, it grew in two different directions that may, at times, seem contradictory. Initially (back in 1996), the main idea was to encourage democratization and professionalization. The international community professed then that by opening the “marketplace” of ideas, by presenting a credible alternative discourse to that of the nationalist parties, the people would see the benefits of Dayton and progressively turn away from the nationalistic rhetoric. But as time went on and the international community moved from being the agreement implementation facilitator to becoming more directive (most notably by making decisions in place of the parties), the information campaign became more authoritarian, resorting to compulsory measures (restructuring) and editorial supervision. The result is that after almost 3 years of operations in Bosnia, the international community claimed to follow and encourage democratic principles while resorting to anti-democratic measures of editorial control when it felt compelled to do so advance its own agenda.

This contradiction is not lost on many local journalists, who have argued to the authors that the international community is now interfering with their efforts and behaving as if Bosnia is their protectorate. Across all three entities, journalists have complained that the international community’s actions often do not correlate with its democratic rhetoric.

Bosnia is a Difficult Environment to Work In

Defining a coherent campaign in an environment such as Bosnia is a difficult task, if only because the local environment is extremely complex. Many of the people we interviewed during our trip mentioned the difficulties of working in this environment, and listed four conditions that complicate any internationally driven effort in Bosnia.

The media environment is completely saturated. Before the war, only the state radio and television network and the state-owned newspapers had legal existence. That allowed only a few media outlets to survive.⁴⁵ The political liberalization of the early 1990s led to a temporary explosion of media outlets, to which the war put a stop. Since Dayton and the transition from a socialist to a free-market economy, the exponential growth of media outlets has resumed. According to statistics gathered by Media Plan, “272 active media survived the war (203 on what came to be called Federation territory, and 69 in Republika Srpska). By March 1997, this figure had risen to 490, by far the biggest growth being in the RS (220 with 270 in the Federation); there were 59 radio stations and 18 TV stations in the RS in July 1997 and 97 radio stations and 24 TV stations in the Federation—totaling 156 radio stations and 52 TV stations.”⁴⁶ Many international players agree that the current situation is anarchic and cannot be sustained. Meanwhile, it makes it more difficult for the international community to monitor the locals, determine who is influential and who is not, and assess whom to support.

The most influential media has political affiliations and support the policies of the nationalistic parties, although many local journalists pledged that their own network or outlet was free and independent of any political links. That reality makes it more difficult for the international

community to look for influential media that can truly support Dayton's agenda.

The Bosnian audience is extremely diverse, from the well-educated living in the big cities (Mostar, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Banja-Luka) to the almost illiterate folk living in the countryside. Before the war, Bosnia had the highest illiteracy rate among the Yugoslav republics (about 30 percent). It is therefore difficult to design a single campaign that can appeal to all with a single, common message. According to the UNMIBH spokesman, under such circumstances, "speaking with one voice to the entire population is difficult."

Regional differences are stunning. Although the war was often described as a "Serbs v. Muslims," it was in fact much more complex than that. In western Bosnia, the war opposed Croats to Muslims. In Northern Bosnia, it opposed Muslims to Muslims. This complexity means that the approach of a centralized information campaign, based in Sarajevo, may not be the best answer. For example, the SFOR PSYOP community strongly felt that many of the products designed in Sarajevo were irrelevant, if not counter-productive, when used in other areas of the country.

Coordination Flaws

The coordination between the various elements of the Bosnia information campaign is an ad-hoc process. The first mechanisms were established in early 1996. From the start of the operation, the Principals have been adamant that the international community presents a united front to the international and local media. To that effect, they have instructed their spokesmen to coordinate closely their efforts.⁴⁷ Today, it is clear that the five major organizations are used to coordinating.

Because the process developed haphazardly without a central authority, coordination is not as effective as it could be. Moreover, as several incidents show (some of them are described in the paragraphs below), it also takes very little to upset coordination.

Individualism prevails. Although the major actors share information about their respective programs, each organization is responsible for its policy and operations. As a result, each organization is completely free in its choices, which ultimately limits the campaign's coherence. For example, the lack of coherence and coordination was obvious in the crisis over SRT-Pale broadcasts in summer 1997, as SFOR, the OHR, and the OSCE were unable to define a common strategy. After SFOR killed one and arrested another Bosnian Serb indicted for war crimes, SRT-Pale broadcast several reports juxtaposing images of SFOR and Nazi troops. The reports implied that NATO was behaving toward Bosnian Serbs like the Nazis during World War II. OSCE instructed SRT to respect the rules on inflammatory speech and incitement to violence and for the next few months, SRT proved "extremely compliant with the OSCE rules," according to one OSCE official. In early September, SRT broadcast an OHR-sponsored program on the International Criminal Tribunal for ex-Yugoslavia (ICTY). At the end, the journalist made a disparaging comment accusing the tribunal of being anti-Serb. That incident led SFOR to take down and seize SRT's transmitters in Pale for non-compliance. According to OHR officials, SFOR had been reluctant to take any forceful action against the stations and only agreed to move when SFOR itself became the target of SRT's inflammatory speech. Nothing in the operation was coordinated with either the OSCE or the OHR. One morning, the High Representative woke up to the news that SFOR had seized the towers. The

coordination work only began after the seizure because there was no plan for what to do next.⁴⁸ In another example, in the field of support to independent media, each organization has created its own criteria for support. For example, the OHR and USAID have decided to grant support on a partisan basis to media who demonstrate support of Dayton's agenda. The OSCE Democratization Department, on the other hand, has based its policy on a non-partisan basis. The prioritization of objectives and projects does not belong to a central authority but to a multiplicity of single decisionmakers; therefore, these activities do not respond to a single, common strategy and the international community's democratization effort appears unfocused.

Information coordination cannot “mask” policy differences. In Bosnia, certain players are clearly at odds with each other. When such differences exist, information and policy coordination mechanisms may not be enough to mute down the differences. For example, Germany is eager to see the Bosnian refugees in its country return as quickly as possible to Bosnia. To that effect, it first gave incentives to returns and then began expelling refugees toward Bosnia. This policy has displeased the United States, the OHR and the UNHCR. The United States has stated publicly that it thought the policy would be counterproductive to the international community's goals during the forthcoming elections (i.e., weaken the nationalistic parties).⁴⁹ According to UNHCR officials, the country is not yet ready for a massive influx of refugees that could endanger the whole DPPE process. UNHCR officials acknowledged that they were leaking the forced returns (when they have advance knowledge) to the press to get the issue in the public domain and pressure the German government into restraint.

Absence of central authority leads to “turf battles.” Both the OSCE and the OHR seem to claim the role of central authority based on their respective mandates. The OSCE argues its authority regarding media issues stems from its mandate to help the parties organize free and fair elections, which entails democratizing the media environment. The OHR argues its authority regarding media matters stems from several Peace Implementation Conferences (PIC) that have increased the powers of the High Representative to force media democratization and professionalization. Indeed, as the OSCE and OHR mandates regarding media issues have been developed separately as needs arose, both organizations are entrusted with overlapping responsibilities. In particular, the OSCE and the OHR have both provided media monitoring, editorial content rules and regulations, and have been entrusted with sanction powers. Although they offered no specifics to back up their claims, several UNMIBH and OSCE officials claimed that rivalry for “the control of media issues” between the two organizations has impeded effective coordination.

OHR imperialism? The OHR role in the coordination mechanism is sometimes viewed by others in the international community as too imperialistic. One UN official accused the OHR of wanting “to be the king of the land.” For example, this official stressed that the UNHCR and the OHR had tried to coordinate an information radio spot designed to explain the new Federation property laws last spring (the law was passed in early May 1998). The two organizations held a meeting to trim down a 2-minute, 45-second legal statement (written by the OHR lawyers) to a 30-second radio spot. After the meeting, the UNHCR discovered that the OHR had reversed its decision because its lawyers were uncomfortable with the summarized version of their initial statement. The UNHCR representative argued

that a 2-minute, 45-second tape would never be aired, and if aired would never make an impact because people would not stay and listen for that long. He also argued about the uselessness of having a coordination meeting if its decisions are not followed through. On the other hand, the OHR representative argued that the shorter version did not accurately reflect the law and that “it should have the last word.” In the end, OHR and the UNHCR agreed to prepare two tapes, one 1-minute and one 2-minute, 45-second. As of July 1998, the tapes had not yet been released. In another example, the OHR Refugee Task Force wanted to develop a campaign to promote refugee returns and explain the procedures. According to an interview with an International Crisis Group representative, the office of public information, which is in charge of most media activities, killed the initiative “because he did not control it.”

Duplication of effort and redundancy. The coordination process does not enable the campaign’s actors to avoid redundancy and duplication of efforts. For example, numerous organizations conduct radio-television campaigns in support of the same Dayton’s principles. During spring and summer 1998, the OHR and the UNMIBH decided to air radio and TV spots to support the common license-plates. In the same period, SFOR, the UNHCR, and the OHR decided to produce numerous messages on refugee returns and property laws. The coordination enables each organization to know what others are doing and eventually to seek support for its own campaigns. But it does not prioritize or time projects for maximizing the potential benefits of the campaigns. In another example, basically all major international organizations conduct media monitoring.⁵⁰ These efforts are not seen as duplicative by the international community because each organization focuses on different aspects. Considering the amount of

resources necessary for good monitoring of the press, it seems somewhat wasteful to duplicate this effort.

Financial Issues

The information campaign also suffers from some important funding problems. So far, the international community has not backed its rhetoric on the importance of dealing with the media situation by coming up with sufficient resources. USAID has contributed some \$10 million to the information campaign since 1995. The EU contributed \$10 million *ecus* (about \$12 million) in 1997, and is contributing the same amount in 1998. Other governments, such as the United Kingdom, Germany, Switzerland, Japan, and France also have unilaterally contributed to specific projects. Since 1996, OBN has received some \$16.5 million in endowment.⁵¹

These funds are limited because of the ambitious agenda of the international community. For many media professionals, creating a new network from scratch with less than \$20 million is a near-miracle. By comparison, the creation of SkyNews, the British 24-hour news network, required a £90 million investment. Admittedly, the OBN does not need to be a rival to SkyNews. The relatively low level of funding has limited the services that the network can provide to its customers. Overall, the limited funding spread over a large number of local projects, does not allow much latitude and limits the scope of the campaign.

Not only are funds limited, but their availability is not reliable. The availability of funds depends on each donor's whim. Budgets suddenly may become available or disappear unexpectedly. For example, as of early October 1998, the OSCE announced that it did not have funds for the media democratization program past October 30. Budgets may fall victim of bureaucratic problems. For example, according

to NATO officials, the PSYOP budget was frozen in July 1998 because of a feud between the organization and some contributing nations. As a result, the CJICTF had to cancel production on a few campaigns. The chaotic availability of funds makes long-term endeavors extremely difficult.

Finally, payment rules can be too bureaucratic. For example, in 1998, The EU awarded Media Plan some financial assistance to open a new school of journalism. Based on that commitment, Media Plan moved from its cramped offices in downtown Sarajevo to the old Architecture school. As of early July, the NGO was already two months behind in rent because it had not received the EU money yet. Timely decisionmaking and delivery processes that work would certainly contribute to the overall effectiveness of the campaign by enhancing the recipients' ability to operate faster and more easily.

Seeking an Effective Message

After almost 3 years of operations, we can draw some important lessons about message effectiveness. The question is: What makes a message succeed or fail? Across the many programs and operations conducted by the international community, we have summarized three basic features that seem to enhance message effectiveness. By message effectiveness, we mean that the message inciting to a certain behavior leads the audience to adopt the sought-after behavior.

The message first needs to be culturally sensitive. All the people we interviewed agreed that being culturally sensitive is a *sine qua non* condition for a successful information campaign. The director of Common Ground Productions in Sarajevo said: "You *must* get a handle on cultural differences or you'll be in a mess and ineffective. Just take a small example here: green is a Muslim color

here, and you've got to be aware of that. If you aren't, you could inadvertently use the color and broadcast messages you don't mean to broadcast."⁵²

Indeed, to be accepted, a message needs to be understood. To be understood, it needs to take into account the specific cultural references. This statement might seem obvious, but in practice, it is not necessarily easy to implement because it requires knowledge and access to local resources (which may not always be available). In Bosnia, the international community's campaign has long suffered from its remoteness to the locals. In the beginning of operations, PSYOP products were considered to be too American and not enough centered on the local culture.⁵³ For a long time, the international community has relied heavily on print products (and the CJICF continues to do so), whereas Bosnians do not have the money to buy newspapers (the highest circulation newspaper prints only 20,000 copies daily), and get their information mostly from radio and television.⁵⁴

Another example is language. Although all three ethnic groups speak Serbo-Croat ("Bosnian" to Bosniaks), each has made an effort to introduce specific words or syntax to differentiate itself from other ethnic groups. This has created headaches for the international community, forcing it to pay extra caution to the vocabulary used.⁵⁵

Meanwhile, the international community has made some major effort to try to adapt to the local environment, and some improvement resulted from this commitment. The 1998 OHR documentaries on sensitive issues, such as Freedom of Movement (FOM), refugee returns, or common institutions is a good example. According to the OHR spokesman, a lot of research went into these products. First, each product is presented to focus groups to help determine the themes and backgrounds that Bosnians like (no matter what their ethnic

affiliation).⁵⁶ Then the OHR decided to hire local talent for the production. A well-known local satirical group (“Toplista”), popular before and even during the war, was hired to appear in several of the products, and a local firm is in charge of production; however, to get good-looking “quality” products, OHR hired a London-based company to direct the project and do the post-production in London.⁵⁷

Likewise, the UNHCR has hired a local NGO (InterNews) to produce 13 television spots on “Happy Returns” to make sure that they are culturally relevant.

To be effective, the message also needs to be tied to a realistic policy. For example, UNHCR officials acknowledged that they are experiencing difficulties convincing refugees to return in areas controlled by ethnic groups different than theirs (minority returns). Although the international community has put a lot of effort into advertising Dayton’s principle (that every refugee is entitled to return to his pre-war settlement), and in disseminating information on the procedure for returning and reclaiming property, the flow of minority returns remains fairly slow and small in numbers. In short, the message does not convince because it is not deemed credible. Most refugees are afraid to return to territory under control of other ethnic groups. They are routinely misinformed (by their own authorities) and intimidated, if not worse (by other ethnic groups). So far, the international community has taken limited steps toward guaranteeing some form of security for minority returns; however, as long as security is not established for those who wish to return where they lived before the war, people will seek safer settlements. The message is not effective because it is not tied to a realistic policy.

Measures of Effectiveness

Hardly anyone knows how effective the overall information campaign is. Measuring effect is a difficult task requiring resources and, in some cases, sophisticated equipment, neither of which the international community has in abundance. Measuring the effect of a “communication” is especially hard because it is always difficult to establish a causal link between a message and an action. When we asked the question of effectiveness, all our interviewees had answers spanning the spectrum of possibilities: “It works really well,” “I am having an impact,” “It works O.K.,” “It doesn’t work at all,” “I don’t know.” All of the interviewees presented some anecdotal evidence to support their claims, such as: “Their products were well distributed,” “Focus groups react favorably to their products,” “I have feedback that some people like it”;⁵⁸ however, the simple fact that the various players have such differing views of how well the overall campaign works shows the lack of reliable measures. Most of the officials we interviewed acknowledged the difficulties of conducting meaningful and accurate impact assessment.⁵⁹ Some officials even expressed some reluctance to conduct impact assessment because it can backfire if it leads to unfulfilled promises. An IO public information official explained that she shied away from raising the MOE issue with her supervisors because she fears they would cut her funding if the results are not as good as expected.⁶⁰ She also acknowledged that she is convinced that her spots have an impact on the population and help change people’s mind. “I am convinced it plays a positive role and facilitates our mission. It’s just that hard facts on the impact are difficult to find and expensive to measure, so I don’t do it.”

Not surprisingly, the international community has, so far, mostly relied on rudimentary measures, such as the following:

Level-of-effort measures. Such measures are designed to assess the amount of effort a military force is putting into a specific task. It consists, for example, of counting how many products a PSYOP task force disseminates. The CJICTF has relied heavily on this type of measure since the beginning of operations in Bosnia.⁶¹

Anecdotal evidence. Such measures consist of gathering reactions to disseminated messages from ordinary citizens or local leaders. A systematic collection process is difficult to set up, and that is why most international organizations rely on partial (therefore, mostly anecdotal) evidence. For example, OHR and OBN personnel gauge the popularity of the network based on President Izetbegovitch's reaction to it. OHR officials stated that OBN "is beginning to have an effect because Izetbegovitch recently criticized the program, so he must think it is having an effect."⁶² Similarly, the OBN director indicated that Izetbegovitch's willingness to appear on the network (for the first time in July 1998) is a sign "that he thinks we are reaching a large audience and he wants a share of it." Anecdotal evidence is also gathered by the PSYOP troops in charge of product dissemination. On their mission, they talk to people and ask them questions about the products; however, these measures are not fully adequate. For example, knowing how many products you produce is hardly an indicator of success, because it does not tell you whether people read, like, or are influenced by the products. As for the feedback gathered by soldiers, CJICTF personnel argued that it was difficult for them to gather reliable, candid data because their appearance (dressed in full combat gear) drives the response.

Content analysis. SFOR-PIO has been particularly keen in that domain. Every morning, personnel read the articles published in the press to check “how our line is played out.” As the CPIO recognized, “This is not a measure of the man on the street, and it is not scientific.” At SHAPE’s request, SFOR CIO developed a red-amber-green benchmark for media compliance based on content analysis. We could not gather specifics on how the CIO uses this measure.

Focus groups and polling data. Several organizations pre-test and post-test their products to see if they appeal to the local populations and have an effect on them. For example, the OSCE voter education department is using pre- and post-testing to make sure that its products are credible and to verify that they gave people the procedural information they needed for the elections.

The existing measures are far from satisfactory. Level of effort measures give insight into an organization’s magnitude of effort, but it is hardly relevant when it comes to whether the audience likes or agrees with the products. It is widely used because it is the easiest quantitative assessment to gather and present. Anecdotal evidence is a double-edged sword. It can be very significant, but it is prone to subjectivity because it depends on the interpretation of incidents, events, and discourse. One might get it right or wrong.⁶³ A second problem concerning anecdotal evidence concerns the gathering methods. For example, it is difficult for the PSYOP to get reliable, candid data because the personnel’s soldierly appearance drives the response. In theory, polls and focus-groups enable a more sophisticated and scientific measurement of effect; however, mainly because of lack of resources, the international community has not yet systematized PSYOPs use. In addition, polls and surveys are more significant on

the long-term (several decades). Using them as short-term MOEs may be hazardous and should be carefully interpreted. Finally, as Sheldon Himelfarb of Common Ground Productions stated: “Conditions in Bosnia, where demography is in flux, mistrust is epidemic, and media polling is rudimentary, make accurate evaluation impact costly if not downright impossible.”⁶⁴

In addition, some of the international community’s programs, such as media professionalization, are extremely difficult to accurately assess. This type of activity does not lend itself to any kind of quantitative measurement because the programs are designed to improve the quality of reporting and broadcasting. Several officials we interviewed offered some personal perspective on these programs. For example, the UNMIBH spokesman (who has spent 5 years in country) and the OBN director (who has been in Sarajevo since the war) both stated that journalists have acquired new standards and are becoming more professional. Both attributed the changes to the work of the international community. The OSCE spokeswoman (who has worked in Bosnia since Dayton) said she has seen a considerable evolution in the local journalists’ professional behavior;⁶⁵ however, as of now, no one has tried to document the extent of the changes and their effect on the overall situation.

Lastly, MOEs in Bosnia mostly concern individual products. Few links exist between the measures and the overall objectives. Among the actors we interviewed, only the OSCE voter education director acknowledged some kind of link between her information campaign and the overall objective. She stated that voter turn-out during the national elections (September 13–14, 1998) would provide an assessment of the information campaign. She specifically mentioned that a 70 percent turn-out would be a success.⁶⁶

No other international organization would agree to give tangible indicators to measure their campaign's effectiveness against the overall objectives. This was all the more surprising that the September 1998 elections were considered as a major benchmark for Dayton's implementation. OHR officials for example, recognized that the international community's goal was for the nationalistic parties to loosen their grip. Although the OHR official refused to provide a statistical threshold, he made the following remark: "If the nationalistic parties win the elections by the same margins (as in 1996), then we might as well pack up and leave, but if the non-nationalistic parties do a good showing, then our campaign is effective." Such statement is hardly a measure of effectiveness as almost any electoral result can be explained to show some progress.

Conclusion: The Information Campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina

The good news is the international community is running an information campaign consisting of a multifaceted and coordinated effort to democratize the local media landscape and foster Dayton's agenda. Bosnia is probably one of the largest peace operations where such an extensive information campaign effort has been undertaken. The bad news is that the campaign has run into numerous obstacles that have impeded its effectiveness. Among the major obstacles encountered are:

An ill-defined campaign—Indeed, as it has developed haphazardly according to the circumstances, the information campaign grew in different and sometimes contradictory directions, alternating between democratic principles and editorial control.

The international community—is undecided whether democratization and reducing the influence of the nationalistic parties is one and the same goal or if they are two different goals that require different measures. In the early days of operations, the international community acted as if democratization would quickly lead to the emergence of viable non-nationalistic alternatives. As the campaign moved along, the international community has moved slightly, shifting its focus on more coercive measures to try to block the nationalistic parties' influence while maintaining its democratic rhetoric.

The commitment to media reform—by the international community is not backed by sufficient resources.

The absence of a clear mission—regarding media reform from the outset of operations has led to structural problems, rivalry, and duplication of efforts, which have diminished the campaign's effectiveness.

The lack of adequate and accurate MOEs—make it more difficult to assess and adapt the campaign's methods to the overall objectives.

¹This chapter is based on research by Kevin Avruch and Pascale Combelles Siegel in Bosnia-Herzegovina, between July 20–28, 1998. The team spent most of its time in Sarajevo with two daily excursions to Banja Luka (in Republika Srpska) and Mostar (including West Mostar). Assisting Avruch and Siegel was Alija Dedajic, field director and translator. Material in this chapter builds on research reported by Siegel in *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations*, 1998. Note that when the present tense is used in this chapter, it refers to late July 1998.

²Indeed, such a study would require fairly sophisticated tools, such as listening/readership measures, survey data, and attitudes analysis.

³In all, we interviewed 34 individuals and attended two press conferences at Tito Barracks.

⁴Two examples come to mind. In 1993, the United States refused to endorse the Vance–Owen plan because it gave too much territory to the Bosnian Serbs (43 percent). After their refusal, the Bosniaks backed out of the deal and contested the maps provided by Vance and Owen. For more details, see Francine Boidevaix, *Une diplomatie informelle pour l'Europe: Le groupe de contact Bosnie*, Paris, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense, collection Perspectives Stratégiques, 7, 1997. In another example, during the first 6 months of 1995, UNPROFOR commanders proposed several plans to restructure the UNPROFOR into a more robust and less exposed force. The plan was systematically and vehemently opposed by Madeleine Albright, then U.S. Ambassador to the UN because it contained the controversial disposition of regrouping in central Bosnia all the UNPROFOR force (including the ones protecting the declared safe areas). For more details on that issue, see Jan Willem Honig and Norbert Both, *Srebrenica: Record of a War Crime*, London, Penguin Book, 1996.

⁵The Croat-Serbs had taken control on the Krajina region in 1991, just after Croatia proclaimed its independence from the Belgrade authorities.

⁶A full description of the international community's mandate appears in General Framework Agreement for Peace available on several internet sites, including <http://www.nato.int>.

⁷For an assessment of the DPA implementation, see NATO and the OHR regular reports to the United Nations Security Council. The reports are available on the UN website at <http://www.un.org>. A more American perspective on the implementation process can be found in the General Accounting Office's reports. See General Accounting Office, *Bosnia Peace Operation: Progress Toward Achieving the Dayton's Agreement Goals*, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, GAO/NSIAD-97-132, Washington DC, May 1997. See also, General Accounting Office, *Bosnia Peace Operation: Pace of Implementing Dayton Accelerated as International Involvement Increased*, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, GAO/NSIAD-98-138, Washington, DC, June 1998. See also, General Accounting Office, *Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force*, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, GAO/NSIAD-99-19, Washington, DC, October 1998.

⁸Dusan Basic, deputy director of Media Development. Media Development is a local NGO monitoring the local media and encouraging journalistic professionalization. It is sponsored by the European Commission and the School of Journalism in Lille, France (Ecole Supérieure de Journalisme).

⁹Among many examples, de la Brosse reports the case of the daily Politika, whose section on “echoes and reactions” allocated five of its six pages to articles listing “Oustachas” crimes during World War II. See Renaud de la Brosse, “Les voix de la guerre,” in General Jean Cot (ed.), *Dernière Guerre Balkanique ? Ex-Yougoslavie: Témoignages, analyses, perspectives*, Paris, Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense, l’Harmattan, 1996, p 169.

¹⁰See Stanco Cerovic, “L’information est-elle possible face à la propagande?” in *Dialogues et documents pour le progrès de l’homme/Expériences et réflexions sur la reconstruction nationale et la paix*, Documents de travail de la Fondation pour le progrès de l’homme, 64, p 190.

¹¹For more details, see Mark Thompson, “Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina,” Article 19, 1994.

¹²Tadeusz Mazowiecki, “Depuis le début des conflits, les informations diffusées par les médias en ex-Yougoslavie ont consisté pour l’essentiel en discours nationalistes et en attaques et insultes généralisées dirigées contre les autres peuples. Il n’est pas surprenant que ce phénomène ait conduit directement à la perpétration d’horribles atrocités sur les champs de batailles et dans l’ensemble du territoire,” in *Rapport spécial sur les médias, Rapporteur spécial désigné par la résolution 1994/72 de la commission des Droits de l’Homme des Nations Unies*, E/CN 4/1995/54, 13 décembre 1994, p 35.

¹³Marjan Malesic, *The Role of the Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict: August 1, 1991 to January 31, 1992*, Stockholm, Psykologist Försvar, rapport nr 164, May 1993, p 129.

¹⁴Interview with the author, Sarajevo, October 10, 1996.

¹⁵American journalist Roy Gutman, visited the camp of Omarska, near Prijedor, in August 1992. This became the first story about Serb-run concentration camps in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

¹⁶Stephen Badsey, “The Media and UN “Peacekeeping” Since the Gulf War,” *The Journal of Conflict Studies*, XVII:1, Spring 1997.

¹⁷See Marjan Malesic, “International Peacekeeping: An Object of Propaganda in Former-Yugoslavia,” *International Peacekeeping*, 5:2, Summer 1998, p 91.

¹⁸See Marjan Malesic, “International Peacekeeping: An Object of Propaganda in Former-Yugoslavia,” *International Peacekeeping*, 5:2, Summer 1998, p 94.

¹⁹Stephen Badsey, *op. cit.*, p 17. According to Badsey, false stories about MacKenzie included that his wife was Serb and that he had raped four Muslim girls from a Serb-run concentration camp.

²⁰Many peacekeepers from the UNPROFOR mission I talked to acknowledged that all sides used propaganda to undermine the UN mission in Bosnia. However, in the literature, I have found more information on the Bosniaks' campaign than on the Bosnian Serbs or Croats'. The paragraph reflects that imbalance. It should be assumed, however, that *all sides* used propaganda and tried to discredit the UN mission for their own aims.

²¹Captain Mark Van Dyke, USN, FIRO Chief Public Information Officer, Public Information in Peacekeeping: The IFOR experience, Briefing presented at NATO, political-military steering committee, Ad-hoc group on Co-operation in Peacekeeping, NATO Headquarters, Brussels, April 11, 1997.

²²Such publications include: The SFOR Informer (published twice a month), a 16 page newspaper focusing on the daily work of the various contingents involved in Operation Joint Guard/Forge; Talon, a weekly newsmagazine published by the PAO staff of MND (N) and serving the soldiers of Task Force Eagle. It focuses on the daily lives and operations of the contingents making up MND (N); American Endeavor, a semimonthly publication by the National Support Element Public Affairs Office (Hungary). It focuses on the lives and operations of the units involved in the US NSE. All three publications focus on the daily lives and operations of 'GI Joe' and are conceived as a morale booster by enhancing the profile of routine daily activity and information sharing. As the U.S. forces place greater emphasis on command information than any other army involved in *Operation Joint Forge*, most of the command information products are produced or directed by U.S. forces.

²³Resorting to psychological operations in support of *Joint Endeavor* (December 1995) caused some unease among NATO partners as some nations saw something of the "Manchurian Candidate" behind the PSYOP effort. The SHAPE PSYOP staff officer acknowledged that in the early days of the IFOR operations he could not use the term "psychological operations" when he was briefing at NATO headquarters because it would have upset some nations. To ease these fears, the SHAPE planners chose to rename the psychological operations campaign: "the IFOR Information Campaign." Although with time, the nations' reluctance eased, the original acronym remains in use.

²⁴The divisions' PSYOP personnel now belongs to the nations composing each division. MND (N) has a US PSYOP component. MND (SW) PSYOP are mostly British and Dutch personnel. As of Summer 1998, the American personnel operating in the British OAR is withdrawn. In MND (SE), the French have established a PSYOP capability. The PSYOP force in MND (SE) consists of French, German, and Spanish forces. As of June 1998, the United States is decreasing its contribution because of strains put on the active component of its PSYOP force (especially the 4th POG) by the demands of the operation. Its overall contribution will be reduced from 120 to 90 personnel. They will be replaced mostly with German and French PSYOP personnel. U.S. equipment is also withdrawn.

²⁵According to SFOR CPIC statistics, *Operation Harvest* (March–April 1998) was a success with 6,600 mines, 4,600 artillery and mortar shells, 725,000 rounds of small arm ammunition, 16,200 grenades, 3,000 kg of explosives, and 2,000 weapons collected. This is a success because, according to COL Maclean (SFOR CIO) and COL Ginn (SFOR CPIC director), the program yielded results above the headquarters expectations.

²⁶The principals are the commander and chairs of the main international organizations operating in Bosnia. They include COMSFOR, the High Representative, the directors of the OSCE, UNHCR, UNMIBH missions in Bosnia. The principals meet regularly to discuss and coordinate policy.

²⁷These remarks—an incipient “measure of effectiveness” —should be recalled when one considers that the nationalist parties did much better, and the moderates much worse, than the international community had hoped in those elections; see concluding chapter.

²⁸According to OHR spokesman, It would have taken too long to work a regulatory body through the parties.

²⁹His remarks proved prescient.

³⁰Ariane Quentier notes that there is a big difference between the UNHCR's campaign during the war and after the war. During the war, she said, the campaign mostly focused on the international press to let them (and therefore the world) know about food, medicine, human rights abuses, and so on. Since Dayton, the focus has shifted to refugee returns.

³¹By doing so, the DPRES associations serve the goals of the nationalistic parties who have systematically limited, delayed, restrained returns.

³²OSCE, Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, OSCE media strategy for 1998 Bosnia and Herzegovina elections, fact sheet, May 10, 1998.

³³The temporary replacement had run the voter information campaigns for the 1997 elections.

³⁴OSCE, Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina, pamphlet, no date.

³⁵For example, in May 1998, the OSCE democratization department organized two essay competition on “Let’s Build our Society Together” in high schools in Olovo and Kakanj and on “The Power of the Media” in Mrkonjic Grad. OSCE, Monthly Summary of OSCE Democratization Activities: May 1998, no date, p2.

³⁶OSCE, Democratization Department 1998, fact sheet, no date.

³⁷OSCE, Media Expert Commission Fact Sheet, no date.

³⁸The EU is currently the largest donor in B-H and has been involved in the country since the outbreak of the war. A few data illustrate this commitment, with humanitarian aid (2 million ecus since 1992 and 50% of ECHO’s budget from 1993-1995) and ECMM. The EU is now heavily involved in the reconstruction of B-H (2 billion ecus since Dayton) and with the CAFAO, the EU is helping the Bosnian authorities come up with viable custom laws.

³⁹U.S. Agency for International Development, Bosnia Independent Media Program, fact sheet, March 1998.

⁴⁰For details of Common Ground Production’s experiences in Bosnia, see Sheldon Himelfarb, “Searching for Common Grounds on Radio,” in David Smock, “Private Peacemaking: USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofit Organizations,” USIP Peaceworks, 1998, n°20, pp. 42-44.

⁴¹The OBN was not able to recruit suitable TV stations, its programs were not very appealing, it ran into many technical difficulties and the opposition of established political leaders (among them Alija Izetbegovitch).

⁴²For example, in early summer 1998, “Radio Boston”, a one-man radio station, made remarks opposing refugee returns in his region and incited violence against DPRES. He was disciplined.

⁴³From our interviews, it was clear that the major protagonists are used to working together and share information on their respective activities. All major spokesmen were able to discuss with us what other organizations were doing (at least in the field relevant to them) and to compare their respective campaigns. This seemed especially true in the case of the OSCE and the OHR. For example, in Mostar the OSCE monitored a report from radio Herceg-Bosna criticizing the international community’s handling of Bosnian Croats and comparing it to Hitler’s treatment of the Jews in the 1930s. After the report was known to members of the OSCE staff in Mostar, they immediately called the OHR media representative to discuss the situation and to attend a meeting with the editor of Radio Herceg-Bosna. The OSCE and OHR jointly asked for a retraction and formal apology to be broadcast twice in prime time by the station.

⁴⁴For example, during our interview, he picked up the day's edition of *Devni Avaz* (July 28), *Devni Avaz*, a pro-SDA paper. The paper is carrying a story on the sanctions imposed by the OHR on Sarajevo. The article accuses the international community of being prompted by "mercenary pro-Serbs or anti-Bosniaks." The director views this as hate speech, but the international community doesn't, so "they don't do anything about it. The international community should take action against this type of speech."

⁴⁵There may have been an underground press, but we are not sure of its strength and significance.

⁴⁶Media Plan, 97' Elections Guide for Journalists in Bosnia-Herzegovina," Sarajevo, August 1997, p 67.

⁴⁷The Principals' request stemmed in part from a desire to avoid the UNPROFOR pitfalls when the military and HCR officials would put out diametrically opposing view points from the same stage.

⁴⁸This account confirms a previous account that I gathered from the then Commander of the Combined Joint Information Campaign Task Force. See *Target Bosnia*.

⁴⁹Carlos Wenderstorp just before the elections asked the German government to discontinue its return policy until after the elections before he fears more returns could play in the hands of the nationalistic parties. Report on "All things considered," National Public Radio, September 2, 1998.

⁵⁰OSCE monitors for hate speech and language. SFOR monitors articles relating to its effort. The OHR monitors the local media on a routine basis.

⁵¹This figure does not account for the price of renting the satellite feed that enable daily broadcasting operations, for which the UK government has agreed to pay directly.

⁵²For further information on the difficulties to be culturally relevant, see Sheldon Himelfarb, "Bosnia: Searching for Common Grounds on Radio," in David Smock, *Private Peacemaking, USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Non-Profit Organizations*, Washington DC, USIP, pp 42-44.

⁵³For example, in 1996, the CJIICTF developed a poster with a chess game to encourage voting. Bosnians interpreted it as the international community playing with Bosnia's future. In another example, the CJIICTF developed a poster with a checklist of what had been achieved and what remained to be done. After the product was disseminated, the CJIICTF realized that Bosnians don't do checklists.

⁵⁴For further information on that point, see Pascale Combelles Siegel, *Target Bosnia*, op.cit.

⁵⁵In the UNHCR series on happy returns, they had to modify the original title because it could not translate in "Serbian." The SFOR CJIICTF has had to "translate" some of its radio or TV spots to make them appropriate for each ethnic group.

⁵⁶The focus groups showed that Bosnians from all sides viewed positively children and the beauty of the country. As a result, many of OHR's products feature children and focus on the themes of the legacy to the children of Bosnia, along with bucolic scenes of Bosnia's countryside.

⁵⁷Each ad costs between £ 60.000 and £ 80.000.

⁵⁸We have heard many criticisms of other's campaigns. For example, the OHR criticizes SFOR campaign (1) for being too crude and too simplistic (such as IFOR campaign on the Serb suburbs and dropping leaflets on Brcko). Several NGOs stated that the OHR products have no impact on the local populations. OHR officials indicated that the OSCE is ineffective in dealing with the media.

⁵⁹Both NATO and the U.S. Government have been developing benchmarks to measure the progress toward a self-sustaining peace in Bosnia. For example, a GAO report released in October 1998 provides the US executive branch list of objectives and conditions for ensuring a self-sustaining peace process. The document lists an objective and the conditions to be realized for this objective to be achieved. However, in the field of media reform, the document does not provide any indication of how to measure whether the conditions are realized or not. See United States General Accounting Office, *Bosnia Peace Operation: Mission, Structure, and Transition Strategy of NATO's Stabilization Force*, Report to the Chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, GAO/NSIAD-99-19, Washington, DC, October 1998, p 44-47.

⁶⁰UNHCR officials says that many people in the organization are already predisposed against mass information campaigns. She also points out that it is hard enough, as is, to convince donors to support these campaigns. If measured results are bad, donors can reduce or cancel their support for this type of effort.

⁶¹However, COMCJICTF (in early 1998) favored this type of indicators to assess the effectiveness of his campaign. His goal was to put out a hundred different products a month.

⁶²However, Izetbegovitch's criticisms began as soon as the network was set up in September 1996.

⁶³For example, that Izetbegovitch publicly criticizes publicly the OBN may indicate that he fears the competition. However, it does not necessarily mean that OBN is having a long-term effect against the nationalistic parties, especially if Izetbegovitch or his party is able to use it to their own advantage.

⁶⁴Sheldon Himelfarb, "Bosnia: Searching for common grounds on radio," in David Smock, "Private peacemaking: USIP-Assisted Peacemaking Projects of Nonprofit Organizations", USIP Peaceworks, 1998, 20, pp 42-44.

⁶⁵For example, she noted that in the first year after Dayton, local journalists behaved like communist journalists. They repeated what authorities told them and did not ask any questions. Now, she says, they are mimicking international reporters' behaviors, asking tough questions and challenging authorities.

⁶⁶This assessment however may be viewed as a success by the OSCE which views its mission as organizing the electoral process, but not necessarily by other international organizations who viewed that the real purpose of these elections was to loosen the grip of the nationalistic parties.

HAITI INFORMATION CAMPAIGN¹

GOALS AND METHODOLOGY

The research trip was undertaken to develop as a case study the information activities of the international community in its intervention in Haiti, from the time immediately preceding the deployment of the U.S.-led multinational force in September 1994 through to the present activities of the UN mission.

The team viewed its task as gathering information on the following aspects of information operations in Haiti:

1. Identifying who the major players have been, what their information efforts consist of, and whether and how they coordinate their activities.
2. Analyzing the information operations and their effects in an effort to discern what general principles might be reflected, as differentiated from decisions owing directly to the specific mission and local conditions.
3. Determining how the actors assess the effectiveness of their information efforts. (We did not attempt to make our own objective evaluation of effectiveness; this would entail a research undertaking well beyond the scope of the present effort.)

To achieve our goals, we first reviewed the historical, analytical, and lessons-learned literature concerning information operations in the international intervention in Haiti. With this background, we identified and interviewed representatives of the key organizations and institutions presently involved in information operations in Haiti. These included the U.S. ambassador and in-country heads of relevant subordinate agencies such as USIS and USAID, as well as officers serving in the U.S. military support group. We spoke with the representative of the UN Secretary General and members of his staff, including officials of the international civilian mission in Haiti (MICIVIH). We also interviewed international and local journalists and broadcasters, and a cross section of Haitian professionals, as well as numerous persons on the street in an effort to get a broad view of what kinds of information people in Haiti have been exposed to and with what effect.

BACKGROUND

This section addresses information-related issues beginning in 1991 with the coup that caused President Aristide to flee Haiti to the summer of 1998 when our research visit permitted us to observe and evaluate ongoing information activities.

Coup leaders remained in control for 3 years (September 1991—September 1994), during which time the international community became increasingly concerned about government corruption, human rights abuses, and large numbers of Haitians making dangerous and desperate efforts to emigrate. The U.S. went through a sequence of changes in its refugee policy with regard to Haitians, attempting to discourage illegal emigration and rescue and process the claims of Haitian “boat people.” Diplomatic and economic measures embodied in United Nations resolutions

aimed at reducing the abusive policies of the dictators and persuading them to accept the return to power of the elected president. Of particular importance was an international embargo, starting in June 1993, which caused serious economic repercussions, social disruption, and physical hardships for the general population.

During the spring and summer of 1994, increasingly forceful negotiations sought to secure a peaceful transition. Continued intransigence by coup leaders resulted in a resolution authorizing a U.S. peacekeeping force to use “all necessary means” to remove the junta. Only when a military invasion was imminent, however, did the coup leader, Gen. Raoul Cedras, agree to step down. American forces entered Haiti on September 19, joined within days by other national contingents. By agreement, the authority of the coup leaders and the existence of the Haitian army was phased out over the next month. President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15.

The U.S.-led phase of the intervention lasted for 6 months; the United Nations assumed authority in March 1995. The UN mission was initially due to expire after new national elections in February 1996, but was extended by request of the Haitian president. A continuing UN presence has been maintained via a sequence of increasingly limited UN programs aimed at promoting the development of democratic institutions in Haiti.

Information Under the Coup

The Haitian leaders of the military coup of 1991 had evidenced a strong hostility to both the local and international media. Upon assuming the reigns of government they brought about the destruction of several radio stations and appear to have been complicit in the

murders of several journalists.² The organization, *Reporters Sans Frontieres*, noted in 1993 that Haitian journalists worked under threat of violence and death. It did not take long for those continuing to work in the field to recognize which subjects were taboo and to avoid addressing these. The sensitive topics included corruption among military leaders, abuses of power by the police chief, and the intimidation tactics of paramilitary groups associated with key government figures.³ Even United States and other foreign press crews were subject to bullying, and activists who persisted in calling attention to government abuses of power were forced to operate from under ground.⁴

As the effects of the international embargo began to take hold in Haiti, the rulers cited shortages as reasons to curtail media operations. Radio stations had their broadcasts limited to 12 hours a day and the nation's two daily newspapers could produce only three editions per week because of fuel and electricity shortages. Outside the capital, radio stations closed completely for lack of fuel and current, while the scarcity and high cost of batteries reduced listenership throughout the nation—including the audience of previously popular Voice of America broadcasts.⁵

As it became clear the United States was serious about removing the regime, coup leaders increased their media restrictions. Policies further curtailing activities of foreign correspondents were announced, although government forces proved unable to enforce them. By the month preceding the intervention, numerous radio stations were accused of having broadcast calls to sedition and revolt, and were warned that they stood to be taken over by the army. The regime went so far as to ban even the broadcast of foreign embassy statements, particularly the U.S. denunciations of repression.⁶

The three main weekly newspapers in Haiti continued to circulate freely—despite the fierce opposition to the military regime of two of them—though they hardly constituted a serious threat because up to 85 percent of the Haitian population can be considered functionally illiterate. On the other hand, the staff of a more radical fourth weekly that enjoyed some popularity in the countryside was seriously harassed and ultimately suspended publication in the face of anonymous threats.⁷

State media highlighted anti-Aristide propaganda, and, as the intervention became imminent, showed films of the U.S. invasion of Panama. Indeed, for 2 weeks *following* the intervention they continued to broadcast virulent anti-Aristide material, as well as anti-United States, pro-Army programs until ordered to stop by American authorities.⁸

Growing public support in the United States for taking action against Haiti's dictators was fueled in part by reports of human rights abuses and by concern that the economic embargo was having a horrific effect on the poor without forcing the leadership to capitulate. But the issue that was interpreted by many as having the greatest impact on U.S. national interests was that of refugees. Media images showed, and government figures confirmed, that huge numbers of Haitians were continuing to head for American shores to escape desperate conditions in their homeland. This situation generated a demand in the United States that authorities act to secure the nation's borders.

The formal effort to cope with this situation before the intervention, *Operation Sea Signal*, had an important information dimension. The hazards of boat migration—dangers of the sea, sharks, inclement weather, poorly constructed boats—were emphasized in Creole language messages transmitted by radio broadcasts and ship-mounted

loudspeakers. When the U.S. asylum policy was made more restrictive, the news was transmitted immediately and repeatedly. Because the scarcity of radios and batteries would inhibit reaching the target audience, the program included the air-drop of 10,000 radios. Meanwhile, keeping order among refugees already in camps at Guantanamo was enhanced by providing them as much information as possible via multimedia resources, including balanced news of events taking place in Haiti.⁹

Efforts to achieve our information objectives in *Operation Sea Signal*—a single aspect of one program in our overall Haiti operations—illustrate the interagency challenge of such undertakings. They required coordination among the Department of Defense, Department of State, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Department of Justice, UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and two NGOs: International Organization for Migration, and World Relief Corporation.¹⁰

Information and Intervention

Pre-deployment

U.S. goals with regard to Haiti had been pursued for more than 2 years by diplomatic and economic means (summarized in the Governors Island Accord and the international embargo), but the absence of a coercive enforcement mechanism permitted Gen. Cedras to stonewall. In the face of his intransigence, planning began for a U.S.-led intervention. Recognizing that information activities would be a key element of this effort, officials formed, in June 1994, the Washington, DC MIST (Military Information Support Team). Its goals were to create an information environment in support of United States objectives to “restore” democracy to Haiti, to allow President Aristide to present a message of reconciliation to

his constituents, and to outline plans for his return to power. The information campaign was considered to be of particular importance because of the steady diet of disinformation and misinformation being provided by the Haitian military regime to its people.¹¹

The MIST was composed of military psychological operations specialists and Creole speaking civilian linguists. It coordinated with President Aristide and with the U.S. National Security Council, and its recommendations and products had to be approved by Aristide and the commander in chief of U.S. Atlantic Command, who was in charge of the area of operation before the intervention.¹²

The information-based effort to discourage illegal emigration from Haiti was a MIST operation, and the organization expanded its activities by establishing Radio and Television Democracy. Aimed at preparing the Haitian populace for the restoration of popular rule, three FM bands alternately broadcast daily messages from President Aristide and discussions conducted by a panel of Haitian political experts. The programs emphasized the benefits that the restoration of democracy would bring about and discouraged as counterproductive violent retribution against agents of the military regime. President Clinton and other key U.S. officials used the programs to legitimize American intentions, discredit the junta, and confirm the determination to remove the corrupt regime by whatever means necessary. The stations also broadcast current news, commentary by popular Haitian figures, and selected Haitian music.¹³

Planning

While formal planning for military operations is typically extensive, the increased focus on information operations has added significantly to the planning burden. Indeed, as

will be demonstrated in the Haiti case, the sharply increased requirements for planning and coordination to conduct an information campaign is a distinguishing feature of such an undertaking. Committed leaders must provide technical experts with the resources and authority to develop and oversee a plan that will have to be executed by many dozens of diverse units and agencies.

Regarding Haiti, U.S. psychological operations experts developed plans to support potential non-combatant evacuation and migrant interdiction operations. It then focused in earnest on dual plans for full-scale intervention: one anticipating a forced entry by the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps and a separate one for an unopposed entry by the 10th Mountain Division.¹⁴ Its contribution went beyond PSYOP-specific operations. It had conducted an extensive study of Haitian geography, culture, society, and telecommunications, as well as being familiar with all the relevant intelligence data. It also participated in migrant relief operations, which became a source of information and expertise for virtually all the other participants in the planning process.¹⁵

The dual planning requirement was particularly challenging. Separate information campaigns had to be conceived for each contingency, with programs and products developed modularly so as to simultaneously meet the unique requirements of each task force and ensure continuity if there was to be a handover from one to the other. Planning support was provided at each level: strategic, to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; operational, for CINCUSACOMs campaign planners; and tactical, to dozens of subordinate units of each task force. The last category included support

to civil-military operations, promoting Haitian support for the intervention, and law and order campaigns.¹⁶

Interagency Coordination

Because the assets needed to execute these plans had to be competed for with units tasked with other important missions, the coordination challenge was daunting. The following passage gives some indication of the complexity of the task.

During Operation Uphold Democracy, PSYOP coordinated leaflet drops with the Air Force Special Operations Command and the 16th Special Operations Wing; Radio Democracy and electronic warfare transmissions with the 193d Special Operations Group; command and control warfare operations with the Joint Electronic Warfare Center and the Electronic Capabilities and Analysis Center; political and information strategies with the NSC, DOD, DOJ, DOS, USIA, JCS, the U.S. country team in Port au Prince, DIA, the Aristide government-in-exile, U.S. Atlantic Command, U.S. Special Operations Command, Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Special Forces, and Special Missions units. The challenge was enormous but essential to the success of the operation and to the significant impact that PSYOP achieved.¹⁷

Key to meeting the coordination requirements was the establishment of information coordinating committees at the national and task force levels. In Washington the Interagency Information Working Group was created and became the author of information policy with considerable ability to cut through red tape. Soon after the intervention took place, a counterpart organization was established in Haiti, the Information Coordination Committee. This body was chaired

by the U.S. Embassy public affairs officer, and included representatives from the joint task force, the joint PSYOPS task force, USAID, and the Department of Justice.¹⁸

Deployment

As it happened, neither of the two contingency plans matched the actual situation. A last-minute political agreement with the Cedras regime resulted in U.S. forces entering Haiti unopposed, but with the junta and its army and police force to remain in place during a transition period. This awkward and unanticipated development required a substantial on-the-fly transformation from an invasion information campaign to a non-combat one, and it led to some initial confusion on the ground.¹⁹

Nevertheless, the task force's main mission remained to establish and maintain a stable and secure environment and the key information tasks were to help gain popular support, reduce Haitian interference with joint task force operations, and maintain civil order. After a stable environment was established, the follow-on mission could be addressed: the restoration to power of the democratically elected government. Information support in this area entailed developing support for civil authority. At the same time, humanitarian civic assistance was proceeding, which also benefited from support by information programs.²⁰

From the outset, a key characteristic of the intervention—both the U.S.-led initial deployment and the follow-on UN assistance program—was its limited mandate. This feature was adopted as both a management device that shaped the information campaign and a substantive message in information operations. Still feeling the anguish and embarrassment of having to withdraw from Somalia, the American public, officials felt, would refuse to support another overseas deployment that would entail anything but

a narrow, clearly delineated set of objectives that could be achieved in a relatively brief time-frame.²¹ These features of *Operation Uphold Democracy* were emphasized to all audiences—the American public, foreign governments and the United Nations, and the citizens of Haiti. Furthermore, given the cynicism in Haiti and throughout the region concerning previous U.S. interventions in the Caribbean and Latin America, the United States sought to ensure all that its goals were benign, limited, and mindful of the responsibility to respect the authority of the elected Haitian government.

In-country, therefore, the information themes aimed at sustaining initial public support for the intervention focused on informing the population about the reasons for a U.S. military presence, minimizing criticism of U.S. actions, and discouraging open hostilities toward U.S. forces. Within days, as representatives and contingents from other countries began to arrive, the themes were adjusted to promote support for a multinational force whose benefits would include achieving economic and political stability for Haitians, restoration of law and order, and the assurance of democracy.²²

The specific activities by which these themes were executed included broadcasts and leaflet drops, mobile loudspeaker messages, and posters taped to the sides of joint task force vehicles. Printed products and taped messages—some with Aristide’s voice—sought to discourage mob acts against officials and supporters of the Cedras regime and to reduce Haitian-on-Haitian crime. Radios and loudspeakers often played the song, *Viv La Pe* (Long Live Peace), written (at U.S. PSYOP request) by a popular Haitian songwriter.²³

Problem Areas

Caused in part by the success of predeployment information activities, the Americans’ arrival was initially welcomed

by a huge majority of Haitians. That some information missteps would occur early on was, of course, inevitable in a complex, crisis-driven enterprise. Significantly, however, despite careful preparation and extensive advice from experts, it was the inability of Americans to accommodate certain nuances of Haitian society and culture that led to episodes that jeopardized the attainment of important information goals.

The eleventh-hour arrangement with junta leaders included an agreement that Cedras military and police forces would temporarily retain responsibility for local law enforcement. This concession failed to recognize the degree of animosity and mutual fear that existed between Haitian troops and citizens. To the amazement of Americans, police brutalized members of a peaceful pro-Aristide demonstration in the very presence of armed U.S. task force members. Believing they had no authority to act, American troops at the scene stood by, leaving many to conclude that the U.S. had either not enough power, or not enough concern to suppress the dictators' barbaric tactics.²⁴

Another negative episode appears to derive from cultural insensitivity. To ensure that security would be maintained at a political rally in the capital, task force troops and vehicles were positioned where they could deploy effectively if needed. The locations chosen, however, placed the American troops between the participants at the rally (Aristide supporters, mostly from the economic lower class) and the section of the city where wealthier citizens (many opposing Aristide's return) owned their walled residences up on the hillside on the south side of Port au Prince. The result was the inadvertent appearance that Americans were deployed to protect the property of wealthy Haitian elites rather than ensuring the safety of the throngs of poor Aristide supporters.²⁵

In yet another incident, U.S. troops acceded to President Aristide's insistence that they physically secure the parliament building in preparation for reconvening the elected legislature. The action failed to anticipate the conclusion that many Haitians—ever suspicious of authority—would reach, that their elected officials would be subject to intimidation by the armed representatives of a foreign government.²⁶

Such events, as well as the much criticized policy of allowing selected former members of Cedras army into the newly established Interim Public Security Force, ran directly counter to the message that the task force was striving to project. In time, the damage that these issues had on public opinion and support was largely overcome, but they had lingering negative effects and constituted a major challenge for those responsible for information activities.²⁷ They can be seen in retrospect as deriving at least partly from the inability to anticipate how actions that seemed harmless and transparent from the American perspective, would be differently interpreted through the lens of Haitian experience.

Another area of confusion centered on humanitarian civic action by the intervention forces. The effects of the international economic embargo on Haiti were found to be disastrous. Severe infrastructural needs, primarily involving water, electricity, and road repair, demanded attention, and a public support windfall accrued to information efforts to publicize the contributions of the multinational forces in these areas.²⁸ At the same time, U.S. policymakers firmly rejected a nation building or nation assistance role for the intervention force, limiting work to those projects that could be demonstrated to have a military payoff. Thus, when electrical power was restored in some areas that had long been without it, the effect on the public was dramatic: it not only restored an important service, it gave them hope for

the future. At the same time, news spread by word of mouth to areas not yet serviced, raising expectations, creating impatience, and sometimes resulting in bitter disappointment. Officials responsible for promulgating information themes now found themselves tasked with curbing Haitians unrealistic expectations that the multinational force could and would address every legitimate need.²⁹

Programs

To enhance the security of the multinational force, and to remove the means of oppression, both the American and Haitian governments supported a disarmament policy. Three programs were developed to pursue this goal, each having a significant information component. “Weapons-for-Cash” gave Haitians the opportunity to turn in lethal weapons such as semi-automatic rifles and grenades for fixed amounts of cash. For a number of reasons, and despite efforts of PSYOPS officers to adjust the terms of the program, few Haitians responded. Weapons cache seizures were considerably more successful, in part because of the psychological operators’ program of encouraging civilian support and offering cash rewards. “Mountain Strikes” were raids on military and paramilitary safe houses. Tactical PSYOP teams participated by broadcasting surrender appeal messages that resulted, in every case, in achievement of the mission without any shots being fired.³⁰

As near-term security requirements began to be achieved, the information focus shifted to somewhat longer range issues: enhancing the image of the Haitian government, building support for the Haitian police, and preparing for the transition to a United Nations mission in Haiti.³¹

Promoting a positive image for the government of Haiti aimed at encouraging both domestic stability and economic recovery. Beyond merely touting the achievements of the Aristide government generally, it would be important to identify the specific strengths and weaknesses of individual departments and make recommendations for how each could make improvements that would contribute to the government's positive image with the populace. This became the mission of Ministerial Advisor Teams—U.S. civil affairs experts who worked for several months in teams of four with particular Haitian agencies. USIS developed a campaign to publicize the program, conducting audience analyses, briefing Haitian journalists, and calling attention to positive results and feedback. Recommendations included promoting outreach programs that would benefit remote communities previously ignored by government. Every opportunity to promote the perception of economic recovery was pursued so that Haitians would see the benefits of non-violence and responsible conduct. High level foreign visits, promised foreign investments, and increasing USAID financial assistance were publicized by USIS and PSYOPs officials.³²

Winning support for the Haitian police would be difficult and would require a consistent, long-term effort. The information program entailed encouraging acceptance of the interim public security force and publicizing the determination to construct a Haitian National Police force that was professional, dedicated to law and order, respectful of human rights, and subordinate to the democratic government. As newly trained officers took to the streets alongside international monitors, an information program designed to instill public acceptance and confidence was mounted. It included radio and television public service announcements, and handbills, leaflets and posters describing the clearance and training procedures

the new force had undergone. Police stations were repainted and new uniforms included insignia of crossed Haitian and U.S. flags, all aimed at softening the police image. Confidence generally grew over time, though success varied from one region to another. Public suspicion decreased more significantly as the interim force gave way to a Haitian National Police, the need for which was extolled in a radio campaign. Citizens were informed that abusive former army types were excluded from the new organization, and that ranks were to be filled by eager, academy-trained applicants.³³

Transition

Transition to the United Nations phase of the Haiti intervention took place in accordance with the internationally fixed timetable. Because control by a dangerous and disagreeable regime had been so recent, there was public fear that disengagement by the U.S. after only 6 months would result in a slide back into repression. Indeed, an upsurge in vigilante killings during this period indicated widespread belief that popular justice would have to supplement or supplant the Haitian police and judicial systems. A U.S.-run information campaign to support the transition highlighted the UN's positive image worldwide, and shifted much of the credit for achievements to date to the government of Haiti. To allay fears of abandonment, public pronouncements emphasized the seamless transition to UN control and the continuing presence of other members of the multinational force. The multidimensional campaign included television, radio, newspaper articles, leaflets, handbills, and loudspeaker broadcasts. In the end, responsibility was turned over without any adverse incidents.³⁴

Information and the UN Mission

Structure and Organization

The United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) officially began on March 31, 1995; but an advanced party had arrived in-country very shortly after deployment of the multinational force the previous September, and a joint working group was quickly established to address transition issues. Although the UN resolution authorizing the mission made no particular mention of an information program, the MIST concept was carried forward. A MISTF (Military Information Support Task Force) was created under the operational control of UNMIH with the following specified tasks:

1. To advise and coordinate information campaign strategy with Special Operations Task Force and UNMIH
2. To attend Information Coordination Committee meetings in order to coordinate and deconflict information issues
3. To conduct a coordinated and integrated information program
4. To disseminate radio and television broadcasts using contract Haitian national radio and television assets
5. To produce print materials using organic and contract Haitian national facilities.³⁵

The MISTF conducted assessments to determine popular Haitian attitudes toward UNMIH and to decide which of MIST's policies and programs to carry forward. Its own objectives were to increase public support for UNMIH and to set conditions for successful elections. In addition, it

sought to continue efforts to increase popular support for democracy, the justice system, and the Haitian National Police, to foster disarmament, and to further reduce Haitian-on-Haitian violence. Procedures called for information products to be reviewed by the UNMIH spokesman and his staff and then to secure final clearance by the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. MISTF teams had a total staff of 104, including 21 Haitian language specialists, and were spread out over UNMIH's six zones of deployment.³⁶

Press and Information Office

The organization of the information effort under UNMIH rationally reflected the main functions of the UN mission.³⁷ An integrated press and information office was established under the direction of the United Nations spokesman and head of public information. This position was held for the first portion of the UN mission by Eric Falt, a French national with excellent English-speaking skills and a wealth of experience in public information related to peacekeeping. He used his authority to ensure that information operations under UNMIH were coordinated and coherent. Subordinate to the spokesman were public information officers for the military contingent and the civilian police.

The functions and responsibilities of the Press and Information Office were broad. It provided media services for approximately 350 journalists, keeping track of media visits and coordinating their field visits. It provided information to members of the press and official visitors. Press briefings were held at least weekly and interviews with senior UNMIH officials were arranged. At the same time, information officers analyzed reporting in the local media and provided this material to UN officials in Haiti and New York. A UNMIH journal was published twice

monthly focusing on internal mission issues such as updates in policy, new developments, and matters that would promote esprit de corps among mission members. Also twice a month a 30-minute TV program on UN activities in Haiti was aired locally.

Military PIO

Military public information was initially located with the civilian information officer and those of the civilian police. Successive leadership changes took place, however, and in March 1996 the new military PIO moved his shop to UNMIH's Operations branch and reported directly to the military force commander. Though the individuals involved contended that they had achieved an effective division of labor, it was no secret that the political and military leadership did not always agree on the conduct of the mission. Nevertheless, there was unequivocal acceptance of political authority, and in turn, broad support by the political leadership for a robust information program. As a consequence, the military information effort remained, for the most part, an element in an integrated information campaign.

Civilian Police PIO

The civilian police contingent of the UN mission (CIVPOL) was, from the outset, one of its vital elements. A central aspect of the strategic plan for Haiti involved helping to develop a professional police force that would merit the trust and confidence of the people. This in turn required that the image of the former Haitian Security Forces as symbols of terror and oppression be overcome. Consequently, the training of the new Haitian police by the CIVPOL had to be accompanied by an information campaign to rebuild the image of the Haitian National Police.

The importance of image building clearly was recognized from the outset. The CIVPOL contingent assigned a bilingual information officer to work in the press and information office. While some of the efforts on behalf of the police involved development of information products (e.g., handbills, leaflets, posters), the greater thrust was on educating would-be Haitian police professionals about the importance and techniques of good public relations. Patrolling officers were taught methods of greeting and gaining acceptance and trust from people in their districts. Administrators received lessons on encouraging and handling questions from the public. Over time, a measurable improvement in public confidence and approval could be discerned, though progress was uneven. Nevertheless, by August 1995 a MISTF survey was able to publish cautiously optimistic results: in addition to improved public awareness of and confidence in the HNP, there was not an over sensitivity among citizens to the role of the United States and UN in training and organizing the force. That is, conditions were conducive to the eventual shifting of awareness from a foreign-trained police force to one of Haitian origin.³⁸

A related information focus was on increasing public support for the justice system using the following messages:

- The new justice system will be fair and efficient.
- Everyone must respect the law and the basic rights of fellow citizens.
- An effective justice system can guarantee respect for your basic rights and safety.
- The judicial system will punish criminal offenders and protect law abiding citizens.³⁹

Also related was the goal of reducing Haitian-on-Haitian violence. These themes were promulgated: citizen violence scares foreign investors and reduces jobs; when some people do not respect the law, everyone is threatened; crimes must be reported to the proper authorities so the justice system can work; and, in a democratic society all citizens have the right to a fair trial. In addition to the standard information vehicles, a crime reporting hotline was established and publicized. The weapons turn-in program was continued with ambiguous results.⁴⁰

Two observations may be made about the outcomes of the effort to change the general disposition in Haiti with regard to the police and the justice system. The first is that, despite making this a significant information objective, there appears to be little formal evidence about how attitudes were affected. Claims are that results have been mixed. To be fair, the attempt to effect a major positive shift in public opinion on a matter that has been shaped by years of largely negative experience is an extremely ambitious undertaking, and one can hardly expect rapid or unequivocal success. At the same time, because the program is considered to be so central to the long-term success of the UN mission, one might expect that a carefully designed analytical mechanism for measuring attitudinal change and relating it to specific information strategies would have been devised. The fact that only indirect indicators and subjective assessments are cited suggests that no more rigorous evaluation is available.

The second observation comes from informal polling conducted by our research group. We asked people to recall the messages they heard during that phase of the UN mission on the subject of reporting crimes to the police and relying on the justice system. In several interviews—some with “Haitians in the street,” others with media professionals—the following consensus view emerged. The messages that

were broadcast on Haitian radio and promoted in posters and handbills were regarded as simplistic and lacking in understanding about “how things really are” in Haiti. Anecdotes were told about persons who attempted to comply with instructions to report criminals rather than seeking popular justice: often the police did not respond, and when they did, the system typically failed to process the case.⁴¹

MICIVIH

The International Civilian Mission in Haiti (French acronym MICIVIH) is a mission jointly sponsored by the United Nations and the Organization of American States. It was organized in 1993 in response to a request by President Aristide, then in exile, to observe the human rights situation in Haiti. Although its executive director reports to the Secretary-General, and the mission receives administrative support from the UN mission in Haiti, it is a separate entity with no military or police components.

The organization’s objective has been to ensure that the human rights inscribed in the Haitian constitution and in international instruments to which Haiti is a party are respected in the country. While MICIVIH has no enforcement apparatus, its powers under the terms of reference include making no-notice inspections of any establishments, meeting freely and in confidence with any individual or group, and collecting information by any means it deems appropriate on matters of human rights in Haiti. The authorities are committed by the terms to provide all information requested, make necessary facilities available, and not to obstruct the group in its tasks.

MICIVIH was active in Haiti under the coup—although it was twice withdrawn temporarily for security purposes—and has continued its work since the intervention. It documents

the human rights situation, makes recommendations to the Haitian authorities, implements a civic education program, and acts as arbiter in cases of alleged arbitrary or illegal detentions. It also facilitates medical assistance to victims of human rights abuses, and it monitors human rights aspects of the electoral process, particularly respect for the freedoms of expression and association.

By its very nature, MICIVIH has had to be adept at using information mechanisms and techniques to achieve its goals. Its main power is exposing its findings to the Haitian population, local and international authorities, and international public opinion. Among its products are press releases and published reports on the abuses it uncovers. It produces radio spots and TV interview shows aimed at informing and educating members of the public about their rights and responsibilities. It sponsors or participates in seminars and workshops on rights-related issues and lends support to foundations doing human rights work.⁴²

The organization generally has not coordinated its information activities with other international institutions operating in Haiti, nor subordinated its goals to an overall information strategy. In some cases, however, MICIVIH information goals run sufficiently parallel to those of other international organizations in Haiti to warrant coordinated action. For example, it participated in visits by officials of such agencies as the UN Development Program to help determine where developmental resources may be allocated with most effect. Its voter education materials supplemented the UN programs to guarantee security of the electoral process. MICIVIH technical support to judicial and penal reform is consistent with UN efforts to improve the administration of justice, the success of which would be expected to help reduce vigilantism.⁴³

A key characteristic of MICIVIH information operations stands out, in part because it contrasts with the programs of many other groups. There is strong recognition of the need to involve Haitians in the work and to encourage and train them to take responsibility for continuation of the programs under local auspices. Thus, rather than simply producing its own radio spots, for example, MICIVIH staff will engage concerned Haitians and hire local talent and technicians with the aim of inculcating both the desire and skill to replicate the process.⁴⁴

Drawing Down

The original charter for UNMIH was due to expire at the end of February 1996, but instead, a reduced mission was approved for several more months. It was succeeded in turn by the United Nations Support Mission (UNSMIH) in July 1996, the United Nations Transition Mission (UNTMIH) in August 1997, and the United Nations Civilian Police Mission (MIPONUH) in December 1997.⁴⁵ With each incarnation, the focus of UN assistance became narrower and the in-country force smaller. As operational zones were redrawn and base camps closed to reflect reduced strength, the UN sought to maintain a visible presence throughout the country in order to promote a secure and stable environment, but its principle function became fostering the professionalization of the Haitian police force.⁴⁶

Reports indicate that as a result of the sequential transitions, military commanders and agency heads were not completely clear on the role that the Military Information Support Teams could play on a nationwide basis and locally in support of a range of UN missions. As a result, what had previously been a key asset became less effective. The report concluded that a clearer delineation of MIST team roles was needed

and that all commanders should receive education and orientation on MIST programs.⁴⁷

MIST II became primarily a tactical level tool, providing force protection by responding to immediate requirements to deal with crowds, obtain information, and disseminate messages by loudspeaker or face-to-face communication. Personnel worked primarily in teams of three, including one Creole speaker. The intent that MIST teams would also develop radio and print products was largely unfulfilled because of insufficient resources.⁴⁸

INFORMATION CAMPAIGN AS OF SUMMER 1998

Information operations in Haiti have evolved into something quite different than the historical account above has described. In part, this is the natural and proper result of the reduction in size and scope of the operation, and of some changes in the nature of the continuing mission of the international community. Our visit thus provides a longitudinal dimension to the case, and a basis to begin making inferences about the effectiveness of what came before.

Haitian Government

A consensus seems to exist among both international observers and many Haitian citizens that the government has not shown any particular interest in informing the public. Outside agencies have virtually had to force President Preval to talk to the local and international press. Radio station managers maintain there is considerable listenership for programs featuring interviews and call-in shows featuring members of government, but officials are reluctant to

participate. Weekly press conferences are well covered by local media, but officials are described as less than forthcoming. Moreover, the effectiveness of the press in holding the government accountable is marginal, given that local journalists generally have a long way to go to achieve first-world professional standards.⁴⁹

USIS

The head of the USIS office in Haiti is the American Ambassador's public affairs officer. The present U.S. approach to public affairs is acknowledged to contrast with the information strategy that was in effect in the early days of the intervention. The policy is deliberately low profile. Furthermore, because the agencies now remaining in Haiti are much reduced in size and their missions are much narrower in scope, it is appropriate that they act relatively independently. It can be anticipated that at particular times, such as the approach of the next election, there will be greater coordination of the information effort to "sensibilize" the population.⁵⁰

One reason for lowering the profile of U.S. agencies in Haiti is to discourage dependency. There are several contradictions in the disposition of many Haitians toward the U.S. government. For example, they may contend that, on the one hand, the American intervention was an unwarranted invasion and second occupation of Haiti, and, on the other, that the U.S. should now intervene when the Haitian government (of which there is now much criticism by members of all economic classes) fails to meet its responsibilities.⁵¹

The Embassy also wants to suppress unrealistic expectations regarding U.S. assistance in the areas of infrastructure repair and economic development. For example, early information themes emphasized the potential benefits to Haitians of

welcoming the multinational force, and military projects such as road reconstruction were pointed to as evidence. Not surprisingly, citizens who had seen much deterioration of their quality of life under the embargo that the U.S. had called for came to anticipate that the Americans would now make other repairs. Policymakers at home, however, are adamant that we will not undertake an ambitious program of nation assistance.⁵²

USIS conducts what may be called indirect information operations in its effort to support the development of Haitian journalists. The trade is held in low esteem in Haiti, and most local practitioners are either very young and inexperienced, or are older but writing while also holding another job. The Information Service conducts workshops, sponsors projects, and funds exchange programs that offer Haitian writers an opportunity to develop their skills under the tutelage of accomplished American journalists.⁵³

Present members of the U.S. country team generally agree that the level of coordination among their various agencies “is about right.” They report a sense that all are working for the same goals, so that cooperation is based on serving mutual interests.

U.S. Military Support Group⁵⁴

As an element of the country team, the low profile policy applies to the U.S. Military Support Group—the tiny successor of what was once a massive military presence in Haiti. With no declared responsibility for security operations, the contingent of some 400 troops focuses on small-scale humanitarian and reconstruction projects. The permanent party, in fact, primarily provides administrative and logistical support for work that is actually performed by engineer, medical, and civil affairs units based in the continental United States that work in Haiti during training

rotations. Though it is not formally acknowledged, the main purpose of the small contingent appears to be simply to maintain a uniformed presence in the capital.

Given this posture, it is not surprising that the information program of the military support group is modest. It garners some public notice for its civic works projects by setting up ribbon-cutting ceremonies at which the U.S. ambassador typically makes remarks. His presence generally guarantees coverage by the Haitian media, which takes advantage of the opportunity to ask questions on other issues.

Fewer Haitians hear about the free clinics run by military doctors and medical specialists because these are generally conducted in rural areas. The military public affairs officer ensures that such events are publicized within the command and dispatches home town news releases as a means of promoting soldier morale and American good will toward its own military.

American armed forces could likely increase the consciousness of Haitians about their continuing role, but such a strategy might well be counterproductive. It would provide grist for those Haitians who resent the U.S. presence and seek to embarrass the government. (Despite an utter lack of supporting evidence, many Haitians appear to accept the rumor that a sizable number of American combat troops are secretly being quartered in Haiti.)

United Nations/Civil Police⁵⁵

The information strategy of the present successor to the UN mission is also to maintain a low profile. The mandate is very narrow: although the Representative of the Secretary-General includes coordinating the activities of all UN agencies in Haiti and representing the S-G to the Haitian

government, the main function is the continued professionalization of the Haitian National Police.

With regard to the police support function, the UN position is that the HNP does indeed need to be concerned about public relations and image-building, but the work should be done by Haitians in the force, not by UN advisors. The international contingent has deliberately confined its efforts to training Haitians to do proper and effective police work. There is satisfaction with the present HNP spokesman, who is said to appear frequently on TV and radio shows to explain the role of police and the relationship it desires to have with the community. Thus, the CIVPOL contends that its information responsibilities are toward its students on the force. It discharges its responsibility in its roles as instructor, advisor, and role model. Officials contend that the results achieved to date are “successful but fragile.”

Regarding his other areas of responsibility, the Representative of the Secretary-General takes a similarly close-to-the-vest approach. At this phase of the operation, UN programs are focused on the government rather than on the Haitian public. Furthermore, anything the UN does in Haiti must now be at the request of the government, and often the government must be encouraged to make the request. In this sequence, affairs are best conducted official to official, with little direct emphasis on public information.

MICIVIH⁵⁶

Although the human rights situation in Haiti has improved dramatically since the coup leaders were replaced, MICIVIH still has much to do in Haiti, with development of the justice system and support the remaining pressing needs of the electoral process.

Some of the organization's responsibilities entail a kind of informational frontal assault. For example, officials say, because the government is so reluctant to talk to the people, MICIVIH's proper role is to encourage it to "do the right thing" in radio and TV spots and on billboards, and the like. Sometimes only an international agency is in a position to say things that local authorities or private citizens cannot or will not say.

Where the role is educating the public and the themes are complex, MICIVIH is turning to more creative media strategies. For example, it is underwriting the development of short radio dramas to teach lessons about human rights. A continuing series of vignettes will feature fictional characters with whom listeners can identify, and whose interactions can help convey subtle, sometimes somewhat abstract ideas. To produce these programs, however, is not a simple task. Script writers must have intimate knowledge of the culture, and competent producers and technicians must be hired. Accomplishing all this is costly, in terms of both money and energy. Even the more traditional media projects—interview shows and discussions by experts—are not simple because they involve renting studios, getting officials to agree to appear, attracting sponsors, publishing disclaimers, etc.

A kind of guiding principle for MICIVIH regarding information programs can usefully be shared with other agencies involved in peace operations: "It should always be the case that public information about projects precedes their implementation. The people should know who is coming, why, and what they propose to do. The programs and the people who execute them lose credibility if there is not an information campaign from day one."

Despite this sage advice, MICIVIH itself is not immune to difficulties relating to image. Haitians in the professional class contend that the organization is not as diligent in pursuing rights violations now as it was under the coup. Examples are offered of alleged politically motivated arrests and lengthy incarcerations without arraignment. Some interviewees said they had not heard anything from MICIVIH for so long, that when the organization spoke out recently about an unjustified jailing, they were surprised because they had believed MICIVIH was no longer operating in Haiti.⁵⁷

Findings

Unique Haitian Environment

If there is any common feature of the kinds of complex human emergencies that we find to be proliferating in the post-Cold War period, it is that each situation is markedly different from the one that preceded it. Even given that acknowledgment, however, one can still make a case that the environment of Haiti is exceptional in ways that have had profound implications for the information challenge associated with the international intervention.

To begin with, the nation is by far the poorest in the Western hemisphere—in many ways not even a third world country—even though it is, as one observer put it, “only 400 miles from Disney World.” The economic circumstances are dire for 90 percent of the population. Disease, illiteracy, and joblessness are endemic and extraordinarily persistent. To make matters enormously worse, the society and its economy were ravaged by a protracted economic embargo, the effects of which were felt most profoundly by the poor, less by the elites, and least by the government dictators and their cronies.

An information campaign must be directed at some audience, yet, in the case of Haiti, it is not at all clear who that is. A distinction must be made between the “elite” audiences and the “mass” public, with the latter group constituting the huge majority in Haiti. For political purposes it used to be the case that the former group was the principal audience, for the country was governed by a series of dictators who cared little about constitutional or popular legitimacy. They maintained power by suppressing and terrorizing the lower class and co-opting the elites. The situation changed, however, when free elections in the early 1990s resulted in the ascendancy of a charismatic figure whose power was based on his appeal to the poor masses.

Another odd feature of Haitian society is the fact that opinions tend to be formed rapidly, by word of mouth. Rumors are given far more credence than in other countries, and are more difficult to dispel once they take hold. This phenomenon, labeled “*telejoule*,” has a double-edged effect. It means that the information released as part of a deliberate campaign will be disseminated rapidly and has a chance of gaining broad acceptance. At the same time, rumor and misinformation travel at least as fast, and if they become entrenched, the new information will struggle to supplant them, even when supported by incontrovertible evidence.

These features exacerbate the level of distrust that Haitians have for authority figures in their own country, and dispose them to embrace conspiracy theories about U.S. motives, particularly given the history of a previous American invasion and 19-year occupation of Haiti. Among the anomalies readily observable to a contemporary researcher is the proclivity of Haitians of all classes to demonstrate an apparently genuine affection for Americans while remaining profoundly convinced of the malevolent intent of the U.S. government toward Haiti.⁵⁸

It is against this backdrop that an information campaign had to be designed for the U.S.-led international intervention. In some cases, the elements and execution of the campaign earn fairly high marks for recognizing and accommodating the unique features of the social environment. The efforts of scholars and information specialists, the involvement of Haitian-Americans with intimate ties to the society and language fluency, and the thorough, painstaking planning of many professionals achieved a string of positive outcomes. It is also clear upon investigation, however, that some messages (such as several cited earlier) were seen as simplistic, others as confusing or contradictory.

Cultural Sensitivity

Haiti's uniqueness can be seen to exist on an even more profound level in certain cultural structures. Indeed, a particularly thoughtful scholar suggested that the many ambiguities, complexities, and contradictions in Haitian culture are confusing to the Haitians themselves, and make it difficult for them to organize and act on their own behalf.⁵⁹ The condition inevitably generates disappointments.

What a person says is almost never exactly so. The cultural phenomenon of *marronage*, for example, generates a condition in which people say "yes" and mean "no." The culturally sensitive listener understands that often their statements must be recognized as a means of protecting themselves. Outsiders must make interpretations and assessments very carefully.

Seen from this perspective, the overall effect of the foreign intervention is judged by some, sadly, to be a huge failure. They argue that various programs and projects being pursued by international agencies have been designed without considering Haiti's problems from a sufficiently wide

perspective. Poverty, for example, is *huge*. It is simply not possible for outsiders to take fully into account the plight of the poor. Nevertheless, a social framework that incorporates this reality *does* exist in Haiti: the people possess a culture and observe tacit rules of organization that outsiders cannot really understand or accept. Hence well-intended reformers are led to conclude that they should provide the society with an opportunity for a “new beginning.” But in so doing, they risk prescribing the imposition of certain “universal” criteria that Haitians are not ready to absorb or adopt.

By this view, the events that have occurred since Aristide’s return have constituted literally a revolution in Haiti. Yet, as the people struggle to acclimate themselves, the international community may be exacerbating the sense of national disorientation by urging the immediate integration of a whole array of political, social, and economic changes aimed at bringing the country into the modern world. But Haiti has a deep propensity to escape and hide—at all levels of society. Reformers may entertain the illusion that they are “getting through,” but very frequently they are not.

This was the theme struck by several of our more informed interlocutors: If we genuinely wish to be helpful, we must develop the ability to listen more, so as to discern reality as it is, not as we wish it to be. Whom we chose to talk and listen to is, in part, a projection of how we wish to see things. We must not be so determined and impatient to inculcate the principles of democracy and human rights that we fail to listen to what the people want and need.

A further insight: There has recently been a large penetration into the religious life of Haiti by energetic, well-resourced American evangelical groups. Because it must overcome the traditionally Catholic affiliation of the people, it

inevitably takes on an aggressive quality. The resulting competition for allegiance plays out in the context of another important feature of Haitian culture: voodoo. In Haiti, voodoo is not itself a religion, but a broader set of cultural attitudes and beliefs in which religion is rooted. Historically, Catholicism as practiced in Haiti has included symbolic elements whose roots are in voodoo. The Protestant evangelicals reject voodoo and condemn Catholic tolerance of it. Yet some of the practices of these faiths, it is argued, parallel those of voodoo. Scripture, for example, sometimes appears to be used as an instrument of protection, almost as a talisman to ward off evil.

People at all levels of Haitian society are affected by voodoo, even though many of the elite publicly disclaim it. Given its pervasiveness, Haitians are not always free to do what they might otherwise do—and as we would expect. Thus, people working to transform the society (including even some Haitians backed by the international community) find it difficult to find ways to achieve conformity between external criteria and internal traditions.

Those who subscribe to this interpretation contend that Haitians are not being listened to, and that many of the policies being imposed are politically generated and lead to exclusion rather than inclusion. The politics of Aristide and the Lavalas party, for example, do not include mediation and negotiation. It is a populist utopianism based on the charisma of the individual leader influencing the people.

Specific to the information challenges of the Haiti intervention, a key factor that foreigners appear not to fully appreciate is that a message that has only a rational dimension is not likely to be interpreted as intended in a society that is characterized by powerful, emotion-driven elements. Failure by information strategists to heed this

warning risks the kind of thorough miscalculation illustrated by the following example. An information campaign that failed (one not connected directly to the international intervention) is one surrounding a solar eclipse that occurred in Haiti a few years ago. Concerned that many Haitians would suffer eye injuries by staring at the phenomenon without eye protection, the church and other groups produced announcements explaining when the eclipse would take place and warning people not to look at it directly. Many people interpreted the message in the context of religious beliefs, superstitions, and the voodoo element of the Haitian culture, and concluded that the eclipse was a powerful supernatural event fraught with danger. So terrified were some that they herded their children indoors and blocked all doors and windows from the light. This action reportedly resulted in the deaths of some persons from heat prostration. The failure of the information effort regarding the eclipse—a campaign handled primarily by indigenous institutions—illustrates how unlikely it is that foreigners can be effective as they expect in getting their message across the barriers of cultural differences.

To summarize and incorporate the advice outlined above, we can describe genuinely helpful assistance programs as having these characteristics:

1. Officials *listen*. They learn who is who, and who is doing what. They listen to representatives of all elements of the society—the business people, the Church, even those who are not particularly pleasant to communicate with.
2. Groups *form partnerships* with the indigenous private groups, such as those that provide education for up to 85 percent of the people. They do not limit their dialogue to government agencies and formal organizations.

3. Outsiders seek to *appreciate* how the history of the country (e.g., slavery, wealth *versus* poverty) has generated important features of society (e.g., voodoo, *marronage*), which must be understood to come to grips with Haiti's real problems.

An Information Campaign

Given the loose manner in which we tend to apply the term "campaign" to information operations, the question, "Did we have an information campaign in Haiti?" would have to be answered by a yes. In fact, we had many. That is, many of the numerous organizations and agencies that participated in the international intervention identified information goals and defined and executed a set of tasks leading to their accomplishment.

However, the question we are really asking is, "Did we conduct a coherent set of information operations, coordinated at all levels, leading to the accomplishment of specific strategic goals?" The answer to this question differs according to which phase of the intervention one is referring to. Information operations in the first phase of the intervention, conducted primarily by American forces and agencies, but joined soon afterward by a multinational force, would seem to qualify as a coherent, thoroughly coordinated campaign. During the second phase, when a still formidable international contingent was operating under UN auspices, the intensity of emphasis and unity of effort toward achieving well defined information goals began to decline. In the continuing international effort taking place in Haiti today, it is difficult to discern what one might identify as an information campaign.

What this observation emphatically demonstrates is that a key ingredient of an information campaign worthy of the title is leadership that is convinced of the importance of

achieving a coherent set of information goals with the authority and resources to carry out the undertaking. For the campaign to be executed with any degree of success, the requirement is for sufficiently expert information specialists to be given adequate time, interagency authority, and resources to plan and coordinate the operation. The absence of any of these elements does not mean that effective information operations cannot be mounted at various places and times, but they will not constitute a campaign in the sense that the term is being used here.

In the initial phase of the Haiti operation, the goals of the information effort were seen as central to the success of the overall mission and resourced accordingly. The key functions—public information, public relations, and military information (PSYOPs)—were addressed at each level—strategic, operational, and tactical. Extensive coordination was effected in the planning stage, and requisite interagency mechanisms were devised to bring those plans to fruition in the execution stage.

Early in the UN phase of the operation, the significance of information operations continued to figure prominently, but reports suggest there was less passionate commitment by the leadership and less consistent agreement on priorities among subordinate agencies.⁶⁰ As the security threat diminished, permitting particular organizations to focus more narrowly on their individual tasks, the need to actively advance theaterwide information objectives became less pressing. Interagency meetings to coordinate information-related activities occurred less frequently and organizational goals came to be pursued with increasing autonomy.

The present incarnation of the UN mission in Haiti is, of course, a shadow of its former self, and concern about a military threat has totally evaporated. The various agencies

now pursue their narrow objectives in something approaching organizational isolation with only casual and occasional need for coordination. Virtually no one speaks of the overall mission of the international community in Haiti.

This is not *necessarily* to say that the Haiti operation has become gradually more flawed or less effective. It can be argued that the importance of hewing to a coherent informational line has declined as earlier mission requirements were achieved and the size and composition of the in-country elements have been adjusted. The present contention is simply that a true information campaign will not persist after active and enthusiastic efforts to keep it vigorous begin to drop off. Whether this constitutes an unfortunate decline in the Haiti case would have to be determined by closer analysis of the organizational effectiveness of the international contingent.

Coordination

By any measure, the effort that went into planning and carrying out the coordination requirements for the information campaign in the Haiti intervention is impressive, as are the results. Reviewing the “paper trail” detailing how many agencies, subunits, and individuals had to be contacted, approached for approval, informed, tasked, supervised, or followed up to make the elements of the program come together is sometimes breathtaking. The lessons of the Haiti experience are both that the challenges are daunting and that they can be surmounted.

“Leadership” was most often cited as the essential factor responsible for the successes of the Haiti information campaign.⁶¹ Policy officials and subject matter experts concurred in the view that top decision makers assigned to the Haiti intervention appear to have brought with them convictions about the importance of having an information

strategy and field experience gained in earlier operations. This disposition inclined them to gather and empower information experts, and then ensure the involvement of subordinate units and agencies.

Another important success factor appears to have been the time available for planning before the actual intervention. With the growing sense that an intervention would be warranted, the U.S. Secretary of Defense ordered interagency planning to begin in early spring 1994. The roller-coaster negotiations that stretched through the spring and summer had the fortuitous consequence of providing time for information officials to put together a capable team and effect the requisite detailed planning.

Methods of Evaluation

One of the difficulties of measuring the effectiveness of an information campaign has already been suggested: outcomes typically are neither tangible nor immediate. As a result, deciding what to measure and how to go about it is not a simple matter. Having acknowledged this, it must be said that only a very modest effort was made in Haiti to gather reliable, objective data on the effectiveness of information operations there. Interviews suggest that this state of affairs characterizes information operations across the board, for a variety of fairly evident reasons. First, however, we can point to the efforts that were made.⁶²

In some cases, information products were pretested, or focus groups were queried to provide operators some indication of likely effectiveness. Specialists acknowledge that such devices are useful, but they are before-the-fact mechanisms, and they cannot fully anticipate effectiveness in the field.

Another approach was to gauge the effort by the inputs to the operation. Thus the information specialists for the UN

mission were able to assert that by October 10, 1995, they had distributed nearly half a million copies of 55 different posters, disseminated nearly 3 million handbills, developed nine newsletters of which 145,000 copies were distributed, developed 88 radio messages and broadcast 10,000 radio spots, and so on.⁶³ Such statistics may have usefulness in terms of managing resources, but they do not indicate how many of these products reached the target audience, how they were received, and what changes in attitude or behavior, if any, they achieved.

Another inexact and potentially unreliable approach was to gauge the reaction of adversaries. When the coup leaders seemed to be made uncomfortable by what American information specialists were doing, or took measures to counter the efforts, task force members tended to conclude that they were on the right track. This common-sense conclusion may often be justified. On the other hand, since the junta conducted no formal evaluations of the effects of our information activities, its insights were not much more reliable than our own.

A somewhat more focused mechanism, but one still without precision or absolute rigor, is the analysis of behavior of members of the target audience. Handbills and radio spots encouraged Haitians to report criminals rather than beat them; when later statistics showed that more of the desired behavior was occurring, it was tempting to conclude a cause-effect relationship. Whether, in the particular instance, the assumption was accurate, all we really had was correlation, and no real measure of which product had what effect. Furthermore, in some instances such correlation may be spurious—subjects' behavior may change without reference to, or even despite, the information efforts.

In the workshop that Haiti provides for assessing the usefulness of information operations, perhaps the most visible shortcoming is the absence of efforts to conduct rigorous evaluations of information techniques. The state of the art in applying such measures, as practiced in the realms of advertising and public relations, is quite advanced. This is not to say that they can be applied with the same degree of precision in the kinds of circumstance that the Haiti intervention exemplifies. In this case, however, there is no evidence that we made a strong effort to put the best experts to work against this challenge.

¹This report is a detailed account of the research trip to Haiti by Ambassador Walter Stadtler, Mr. James Narel, and Ms. Michiko Diby. The trip was part of a POPP-sponsored study of information campaigns in peace operations, and took place July 19-26, 1998. The team conducted its research in the capital city, Port au Prince and its environs.

²*IPI Report*, December 1994, p.33.

³*Ibid.*

⁴*Ibid.*

⁵*Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

⁶*Ibid.*, p. 33.

⁷*Ibid.*, p. 34.

⁸*Ibid.*

⁹Psyop Support to Operation Uphold Democracy, pamphlet produced by the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force Haiti, May 1995, pp. 6-7. (Hereafter referred to as "Task force pamphlet.")

¹⁰*Ibid.*, p. 10.

¹¹*Ibid.*, p. 6.

¹²*Ibid.*

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 8.

¹⁴Stephen D. Brown, "Psyop in Operation Uphold Democracy," *Military Review*, Sep-Oct 96, pp. 59-60

¹⁵Task force pamphlet, p. 14.

¹⁶*Ibid.*

¹⁷*Ibid.*, p. 15.

¹⁸Brown, p. 60.

¹⁹Task force pamphlet, p. 17.

²⁰Brown, p. 62.

²¹Stanley Meister, *United Nations: The First Fifty Years* (New York: The Atlantic Monthly Press, 1995) p. 309.

²²Brown, p. 62.

²³*Ibid.*, pp. 62–63.

²⁴Margaret Daley Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, *Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti—A Case Study* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996) p. 48.

²⁵This episode was recounted to us by staff members at the U.S. Embassy in Port au Prince in July 1998.

²⁶Brown, p.67.

²⁷Task force pamphlet, p. 22.

²⁸Brown, p.68.

²⁹*Ibid.*

³⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 68–70.

³¹*Ibid.*, p. 70.

³²*Ibid.*, pp. 70–71

³³*Ibid.*, pp. 71-72.

³⁴*Ibid.*, p. 72.

³⁵Ingrid Lehman, *Public Information Campaigns in Peacekeeping* (Toronto, ON: Brown Book Co., Ltd., 1998) p.13.

³⁶*Ibid.*, pp. 13–14.

³⁷The organization and functions described in this section are offered by Lehman, *op. cit.*, pp. 4–8.

³⁸UNMIH, Military Information Support Task Force, *Haitian National Police Survey* (Port au Prince, Haiti: September 13, 1995) p. 5.

³⁹Lehman, p. 14.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, pp. 15–16.

⁴¹While our interviews did not begin to meet the standards of a scientific survey, it is significant that all of the anecdotal material, from a variety of sources, supported the generalization reported here. None offered a contrary view.

⁴²“MICIVIH News: Monthly Information Bulletin on MICIVIH Activities,” August 1995, pp. 1–8.

⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴Interview with a senior official of MICIVIH in Haiti in July 1998.

⁴⁵UN web page: <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/mipon>, updated March 31, 1998.

⁴⁶Lehman, p. 18.

⁴⁷UNMIH, “Lessons Learned: 1 April 95–29 Feb 96,” p. 6.

⁴⁸Lehman, p. 19.

⁴⁹These views are aggregated from interviews in Haiti in July 1998 with U.S. Embassy staff, Haitian professionals, Haitian media managers, and international journalists working in Haiti.

⁵⁰Interviews with senior U.S. Embassy and USIS officials in Haiti, July 1998.

⁵¹Discussion with Haitian professionals, Port au Prince, Haiti, July 1998.

⁵²Senior U.S. Embassy official, Haiti, July 1998.

⁵³Senior USIS official, Haiti, July 1998.

⁵⁴The information in this section was distilled from discussions with several military officers assigned to the military support group staff in Haiti, July 1998.

⁵⁵Information in this section is based on an interview with a senior official of the United Nations mission in Haiti, July 1998.

⁵⁶Information in this section is based on an interview with a senior official of the MICIVIH mission in Haiti, July 1998.

⁵⁷Discussion with Haitian professionals, Port au Prince, Haiti, July 1998.

⁵⁸The propensity of the professional class Haitians we spoke with to embrace conspiracy theories about both U.S. and Haitian government authorities was breathtaking. Similarly, few showed any tendency to revise their views when shown that (a) they had no evidence to support their claims, and (b) abundant evidence was available to refute them.

⁵⁹Many insights in this section were suggested by a senior representative of the Roman Catholic Church in Haiti. The views are augmented by thoughts that surfaced in discussions with other observers of Haitian culture, including senior diplomats, educators, and international journalists.

⁶⁰The notes accompanying Lehman's analysis (cited earlier) document increasing differences of view among officials responsible for the information campaign during the UNMIH–UNSMIH–UNTMH–MIPONU sequence of missions. Our own interviews with officials in Haiti and the United States corroborate the conclusion that this was, in fact, a trend.

⁶¹This was the virtually unanimous view of officials we interviewed in Haiti and the U.S., American and foreign, civilian and military.

⁶²Information is based on interviews with information specialists in Haiti and the United States, including several representatives of the American military psychological operations community who served in Haiti and who are currently stationed at Fort Bragg, NC.

⁶³Lehman, p. 14.

CONCLUSIONS: INFORMATION AND PEACE OPERATIONS

HAITI AND BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

Our case studies of information activities in Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate, if nothing else, the wide range of environments and challenges that face third-party intervenors in the so-called second generation of peace operations. The most superficial comparison should serve to convince planners that a one-size-fits-all approach to information campaigns is wholly inappropriate. In most respects, given the limited goals of the Haitian intervention—the return of President Aristide to office and the cessation of the migrant flow to the United States—the operation can be judged a success. From the very beginnings of the operation, with *Sea Signal* in May 1994, which addressed managing the migrant problem, the U.S. military mounted information activities consonant with the changing requirements of its mission. Compared to Somalia, where the supply of qualified linguists was quite limited, finding qualified Creole-speakers to work with American and UN forces was not a problem, and MIST teams (prepared for either the forcible entry of *Uphold Democracy* or the permissive one code named *Maintain Democracy*, and in the end on the ground dealing with something in between) functioned successfully at tactical

levels in a fairly traditional PSYOP role. The interest of the international media, after it looked as if a full-scale invasion with attendant combat was not in the works, fell off rapidly. Although there have been a series of UN and latterly OAS missions in the country, the military forces involved were formally multinational, and while the last mission, rebuilding the Haitian National Police, has a decidedly francophone cast to it, the story of Haiti's "intervasion" has been overwhelmingly that of a U.S.-led and dominated operation.¹ As U.S. involvement decreased in scope and intensity since 1994, the emphasis placed on information activities has declined with it. Today, the American presence is purposely a low-profile one,² even as UN efforts have narrowed (many Haitians no longer know that MICIVIH, the human rights mission, still operates in the country, for example) and are mainly directed to its CIVPOL mission (MIPONUH).³

In many ways, information activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina demonstrate an inverse trajectory to Haiti. In Haiti, the initial activities were centrally directed, coherent, and, under a dominant American military umbrella, well coordinated. In Bosnia, the recognized and costly failure of the initial international response, UNPROFOR, was in part a failure on the information front. UNPROFOR proved unable to counter the intense propaganda of the warring factions—against it and each other—and thus was unable to secure support for its mission. Intensely criticized for its impotence by much of the international media, it mercifully disappeared with Dayton and was replaced by NATO and a host of international organizations (UN agencies, OSCE, OHR, EU). But amazingly, although it was widely felt that Serb and Croatian factions, by taking over the old Yugoslavian state TV and radio system and using it to mount venomous information campaigns that exacerbated the deadly violence,

media, or information issues were not formally included in the Dayton Accords. Only later did the principals address information with an ambitious and wide-ranging program of media reform and restructuring, as recounted in the case study. But in part because it was “back-engineered”—added later, segmentally, with functional responsibilities either needlessly duplicated or inefficiently spread over a number of different actors—the campaign developed haphazardly with as many faces as there were players. Given this, the level of coordination reached among the principal players in Bosnia-Herzegovina in the months before the national elections of September 1998, was quite remarkable, as exemplified by the collective twice-weekly press conferences held at the Tito Barracks, and the regular meetings of multiagency Media Issues Group. Nevertheless, as those elections demonstrated, given the fundamental (and perhaps utopian) goal specified by Dayton—a multiethnic, pluralistic, single state in Bosnia-Herzegovina—the information campaign mounted by the international community in the end cannot be adjudged a success.⁴

SOME PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS FOR PEACE OPERATIONS

As mentioned earlier, the history of information campaigns in peace operations is not a very long one, dating back to 1991 in Namibia and notably to activities carried out in Somalia and Cambodia. Taking these experiences, together with our analyses of Haiti and Bosnia-Herzegovina into account, we offer a preliminary assessment of some principles for organizing an information campaign, framed partly as a set of cautions.

- *Be wary of mistaking “information campaign” for “information warfare.”*

The military’s conception of information operations includes a range of operations functional for warfighting but inappropriate for peace operations. Unlike warfighting, the “transparency” of the operation is both a prerequisite and a measure of its success. Such options as deception or disinformation carry with them a very high cost—the possible loss of credibility.

Preservation of credibility is crucial to maintaining the *sine qua non* of a peace operation—the legitimacy of the third party. In “classical” peace operations, legitimacy was guaranteed in part by the perceived neutrality of the third party, and the consensual basis (on the part of the contestant parties) of its deployment. In so-called second-generation peace operations, where third parties find themselves intervening in the wake or the midst of ethnic cleansing or genocide, neutrality is harder to sustain; and in the context of collapsed states, which are themselves unable to function as credible interlocutors for the third party, legitimacy is harder to engender. At the same time that one must not mistake information campaign for information warfare, be aware that the contestants may well be using—as in Bosnia-Herzegovina or Somalia—techniques of information warfare, including deception and disinformation, *against* the third party.

- *Be wary of limiting information campaigns to military paradigms of them.*

The three pillars of NATO’s information campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina—Public Information, PSYOP, and Civil Affairs—take us only part of the way in conceptualizing these activities. In thinking about possible civilian analogs to these pillars, one may come up with

Public Relations, Marketing and Advertising, and Consumer Affairs departments of corporations. Corporations devote a substantial percentage of corporate resources to these departments. The goals of the corporation are usually fairly clear and easy to specify: to sell more widgets. Yet corporations often still cannot say why one advertising campaign works and another does not—hence campaigns and agencies are changed as often as they are. In contrast, the goals of a peace operation are often unclear (perhaps because they are politically difficult to express out loud?), and the commensurate resources devoted to information activities—compared to the corporate world—have been insubstantial, both in military and civilian sectors. Unlike quarterly sales figures representing the number of widgets sold, a similar number for judging a peace operation's success is harder to agree upon. (Are refugees returned? Houses rebuilt? Mines cleared? Infant mortality reduced? Political stability increased? Peaceful succession of leadership established? Economic recovery expedited?)

- *Peace operations are fundamentally political acts, not military ones.*

To be effective, the messages pushed by an information campaign must be connected to realistic policy. The ideal information campaign, therefore, is one that connects the operation to the wider political goals that the intervenors and indigenous actors articulate. If these goals are not articulated, are self-contradictory, or are divorced from the political realities on the ground (as Dayton's full implementation is for the three ethnic groups of Bosnia-Herzegovina?), then the information campaign will founder, fragment, or by default reduce itself to the military's well understood use of information to fulfill the tactical requirements of force protection. Given the main ethos of military culture, it is admittedly hard to sustain the military's

involvement in these operations in a supporting, not leading, role but the will and capability to do so on the part of civilian national political decision makers is key.⁵

- *The role of the international media is especially important in peace operations.*

Because the connection of these operations to perceived vital national interests is often not obvious, media plays a particularly important role in building up and sustaining the legitimacy of the intervention in the eyes of the American public and Congress. For example, it was the media's increasing lack of confidence in, and ultimately disgust with, UNPROFOR that signaled the failure of that mission. The media is pulled in different directions—NGOs will pursue a different tack with it than might the military, while indigenous actors (for example Gen. Aideed in Somalia) use it still differently. For all the players in the operation, the international media is both another independent actor as well as a (perhaps *the*) crucial resource in mounting its own information campaign aimed at the international community. For this reason, media relations are much too important to be left to a low mid-ranking press officer; they must be coordinated at the highest decision-making levels, and be connected directly to implementing the political goals mentioned above.

- *The requirements of managing information campaigns in coalition or multilateral operations are especially difficult.*

When the American-dominated UNITAF mission in Somalia gave way to the more thoroughly multilateral UNOSOM-II, information activities lost coherence and effectiveness. The relative success of the MIST teams and other information activities in Haiti's "intervasion" resulted in large part from, once again, the dominance of U.S.

doctrine and practice.⁶ In contrast, the turf battles and duplication of the international community's information campaign in Bosnia-Herzegovina was caused in large part by the competing agendas, mandates, and egos among the various parties that make up the international community. Coalition and multilateral operations are intrinsically harder to coordinate because no one doctrine or set of practices dominates. Information activities, which depend fundamentally on communication among interlocutors, are especially vulnerable on this score. Moreover, national or organizational sensitivities to different aspects of the campaign—the French initial aversion to PSYOP, for example, or the UN's institutional allergy to intelligence activities, or a pacifist NGO's reluctance to appear with military loudspeaker teams in public—magnify the problem.

- *A sensitivity to cultural issues is crucial to the success of the mission.*

This is doubtless the crucial question of “audience reception theory” and information campaigns: how do we know if the message we send is translatable, culturally appropriate, credible, and relevant to the intended “target” audience? For example, cultural sensitivity means knowing that green is a “Muslim” color, and, therefore, care should be taken in using it in TV programs aimed at Serbs and Croats. But it also means something deeper: for example, knowing that the Haitian perception of the United States' historical involvement with Haiti is such that probably *no* amount of “transparency” and “truthful” broadcasting on its part will disabuse most Haitians from believing that the UN mission is really a U.S. mission, or that the U.S. Military Support Group is really engaged in extensive intelligence activities (or worse) in the country, or that the U.S. ambassador is right now dictating President Preval's next speech. Whatever else it does, cultural sensitivity is crucial to disabusing the

intervenors from believing that information, if “truthful” is always self-evident about...the “truth.” Like beauty and truth, disinformation and deception are often in the eyes of the beholders, or television viewers, as well.

- *In assessing an information campaign, do not mistake measures of effort or performance for measures of effectiveness.*

The most common measures of effectiveness both research teams encountered involved counting the number of pamphlets printed and distributed, the number of posters put on walls (without noting how long they remained up), the number of hours broadcast daily, or the “electronic footprint” of a transmitter projected unthinkingly onto an estimate for actual viewership. Occasionally soldiers went out with questionnaires or surveys to evaluate PSYOP products. Several military officers as well as civilians noted the obvious methodological problems inherent in having a kevlar-helmeted and flak-jacketed Marine carrying an M-16 ask you how much you like these products, the magazine, or the call-in radio talk show, “on a scale of one-to-ten.” But other actors told the teams they were reluctant to raise the issue of MOEs at all because they felt information activities were viewed as marginal within their particular organization, and any perceived “softness” in their effectiveness would be used politically to stifle them entirely. Still others told us: “Well, the broadcasts seem to annoy (Aideed, Cedras, Izetbegovich), so they must be working.” We understand that the obstacles to securing valid and reliable data on the effectiveness of information campaigns are substantial: complex environments, crisis conditions, fast-paced events, and limited resources. Nevertheless, if it is important to do evaluations well (and we think it is), there simply must be more attention paid to the question of metrics and a large scale ramping up of the

effort. Bring in real experts on marketing and media and public opinion/survey research (paying attention always to issues of cultural appropriateness), understand this will be costly (it is for corporations and political candidates), and give them the resources to tackle the problem. None of this has been adequately done in the past.

INFORMATION CAMPAIGNS FOR WHAT?

In speaking with many individuals in Bosnia-Herzegovina who were involved in information activities—in NATO, in various IOs and NGOs; as press officers, media monitors, or working journalists; from the ambassadorial level to that of project assistant; from members of the international community and Bosnians both—there was an overwhelming feeling expressed that information *had* to matter; that the media in particular *had* to play a significant role in putting the country back together, for the “simple” reason that it had played such a large one in tearing it apart. Yugoslavia in disarray is not the only or paradigmatic example we have of television and radio serving as vehicles for spewing forth dissension in the form of ethnic hatred and paranoia; probably the infamous *milles collines* (“thousand hills”) radio of Rwanda, where people were directed explicitly to murder and told how best to strike flesh with a machete, takes that particular prize. But the examples of hate radio and television that now so often precede and accompany the ethnic cleansings and, worse that form the context for third-party interventions in peace operations, cannot help but sensitize us to the tremendous potential that information campaigns possess in all aspects of peace operations, from peacemaking (in the guise of public diplomacy), peacekeeping (in the form of psychological operations, or information aspects of civil

affairs), to peace building (in the form of media reform and restructuring). Along with our Bosnian interlocutors, we want to be able to “reverse causality,” and use information to put together polities and communities that, we believe, information helped to pull apart.

Or did it?

Perhaps the real lesson of the national elections of September 1998, in Bosnia-Herzegovina (elections in which nationalist parties and candidates of all three ethnic groups did much better than the international community had hoped), was that, despite the millions of dollars and institutional resources that the international community devoted to information campaign and media reform (aimed variously to discredit the nationalists, empower the moderates, or both), ultimately the campaign could be no stronger than the support the people of Bosnia-Herzegovina *really* gave, or were prepared to give, to the goals and ideals of the Dayton Accords. Perhaps it is not so easy to revalorize “hate radio” into “tolerance radio” (much less into “love-thy-neighbor radio”) and thus reverse the deleterious effects we see as consequences of hate radio. Perhaps these consequences depend on more than the simple *reception* of messages of hate; rather, they depend on a deeper substrate of ethnic/racial/nationalist enmity, paranoia, or distrust, a substrate that acts as a sort of resonating board able to amplify the messages hate media churns out. Without an analogous, though oppositely valenced, substrate of peace, trust, and amity—without a very different sort of resonating board—then all the messages of tolerance and coexistence produced by the slickest media consultants the international community can subcontract, will not in the end matter much at all.⁷

What this means is that, as third-party intervenors in peace operations, we need ourselves to gather sufficient information on the root causes of the conflict before we turn our attention to designing information campaigns. In the language of conflict resolution, we need a thorough analysis of any conflict we attempt to resolve, before we jump in with the latest techniques and processes. In the not so dissimilar language of the military, we need to have a strategic vision—and plan—in place, before we design operational and tactical responses. In the language of policymakers, we need a coherent national-level policy in place, something able to guide the national leadership and relevant decision makers as the inevitable problems and crises present themselves. If we lack these, then the information campaign that results (if something as coherent as a “campaign” can, in fact, result) develops haphazardly in response to tactical- and operational-level exigencies. For the military, the tactical and operational requirements of an information campaign in peace operations are easy to specify. The variables are usually force protection and force multipliers. Explaining to the Haitians/Bosnians/Somalis/and the like why these armed foreign troops are in their country (“We are here to help you”) makes a lot of sense. It may prevent an unnecessary violent confrontation between peacekeepers and natives (*force protection*). Likewise, inviting indigenous political leaders and journalists to attend the latest NATO exercise as honored VIP observers makes a lot of sense. It may give them some idea of the forces at the peacekeepers’ disposal, and thus the costs that could be incurred, if they decide foolishly to challenge them (*force multiplier*). But no one, and least of all the military officers who design and implement them, would mistake these essentially tactical or operational civil affairs or PSYOP activities with a strategic plan for conflict resolution or peace building.

Until we can conceive and carry out peace operations that are connected to coherent and realistic political policy making at the highest national and international levels—as well as take account of the parameters of the conflict as the contestants themselves perceive them—we risk mistaking propaganda for information, and both of these for socially transformative and empowering *knowledge* about the potentialities for peace building and conflict resolution.

¹*The Intervention of Haiti*, Adam B. Siegel, 1996.

²The low-profile extends to the U.S. Military Support Group, the U.S. Information Service (USIS), and the Department of Justice's International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) mission.

³As opposed to the self-evident success of the American-led mission to restore Aristide to the presidency, the latest international endeavor, MIPONUH, the reconstruction of the Haitian national police, was characterized more modestly by the Special Representative of the Secretary General as a "fragile success." (Interview with Kevin Avruch in Port au Prince, May 20, 1998).

⁴In interviews conducted in July, 1998, many in the international community involved in aspects of the information campaign told Avruch and Siegel that the results of the (then) upcoming elections would be *for them* the main indicators of the success or failure of their efforts. And preliminary post-election indications are that the international community may be rethinking its investment in the campaign, for example by cutting funds at the end of October, 1998 to OSCE to support its media-monitoring activities.

⁵Thus PDD-56 retains (vis-à-vis American involvement in these operations) the leading overall political role for the Department of State, and the leading information role for the USIA. Yet neither of these organizations has yet stepped forward in operations to play these roles.

⁶On the other hand, the longer term or more deeply rooted *political* problems Haiti faces, well beyond reinvesting President Aristide, have not been so successfully addressed by the international community, or its information activities.

⁷On the other hand—raising the important question of how proactive or aggressive we ought to be—we might simply decide to tear down the antennas and destroy the transmitters of the offending hate media. But then we have moved into the territory of information warfare, with all of the costs (as we learned from Somalia) that peace operations turned into warfighting entail.

APPENDIX I: ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Compiled by Annemarie van Berkel
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PREFACE

This bibliography was compiled as part of a larger research effort on Information Campaigns and Peace Operations. This research was conducted through the Program on Peacekeeping Policy (POPP) for the ASD/C3I (CCRP).

The bibliography seeks to identify and summarize a variety of sources on information campaigns and peace operations: articles, books, reports, manuals. The first part is organized according the Conceptual Model on Peace Operations (CMPO), which discerns peacemaking, peace building, and peace support. The topic is also placed in a broader context: propaganda, public relations, and media.

Other (annotated) bibliographies were used in compiling this one.

There is an additional bibliography on information warfare.

Abbreviations:

IW = information warfare

IO = information operations

PPC = Pearson Peacekeeping Centre

PSYOP = psychological operation

PI = public information

A. PEACE MAKING

Bailey, Sydney D. "The Diplomacy of the Security Council." In: *How Wars End: The UN and the Termination of Armed Conflict, 1946–1964, vol. 1*. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1982.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in book (mainly pp. 160–162)

ABSTRACT: One paragraph in the chapter is on publicity of negotiations. Diplomatic negotiations are conducted in private, though each party is free to interpret its own role to the press or public. The presence of the media in the vicinity of sensitive negotiations does not necessarily advance diplomatic progress. Biased or premature publicity by one or both sides has caused ill will and disrupted negotiations.

Ikle, Fred C. *How nations negotiate* (reprint). Millwood, NY: Kraus Reprint.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: This book deals with several issues concerning negotiation: objectives, side effects, reputation, domestic affairs, personalities.

Lent, J. A. "Communication: Wary Partners: Diplomats and the Media by David D. Pearce." *Choice*, Dec 1995, 33 (4), p. 609.

DESCRIPTION: Book review

ABSTRACT: The practical problems, organization dynamics, and professional issues reporters and diplomats face are examined by an author who served in both fields. Pearce tapped personal experience and interviews. The result is an interesting and useful hodgepodge that offers elemental concepts; discusses the strategies of diplomats in obtaining maximum media play or in burying a story; critiques the increased power of media producers, television's superficial reportage; and the impacts of conglomerates, technology, and shifting consumers preferences; and provisional guidelines for a more effective and mutually beneficial relationship between diplomats and reporters.

Mak, Dayton and Charles Stuart. *American Ambassadors in a Troubled World: Interviews with Senior Diplomats*. Westport, CT/ London: Greenwood Press, 1992.

DESCRIPTION: Book (vii, 231 p.)

ABSTRACT: The authors give a description of ambassadors, and deal with several crises: e.g. Korea, Cyprus and Nicaragua. There is no book of instruments to advice ambassadors what to do or how to act in times of crisis. Decisions must be made quickly on the spot; there is no time to ask advice from Washington. Often there is little that an ambassador or embassy can do except to keep head down, to make sure that Americans are safe and to keep informed as to what is going on.

Maren, Michael. "Video warriors: Clinton, Somalia, and the politics of pictures." *Village Voice*: 38(42), pp. 31–32, Oct 19, 1993.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: Reacting to pictures that, while gruesome, hardly tell the real story, President Clinton has given us a policy in Somalia that answers to images and the whims of Congress and the public. U.S. policy in Somalia is discussed.*

Pearce, David D. *Wary Partners: Diplomats and the Media*. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xiii, 205 p.)

ABSTRACT: The Foreign Service and the foreign policy establishment do not think in public relations terms. Too many of those people are fundamentally afraid of them. This book is an attempt to help address those problems. Good media relations are part of good diplomacy.

Roberts, Walter R. "The Media Dimension II: Diplomacy in the Information Age." *World Today*: 47(7) Jul 1991, pp. 112–115.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: Because of technological developments, diplomacy is no longer done as it once was. The role of the diplomatic representative, who must now make contact with non-governmental people as well with those in government service, is discussed.*

Sharkey, Jacqueline. "When pictures drive foreign policy."
American Journalism Review (AJR): 15(10), pp. 14–
19, Dec 1993.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: News photographs out of Somalia and the dramatic reactions they evoked have raised serious concerns about the impact the media can have on public and congressional opinion. The possible influence of the press on U.S. policy in Somalia is discussed.*

Smith, Gordon S. "Driving Diplomacy into Cyberspace."
World Today: 53(6) Jun 1997, pp. 156–158.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: Information technologies are having a profound impact on the business of diplomacy, and delays in diplomatic responses to crises now could mean loss of international goodwill, loss of political advantages, loss of business opportunities, or loss of life.*

B. PEACE BUILDING

Bray, John. "A Web of Influence." *World Today*: 53(8–9),
Aug 1997, pp. 206–208.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: The widespread use of the Internet has become beneficial to non-governmental organizations, companies, and states and should lead to better-informed citizens and corporations.

Fowler, Alan. *Striking a balance: A Guide to Enhancing the Effectiveness of NGOs in International Development*. London: Earthscan Publications, Ltd., 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Book (298 p.)

ABSTRACT: At time of rapid global change, development NGOs are having to scale up their impact, diversify their actions, respond to long-term crises and improve their performance on all fronts. This book offers analysis and a practical guide to how NGOs can fulfill these demanding expectations.

Gersh, Debra. "The press in Somalia." *Editor Publisher*: 126(4), pp. 11–12, Jan 23, 1993.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: Compared to the conditions in Somalia with little food, water or electricity, reporters claim those of the Persian Gulf were luxurious. The role of the media in U.S.-UN relief efforts in Somalia is discussed.*

InterAction. "A Win-win in Media Relations." *Monday Developments*: Jun 17, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

LaRose-Edwards, Paul. "Human Rights and Operation Field Partners." In: *United Nations Humanitarian Operations: Principles and Practice in UN Field Operations*. Ottawa: Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs, Human Rights and Justice Division, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in book (pp. 53–78)

ABSTRACT: The book deals with guidelines for PI and working with donor representatives.

Metzl, Jamie F. "Information Technology and Human Rights." *Human Rights Quarterly*: 18(4), Nov 1996, pp. 705–746.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: The author examines how NGOs, governments, and the United Nations are using and can use information technology systems to promote human rights. She also considers the dangers the technological developments pose.*

Passarelli, Anne B. *Public Relations in Business, Government and Society: A Bibliographic Guide*. Englewood, CO: Libraries Unlimited, 1989.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xiv, 129 p.)

ABSTRACT: This book deals, for example, with public relations in government (e.g. PI offices) and in nonprofit organizations. For government, it is important to communicate information about government programs to the public, but also to promote the agency, and to maintain its legitimacy. For nonprofit organizations, it is important because they depend on goodwill for funding, workers, and their very existence.

C. PEACE SUPPORT

Allard, Kenneth. *Information Operations in Bosnia: A Preliminary Assessment*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Institute for National Strategic Studies, Report Number 91, Nov 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Report

Brown, Stephen D. "PSYOP in Operation Uphold Democracy." *Military Review*: 26(5), Sep–Oct 1996, pp. 57–73.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: Uphold Democracy's rapid and resounding success obviously relied on much more than effective PSYOP (psychological operation). But Haiti's information—and rumor—saturated environment epitomized the post-Cold War challenge that makes PSYOP essential successful in peace operations.

Bunker, Robert J. Rethinking OOTW.¹ *Military Review*: LXXV (6), Nov–Dec 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

Center For Advanced Command Concepts and Technology (ACT) National Defense University. *Operations Other Than War (OOTW): The Technological Dimension*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, Nov 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: This report documents the results of meetings bringing together operators, planners, researchers, and analysts to identify and examine those aspects of command

and control in operations other than war (OOTW). The documentation addresses a number of topics concerning the utilization of IT in such operations.

“CIA Atrocity Report Rejected by Pentagon, UN Sources.”
SerbNet Report: Oct 24, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Article (Internet)

ABSTRACT: A CIA report leaked to the New York Times, which claims Serbs are responsible for 90 percent of the ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is an old, discredited analysis, which is sharply disputed by the Pentagon and the UN, according to officials directly involved with operations in the region.

Cloughley, Brian. “Peace in Mind: Will the UN Give PSYOPS a Chance?” *Jane’s International Defense Review*: 29(3), Mar 1996, pp. 59–61.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: Psychological operations are an integral part of modern warfare. Can UN military missions afford to ignore such a useful tool? But the employment of PSYOPS must be more skillful and subtler than in the past.

Combelles Siegel, Pascale. *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations: NATO-led operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, December 1995–1997*. Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control Research Program, Apr 1998.

DESCRIPTION: Book (199 p.)

ABSTRACT: This monograph examines the place of PI and PSYOP in peace operations through the prism of NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It presents a background

on NATO-led operations in Bosnia. It then analyzes the pillars of the campaign: PI, PSYOPS, and civil-military cooperation information. It analyzes how these different tasks were coordinated throughout the command and with international organizations. Finally, it presents an assessment of the effectiveness of NATO information activities in support of mission accomplishment and offers some thoughts for future operations.

Combelles Siegel, Pascale. Information Activities. In: Larry Wentz (ed.). *Lessons from Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*. Washington, DC: DoD Command and Control Research Program, Apr 1998.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in book (pp. 167–187)

ABSTRACT: The chapter examines the place of PI and PSYOP in peace operations through the prism of IFOR operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina (brief version of the mentioned book).

Gersh, Debra. “It’s Hollywood! No, It’s Somalia!” *Editor & Publisher:* (125)51, pp. 9–10, Dec 19, 1992.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: Military leaders in Operation Restore Hope have criticized the massive media presence during the landing of U.S. troops, but the media contends the Pentagon actually encouraged it.*

Hernandez, Debra Gersh. “Press pool was ready to go.” *Editor & Publisher:* 127(39), pp. 9–10, Sep 24, 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: An invasion of Haiti would have been the first combat test of new media arrangements since the Persian Gulf War. Those involved in the arrangements say it would have been a success, citing “strong planning” and “good faith.”*

Holmes, Steven A. “US is examining new Bosnian pact.”
The New York Times: Sep 17, 1993, Sec. A, p. 8,
col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: Clinton administration officials said that they did not have enough detailed information about an agreement worked out between the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government and the Bosnian Serbs to determine whether the accord would meet the president’s conditions for sending American peacekeeping troops to Bosnia.*

Jenkins, Simon. “We should beware the laptop bombardiers.” *Spectator*: 272 (8650), p. 29, Apr 23, 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: The techniques used by the modern press to drive politicians to a declaration of war are examined. Although the press succeeded in bringing about U.S. intervention in Somalia and Beirut Lebanon, it is unsure whether it will succeed in Bosnia.*

“Haiti.” *IPI Report*: (43)12, pp. 33–34, Dec 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Report

ABSTRACT: A look back at the news media in Haiti during 1994 is presented. The United States peaceful occupation of Haiti on Sep 19 and the return to power of exiled President

Jean-Bertrand Aristide a month later restored complete freedom of the press to Haiti.

Kaiser, Charles. "The comedians, reporting live from Port-au-Prince." *New York*: 27(38), p. 31, Sep 26, 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: The news media's coverage of events in Haiti in Sep 1994, in anticipation of a U.S. invasion, is discussed. TV networks were spreading disinformation about the number of reporters they planned to send to Haiti.*

Lehmann, Ingrid. *Pearson Paper Number 1: Public Information Campaigns in Peacekeeping: The UN Experience in Haiti*. Toronto: Canadian Peacekeeping Press, Aug 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Report

ABSTRACT: While in previous decades public opinion was incidental to peacekeeping missions, in the "Information Age" of the nineties public perception of these operations are formed rapidly by television images instantly created from the area of conflict. Therefore, how international public opinion and the local population view an operation has an impact on the effectiveness of the operation and can affect the whole peace process. PI campaigns need to be undertaken jointly by the military, civilian and police components in peacekeeping missions. Moreover, they need unified messages, images and campaign plans to be successful. They also need the attention and support of political and military leadership of the missions, as well as adequate funding.

The author explores the development of PI Campaigns in Haiti, both civil and military, from 1994 to 1996. The main

innovation of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) was the introduction of the Military Information Support Teams (MIST). MIST operations over three different phases of the peacekeeping mission in Haiti are examined: the initial deployments to Haiti as part of Operation Uphold Democracy; UNMIH under United States leadership; and UNMIH under Canadian leadership.

Lule, Jack. "News Values in a New World: A Burkean analysis of The New York Times in Haiti, 1994–96." *Journal of Communication Inquiry*: 21(1), pp. 3–26, Spring 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: The author scrutinizes *The New York Times* reporter Larry Rohter's coverage of the events in Haiti during 1994–1996 in a broader context of the international debate over the direction of news media values in the post-Cold War world.*

NATO. *Lessons learned in peacekeeping operations—February 1997* (3rd rev.). NACC/ PFP (PMSATIG) N (96) 37.

DESCRIPTION: Report (28 p.)

ABSTRACT: This revised general paper, produced by NATO Headquarters as Lessons Learned in peacekeeping operations, incorporates elements drawn from most national papers. General aspects: public relations (importance of relation with local authorities, population and media). Operational and specific aspects: information and other operational aspects (timely and reliable information concerning regional conflict, situation and changes in position of parties, establishment of Information Center).

Oppel, Richard A. "We didn't need it in Haiti, but..." *ASNE Bulletin*:² (762), pp. 24–25, Oct 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: The DOD's press pool has been deployed 14 times since its organization in the mid-1980s. The role and responsibilities of the DOD press pool are discussed.*

"Pentagon hasn't learned when secrecy is needless." *Denver Post*: Dec 30, 1993, Sec. B, p. 6, col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: An editorial comment that the Pentagon's unwillingness to supply information about the identity of the dead soldier who was dragged through the streets of Mogadishu Somalia in October 1993, showed the same mentality that proved the nation's undoing in Vietnam and has no place in a free society.*

Quigley, John B. *The Ruses for War: American Interventionism Since World War II*. Buffalo, NY: Prometheus Books, 1992.

DESCRIPTION: Book (310 p.)

ABSTRACT: Despite some downscaling, the United States retains a far-flung network of air, naval, and land forces prepared to combat on short notice. How and when those forces are used, depends in large on how the public perceives the need for its use.

The public gets its information from the media, who get their initial information from the White House, the Department of Defense, and the Department of State. The authors argue that presidents not always divulge the truth,

or least not the whole truth. U.S. military actions over the past half-century are explored.

Raymont, Henry. "Haiti: Reporters look good, not so the pundits." *Nieman Reports*: 48(4), pp. 47–49, Winter 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in report

ABSTRACT: The news media's coverage of the Haitian crisis, some of which was good and some of which was not, is discussed. Most of the speculation and fear that flew around Washington before U.S. forces landed in Haiti did not deal with the real situation of Haitians or their government.*

Rota, Dane L. "Combat Decision Making in 'Operations Other Than War'" *Military Review*: LXXVI (2), Mar–Apr 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

Sharkey, Jacqueline. "The shallow end of the pool?" *American Journalism Review (AJR)*: 16(10), pp. 42–46, Dec 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: The questions surrounding the pool assembled to cover the invasion of Haiti are discussed. The Haiti pool suffered from logistical problems, such as transportation and communication difficulties.*

Shelton, H. Hugh and Timothy D. Vane. "Winning the Information War in Haiti." *Military Review*: Nov/Dec 1995, pp. 3–16.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: Operation “Uphold Democracy” in Haiti showed there can be common ground and accommodation between the media and the military in covering America’s Armed Forces deployment. Reporters had unparalleled access to American troops. While operations in Haiti may not be the new paradigm for the media-military relationship, it certainly improved it.

Skogmo, Bjorn. “The Troop-Contributing Countries.” In: *UNIFIL: International Peacekeeping in Lebanon, 1978–1988*. Boulder/London: Lynne Rienne Publishers, 1989.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in book

ABSTRACT: Practical, administrative problems have to be sorted out individually with each troop-contributing country. One of these was the question of press coverage and media access to various battalion areas. Initially, officers were generally very cautious with media representatives. The media gave a somewhat simplified view of the overall situation. Later, the media focused on their own country. Information services could not be centralized.

Smith, R. Jeffrey and Julia Preston. “U.S. probes security for Somalia files.” *The Washington Post*: Mar 12, 1995, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 6.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: Several boxes containing classified US intelligence documents were discovered by U.S. officials in a vacant UN office in Somalia days before the pullout of UN peacekeepers, prompting some U.S. officials to question if the international organization had mishandled sensitive U.S. secrets.*

Unger, David C. "Taking Haiti." *The New York Times Magazine*: p. 52, Oct 23, 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: The high profile U.S. military actions are given now by the media is discussed. The question of how accurately the media portrayed U.S. actions in Haiti is discussed.*

U.S. Army. *Field Manual FM 24-33: Communications Techniques: Electronic Countermeasures*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Jul 1990.

DESCRIPTION: Field manual

U.S. Army. *Field Manual FM 33-1: Public Affairs Operations*. Washington, DC: Feb 1993.

DESCRIPTION: Field manual

U.S. Army. *Field Manual FM 34-1: Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Sep 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Field manual

U.S. Army. *Field Manual 46-1: Public Affairs Operations*. Washington, DC: Nov 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Field manual

U.S. Army. *Field Manual FM 100-6: Information Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, Aug 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Field manual

U.S. Army. *Joint Pub. 3-13: Joint Doctrine for Information Operations*. Washington, DC: Department of Army, Jan 21, 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Joint pub

Walker, Doug. "Haiti: Broader picture needed." *Nieman Reports*: 48(4), pp. 50–52, Winter 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in report

ABSTRACT: Overall, media coverage of the Haitian crisis in the summer of 1994 was good because it afforded average citizens several different viewpoints on the situation there. The media failed, however, to offer any real understanding of the Haitian people. Broader coverage of issues like these should not stop now that the crisis is over.*

D. REMAINING

1. Information Technology

Alberts, David. *Unintended Consequences of the Information Age Technologies: Avoiding the Pitfalls, seizing the initiative*. Washington, DC: Directorate of Advanced Concepts, Technologies and Information Strategies, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Report (62 p.)

ABSTRACT: The military is now on the road to becoming an information age organization. The transformation involved is fraught with both risks and opportunities,

because it will affect the nature of the information provision as well as the manner in which it is provided.

Jago, Carol. "War on the World Wide Web." *Los Angeles Times*: Jan 31, 1996, Sec B, p. 9, col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The author discusses the information on U.S. soldiers in Bosnia available on the World Wide Web, and says the medium offers a wealth of data, but no context.*

UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service. *At Ease with E-mail: A Handbook on Using Electronic Mail for NGOs in Developing Countries*. New York: UN Non-Governmental Liaison Service, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Handbook (107 p.)

ABSTRACT: Computer-based communication—through e-mail, bulletin board systems, computer conferencing and networking and on-line databases—offer NGOs, particularly in developing countries, a modern, effective and affordable communications toolkit with which to share information, network, conduct research and support advocacy work and campaigns on developing issues.

2. Media

"Anti-NATO Images on Bosnian Serb TV." *New York Times*: Aug. 23, 1997, Sec. A, p. 4, col. 5.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: A Bosnian Serb television station is broadcasting anti-NATO propaganda, mixing images of NATO troops with footage of Nazi soldiers. The station, which is controlled by hard-liners of the Serb Democratic

Party, is airing a feature several times daily that portrays the NATO-led Stabilization Force as an occupying force.*

Arno, Andrew and Wimal Dissanayake (eds.). *The News Media in National and International Conflict*. Boulder: Westview Press, 1984.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xii, 250 p.)

ABSTRACT: The mass media can be seen as a factor in the creation of international conflict; they also, claim many scholars, are the key to control and resolution of these problems. Whichever side of the coin one chooses to look at, there is no doubt that the news media are no longer peripheral players on the global scene; they are important participants whose organizational patterns of behavior and values must be taken into account in understanding national and international conflict. A variety of news media—newspaper, radio, television—and a variety of conflicts—United States-Iranian, Indo-Pakistan—are examined.

Article 19. *Broadcasting Genocide*. London: Article 19, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Report (180 p.)

ABSTRACT: The report examines and analyzes media often blamed as major cause of genocide. It documents the use of censorship and propaganda by Rwandan authorities in the years preceding the crisis.

Bonner, Raymond. "Keeping the Peace in Bosnia, and the Press." *The New York Times*: Jan 15, 1996, Sec. D, p. 5, col. 4.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The U.S. military's change in attitude toward the press during the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia in 1995 and early 1996 is discussed. In a switch from the Vietnam War and the Persian Gulf War, the media is advocating cooperation with the media.*

Brock, Peter. "Dateline Yugoslavia: The Partisan Press."
Foreign Policy: Apr 13, 1996.³

DESCRIPTION: Article (Internet)

ABSTRACT: The almost uniform manner by which the international news media, including the American media, dismissed Serb claims has played a critical role in the unfolding tragedy in the former Yugoslavia. The media became a movement, co-belligerent no longer disguised as noncombatant and nonpartisan. The mistakes were blatant.

Girardet, Edward R. (ed.). *Somalia, Rwanda and beyond: The Role of International Media in Wars and Humanitarian Crises*. Columbia University: Crosslines.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: The purpose of this book is to explore the role of the international media, whether print, radio, or television, in the reporting of wars and other humanitarian crises: famines, refugee exoduses, genocide. While the media is blessed with new communication aids—cellular phones, laptop computers, Internet—such techniques do not necessarily mean that the quality of news reporting has improved.

Gowing, Nick. *Media Coverage: Help or Hindrance in Conflict Prevention. A Report of the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict*. New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, Sep 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: The author, a BBC journalist, looks at how media reporting of foreign affairs can help or hinder conflict prevention, through a variety of recent experiences from the former Yugoslavia to the Great Lakes. He concluded that the media have far less influence on policy than generally acknowledged or assumed. In particular, he asserts that when a policy is set, then there is little that the media can do to change that. He also concluded that media coverage is also too late and/or too distorted to trigger an adequate response and thus objectively contributes to aggravating the crisis (Pascale).

Gowing, Nick. *Dispatches from Disaster Zones: New Challenges and Problems for Information Management in Complex Emergencies. Ominous Lessons from the Great Lakes and Eastern Zaire in late 1996 and early 1997*. Conference Paper Presented in London, 27–28 May 1998.

DESCRIPTION: Report

ABSTRACT: Still dealing with the quality of media reporting of foreign affairs, Gowing takes a look at how the international media let themselves be manipulated by the Tutsi/Kabila alliance during the latest Great Lakes crisis. He concluded that the media did not perform their duty of information, but instead fed rumors and propaganda to their audiences. Notwithstanding the judgment of his colleagues' work, this piece is especially valuable because it provides a

detailed analysis of the constraints that lead to biased media reporting (Pacale).

Hallin, Daniel C. *“The Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

DESCRIPTION: Book (vii, 285 p.)

ABSTRACT: It has become widely accepted that the relation between the media and the government during Vietnam was in fact one of conflict: the media contradicted the more positive view of the war officials sought to project.

The American news media is both highly autonomous from direct political control and, through the routine of the news gathering process, deeply informed in the actual operations of government. The Vietnam War would have been much different if the news had been censored or television excluded or the journalists more inclined to defer presidential authority.

Hamilton, Denise. *How to Conduct a Multi-Ethnic Team Reporting Project*. New York: Center for War, Peace, and the News Media, 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Article (Internet)

ABSTRACT: Overview of the course.

Hockstader, Lee. “Troops Seize Bosnian Serb TV Towers: NATO Says It seeks Balanced Coverage. *The Washington Post*: Oct 2, 1997, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 3.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: NATO-led peacekeeping troops seized control of four key television broadcasting towers in the Serb-controlled half of Bosnia, hoping to achieve by force

what international officials have failed to secure by repeated pressure: media more balanced and to their liking.⁴

Holguín Gutiérrez, Lina Mariá. *The Role of Television News in Conflict Resolution*. Castellón, Spain: European Peace University, 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Thesis (115 p.)

ABSTRACT: Television news has created the impression that conflicts are unsolvable. It has contributed to the creation of negative stereotypes that have aggravated conflict situations. The thesis is a reflection on why this has happened, by presenting the problem of TV news, while searching for a path for TV news to become involved meaningfully in conflict resolution.

Hunt, W. Ben. *Getting to War: Predicting International Conflict with Mass Media Indicators*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Book (304 p.)

ABSTRACT: The book tries to identify leading indicators of war. It deals with theory and practice.

“Influence of the Brock Analysis. Editor’s Note.” April 13, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Article (Internet)

ABSTRACT: Brock took a magnifying glass to press reporting of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and argued that there were many distortions and mistakes. This article (“The Partisan Press”) raised a lot of controversy. However, the article did not say that all or even most reports of atrocities in the former Yugoslavia are wrong. The Yugoslavia crisis has been unusual in the degree to which

governments appear to base daily pronouncements and decisions on media reports and TV images. The Brock article was one early and critical assessment of that issue.

Kennan, George F. "Somali through a Glass Darkly." *New York Times*: Sep 30, 1993, Sec. A, p. 25, col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: In an excerpt from his diary, George Kennan anticipates the problems that the U.S. humanitarian mission in Somalia would entail. Kennan regards the move as "a dreadful error of American policy" and blames the media as partially responsible for the Bush administration's decision to send U.S. troops there.*

Komarow, Steven. "NATO Pulls the Plug on Serbs TV Station Raids Aimed at Karadzic Allies." *USA TODAY*: Oct 2, 1997, Sec. A, p. 8, col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: U.S. and other NATO-led troops yanked four Bosnian-Serb television stations off the air, seizing key transmitters in response to broadcasts suggesting that the UN war crimes tribunal is anti-Serb.

LeMay, Craig, et al. (eds.). *The Media at War: The Press and the Persian Gulf Conflict*. New York: Gannet Foundation Media Center, 1991.

DESCRIPTION: Book

"Media Seek Video of Somali Fight." *San Francisco Chronicle*: Dec 25, 1993, Sec. A, p. 4, col. 3.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The efforts of the U.S. news media outlets to obtain Defense Department video footage of a Somali fire fight that killed 18 American soldiers, wounded 78, and forced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country are discussed.*

Menkhaus, Ken. "A Second Look at UN's Action in Somalia." *Christian Science Monitor*: Jul 16, 1993, p. 19, col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The author argues that the news media coverage of the violence in Somalia between UN forces and the militia of General Mohammed Farah Aideed has been disappointingly superficial and inaccurate, saying that the most egregious factual error by the media was its widespread reporting that the armed conflict in Mogadishu represented a rising tide of anti-UN and anti-American feelings across Somali society.

Moffett, George. "How Media Blitz Alters Peacekeeping Missions." *Christian Science Monitor*: Jan 11, 1996, p. 1, col. 3.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The difficulty of conducting U.S. peacekeeping missions, such as the one in Bosnia, in the presence of a free press is discussed. Intensive press coverage in an age of instant global communication could limit the ability of the president to use the military as an effective instrument of U.S. foreign policy by turning public sentiment against such operations, according to some experts.*

Neuffer, Elizabeth. "Media War in Bosnia gives Serbs a Choice on Truth." *Boston Globe*: Sep 22, 1997, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 5.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The Bosnian Serb state television program shifted, not so subtly, to an image of NATO soldiers looking grim-faced and intimidating. This footage angered NATO commanders so much that they dispatched electronic jamming planes, saying such broadcasts would not be tolerated. The result is a media war unprecedented in the Serb-held half of Bosnia, a land where propaganda long ago took the place of independent news.

Neuman, Johanna. "Is Satellite TV Driving Foreign Policy? Not Really." *USA TODAY*: Jan 17, 1996, Sec. A, p. 11, col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The author admits that the immediacy of satellite photos of war-torn Bosnia could have an effect on US involvement there, but argues that that is not the case with the current U.S. peacekeeping troops, noting that 3 years of news media revelations did not propel Western powers to intervene. She examines the relationship between military intervention and the media in past wars.

Raevsky, Andrei. *Managing Arms in Peace Processes: Aspects of Psychological Operations and Intelligence*. Geneva: UNIDIR (United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research), 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Report

Regourd, Serge. "Power of the Media and Decomposition of Thoughts." *Serbia Bulletin*: Dec 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Article

ABSTRACT: The media, in particular audio-visual ones, are based on spectacular and immediate emotions, which substitute constructive reasoning and critical examination. In this context, the public has a caricaturist perception of the war in Bosnia.

Ricks, Charles W. *The military-news media relationship: thinking forward*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, Dec 1993.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: It seems inevitable that there is a persistent tension between the military and the news media, because of very different objectives and often very different values. This study seems to move forward by acknowledging and examining those news media issues, which will most affect commanders as they execute their assigned missions. It identifies various planning factors, which should be considered as commanders preparing their public affairs concepts of operations.

Roach, Colleen A. (ed.). *Communication and Culture in War and Peace*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1993.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xxv, 274 p.)

ABSTRACT: By exploring the role of both culture and mass media, this volume fills a crucial void in the study of war and peace. It is a multidisciplinary and action-oriented book.

Rohde, David. "Agog in a Fog: Media Pack Sees GIs as AWOL in Tuzla." *Christian Science Monitor*: Dec 18, 1995, p. 1, col. 3.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: For days, winter weather has delayed full deployment of U.S. forces to Tuzla, Bosnia, but the pack of hungry media is eager to report an event that has yet to happen. Resorting to the most embarrassing practice of the trade, members of the press are interviewing and photographing each other.*

Rubenstein, Richard E., et al. *Framework for Interpreting Conflict: A Handbook for Journalists*. Fairfax, VA: Institute for Conflict Analysis and Resolution, 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: Attempts to acquaint journalists working in conflict-ridden areas with some (ICAR) conflict theory and conflict resolution techniques (Kevin).

"Savagery on Screen." (*Manchester*) *Guardian*: Apr 24, 1993, Sec. 2, p. 24, col. 4.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: An editorial discusses the role of the media in forming foreign policy, first in Somalia and most recently in Bosnia, and argues that the countries that are best at manipulating the media receive the most attention from governments offering humanitarian aid and peacekeeping forces.*

Schram, Martin. "Waging War by Numbers." *Atlanta Constitution*: Dec 6, 1995, Sec. A, p. 17, col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The author laments the use of "quickie polls" by the news media to create instant news reports, saying the media doesn't care whether the numbers are right, wrong, rushed, or relevant. The latest malpractice of the craft is the media's instant polls on President Clinton's nationally televised plea for support to his plan to send 20,000 troops to Bosnia.*

Himelfarb, Sheldon. "Bosnia: Searching for Common Ground on Radio." In: Smock, David (ed.). *Peaceworks*, no. 20: *Private Peacemaking*. United States Institute of Peace: 1998.

DESCRIPTION: Article (report)

ABSTRACT: In 1996, Common Ground Production (GGP), the media arm of Search for Common Ground, received support from the United States Institute of Peace to produce an innovative series, Resolutions Radio, for the Bosnian radio. This article deals with the lessons of the use of media in Bosnia's conflict.

Kurspahic, Kemal. *As long as Sarajevo exists*. Stone Creek, CT: The Pamphletheer's Press, 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xxxviii, 248 p.)

ABSTRACT: This book is about the journalists of the "Oslobodejenje" whose commitment to their profession and to a pluralist, multiethnic Bosnia-Herzegovina was translated into a unique form of resistance to the ultra-nationalist warriors who laid siege to their city and rent their

country from end to end. By refusing to put their pens down, even at the rise of their lives, they proved once again that ideas and ideals are not ephemeral things and cannot be obliterated by guns.

Magnusson, Thomas (ed.). *From Saigon to Sarajevo: Mass Media in Times of War*. Stockholm: Swedish Council/ Geneva: International Peace Bureau, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Book (102 p.)

ABSTRACT: The whole story of news management in wartime is about the efforts the military makes to get the media on side. And how easy, except for a few honorable cases, it turns out to be.

Minear, Larry; Colin Scott and Thomas G. Weiss. *The News Media, Civil War and Humanitarian Action*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: This study makes clear how the three sides of the triangle—media, governments, and humanitarian organizations—are reconfiguring in a changing world to address new problems. There is symbiosis, but it is an unequal triangle. The media does not necessarily need success, like the other parties do.

Rotberg, Robert I. And Thomas G. Weiss (eds.). *From Massacres to Genocide: The Media Public Policy and Humanitarian Crises*. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution/Cambridge, MA: The World Peace Foundation, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: This book deals with how the media and humanitarians do and should behave in the field, how those interactions can be furthered and improved, and the extent to which the media and the humanitarians can both influence the making of well-considered policies towards future complex humanitarian emergencies, ethnic and religious conflicts, incipient genocide, and other tragedies.

Squitieri, Tom. "NATO 'Rocking' the Balkans." *USA Today*: Jan 26, 1996, Sec. A, p. 6, col. 2.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: IFOR radio station is NATO's centerpiece weapon in a quixotic bid to win over the hearts of skeptical Serbs, Muslims, and Croats. Augmented by a weekly newspaper, handbills, loudspeakers and posters, the operation also monitors international media coverage of the NATO operation and provides status reports on just how well the NATO message is getting through.*

Steele, Jonathan. "Peacekeepers Seize Hard-line Bosnian Serb Transmitters." (*Manchester*) *Guardian*: Oct 2, 1997, Sec. 1, p. 12, col. 4.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: NATO-led peacekeeping troops seized four television and radio transmitters yesterday in Bosnian Serb territory in a show of force intended to block propaganda by hard-line opponents of President Biljana Plavsic. With elections for the parliament due, Mrs. Plavsic dissolved this summer; the move was aimed at ensuring fair media coverage. Without it, Western governments fear she might not win a majority and could even lose her job, which will be up for election.*

Strobel, Warren P. "The Media and US Policies toward Intervention: A Closer Look at the 'CNN effect.'" In: Crocker, Chester A. et al (eds.). *Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in book (pp. 357–376)

ABSTRACT: This essay examines the news media's impact on one portion of foreign policy and national security concerns – the decision about whether or not to intervene (in form of peace operations) with US military might. The media also have a potential impact on international crises of great importance to the US, but where intervention is not feasible or realistic. Or when US troops already have intervened and face some setback or change in their mission. The power of the news media is nevertheless not that dramatic, as the cases show.

Strobel, Warren P. *Late-Breaking Foreign Policy: The Media's Influence on Peace Operations*. Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xiii, 275 p.)

ABSTRACT: The author, a foreign correspondent for the Washington Times, studies whether the media, in particular television, is a driving force in U.S. foreign policy. There have been few in-depth studies of how televised news reports and newspaper accounts of humanitarian tragedies affect to deploy U.S. forces. He provides riveting behind-the-scenes accounts of recent peace operations, drawing on interviews with senior U.S. national security officials and journalists who covered humanitarian relief operations in Bosnia, Rwanda, Somalia, Haiti, and northern Iraq.

He concludes that if the media plays a role when reporting foreign news, it does not have the level of influence required to make either decisions happen. According to Strobel, the U.S. political and military leadership is the real and final decision maker.

Szalai, Sándor and Margaret Croke. *The United Nations and the News Media: A Survey of Public Information on the United Nations in the World Press, Radio and Television*. New York: UN Institute for Training and Research, 1972.

DESCRIPTION: Book (vi, 232 p.)

ABSTRACT: This study is concerned with the role of the news media in spreading information on the world organization, and with the coverage of UN policies and activities by the world press, radio and television. The UN is not in a part favorable position when competing for the public eye in order to make its policies and activities better known and understood. It is subject to all sorts of political, organizational, and financial constraints, some of them self-imposed but others quite outside its own sphere of authority.

Trainor, I. "Yugoslavia's Brutal Television War." *International Press Institute Report*: 41(2), Feb 1992.

DESCRIPTION: Article

Whitney, Craig R. "Bad News They Can Manage." *New York Times*: Jun 11, 1995, Sec.4, p. 3, col. 1.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The U.S., France, and Britain have taken different approaches to managing the risks posed by

troubling media coverage of soldiers in Bosnia. While the U.S. refused to disclose the name of Air Force Captain Scott F. O'Grady before his dramatic rescue and Britain made no move to prevent British news media from identifying soldiers taken hostage by the Bosnian Serbs, France exacted greater restraints on coverage of the hostage incident.*

Wolfsfeld, Gadi. *Media and Political Conflict: News from the Middle East*. Cambridge (UK)/ New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xiv, 255 p.)

ABSTRACT: The news media have become the central arena for political conflicts today. It is, therefore, not surprising that the role of the news media in political conflicts has received a good deal of public attention in recent years. The book tries to provide an understanding of the ways, in which news media do and do not become active participants in these conflicts.

“World-wide: A Peacekeeping Official Has Ordered.” *Wall Street Journal*: May 19, 1993, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 3.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: Cambodia's UN peacekeeping chief ordered all UN personnel in the country not to speak to the news media before the elections begin. The UN was concerned about unauthorized comments to the media, many of them critical of the UN and its mission in Cambodia.*

Young, Peter R. (ed.). *Defense the Media in the Time of Limited War*. Portland: Frank Cass, 1992.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: The book highlights increasingly complex and difficult relations between defense and media in time of war, especially the acute problems given the growth of the new high-tech media and its given spread and immediacy. The book explores also how to reconcile the competing demands for secrecy and the public's right to know.

3. Propaganda

“Bosnian ‘Genocide’ Charges False Says Serbian-American Coalition, Assails Pro-Intervention Propaganda.”
SerbNet Report: Oct 24, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Article (Internet)

ABSTRACT: While the war in Bosnia is tragic and bloody, charges of genocide are built on false numbers and pro-intervention propaganda.

Chomsky, Noam. *Media Control: The Spectacular Achievements of Propaganda*. Seven Stories Press (The Open Media Pamphlet Series, No. 1), 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: A concise and interesting (if sometimes doctrinaire) review of propaganda in and by the USA during the 20th Century.

Cole, Robert (ed.). *Encyclopedia of Propaganda*, M. E. Sharpe, 1998.

DESCRIPTION: Encyclopedia

ABSTRACT: With contributions from over 200 writers, this three-volume set is my new nomination for the definitive work on the subject.

Dawson, Pauline. "Attitudes of the Press and the People."
In: *The Peacekeepers of Kashmir: The United Nations Observer Group in India and Pakistan*.
London: Hurst Company/ New York: St. Martin's
Press, 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in book (pp. 183–201)

ABSTRACT: Media propaganda has given cause for concern before. Both sides in the conflict consider themselves guilty of alarmist propaganda. A leakage of a UN report to the Indian press in 1955, caused resentment in Pakistan. The UN's reaction was concern. It sent an aide mémoire.

Ellul, Jacques. *Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes*. New York: Random House, 1973.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: This is a classic text on propaganda in general. Even after a quarter century, there is hardly any other volume better recommended for an overview of the subject.

Gustainis, J. Justin. *American Rhetoric and the Vietnam War*. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1993.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xvii, 160 p.)

ABSTRACT: Rhetoric during wartime is about creation of consensus. Since war tend to drag on, consensus among the citizenry is vital if victory is to be achieved. The book is about the efforts of several administrators to build consensus about Vietnam and about the failure of those efforts. It consists of three parts: pro-war rhetoric, anti-war rhetoric, and the rhetoric of the media.

Heder, Stephen R. and Judy Ledgerwood (eds.). *Propaganda, Politics, and Violence in Cambodia: Democratic Transition under United Nations Peacekeeping*. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xx, 277 p.)

ABSTRACT: This book consists of eight essays on development in Cambodia during the period of UNTAC: United Nations Transitional Authority Cambodia. The essays deal with the propaganda used by the different parties.

Heininger, Janet E. *Peacekeeping in Transition: The United Nations in Cambodia*. New York: The Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1994.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xii, 183 p.)

ABSTRACT: The Information and Education Division of UNTAC is a unit within the Office of the Special Representative. It is responsible for monitoring and countering propaganda by all factions. UNTAC expected to run a massive campaign of production and distribution/dissemination of material in order to ensure that the messages reaches Cambodians at all levels of society and in all parts of the country. The progress was slow, because of logistics and procurement difficulties, and because of a shortage of properly qualified translators. The work was nevertheless essential in election's success. The lesson for the UN is to include information and education unit as an essential element of all future missions, particularly those involved in peace-building.

Jackall, Robert (ed.). *Propaganda (Main Trends of the Modern World)*. New York: New York University Press, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: Classic and modern essays trace the origins, ethos, and workings of modern propaganda and explore the social and institutional groundwork of propaganda. They examine propaganda from the Great War to the Cold War, focusing on organizations such as the Committee on PI and the Nazi propaganda machine, and Hollywood propaganda films during WWII. They discuss bureaucratic propaganda, advertising, public relations, and politics and language in contemporary society. (Booknews)

Jowett, Garth and Victoria O'Donnell. *Propaganda and Persuasion*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, 1992.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xv, 294 p.)

ABSTRACT: Propaganda is nowadays replaced by communication, information, and persuasion, because they imply no value judgment. The book deals with the historical development, theories and research, and analysis.

Kulics, Richard. News, Advertising or Propaganda? Oct 24, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Article (Internet)

ABSTRACT: From the beginning, journalists have slapped the label "aggressors" on the Serbs. Croats and Muslims have been identified as more legitimate.

Lasswell, Harold D., Ralph D. Casey and Bruce L. Smith (eds.). *Propaganda and Promotional Activities: An Annotated Bibliography*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xxiii, 450 p.)

ABSTRACT: Although this is an old bibliography, it still is interesting. It consists of seven parts: strategies and techniques, promoting group, response, symbols and practices, channels, measurement of effect, and censorship in modern society.

Makara, Petar. "A Telling Interview: How the Lies of What Is Happening in Yugoslavia Were Spread, Or: How to Fiddle on People's Emotions." Oct 24, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Book review (Internet)

ABSTRACT: Review of "Yugoslavian truths are not as good as to be told" by Jacques Merlino. He says the suffering of the Serbs is ignored. There was anti-Serb and pro-Muslim propaganda.

Martin, L. John. *International Propaganda: Its Legal and Diplomatic Control*. Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1969.

DESCRIPTION: Book (vii, 284 p.)

ABSTRACT: The book deals with the historical background, definition, agencies, and control by law.

Murty, B.S. *Propaganda and the World Order: The Legal Regulation of the Ideological Instrument of Coercion*. New Haven: New Haven Press, 1989.⁵

DESCRIPTION: Book (lxx, 310 p.)

ABSTRACT: The book is an attempt to study propaganda from what is known as the value—or policy-oriented approach. The main concern is with decisions and decision makers. The book was published more than two decades ago. Events that have happened since then called for

updating and some revision of its contents (e.g. communication technology and power structures).

Nelson, Richard A. *A Chronology and Glossary of Propaganda in the United States*. Greenwood Publishing, 1996.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: The first of three volumes that will serve as a comprehensive and inclusive finding tool, this work defines propaganda in an uncertain postmodern information age. Linked to the U.S. Constitution, mass media, and business, the role propaganda plays must be understood in terms of an information-based economy. An extensive chronology of propaganda-related events, plus an A–Z guide defining hundreds of important terms (some ill-defined in context, such as “backdoor contact” and “spin doctor”), combine to meet an immediate need for an easy-to-use resource that not only credibly defines the field but stimulates new research (publisher’s blurb).

Pratkanis, Anthony R. *Age of Propaganda: The Everyday Use and Abuse of Persuasion*. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1998.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: A newly published (and highly provocative) volume on persuasion in American society.

Qualter, Terence H. *Propaganda and Psychological Warfare*. New York: Random House, 1962.

DESCRIPTION: Book (176 p.)

ABSTRACT: This book deals with theory, development and techniques.

Smith, Bruce Lannes, Harold Dwight Lasswell and Ralph Droz Casey. *Propaganda, Communication, and Public Opinion: A Comprehensive Reference Guide*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1946.

DESCRIPTION: Book (435 p.)

ABSTRACT: Although it is an old bibliography, it still is interesting. The categories are: promoting group, response, symbols and practices, channel, measurement, and control and censorship.

Taylor, Philip M. *Munitions of the Mind: A History of Propaganda from the Ancient World to the Present Era*. Manchester University Press, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Book

Whitton, John B. and Arthur Larson. *Propaganda towards Disarmament in the War of Words*. Dobbs Ferry, NY: Oceana Publications, 1964.

DESCRIPTION: Book (xi, 305 p.)

ABSTRACT: Propaganda means the use of facts, fiction, argument and suggestion, sometimes supported by an effort to suppress inconsistent material, with the calculated purpose of instilling the recipient certain beliefs, prejudices, or convictions which will serve the interest of the author, usually by producing or tending to produce a certain line of action. Propaganda can be good and can be bad. It is a threat to peace. Part 2 deals with deals and part 3 deals with remedies and improvements.

4. Public Information

Allard, Kenneth. *Somalia operations: Lessons Learned*. Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1995.

DESCRIPTION: Book

ABSTRACT: The lesson for the media is that an effective PI program is critical to the success of any operation, especially those involving peacemaking or peacekeeping. Two important points:

There must be an efficient means of dealing with visitors, including not only the media, but also congressional leaders and other public figures.

How well the PI officer defines the situation in every public comment, television appearance or newspaper.

Balk, Alfred. "Regional Report: United Nations, Feeling of Renaissance." *Press Review*: 35(7), pp. 45–46, Jul 1988.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: United Nations Undersecretary General for Public Information Therese P. Sevigny is interviewed. Sevigny's task of restructuring the UN's and archive activities is part of an overall reform plan in progress.*

Bennett, Christopher. "Bosnia Arrests Must Be Followed by a Public Information Offensive: The Serbs have to understand that it's not an attack on them." *Christian Science Monitor*: Jul 18, 1997, p. 18, col. 2.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: Two war criminals were indicted. The state-controlled Bosnian Serb news media reacted predictably, describing the operations as criminal acts. Meanwhile, the Bosnian Muslim news media has gloated in triumph.

Bernstein, Alan B. *The Emergency Public Relations Manual* (3rd ed.). Highlands Park, NJ: PASE Inc.

DESCRIPTION: Handbook

ABSTRACT: The manual explains emergency public relations and shows its place in overall crisis management. It is intended to familiarize senior officials in government, business and industry, professionals in law enforcement and security, as well legal operational and technical experts with the public relations needs created by crises and disasters. Flexibility is required in all aspects of crisis management. But there is a correct process for pursuing the planning and implementation of emergency public relations activities.

Bryson, Jo. *Managing Information Services*. Hampshire (UK): Gower Publishing Ltd.

DESCRIPTION: Book (428 p.)

ABSTRACT: This book has been written as a management handbook for people working in information services in small- to medium-sized organizations both public and private.

Dispatches: Media Relations. 4(3), Mar 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Handbook

Dorn, A. Walter. *The Cloak and the Blue Beret: Secret Intelligence in UN Peacekeeping Operations* (draft). Cornwallis Park: Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Jun 10, 1998.

DESCRIPTION: Article

ABSTRACT: The United Nations continues to shy away from official use of the term intelligence, because of its association with illegal and covert activities. Nevertheless, intelligence, in the pure sense of “processed information (both secret and open) relating to international security,” is an essential part of UN peacekeeping, and is recognized as such by UN staff, both civilian and military.

The paper seeks to present a framework, based on the UN’s history and current experience, for determining the balance between secrecy and openness.

International Peace Academy. “Information and Public Relations.” In: *Peacekeepers Handbook* (3rd ed.). New York: Pergamon Press, 1984.

DESCRIPTION: Chapter in book (pp. 330–342)

ABSTRACT: Any peace initiative excites public interest. Information should be constantly forthcoming, chronicling the progress or the decline. The intelligence input provided produces reactions which can further add to the volume of discussion and debate, both critical and influential, to the success or failure of the peace initiative. Accurate and objective reporting is important.

The United Nations has a Department of Public Information (DPI), with a headquarters in New York and a permanent staff unit at the European headquarters in Geneva. In a UN operation, a Press Information Officer is seconded from the

Office of Public Information. He or she has a duty to the headquarters and the UN force/mission.

Lehmann, Ingrid A. "Public Perceptions of UN peacekeeping: A Factor in the resolution of international conflicts." *Fletcher Forum World Affairs*: 19(1), 1995, pp. 109–119.

DESCRIPTION: Article (journal)

ABSTRACT: This article examines some of the consequences of post-Cold War developments for the information task of the UN and how the organization has coped with the new challenges. It analyzes the successful UN peacekeeping operations in Namibia and Cambodia as experiences from which much can be learned to improve the information flow both in future areas of operations and to the international community, whose support of the peace operations is essential.

Salmon, Charles T. (ed.). *Information Campaigns: Balancing Social Values and Social Change*. Newbury Park: Sage Publications, 1989.

DESCRIPTION: Book (306 p.)

ABSTRACT: This book contains different interesting chapters. Robert Hornik, for example, deals with the knowledge-behavior gap. Patricia G. Devine and Edward R. Hirt identify two persuasion strategies: message-based and behavior-based.

Syndicate 3: Humanitarian and Information Aspects. Comprehensive Seminar on Lessons Learned from UNOSOM, Sept 13–15, 1995. Plainsboro.

DESCRIPTION: Report

ABSTRACT: Recommendation following information aspects, lessons learned:

Operational information: The UN authorities operating in a crisis area need to develop better mechanisms for sharing information.

PI: There immediately needs to be a staffed PI unit with radio facility, that regularly consults with UN agencies, in order to send coordinated messages.

UNICEF. Promoting External Relations. In: *Assisting in Emergencies: A Resource Handbook for UNICEF Field Staff*. New York/ Geneva: UNICEF.

DESCRIPTION: Handbook

ABSTRACT: The handbook gives guidelines for PI and working with donor representatives.

United Nations. *Seminar on Public Information Policies and Practices for Field Missions*. Harrison Conference Center, New York, Mar 5–6, 1997.

DESCRIPTION: Report (43 p.)

ABSTRACT: Public understanding of the UN role in the field contributes significantly to an operation's chances for success. A well-conceived, well-educated PI strategy helps establish and maintain a mission's credibility, enhances the security of its personnel and contributes to the overall effectiveness. The UN Secretariat has intensified efforts to improve the organization's PI capacity related to peacekeeping and other field missions.

“World-wide: The UN Offered.” *Wall Street Journal*: Jun 24, 1993, Sec. A, p. 1, col. 3.

DESCRIPTION: Article (newspaper)

ABSTRACT: The UN offered a reward for information leading to the capture of Somali clan leader Mohammed Farah Aideed, a day after he dared peacekeepers to try to arrest him.

¹OOTW: Operations Other Than War.

²American Society of Newspaper Editors.

³Printed version: No. 93, Winter 1993-1994, pp. 152-172.

⁴See also Komarow.

⁵Reissue of: *Propaganda and World Public Order*, 1968. With new introduction.

APPENDIX II:
LIST OF ATTENDEES AT
INFORMATION
CAMPAIGN WORKSHOP
JULY 13, 1998

Ms. Lisa Davidson, EVIDENCE BASED RESEARCH

Col. Michael Dzedzic, NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

LTC Mike Harwood, ARMY WAR COLLEGE/PKI

Mr. Sheldon Himelfarb, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, COMMON
GROUND PRODUCTIONS

Mr. John Langlois, COMMON GROUND PRODUCTIONS, LIBERIA

Mr. Martin Lidy, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS

Dr. Jamie Mezl, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Mr. Thad Penas, VOICE OF AMERICA

Mr. Bob Perito, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE/ICITAP

LTC Michael Stout, ASD/SOLIC

Mr. Gene Visco, CONSULTANT

Ambassador Walter E. Stadtler, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING
POLICY/GMU

Professor Kevin Avruch, POPP/GMU

Mr. James Narel, POPP/GMU

Ms. Pascale Combelles Siegel, POPP/GMU

Ms. Lucy Michiko Diby, POPP/GMU

Ms. Beth DeGrasse, POPP/GMU

Mr. Bill Coester, POPP/GMU

APPENDIX III:
LIST OF ATTENDEES AT
INFORMATION
CAMPAIGN WORKSHOP
OCTOBER 8, 1998

COL Joseph C. Bebel, JMIC

Mr. Walter S. Clarke, CONSULTANT

Mr. A. Martin Lidy, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES (IDA)

Mr. Patrick Curley, GRC INTERNATIONAL INC.

LTC Rick Kilroy, ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE (AFSC)

Maj Jim Tabak, ARMED FORCES STAFF COLLEGE (AFSC)

Mr. William J. Doll, JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS CENTER
(JWAC)

Mr. Ed Pechous, INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSES (IDA)

Mr. Gene Visco, CONSULTANT

Mr. Larry Wentz, ACS SERVICES

Ms. Jan Dailey, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. Klaus Niemeyer, NC3A NATO

MAJ John Shissler, J2P

Ms Heidi Davis, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL STRATEGIC STUDIES

Mr. Adam Siegel, CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

Mr. K. C. Ng, INFORMATION EXTRACTION TRANSPORT INC. (IET)

Mr. David A. Duff, INFORMATION EXTRACTION TRANSPORT INC. (IET)

Mr. Charles W. Orth, INFORMATION EXTRACTION TRANSPORT INC. (IET)

Professor Dennis J. Sandole, INSTITUTE FOR CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND RESOLUTION

Mr. Robert Harris, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

Mr. Alfred Farrugia, GEORGE MASON UNIVERSITY

Mr. David F. Davis, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY

Ambassador Walter E. Stadtler, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY

Mr. James Narel, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY

Professor Kevin A. Avruch, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY

Dr. Ivan King, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY

Ms. Beth C. DeGrasse, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY

Ms. Pascale Siegel, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY

Mr. William H. Coester, PROGRAM ON PEACEKEEPING POLICY