

"But war is a ruthless taskmaster, demanding success regardless of confusion, shortness of time, and paucity of tools. Exact justice for the individual and a careful consideration of his rights is quite impossible. One man sacrifices his life on the battlefield and another sacrifices his reputation elsewhere, both in the same cause. The hurly-burly of the conflict does not permit commanders to draw fine distinctions; to succeed, they must demand results, close their ears to excuses, and drive subordinates beyond what would ordinarily be considered the limit of human capacity."

--- George C. Marshall

A Historic Failure in the Social Domain

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Sensemaking addresses those activities carried out at both the individual and collaborative level to -

- **Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework**

- **Version 1.0, p33**


- (1) make sense” of the information available within the network in the context of experience/expertise
- (2) to draw from this information specific implications regarding potential threats and opportunities that require responsive action
- (3) to organize these inferences into actionable knowledge that can frame key decisions.

- **Network Centric Operations Conceptual Framework**

- **Version 2.0 p25**

- **become aware of their situation, understand what is happening, make decisions, and take effective action**

Enigma & Lorenz Coding Machines



Ultra Access

<u>Position</u>	<u>12th AG</u>	<u>First Army</u>	<u>Third Army</u>
Commanding General (CG)	General Bradley	General Hodges	General Patton
Chief of Staff (CofS)	MG. Allen	Yes	MG. Gay
Deputy CofS	*		Col. Harkins
ACofS Personnel (G-1)	BG O'Hara		
ACofS Intelligence (G-2)	BG Sibert	Col. Dickson	Col. Koch
G-2 Executive Officer	*		Col. Forde
Asst. G-2	*		Col. Allen
the G-2 Air	*		
a member of the G-2 Special Plans	*		
ACofS Operations (G-3)	BG Kibler		BG Maddox
Deputy G-3	*		
the G-3 Air	*		
Chief of OB Branch	*		
Chief of Terrain and Defense Branch	*		
ACofS Logistics (G-4)	BG Moses		
Chief of Supply & Transportation Branch	*		
The Chief Intelligence Branch	Col. Standish		
Signals Officer	*		Major Flint
The CG 9th Air Force	LTG Vandenberg	?	General Wyand. CDR XIX Tac Air
The 9th Air Force G-3	BG Lee	?	Maj. Grove, Liaison XIX Tac Air
Ultra Liaison	LTC's Murnane and Orr	LTC Rosengarten MAJ Rosenthal	LTC Helfers CPT Church

Bradley Says

“Seldom in history has an opposing army known so much about it’s opponent”

- "intelligence community had come to rely far too heavily on Ultra to the exclusion of other intelligence sources. Ultra had become virtually infallible..."
- “...The German Army had less need of radio communications and more often used secure ... land lines.”
- it ... did not occur to our intelligence community that the Germans could plan and launch an operation with complete radio and telephone silence imposed”
- over reliance on Ultra was held in check by the nature of the raw Ultra decodes
- over 11,000 Ultra’s were sent out by radio to the field commands between October 1, 1944 and January 31, 1945
- 17 Nov 12th AG Periodic Report the enemy has demonstrated that he can mass a large force - two divisions with up to fifty tanks - in an assembly area close to our lines without any of our sources becoming aware of it.

Contradict a defensive intent

- Baron's personal analysis, sent out as SRS 1496 decode 24 November, "In the long run, Germany's leaders confronted with the fact that the battle lines have contracted virtually to the prewar boundaries... will have no choice but to open a road of blood one direction or the other. The chance may come after the enemy's overhasty offensive has been repulsed"
- 6th Panzer Army created and under Hitler's direct control
 - Moved to west bank of the Rhine in November
 - Radio listening silence 10 December
- Jaegeraugmarsch of the Luftwaffe
- Arado 234 jet bomber/recon units assigned Meuse River bridges 8 December

Social

- Marshall's opinion: didn't think that the Commanders were all that interested in German actions in October and November
- Bradley becomes Montgomery's adversary
 - September 22 conference to decide a strategy for the conquest of the German Reich.
 - Montgomery leverages the orders for and results of the 16 Nov offensive: 7 Dec Maastricht Conference – high stakes for Bradley
 - Objections: took offense at being treated as poor country cousin, at Sep 22 snubbing and risk to his own life, at his career put at risk, the Falaise Gap decision
- **LTG Gavin observed**
 - Never were the problems of coalition warfare more in evidence, National interests, national pride, and public opinion seemed to prevail in Allied councils. This, despite the dedication to objectivity and to common victory by the Allied generals, and Eisenhower in particular
 - Montgomery proposed establishing a ground forces commander.
 - The American public, government, and military establishment “would not allow the placement of Montgomery in that position.”.
 - Nor would the British have accepted Bradley in such a position over Montgomery.
 - Eisenhower retained the ground forces command for himself and avoided choosing a single main effort

Summary

- Interactions between Montgomery and Bradley were adversarial
- Winning the struggle became an objective of 12th AG
- Distorted sensemaking within the 12 AG
 - Enemy capable of large scale attacks without any warnings
 - Warned Nov 16 enemy in a position to launch an offensive if 6th Panzer Army not used in a successful defense
 - Misjudged implications of enemy suffering great losses in manpower, formations, and key terrain while withholding 6th Panzer Army and large assembly of air power: risks were not the actions of a “conservative and by the book” commander
 - Enemy buildup in the Ardennes
 - Japanese Ambassador Baron Oshima reports Hitler in charge and expects attack in the west when the current Allied attack ends
- Did not take responsive action to the potential threat: Let them come!
 - Ensure the chain of command to the lowest level reporting all observations of the enemy

Conclusion

General Bradley arrived at the wrong implications regarding potential threats not because he was poorly served by Ultra but because he was fixed on his contest with Field Marshall Montgomery for control of the ground forces and the concept for the assault into Germany.