



*Power to the Edge* 



# DoD-wide Command and Control: Is it Adequate and the Policy Challenge

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# Lessons Learned



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- **The flow of intelligence from the field to the national leadership needed substantial improvement.**
- **Civilian leadership was not able to exercise effective control over the forces in the field.**
- **There was a need to overcome deeply ingrained resistance to centralized direction and oversight of regional operations.**
- **Communications systems became overloaded during the crisis and there were serious deficiencies in communications security.**
- **Civilian communications to foreign heads of state and the linkage between the military and civilian agencies of government was inadequate.**
- **And, in essence, there was a lack of robust command and control.**



# What We Need to Do Differently



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**The DoD needs an overarching C2 policy that will enable the department to:**

- **Think differently about how to implement C2.**
- **Recognize that C2 is more than joint.**
- **An enterprise approach to C2 within the DoD net-centric architecture.**



# Thinking Differently About C2



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## **Pace, scope and outcome:**

- **C2 must handle a significantly increased pace of operations**
- **C2 must address an expanding range of actors, enemies, technologies, capabilities and actions**
- **C2 needs to focus on outcomes.... Not tasks, missions or programs**



# C2... More than Joint in today's more complex security environment.



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**The 2002 & 2004 UCPs codified  
fundamental changes in Combatant  
Commander responsibilities**

## ASSIGNED MISSIONS

**STRATCOM – Nuclear Strike /  
C4ISR / Space**


**STRATCOM with Regional  
Combatant Commands – Missile  
Defense / IO / Global Strike**

**JFCOM with Regional Combatant  
Commands – Tactical / Strike**


**NORTHCOM – Homeland Defense**

**SOCOM – SOF**


## Single Mission – Multiple Commands



## Multiple Missions – Multiple Commands



**The NPR brought a new strategic posture...**





# C2 Needs to be Viewed as an Enterprise



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- **Current weaknesses:**
  - C2 architectures and systems = pt – pt communications architectures
  - How to unlock C2 functionality in existing systems to the network for other users to access
  - Governance that transcends organizational ricebowls
  - Seeking 100% solutions
  - Shifting acquisition focus from programs to portfolios of capabilities and services
- **An approach... an C2 applications framework**
  - Leverage large investment in legacy C2 applications and data
  - Decompose C2 JFCs, JICs and “to be” architectures into core information integration and decision support processes and exchanges
  - Identify what legacy C2 capabilities exist, what information is produced and consumed
  - Identify missing priority capabilities and, where possible, leverage legacy applications to provide missing capabilities



# WWMCCS... the Current Policy for DoD-wide C2



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- Last updated in 1972
- WWMCCS the system replaced by GCCS in the 1990s
  - GCCS focused on Joint Command and Control
- Is new C2 policy really needed?
  - Drive capabilities responsive to warfighters and national leaders
  - Recognize the new environment, assign roles and responsibilities, and overcome organizational boundaries in management and funding
  - Recognize that C2 is more important, scope has increased and has to be enterprise in nature.