

Security Metrics

Mark Torgerson
Sandia National Laboratories
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
What is wanted in a Security Metric?

- Deterministic function of a system
 - $M(A)$ tells you how secure the system A is
 - $M(A) < M(B)$ means something

Function where you input a component of a system
A number is generated
That number tells you how secure the system is


Industry can't seem to define a metric with these properties

We will show that certain security metrics do not exist



Terms

- **Communication System:** A real collection of hardware, software, and human components brought together to facilitate communications of some kind
- **Adversary:** An entity that desires to gain some nefarious goal against the system
- **Security subsystem:** The system components used, either directly or indirectly, to prevent an adversary from achieving his goals
- **Weakness:** Something attribute of the system that an adversary may use to achieve his nefarious goals
- **Trust:** Confidence that one may have in their system in preventing an adversary from achieving his nefarious goals




Adversary

- Two adversarial attributes
 - **Knowledge**
 - Intellectual Resources
 - **Physical Resources**
 - Money
 - Computational power
 - Employees
 - Etc.

All adversaries discussed here
have a physical resource bound B

All systems are insecure against a completely unbounded adversary




Weaknesses

- **Rule of thumb:** No system is 100% secure

Weakness Axiom 1: Every real communication system has a non empty set of weaknesses

- **S** is the system
- **W** is the set of ALL system weaknesses
- **P** the protections placed on S






Weaknesses

- MW(P) weaknesses mitigated by P
- UMW(P) weaknesses unmitigated by P


- MW and UMW

- Are functions of P
- Partition W
- System constants
- Independent of who is viewing the system




Known Weaknesses

- V is a viewer of the system
- $WK(V)$ is the set of weaknesses known to V
- $WUK(V)$ is the set of weaknesses unknown to V




Exploitable Weaknesses

- The weaknesses exploitable by V
 - $E(P, V) = \text{UMW}(P) \cap \text{WK}(V) \rightarrow E_v$



Definition of Security?....


If E_v is empty, then S is secure against V



More Axioms

Weakness Axiom 2: For viewer, V , of the system
we have that $WK(V)$ is a strict subset of W

Weakness Axiom 3: The system owner cannot know
 $WK(V)$ for all adversarial viewers of the system




Security Metrics

- Real valued function of the communication system
 - Owner computable
 - Non trivial
 - Meaningful


Metric Axiom 1: Sets comprised of unknown weaknesses are not measurable

Weakness Based Metrics

- **Theorem 1:** There are no security metrics that include $WUK(V)$ in a non-trivial way
- $E = \cup_v E_v$ E embodies all weaknesses that the system owner should be concerned about




- **Theorem 2:** E is not measurable and thus no non-trivial security metric exists using that quantity



The main point of the story


- Weakness-based metrics are the metrics of choice
 - Weaknesses or lack thereof embody the security of the system
 - One cannot know all of the unmitigated weaknesses
 - No nontrivial security metric of unknown weaknesses exists

No metric exists that can tell you how secure your system is in an absolute sense



The main point of the story Does Not Say...


- The main point does not say that you cannot secure your system
 - One may create a system so that E is empty and is thus secure against all real adversaries
 - You will just never know when you have done that
- The main point does not say that all security related metrics are trivial
 - Value can be had from measuring known aspects of the system



Further Research

- What aspects of the system can we use to estimate the security of the system?
- What constitutes a good estimate of the system security?
- What methodologies and processes give reasonable estimates on security?

Maybe we should use the term “security estimators”
Rather than “security metrics”



QUESTIONS?