

Command and Control During the First 72 Hours of a Joint Military-Civilian Disaster Response

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Background Hurricane Katrina

- First test of large scale military-civilian response collaboration
- Advance warning
- New Orleans rapidly disintegrated
 - Almost total loss of civil authority
- The first 72 hours were pivotal

Katrina Time Line

August 29, 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Katrina makes landfall (8AM CDT)• 20,000+ in Superdome• 551 National Guardsmen in Superdome• New Orleans flooded (levee breach)• Communications infrastructure lost• New Orleans Airport closed• Most roads to/from New Orleans are under water• Mayor predicts "significant" loss of Life• Looting begins
August 30, 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Mayor projects death toll at thousands• Communications infrastructure still lost• FEMA and Louisiana Governor argue about who should provide busses¹• Looting spreads throughout the city
August 31, 2005	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• New Orleans police ordered to abandon Search & Rescue• Evacuation plan countermanded by DOD: 24 hour delay while DOD assumes control²• Communication infrastructure still unavailable• New Orleans is almost in anarchy with total loss of control by the civil authorities• Persistent media coverage fuels national anger over evacuation delays.

First 72 Hours

- Generally accepted as the most crucial period
 - The larger the event the more likely that citizens or communities are on their own
 - Even with advance warning options are limited
 - Can't stage on storm's path
- Response continuum
 - Local responders
 - CERT/NERT
 - Red Cross
 - National Guard
 - Federal government

Models of Disaster Management

- Community Model
- Command and Control Model

Joint Disaster Response U.S.

- HSPD-5
 - NRP
 - NIMS
 - Military support to civil authorities
- The Guard
 - Under governor's command
 - Under president's command

Multiple C2s Must Blend

- Military C2
 - Support Instrument
- Civilian C2
 - Functional Instrument
- Incident Command
 - Organizational and Tasking Instrument

Gaps




- External Influences
 - Media
 - Politics
- People
 - Local responders
 - Mayor-Generals
- Operational Factors
 - Difference C2 paradigms
 - Response vs. Assistance
- Interoperability
 - Purely technical issues


Proposed Model Principles

- Security
- Communications
- Local responders probably are also victims
- Psychological dimension


Current Command Structure



Proposed Command Structure



Mission Areas



- Tactical Control
 - Focused on the short-term
 - Teams can be attached in whole
 - Use their existing and familiar C2
 - Rely on their own logistics chain
 - Report through the Unified Commander
 - Fire companies
 - Guard units
 - Red Cross
 - Each team can operate within its own familiar op-tempo
 - Multiple teams can be dispatched for the same mission

NIMS Implications (First 72 Hours Only)

- Security
 - Local police
 - Contract local private security
 - The Guard (under Governor's command)
- Communications
 - The Guard
- Force Maintenance
- Psychological and political support
- Technical
- Legal
- Cultural

Conclusion

A central control, distributed execution model, as proposed here, could significantly improve collaborative military-civilian response to large disasters by acknowledging the importance of the first 72 hours and extending the NRP/NIMS model to accommodate the unique circumstances of this critical time period.

THANK YOU



Contact Info

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