

13th ICCRTS: C2 for Complex Endeavors

“NATO – Flirting with a More Comprehensive Approach to Alliance Security”

Topics: 1, 10, 11

Mark N. Clemente

The Boeing Company

1215 S Clark St. Ste 302 MC 793C-G029
Arlington, VA 22202-4398

703-872-4106

mark.n.clemente@boeing.com

NATO – Flirting with a More Comprehensive Approach to Alliance Security

Abstract

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949 as a hedge against a feared Soviet expansion into Western Europe. That never happened. Now the alliance is expanding east and evolving its focus. With footprints in Iraq, Afghanistan, Darfur, Bosnia, and Kosovo ..., there's recognition in the alliance that the nature of collective security has changed. Preventative measures taken well "left of boom" require closer coordination from the disparate entities of NATO -- and go well beyond the military tool kit. From the Riga Summit, "... today's challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments ..."¹

Easy to say, hard to do.

This paper examines how NATO is experimenting with new ideas to address current challenges; as seen through the lens of a recently completed NATO sponsored lecture series on effects based approaches to operations. How can NATO evolve to effect closer cooperation between diplomatic, information, military, and economic functions that poorly interact within nations, much less between nations? The old structures and processes will no longer suffice.

Keywords: Effects-Based Operations, comprehensive approach, NATO, complexity, experimentation, joint, alliance, transformation.

Introduction

Developing a more effects based approach to operations (EBAO) has been of keen interest within NATO and several of its member nations. Ongoing operations in Afghanistan and Iraq underscore the urgent need for a broader, more comprehensive cross-domain approach centered on the human dimension of security operations ... and starkly highlight the limitations of traditional attrition-based approaches. In November 2007, the *NATO Research Technology Organization's (RTO) System Analysis and Studies Panel* sponsored a lecture series on EBAO to help demystify and clarify terms and concepts – both to the Alliance and to member nations who are in varying stages of exploration and implementation. In the course of preparing for and delivering the lecture series, we discovered that while EBAO may have once been viewed as a niche area of transformational exploration (and often linked to nodal targeting), it's basic tenets have become an urgent unfilled need –driven from actual NATO field commanders facing daunting and complex scenarios for which they found themselves ill prepared.

The NATO Military Committee defines EBAO as “... the coherent and comprehensive application of the various instruments of the Alliance, combined with the practical cooperation along with involved non-NATO actors, to create effects necessary to achieve planned objectives and ultimately the NATO end state.”² The rub comes when trying to define the interplay and boundaries between EBAO and what the Riga summit dubbed, the “comprehensive approach.” Of concern is how to generate capacity for “practical cooperation” between diverse entities where collaboration is critical ... when NATO is still internally deliberating on what they believe is “in their lane” to execute. To help advance the dialogue, the November 2007 Lecture Series explored:

- ☑ The theory of effects-based approaches to operations,
- ☑ commonalities and differences of national thinking and
- ☑ the pre-doctrinal ideas of NATO ACO/ACT.

- ☑ In addition, panels of local participants discussed implementation challenges -- and successes.

Three NATO hubs hosted the lecture series: the Defense College in Rome (operational focus); Headquarters in Brussels (policy focus), and Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk, VA (transformation focus). While there were some differences identified by member nations who are in varying stages of implementation, what was more startling was the general acceptance of the effects-based philosophy and need for action. There was broad agreement that the challenges facing the alliance were of a complex nature and that a broader cross-domain look would be required to properly address those challenges. Many started out with their own definitions and preconceived notions of what effects-based approaches meant to operations. But once a common baseline was set, and lexicon differences set aside ... most participants found themselves – sometimes reluctantly – in violent agreement.

This paper will provide an overview of the thoughts and ideas brought forth during the lecture series, and what some member nations and NATO’s operational arm are doing to readdress their capabilities to new and evolving threats. While there was general “admiration” of the challenges ahead, there is still much more work to be done to envision, experiment and eventually field the requisite processes, tools and organizational changes that will be needed to effectively address those challenges.

The Underlying Theory

There was broad agreement on the theoretical aspects of EBAO and Dr. Edward A. Smith, author of *Effects-Based Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare in Peace, Crisis, and War* (2003) and *Complexity, Networking, and Effects-Based Approaches to Operations* (2006) helped baseline lecture series participants on the basics of effects-based approaches through theory and case study, showing how EBAO has evolved from

what some might have characterized as fancified targeting to a process that better networks a “whole of” government /nation/alliance/enterprise solution to complex challenges.

Effects-Based Approaches to Operations

If one takes a broader view of security than strictly military, it appears more as a continuum (Figure 1) with traditional “major combat operations” only representing a small temporal moment in the full spectrum of engagement.




Figure 1

As we move further “left and right of boom” ... we find ourselves in situations that are:

- ☑ Increasingly human-centric
- ☑ Increasing in complexity
- ☑ Cross spectrum (stovepipe functions will need to interact/cooperate/coordinate, perhaps even harmonize)
- ☑ And increasingly “whole of government”

And this is where NATO and its member nations will increasingly find themselves engaged in the future. Because of the proliferation of information age technology; small, loosely coupled networks with limited means (but great will) can have a disproportionate effect against an industrial age opponent – who may have the best “IT” but is also burdened by both bureaucracy and the “curse” of prior success.³



Figure 2

Complexity.

When dealing temporally to the left and right of major combat, military forces will encounter and have to work with: other government agencies, Aid workers, Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), other International Organizations (UN, EU, World Bank, etc.) ... a vast array of interdependent entities, with varying agendas and different ideas about what is permissible, and what is obligatory. This makes discerning causality difficult (and non-linear) and prediction near impossible. These are complex adaptive human-centric systems that will not respond well to linearly engineered solutions by one or more of the entities. In fact, the engineered linear solutions are likely to be so specific that they do not apply outside of one narrow set of circumstances and therefore tend to prevent effective cooperation. That said this environment is neither chaotic nor random. Common challenges and shared values help bond disparate groups together. And like all living and social systems, these large, seemingly static entities still have to learn, grow, adapt and purposefully evolve to ensure their function continues to add value to the greater system.

Effects-based approaches implies coordinated sets of actions, directed at influencing the behavior of observers – friends, neutral, competitor or enemy – in peace, crisis and conflict. Challenges that necessitate a “whole of government” solution call for orchestrating capabilities that reside in functional stovepipes that usually retain their own metrics, cultures, languages – and not trivial – funding streams. But while stovepipes normally carry a negative connotation, these silos of excellence also foster and sustain complex knowledge of their domains. They help nurture culture and esprit de corps ... and should not be summarily dismissed. A better approach would be to create -- through increased agility -- the ability to tap into domain expertise as required, rather than try to

either replicate that domain knowledge organically or create a giant enterprise model that includes all requisite capabilities. And in an asymmetric battle, a country or coalition would have a much bigger quiver of capabilities (as compared to non-state actors or empowered individuals) to choose from and harness – the trick is getting them to the fight.

Since complex challenges are characterized by very large numbers of interdependent variables whose number, identity, and interrelationships continually change, they are ultimately about people. The range of these variables is so vast that no single stovepipe entity can handle more than a small fraction of the whole. Moreover, the challenges are not static but continually mutate so that there is no onetime “solution” or “one size fits all” answer. Thus, any whole of government action must deal not only with complex problems spanning multiple stovepipes but with requirements that continually change over time as we learn and adapt our collective response to those changes.

Therefore an operational level commander will need a common language across domains, a common process, and appropriate tools to bridge disparate entities and address operational level challenges and effects.⁴

The larger the variety of actions available to a control system, the larger the variety of perturbations it is able to compensate.

Ashby's Law

5

The Edge of Chaos and Consensus

Plotting pace/tempo on one axis and scale/scope of an operation on another – we can graphically display a “comfort zone” of capability for a particular system (Figure 3). If either pace or scale are exceeded, that system could go into chaos and be unable to function effectively. If through better equipment, organization and training one side can operate at a higher level of complexity; this would also be a decided advantage.




Figure 3

But if we consider this effect on a coalition like NATO, the limiting factor may be more consensus than chaos, with the coalition able to move only as far and fast as its slowest member (Figure 4.)




Figure 4

By relying on the least common denominator, much capacity and capability will go unused. Next we will look at how this theory is being instantiated at the National and Alliance levels.

What's going on at the National Level

NATO, through the SAS Panel lecture series, sent out a questionnaire to all member nations to ascertain what was (or wasn't) in development at the national level with regards to effects-based or comprehensive approach. Was the approach only for the military or were they also addressing the whole of government issues? What were the underlying approaches? Which ministries / agencies were contributing? On EBAO, was it more a philosophy or process? What was the scope and how was it being applied in the field? We received 11 responses, including replies from most of the larger NATO militaries; including Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States.

In addition, the lecture team conducted a preliminary literature search and discovered that 7 of the 11 responders had either written or had emerging effects-based doctrine either already published or under study. 9 of 11 had written articles/papers in official / government journals and 10 of 11 had written private papers. Also, other nations that didn't officially respond to the questionnaire, had written peer reviewed papers.

More Similarities than Differences

Even though we uncovered a lexicon tower of Babel ... (both difference concepts for the same words and similar concepts in different words!), there were many more conceptual similarities than differences. A common driver was recognition that the current operational environment was complex, and that our problems could not be solved by the military alone. A whole of government/ nation, cross-spectrum response would be required to handle most complex future scenarios. It was also generally agreed that with so many interdependent variables, causes and outcomes would often be unpredictable – leading for a general call for a better means to manage this complexity ... a more comprehensive approach.

Effects-based was considered more a way of thinking or philosophy than a specific process. It does not lose sight of the human in the loop – in fact, humans were seen as the best and sometimes only means to deal with the complexity. EBAO was also generally viewed as the military contribution to a comprehensive approach.

The major differences identified were approaches and terminology. While official NATO has floated pre-doctrinal documents on EBAO, several nations are independently addressing their own unique challenges to their systems and situations. There is a wide variation in implementation strategies with some nations experimenting with doctrinal changes while others wait to see what official NATO decides. Some actively participate

in the Joint Forces Command sponsored Multinational Experiment Series⁶ where participants explore different aspects of effects-based and comprehensive approaches. We also noted some differences with respect to scope, level of application, and requirements for adaptability, networking and expertise. The biggest difference identified was lexicon; both across ministries, agencies within a government, as well as across NATO member nations. One man's comprehensive approach (UK) is another's Unified Action (U.S.) or Networked Security (Germany), but the thought processes are strikingly similar.

UK and French National Perspective

The United Kingdom's Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre (DCDC) is at the forefront of developing a UK National Perspective and they are further along than most in developing national effects-based doctrine. The UK has published two (pre-doctrinal) pamphlets, referred to as Joint Doctrine Notes (JDNs), as a means of establishing and disseminating current best practice while acknowledging that they do not represent an agreed or fully staffed position. They also establish the basis for further development and experimentation and provide guidance for operations and exercises.

- ☑ *The Comprehensive Approach – Joint Discussion Note (JDN) 4-05*
- ☑ *Incorporating and Extending the UK Military Effects-Based Approach (EBA) – Joint Doctrine Note 7/06*

The UK took note of various skeptical comments regarding EBAO and, as a result, was keen to emphasize that the UK's Military EBA was very much evolutionary, drawn from the "British Way of Warfare" and entirely complementary with the key themes that run through extant UK military doctrine – manoeuvrist approach, mission command, etc. It required some adaptation of the tried and tested methods of Operational Art, reinforcing the ability of commanders to use their intuition and experience.

The UK view is that the Military instrument should act in harmony with the other national instruments of power, namely Diplomatic and Economic; this yields a more effective cross-government response and is no more than what has been formerly expressed in doctrine. However their view extends to developing a conceptual model of the key constituents of a nation or society and, in so doing, recognizes that each nation or state will be subtly different and will have developed differing strengths, priorities and interdependencies based on their respective core values supplanted by their history and evolved culture. The origins of a crisis often lie in failures to govern adequately one or more of these constituents in a manner perceived to appropriately benefit their population.




Figure 5

The UK, through their concept of EBA, deduce that other actors within the operating environment may require coordination, or at the very least dialogue, thereby leading to a comprehensive response to the problem situation. The aim is to stimulate a co-operative culture from in-theatre actors; in its simplest form this might amount to no more than shared understanding and agreed outcomes. As the concept takes hold though, the UK sees relationships expanding into improved processes and structures that themselves will better underpin their working definition of a Comprehensive Approach: *‘Commonly understood principles and collaborative processes that enhance the likelihood of favorable and enduring outcomes within a particular situation’*.⁷

The UK view of EBA seeks to address one other core issue beyond the requirement to coordinate with other actors through a Comprehensive Approach as indicated above. It highlights the need to take a long term view of the crisis presented. Under current doctrine, while long term issues may be addressed at the strategic level, those responsible for campaigning at the operational level may adopt a more restricted outlook, focused on more immediate objectives and specific tactical imperatives. The UK’s EBA raises the campaign plan to a status that ensures it dominates the operational level, taking up far greater space of this vital middle ground between the strategic and tactical levels of war. In so doing it reinforces the need for operational level headquarters to coordinate with the other instruments of power, the other state constituents and identified actors. The approach is by necessity nested with non-military instruments, actors and in-theatre partners and, unavoidably, makes a more holistic attempt to address what needs to be done to resolve challenges. It is left to the subsequent OPLAN and OPORD to extract those supporting effects articulated in the campaign plan which are immediately relevant to the unfolding situation and present them in a manner that ensures prioritization and synchronization of activity, (Figure 6)




Figure 6

The Centre Interarmées des Concepts des Doctrines at d'Experimentation (CICDE) is helping develop the French perspective. While not yet as far along as the UK's, philosophically there is little difference in the two approaches. France is equally concerned with how to better use the various instruments of national power in a more comprehensive way to address a broader, cross domain approach to conflict resolution. Both see EBAO as the military contribution to a more comprehensive approach. (Figure 7)




Figure 7

What's going on in official NATO

EBAO has been in development at Allied Command Operations (ACO) and Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in some form or another since 1999 through multiple experiments and white papers.⁸ And while official guidance was issued at the December 2006 Riga summit to come up with a pragmatic proposal on how NATO could contribute to a comprehensive approach – there is an even stronger demand coming from the field –

notably in Afghanistan (ISAF) and with the Joint Force Commanders -- who are experimenting on their own with a lack of official guidance. ATO/ACT's Bi-Strategic Command EBAO working group drafted an EBAO Handbook and delivered it to the nations in December 2007⁹ for review and a revised edition will soon to go the Military Committee for approval.¹⁰ This will help provide doctrinal overhead for more dedicated experimentation.

NATO recognizes the need for a comprehensive approach, yet struggles with what is and is not "in their lane" to execute. (Figure 8) NATO still sees itself in a specialist roll as the military instrument of allied power, even though their forces are deployed in roles that span the security spectrum from peace through war and reconstruction.




Figure 8

Philosophically, there is little difference between the theory, the national views and NATO pre-doctrinal literature. All recognize or "admire" the same challenges. The debate is more over implementation – and how to overcome Industrial Age organizations and practices. Many of these changes are cultural, and the good news is that most change is occurring bottom-up – from those forced to figure out 21st century warfare while steeped in the heat of 21st century battles. ACO identifies four essential functions to support EBAO: knowledge development, planning, execution and assessment – and there is still much work to be done on all functions.

Additionally, in response to current operational realities, NATO has sanctioned 3 initiatives that each attempt in subtly different ways to respond to complexity and the need address the interagency, comprehensive approach challenge:

- ☑ **EBAO** – as discussed, led by bi-Strategic Command Working Group (bi-SC WG),
- ☑ **Comprehensive Approach** - being explored by the International Military Staff (IMS) with the North Atlantic Council in response to the statements made at the Riga Summit, and

☑ **Future Comprehensive Civil Military Interaction Concept (FCCMIC).**¹¹

There is no clear delineation between the initiatives; and when combined with the differing national perspectives on EBAO implementation, it is difficult to envisage how NATO will gain consensus or bring any of the initiatives to fruition. Moreover, although the bi-SC WG has sought national comments on a discussion paper, much of its work will be developed and implemented without recourse to national experts. Consequently, the first time consensus will be sought may be when emerging bi-SC operational guidelines are incorporated into doctrine. Furthermore, there is an apparent reluctance on the part of some working EBAO and CA issues to seek clarification or direction from either the Military Committee or North Atlantic Council on boundaries or direction for fear of getting mired in political wrangling. Still, there is a need to better address the relationships between EBAO, CA and FCMCC.

Local Commanders Respond

Finally, each day of the lecture series concluded with a panel discussion of local commands and participants chaired by Dr. Johannes DeNijs, from Allied Command Transformation (ACT).

- ☑ At the NATO Defence College, the panel focused on their commands' efforts to implement or inculcate EBAO and CA. It consisted of: Brig Gen Doctor Klaus Wittman, German Army, Director of Academic Planning and Policy, NDC; Col Steve Sifers, US Air Force, Joint Force Command, Naples; and Lt Col David Jenson, US Air Force, Joint Forces Command, Brunssum.
- ☑ At NATO Headquarters, the panel provided a policy perspective on EBAO and CA. It consisted of: Ms Erini Lemos-Maniati, Political Affairs and Security Policy Division, NATO International Staff; Mr. Diego Ruiz-Palmer, Head, Planning Section, Operations Division, NATO International Staff; and Col Christos Manolas, Greek Army, SHAPE J-9.
- ☑ At Allied Command Transformation (ACT), the panel offered personal perspectives on current EBAO and CA initiatives in their areas. It consisted of: Col Mike Postma, US Army – recently returned from Afghanistan, US Joint Force Command J-9; CAPT Patrick Chevallereau, French Navy, ACT; and Col Rainer Waelde, German Army, Bundeswehr Center for Transformation.

Next we will cover a couple of germane cross-cutting themes highlighted in discussions.

Governance

While it was well recognized that many disparate entities would need to come together on the modern complex battlefield ... it was also evident that the military domain was often the only system with the resources and capacity to address the challenges. That made the military instrument of power the “800 pound gorilla” in every situation it entered. That said, our UK representative keenly observed that this should be “... the military working

with others, not others working with the military.”¹²

EBAO/CA hint at “grand strategy” and many in attendance at the lecture series were justifiably concerned with how NATO would execute grand strategy without getting into areas considered outside its comfort zone (military with some limited political). Several participants voiced political sensitivities to NATO even using terms like “instruments of national power.” But what NATO may lack in the ability to control sovereign governments, they might make up for with influence. Perhaps influence mechanisms vice control systems are what should be explored further. It was suggested by some that the European Union might be a better venue to handle aspects of a CA that appear outside NATO’s traditional lane – for instance economic diplomacy. There is some concern that CA could lead to a supranational governance model which could prove most problematic. CA might more resemble a trading floor of effects rather than a supranational marionette.

Some view the CA as a way to better improve the civil-military interface, not to coordinate international efforts ... NATO preparing the battlespace for other international organizations to continue work. Others see the attempt to operationalize EBAO in NATO as problematic with so many different national approaches. Execution will need to be evolutionary, pragmatic and centered around solving real world problems (i.e. ISAF). EBAO may be easier to execute on the ground than to codify in doctrine. The need is agreed upon; execution is still a ways off.

Analysis, Experimentation and Implementation.

Focusing on endstate and causality chain is not new. The challenge remains in how strictly one can build / trace the causality chain. Some voiced concern with EBAO becoming overly simplistic (clinical targeting approach) – since in complex, human-centric challenges, not everything is measurable. JFC Naples has been experimenting with effects-based thinking at least since ADM Michael Mullen was Commander, Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR). Their approach is top down driven and permeates the entire commands thinking – even to command VIP visits and NAVEUR’s military exercises program. They take an UNODIR (unless otherwise directed) approach and believe that most resistance to change will end when the old guys retire. The younger officers – all tempered by combat in Iraq and Afghanistan – have fewer problems with holistic effects-based approaches. NAVEUR has also created several permanent cross-functional working groups that span various functions (J-codes).

JFC Brunssum is in effect experimenting “bottom up” with actual operations in Afghanistan but are not officially “implementing” EBAO until they get doctrine from NATO HQ. NATO leadership in Afghanistan was impressed by the experimental results when exercising the SEAS (Synthetic Environment for Analysis and Simulation) model in International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 10. SEAS forecasts friendly, neutral and enemy reactions and is fed through a large reach back mechanism with frequent data updates on the demographics of different layers of a nation’s population. While SEAS is still a maturing tool, some in NATO are expressing concerned over its eventual cost,

since all live in a cash strapped environment. But as a JFCOM representative said, “50% is better than ZERO %!”¹³ ... when commanders are trying to best address ardent pleas coming from the field.

The ultimate challenge is how can we better integrate agile and adaptive systems of systems – especially well left and right of major combat operations – and with the human in the loop?

Conclusions

NATO faces many new challenges as it adapts to life after the iron curtain. The good news is that with regards to EBAO and CA, there are many more commonalities than differences. When lexicon was demystified, we found general consensus that governments need to take a more holistic “comprehensive approach” to expanding complex challenges in the global security environment. While nations are at varying levels in their implementation, there is pre-doctrinal work that needs to be rigorously exercised, updated and approved so NATO can move forward. Many disparate systems and organizations will need to harmonize capabilities -- well beyond traditional military skill sets — to reach long term NATO end state objectives. And while there is a natural reluctance not to stray too far from familiar lanes of responsibility, an effective effects based approach is less about re-defining military skill sets and operational planning and more about identifying the need to work with, and how to better tap into, the vast variety of capabilities residing in a nation or alliance.

If necessity is the mother of invention, then NATO has an excellent opportunity to adapt a 20th century alliance to 21st century challenges. The test is now, on the fields of Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo and Darfur. This will certainly require new processes, tools and procedures – but mostly new thinking -- along with adaptive and agile organizations and people who can quickly respond to changing requirements in a shrinking global environment.

¹ “Riga Summit Declaration,” Nato.int, 29 November 2006 < <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2006/p06-150e.htm>> (12 December 2007)

² “MC Position on an Effects Based Approach to Operations,” North Atlantic Military Committee, MCM-0052-2006, 6 June 2006.

³ Failure causes introspection and adaptation ... sometimes too much success can blind one to the need for change.

⁴ Edward A. Smith. & Mark N. Clemente, “So it’s connected...now what? C2, Effects-Based Operations, and Whole of Government Action,” Presentation at 12th ICCRTS Newport, Rhode Island, 21 June 2007

⁵ William R. Ashby, “The Law of Requisite Variety,” < <http://pespmc1.vub.ac.be/REQVAR.html>> (14 March 2008)

⁶ Multinational Experiment (MNE) Series are sponsored by US JFCOM, however, NATO (ACT) is leading the EBAO focus area -- one of several focus areas within this Series – and the theme for MNE 5 is the Comprehensive Approach.

⁷ “The Comprehensive Approach,” UK Joint Discussion Note 4/05, pg. 1-5

⁸ Development of EBAO within NATO has included numerous publications and other efforts including: “The Alliance’s Strategic Concept,” Apr 99, “Comprehensive Political Guidance,” Feb 06, “Concept for alliance Future Joint Operations (CAFJO),” 20 Feb 06, “SACEUR Letter, ACO Way Ahead – EBAO,” 17 May 06, “MC Position on an Effects Based Approach to Operations,” North Atlantic Military Committee,

MCM-0052-2006, 6 June 2006, “Bi-Strategic Command Pre-Doctrinal Handbook (Effects Based Approaches to Operations),” 4 Dec 07.

⁹ NATO’s Bi-Strategic Command Pre-Doctrinal Handbook (Effects-Based Approach to Operations), 4 Dec 2007

¹⁰ There is still hope for a declaration on Comprehensive Approach at the Apr ‘08 Bucharest Summit, but there is no guarantee that it will surface with all the other hot issue: ISAF participation, new member status, etc. Parts of the EBAO Handbook were validated in Feb 08 in Stavanger, Norway, and there will be an update to the EBAO Handbook in Fall ’08 that will reflect ongoing work in Operations Planning, Assessment and Knowledge Development (KD). The EBAO Handbook will summarize these and serve as the platform upon which an interim doctrine will be based, until NATO Allied Joint Ops Doctrine Board completes the revision of AJP 1, 2, 3 and 5 within the next 2 years.

¹¹ From a NATO perspective, Future Comprehensive Civil Military Interaction Concept (FCCMIC) is a new concept that was presented to the Military Committee last July. It was criticized and has since been sent back for re-work/re-wording. CIMIC (civil-military cooperation) is a military function (J-9) that already has established procedures and doctrine for dealing with non-mil agencies and issues in the field. FCCMIC seeks to address the needs for coordination, liaison, and interaction etc at the strategic level during the early phases of a crisis (i.e. planning), during execution as well as draw down of forces.

¹² Col Chris Henwood, UKAF at EBAO Lecture Series, Norfolk VA, 19 Nov 2007.

¹³ Col Mike Postma, USA at EBAO Lecture Series, Norfolk VA, 19 Nov 2007.